Does an effect of marriage duration on pre-transition fertility signal parity-dependent control? An empirical test in nineteenth-century Leuven,Belgium

It has been demonstrated for many pre-industrial populations that the age at marriage, or marriage duration, influences age-specific marital fertility but the reason for this remains unclear. Among the several mechanisms that may be responsible, the following are often cited: secondary sterility or increased subfecundity associated with parity; declining coital frequency; the age difference between the spouses; and, importantly, parity-dependent fertility control. If the latter mechanism were partly responsible for the marriage-duration effect in pre-transition populations, it would contradict the concept of the modern fertility transition as the evolution (or revolution) from parity-independent to parity-dependent fertility. The study presented in this paper investigates the relative importance of these alternative explanations. The application of multivariate Poisson regression to the fertility data from two birth cohorts in the Belgian city of Leuven shows that a linearly declining or even concave age-specific fertility pattern, disaggregated by age at marriage, does not imply parity-dependent fertility limitation.     

Antecedents to contraceptive innovation: Evidence from rural Northern Thailand

A number of different causal mechanisms have been proposed to explain the onset of fertility declines in populations with previously uncontrolled fertility, but they have never been adequately tested. The present study identifies and tests five antecedents to family limitation practices in a sample of 755 currently married couples resident in rural Northern Thailand. The loglinear multiple regression models estimated indicate that couples in more developed districts, more modern couples, couples in which wives have more equal roles, couples believing that intergenerational wealth transfers favor children rather than their parents, and more wealthy couples, were all significantly more likely to be early adopters of contraception. Local development levels appeared to have the greatest net effects on the timing of adoption of fertility control. In addition, couples in areas where contraceptive services were more readily available were also significantly more likely to be contraceptive innovators, net of these five variables.     

Race,Remarital Status,and Infertility in 1910: More Evidence of Multiple Causes

The dominant approach to studying historical race-related fertility differences has been to limit samples to first-married and younger women. We argue that studying historical race-related fertility differences in the context of remarriage is also important: remarriage and fertility patterns are both rooted in the biosocial conditions that produce racial disparities in health. We employ a multiple causes framework that attributes variation in fertility patterns to voluntary limitation and involuntary factors (infecundity/subfecundity). We use data from the 1910 Integrated Public Use Microdata Series and estimate zero-inflated negative binomial models that simultaneously distinguish those who are infecund (vs. fecund) and estimate the number of remarital births among the fecund. Our approach allows us to evaluate historical remarital (in)fertility differences, accounting for marital, socioeconomic, and geographic influences on fecundity and fertility, while empirically accounting for the influence of children “missing” from the household due to mortality and fostering/aging out. Consistent with past studies that emphasized poorer African American health as a major influence on involuntary infertility, we find that African American women were more likely than white women to be in the always-zero (infecund) group and to have fewer remarital births. Supplemental analyses nuance these findings but indicate that these results are robust. Overall, we find support for a multiple-causes perspective: while the findings are consistent with the adoption of deliberate fertility control among urban and higher-status women at higher parities, remarital fertility differences in 1910 also reflected greater infecundity/subfecundity among subgroups of women, especially African American women.     

The Effect of Parental Education on Marital Fertility in Developing Countries

The effects of parents' education on marital fertility are analysed with data from 38 Surveys in the WFS programme, and a two-parameter model in which the age-dependent level of fertility and a duration-dependent slope of fertility are estimated. The level parameter reflects post-partum infecundity and, in some populations, contraceptive spacing of births. The slope parameter reflects parity-specific birth control. The effects of the husband's and of the wife's education are estimated, both before and after adjustment for other socio-economic factors. The schooling of the wife emerges as a more decisive influence on fertility than that of the husband, with substantial net effects even after controlling for urban-rural residence, husband's socio-economic status and wife's employment. In Latin America and the Arab states, monotonic declines in marital fertility are found, as the level of the wife's education increases. However, in many Asian and African populations, the highest fertility is observed among women with moderate exposure to schooling, because the relaxation of traditional spacing mechanisms is not matched by increased birth control. This regional diversity cannot be explained convincingly by national levels of economic development or efforts made to popularize contraception, but appears to relect ill-understood cultural factors.     

Transitional stages and identity boundaries: the case of ethnic minorities in China

At the advent of the Republic in China in 1911, the minority issue took on its real dimension. Its founder Sun Yat Sen, aware of the fragility of the new Nation-State, and turning a deaf ear to the statistical evidence, tried to minimize the influence of the minorities and to enhance, in his writings and speeches, the demographic supremacy of the Hans. On the contrary, the communist regime since the very start (1949) made a full-fledge recognition (including religion as a criterionr of ethnic minorities. There are now 55 minority groups, amounting to 120 million inhabitants, almost 10% of the population. This article explores the relationship between fertility trends since 1970, as depicted in the single age and sex structures in the 1990 census, and socio-economic, cultural and religious factors. Most sinicized minorities (Manchu, Mongols, Koreans …) have more or less followed the same pace of fertility transition as the Hans, under the yoke of the tough restrictive population policy. On the other hand, fertility trends among the less sinicized groups (Tibetans, Uigurs, Kazakhs and Kirgiz), have been largely at odds with the mainstream Han group. Their fertility remained high at the very moments when it was sharply reduced among Hans and decreased when Han fertility was remaining almost stable. This reflcts the fact that the Chinese authorities have conceded substantial privileges to their minorities, especially in the frontiers by relaxing the family planning policy. Religion as such does not emerge as a key explanatory variable explaining fertility differences. Hence, fertility among Moslem minorities has diverged to a great extent among the more integrated Hui minority, on the one hand, and the Turkic ones (Uigurs, Kazakhs and Kirgiz), on the other. Whereas the patterns of the Hui fertility were always in line with those of the Hans, the Xinjiang populations have displayed a higher than expected fertility, which might be a demographic response to the ambitions of the central government, whose aim was to strenghten its buffer-zone in the Turkic regions by drowning them under the masses of Han immigrants. The proportion of ethnic Chinese in Xinjiang has thus increased from a mere 7% in 1953 to some 40% today. However, this proportion is unstable and likely to decrease in the near future under the impact of the higher natural growth of the Turkic populations.     

Second Births and the Second Shift: A Research Note on Gender Equity and Fertility

In a set of propositions on fertility transition, Peter McDonald recently proposed that the decline from replacement‐level fertility to low fertility is associated with a combination of high levels of gender equity in individual‐oriented institutions, such as education and market employment, and low levels of gender equity in the family and family‐oriented institutions. Similarly, the “second shift,” or the share of domestic work performed by formally employed women, forms a critical piece of current cross‐national explanations for low fertility. Building on this scholarship, the authors explore whether there is empirical evidence at the individual level for a relationship between gender equity at home, as indicated by the division of housework among working couples with one child, and the transition to a second birth. Results, based on a sample of US couples, indicate a U‐shaped relationship between gender equity and fertility. Both the most modern and the most traditional housework arrangements are positively associated with fertility. This empirical test elaborates the family‐fertility relationship and underscores the need to incorporate family context, including gender equity, into explanations for fertility change.     

What's happening to U.S. family size?

A telephone survey by Zero Population Growth demographers found that birthrates have risen slightly for the 1st quarter of 1977. Average estimated family size is now 1.85 children per women compared with 1.77 for the 1st quarter of 1976. For all of 1976 the total fertility rate was 1.76 children per woman. It is predicted, on the basis of the informal survey, that the total fertility rate will rise to 2.0 or 2.1 children by the early or mid-1980s. In 1976, married women expected an average of 2.4 children each. Wives 18-24 expected 2.1 children each while older women (35-39) expected 3.0. Many women are delaying births. Wives 18-24 have an average of .8 children each, wives 25-29 have 1.6 children each. Campbell Gibson, former chief of the projections branch of the Census Bureau, believes births will not reach levels of expectations becuase of the financial, employment, and social problems the huge Baby Boom age group faces throughout its lifetime. The undecided women in the surveys reduce the predictive value. 18% of single women aged 14-39 and 8% of married women in the same age group said they were uncertain about how many children they would have. Since the personalitites and motivations of this undecided group are similar to those who expect to remain childless, it is possible that this group will have fewer children. Such nondemographic factors as media publicity about low fertility rates may inspire some couples to have children. Conversely, the postponement of births may enable couples to become comfortable with a certain lifestyle and these couples may not have as many children as they expect. Social norms are already changing. The percent of wives expecting to be childless rose from 1.3 to 4.1% between 1967-1975. Those expecting only 1 child rose from 6.1 to 11.2%.     

Does welfare reform affect fertility? Evidence from the UK

This paper provides evidence on the effect of welfare reform on fertility, focusing on UK reforms in 1999 that increased per-child spending by 50% in real terms. We use a difference-in-differences approach, exploiting the fact that the reforms were targeted at low-income households. The reforms were likely to differentially affect the fertility of women in couples and single women because of the opportunity cost effects of the welfare-to-work element. We find no increase in births among single women, but evidence to support an increase in births (by around 15%) among coupled women.     

Republic of Korea. Country feature

The Government of Korea's 5th 5-Year Economic and Social Development Plan (1982-86) seeks to reduce the population growth rate from its 1982 level of 1.58% to 1.49% by 1986; it is assumed that the population replacement level of fertility (total fertility rate, 2.1) will be attained in 1988. The task of achieving these demographic targets is expected to be made more difficult by factors such as the impact of the 1950s baby boom and widespread son preference. New population control policy measures announced in 1981 call for improvements in the current family planning program management system; a new social and institutional support system to inculcate the small family size norm; strengthened information, education, and communication activities for family planning; and establishment of coordination among the government organizations involved in population-related activities. Numerous social support measures have already been put into effect, including income tax exemptions for up to 2 children, inclusion of population education in the school curriculum, priority in alloting public housing to sterilization acceptors with 2 or fewer children, and provision of IUD services through the medical insurance system. The number of contraceptive acceptors in the government program increased 78.3% from 1981-83, from 614,000 to 1,094,600. Sterilization and menstrual regulation services have shown particularly sharp increases. Program achievement for 1983 was equivalent to 19% of eligible women ages 15-44 years. The total fertility rate stood at 2.7 in 1982. Major efforts now must be directed toward eradicating the strong parental son preference and ensuring better family planning program efficiency and effectiveness.     

Understanding U.S. fertility: findings from the National Survey of Family Growth,Cycle III

The 1st overview of findings from Cycle III of the National Survey of Family Growth, the latest of 7 such surveys of US fertility since 1955 and the 1st to cover all women of childbearing age in the conterminous US is presented. Interviews between August 1982 and February 1983 with 7969 women, representative of 54 million women aged 15-44, reveal that sterilization is now the leading contraceptive method in the US, used by 33% of all contraceptors in 1982 (22%, female sterilization; 11% male sterilization), followed by the pill (29%), condom (12%), diaphragm (8%), and IUD (7%). Linked to this is the continuing decline in unwanted births since the baby boom peak in 1957, which accounted for nearly 1/2 of the drop between 1973 and 1982 in ever-married women's children ever born, from 2.2 to 1.9/woman. However, births conceived sooner than planned increased slightly among younger married women, probably due to the large drop in pill use since 1973 and increased use of the less effective diaphragm and condom among couples still intending to have more children. Black women are now more likely than white women to use the most effective female methods: female sterilization, pill, and IUD. Only 45% of women aged 15-44 in 1982 had used a contraceptive method at 1st intercourse. 4 out of 5 women married for the 1st time between 1975 and 1982 had intercourse before marriage. However, premarital sexual activity may be leveling off among white teenagers after a steep rise since the early 1970s and declining moderately among black teenagers. 16% of 1st marriages among ever-married women aged 15-44 in 1982 had been dissoved within 5 years, mostly by divorce or separation. 59% of black women with children in 1982 had their 1st birth before marriage, compared to 11% of white mothers. The proportion of babies who were breastfed more than doubled between 1970-71 and 1980-81, from 24 to 53%.     

Communique of the State Family Planning Commission on a nationwide fertility sampling survey of every person per thousand

In 1982, the Chinese State Family Planning Commission conducted a nationwide fertility survey of 1 person/1000 in 28 provinces, municipalities, and autonomous regions. 815 sample units were selected and 310,462 women aged 15-67 were interviewed, 99.9% of those identified. 252,094 (24.77%) were of childbearing age (15-49) with 24.76% 15-19 years old. Among women of fertile age, 31.46% were unmarried, 64.53% were married to their 1st husbands, 2.89% were remarried, .19% were divorced, and .94% were widowed. Average age of 1st marriage increased from 18.4 in the 1940s to 22.8 in 1981. Total fertility rate dropped from 5.44 in the 1940s to 2.63 in 1981. In 1981, the birth rate was 85/1000 women of fertile age. Fertility was much higher among minority nationalities. 118 million of China's 170 million married couples of reproductive age (69.46%) use birth control at present; 50.2% use the IUD, 25.4% tubal ligation, 10.0% vasectomy, 8.2% oral contraceptives, and 2.0% condoms. About 21 million married women should have begun using contraception but have not. 14 million or 42.3% of 33 million 1 child couples have pledged to have only 1 child. If the fertility level of 1981 is maintained and the average woman continues to have 2.63 children, 2.91 in rural areas, China's population will reach 1.2 billion by 1993 and will exceed 1.3 billion by 2000. The Central Committee has a target population of 1.2 billion by 2000.     

Does welfare reform affect fertility? Evidence from the UK

This paper provides evidence on the effect of welfare reform on fertility, focusing on UK reforms in 1999 that increased per-child spending by 50% in real terms. We use a difference-in-differences approach, exploiting the fact that the reforms were targeted at low-income households. The reforms were likely to differentially affect the fertility of women in couples and single women because of the opportunity cost effects of the welfare-to-work element. We find no increase in births among single women, but evidence to support an increase in births (by around 15%) among coupled women.     

Stepfamily fertility in contemporary Sweden: The impact of childbearing before the current union

We focus on the fertility of Swedish men and women who lived in a consensual or marital union in the 1970s and 1980s, and where at least one of the partners had children before they entered that union. Couples without any children before the current union were included for contrast. We find clear evidence that couples wanted a shared biological child, essentially regardless of how many children (if any) they had before their current union. The shared child seems to have served to demonstrate commitment to the union, as did its conversion into a formal marriage. We have not found much support for the hypothesis that our respondents sought to enter parenthood to attain adult status. A second birth might have been valued because it provided a sibling for the first child -- a half-sibling acting as a substitute for a full sibling -- but our evidence for such eåects is contradictory. Our analysis makes it very clear that parity progression depends on whose parity we consider.     

Reported excellent health among men in same-sex and mixed-sex couples: Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System, 1993-2010

Self-reported excellent health was examined across sexual orientation among male adult couples using 18 years of data from the Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System. Men in same-sex couples were more likely to report being in excellent health (28.7%) than men in unmarried and married mixed-sex couples (20.4% and 23.2%). After adjusting for other demographic and health factors, men in same-sex couples remained more likely to report excellent health than men in unmarried mixed-sex couples, but not than men in married mixed-sex couples. Reporting only adverse health disparities provides a partial picture of sexual minority health, and discounts the role of resilience and other health promoting factors in these populations.     

Does It Matter What She Wants? The Role of Individual Preferences Against Unmarried Motherhood in Young Women’s Likelihood of a Nonmarital First Birth

Most young people in the United States express the desire to marry. Norms at all socioeconomic levels posit marriage as the optimal context for childbearing. At the same time, nonmarital fertility accounts for approximately 40 % of U.S. births, experienced disproportionately by women with educational attainment less than a bachelor’s degree. Research has shown that women’s intentions for the number and timing of children and couples’ intent to marry are strong predictors of realized fertility and marriage. The present study investigates whether U.S. young women’s preferences about nonmarital fertility, as stated before childbearing begins, predict their likelihood of having a nonmarital first birth. I track marriage and fertility histories through ages 24–30 of women asked at ages 11–16 whether they would consider unmarried childbearing. One-quarter of women who responded “no” in fact had a nonmarital birth by age 24–30. The ability of women and their partners to access material resources in adulthood were, as expected, the strongest predictors of the likelihood of nonmarital childbearing. Nonetheless, I find that women who said they would not consider nonmarital childbearing had substantially higher hazards of fertility postponement and especially of marital fertility, even after controlling for race/ethnicity, mother’s educational attainment, family of origin intactness, self-efficacy and planning ability, perceived future prospects, and markers of own educational attainment and work experience into early adulthood.     

Constructing fertility tables for Soviet populations

Because the 1970 Soviet Union census does not provide information on the age structure of men and women separately by sex and according to their ethnic affiliation, the 1959 USSR census data serve as the basis to infer knowledge about ethnic fertility. The model takes into account (1) the total number of births in 1960, estimated from the child-woman ratio in 1959, (2) the age structure of women in 1959, and (3) the assumed pattern of age-specific birth rates structured in terms of the modal age at childbearing and the length of the fertility age span. The results show that Ukrainians among the Slav populations ranked as the lowest with 2.07 children born per woman. Their total fertility contrasts with that of Kazakhs native to Central Asia, who reportedly according to Soviet sources had 7.46 children per woman in 1958-1959, and whose estimated rate is around 8.59 children. Extreme variations appear in the estimates of fertility among nationalities of the Caucasus region, Volga Basin, and to a lesser degree in Siberia. Official Soviet calculations of crude birth rates and age-specific rates for 15 Union Republics in 1967-1968 are transcribed and compared with the estimates for nationalities in 1959-1960. The same theoretical model used to generate the Soviet rates may be adapted under different assumptions to non-Soviet populations in other situations where the data are scanty or incomplete.     

The two generation urbanite hypothesis revisited

It is generally accepted that socioeconomic differentials in fertility are minimal among urban couples with nonfarm origins -- two generation urbanites. In this paper, we replicate Duncan's (1965) analysis to see if the two generation urbanite hypothesis holds for more recent cohorts of American women. In four cohorts of women, drawn from three recent fertility surveys, we find no support for the two generation urbanite hypothesis. It appears that the links between farm background, socioeconomic status and fertility were different for the low fertility cohorts of women born in the early 1900's and the more recent cohorts of women who experienced the baby boom.     

Current primary investigation on the view of family planning of Chinese peasants]

The ideal number of children for 850 couples among 10 cities or counties and 20 villages in China were surveyed. Of the 850, only 1 wanted unlimited children, which accounted for 0.12% of the couples. About 33 desired more than 5, which accounted for 3.9%. However, most of the couples, about 81.4%, prefer 2 or 3 children. 3.2% of the couples were happy with 1 child in their life. In China, peasants still want more children because of their economic situation. There is no retirement and health insurance in the countryside, and the major labor force is in field work. Some consider males as better able to keep family heritage intact. Also, there is difference between agricultural and nonagricultural couples. Comparing the percentage of couples who want 2-3 children, 80% in agricultural sector and 92% in nonagricultural sector desired this number. The remainder of the agricultural group desired more than 3 children. Since economic reform started in the countryside in the early 80s, effects on fertility are seen. One is that peasants want more children because of a rising need for labor. On the other hand, many more opportunities are available to change careers and obtain more education, lowering fertility. However, a rise in fertility is predicted as people concentrate more on economic reform and economic development, increasing their need for children.     

Below-replacement fertility of ethnic Indians in Fiji: a decomposition analysis of the components of changes in the total fertility rate

The population of Fiji consists of two major ethnic groups, Fijians and Indians; it also comprises other groups, such as Europeans, Chinese and other Pacific Islands. The 2007 Census showed that there were 56.8 % Fijians and 37.5 % Indians, with the remaining 5.7 % consisting of other groups. This paper examines ethnic variation in fertility using current fertility estimated directly from the census data. As the Fiji census continued to gather information on the relationship of mothers with their own children, this information has been used to estimate fertility trends over the past 15 years preceding the census by the application of the own-children method. Fiji has recently undergone a spectacular decline in fertility but with a marked variation between Fijians and Indians. The total fertility rate (TFR) among Indians dropped to 2.8 in 1986 and 2.5 in 1996. It continued to decline further, approaching below the replacement fertility of 1.9 in 2007. By contrast, Fijian fertility reached 3.9 in 1996. As with that of Indians, Fijian fertility also fell sharply, to 3.2 in 2007. This paper uses a decomposition analysis technique to determine the components of changes in the TFRs due to marital structure and marital fertility among Fijians and Indians, covering the intercensal periods, 1966–1976, 1976–1986, 1986–1996 and 1996–2007.     

Job bust, baby bust?: Evidence from Spain

The unemployment rate in Spain has been exceptionally high for more than two decades by now. During the same period the fertility rate dropped dramatically reaching the lowest level in the world. In this study we look for evidence of a link between the `unemployment crisis' and the `fertility crisis' in Spain. We examine the factors that affect individuals' ages at marriage and childbirth, focusing on the effects of male employment status. Our results show that spells of non-employment have a strong negative effect on the hazard of marriage. We also find negative (but smaller) effects of part-time or temporal employment on the hazard of marriage. The estimated direct effects of joblessness and part-time work on birth hazards conditional on marriage are smaller and/or not significant for most birth intervals and sample groups. Simulations based on the estimated models confirm the potential for large `delaying' effects of joblessness on marriage. However, the delaying effect is not so large in simulations which control for the actual incidence of non-employment in the sample. Received: 7 January 1999/Accepted: 7 March 2000