The evolution of French immigration policy after May 1981

Changes and continuities in French immigration policies, following the assumption of power by the socialist government in 1981, are described. Attention is focused on the political implications of immigration and on the role of immigrants in French politics. Efforts to restrict immigration to France were initiated in 1931, but clandestine immigration, especially from Portugal, remained largely unchecked for 4 decades. In the early 1970s, stricter enforcement measures were adopted, but these measures met with considerable international and national opposition. In 1977, the government altered its approach to immigration by offering financial aid to help illegal migrants return to their countries of origin. These efforts met with little success, and in 1980 the government initiated measures to promote the integration of immigrants into French society. The socialistic government basically adhered to the immigration policies of the preceding government. The current government seeks: 1) to stop further illegal immigration through the intensification of border controls, 2) to grant amnesty to illegal aliens who currently reside in the country and who meet certain employment requirements, 3) to penalize employers who hire illegal aliens or who contract to bring illegal aliens into the country, and 4) to improve living conditions for legal immigrants. The politicalization of immigration has increased in recent years. Current issues center on the human and political rights of migrants and on arbitary administrative efforts to control immigration. It was expected that migrants would acquire political rights after the 1981 election; however, this expectation was not realized, and the political status of immigrants remains an unsettled issue. Consequently migrants have become pawns in the political struggle between different groups in the population both at the national and the local level. Immigration threatens to become an explosive issue. At the same time, migrants themselves are playing an increasingly prominent role in political activities, such as rent strikes and protest movements.     

U.S. immigration policy: the guestworker option revisited

In guestworker programs foreign nationals are admitted into another country on a nonmigrant status with severely curtailed social and limited labor market rights. The duration of stay is always finite and compliance with the terms of the contract are entered through a network of legal arrangements which allow officials in the receiving country a substantial amount of administrative discretion. Pro-guestworker arguments say that the borders cannot be closed, that guestworkers can be substituted for illegal aliens, that guestworkers are better than illegal aliens, and that additional labor benefits the US economy. Those against guestworker programs stress longterm socioeconomic issues rather than short-term economic advantages, saying that guestworker programs are no quick answer for illegal immigration, for domestic labor shortages, or for the US poor population. Guestworker programs, its opponents say, provide short-run economic benefits to a few employers and individuals at the expense of more widespread and longterm socioeconomic costs. They oppose: 1) the concept of admitting foreign workers with restricted rights, 2) the concentration of any negative labor market impacts on already disadvantaged domestic groups, 3) the proliferation of "jobs which Americans won't take," 4) many temporary guests ending up permanent residents, and 5) that exporting workers is as likely to impede as accelerate job-creating economic development in immigration countries. Most economists believe that diminishing marginal productivity produces downward-sloping short-run demand for labor schedules. The European experience with these programs has been different than those in the US since foreign workers in Europe were initially recruited in response to actual labor shortages and have always had legal status, but both Europe and the US have experienced large contingents of workers who remain in the countries and are at a pronounced power disadvantage regarding the society's institutions. Studies of guestworker programs have shown that worker flows eventually become impervious to the receiver's actual labor needs as employers disaggregate jobs into components which match the low skills of migrants and create additional foreign worker jobs which are then shunned by native labor, thus perpetuating a need for such labor. If the US opts for a large-scale guestworker program this will only replace 1 set of problems with another and it is not at all certain that large-scale guestworker admissions will proportionately reduce illegal migration inflows.     

Immigration reform,American style

This article reviews the background of the proposed Immigration and Reform Act (also known as the Simpson-Mazzoli bill), which seeks to overhaul US immigration law for the first time since 1952. This bill is consistent with President Reagan's hard line on border enforcement and mandates stiff penalties for those who transport illegal aliens for commercial advantage or private profit. It further offers Mexico preferential treatment in immigration (40,000 additional visas/year). It includes an amnesty program to offer legal status to qualified illegal residents. The bill directs the President to develop a secure national worker identification system and would create a large-scale temporary foreign agricultural program for perishable commodities. Agricultural workers' families would not be eligible to accompany them unless they also obtain temporary visas. Foreign temporary workers, employable only in cases where local domestic workers are not available, must be provided with wages and working conditions equal to those prevailing among domestic workers. Stiff penalties are stipulated for employers who fail to abide with the terms of the program. In the author's opinion, this bill fails to appreciate the global character of international migration and its complexity. It relects a fundamental ambivalence about a strictly controlled main gate versus a back door approach to immigration as well as the conflicting images of the US as a nation of immigrants versus the historical reality of American nativism and xenophobia. Needed are comprehensive initiatives whose mutually reinforcing components can address the multiple dimensions of the immigration problem within a framework that does not ignore workers who have contributed to the economic well-being of the US, regardless of their legal status.     

The Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986: America amends its immigration law

This disucssion of the Immigration and Control act of 1986 covers legalization, employer sanctions, and foreign agricultural worker reforms. It also identifies other changes in immigration law. The Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 recognizes 4 types of aliens who are eligible to receive legalization benefits: those who have resided "continuously" in the US since January 1, 1982; those who have worked in US perishable crop agriculture for 90 "man-days" each year ending on May 1, 1984, May 1, 1985 and May 1, 1986 (special agricultural workers) or who have performed such labor for 90 man-days between only May 1, 1985 and May 1, 1986; those who have been in the US since before January 1, 1972; and those classified as "Cuban-Haitian entrants" and who have been in the US since January 1, 1982. Each legalization category has specific eligibility requirements, its own application procedures, and its own process for obtaining legal permanent resident status. The IRCA forbids employers from knowingly employing unauthorized aliens. For the 1st time in US immigration history, an employer would be punished for employing aliens without work authorization. An employer would be able to establish an "affirmative defense" in his or her behalf if the employer examined certain documents which appear to be genuine or the applicant was referred to him by a State employment agency which previously has verified the applicant's employment eligibility. If the employer is found to have violated the provisions, a cease and desist order will be issued with a civil penalty of between $250-2000 for each unauthorized alien for the 1st time the violation occurs, between $2000-5000 for each alien for the 2nd violation, and between $3000-10,000 for each alien for subsequent violations. The Act provides for criminal penalties for employers who engage in a "pattern or practice of violations." Employer sanctions will not be effective for 18 months following passage of the Act. The changes which the IRCA introduced in terms of foreign agricultural workers fall into 2 broad categories: a formula for recruiting foreign agricultural workers for permanent residence in the US beginning with 1990 (replenishment workers); and changes in the existing system of temporary foreign workers for agricultural work. Among other things, the Act also increases colonial quotas to 5000 from 600, offers special immigrant status to certain officers and employers of international organizations and their immediate family members; and offers nonimmigrant status for parents and children of aliens given spcial immigrant status.     

A Confluence of Interests in Immigration Enforcement: How Politicians,the Media,and Corporations Profit from Immigration Policies Destined to Fail

The concept of an immigration industrial complex draws from previous work on the prison industrial complex and the military industrial complex. All three of these complexes point to the ways that the interests of government bureaucracies, corporate elites, and politicians shape laws and policies. This article explains how the undocumented status of migrants provides advantages to at least three groups: (a) media pundits who make their careers railing against ‘illegal aliens’; (b) politicians who use undocumented migrants as scapegoats; and (c) contractors who profit from massive immigration enforcement expenditures. The disenfranchised status of undocumented migrants enhances the ability of each of these groups to benefit from their presence. This confluence of interests explains why Congress has not enacted viable immigration policies that effectively deal with the ‘problem’ of illegal immigration. This is the second in a two‐part series on the immigration industrial complex.     

International migration in a changing world

This paper eulogizes the life and work of Gunther Beijer (1904-1983), an international migration research supporter, who was himself a refugee from Nazi Germany. The brain drain of professional workers of other nations into such traditional receiving countries as the US, Canada, and Australia particularly interested Beijer. The creation of many independent nations after World War II changed migration trends greatly. By the 1970s the immigration policies of receiving countries had changed to favor non-Caucasian professional workers and relatives of current residents. This new migration may be classified as 1) permanent settler, 2) guest worker, 3) professional transient, 4) clandestine, and 5) refugee. Non-Caucasian immigrants increasingly find that they may not be wanted when perceived as an economic or social threat. Beijer understood guest worker migration within Europe in the early 1960s, but he could not foresee the demands that guest workers and their families would place on receiving countries. Guest worker migration gives sending countries relief from unemployment and provides remittances; it also provides needed labor to economically health countries. Guest workers such as those currently employed in the Persian Gulf may not be accepted socially or politically by the host community and may be considered undesirable employees on their return home. Nations often tolerate illegal or clandestine migration when the labor need is high, but illegals may be expelled when economic or political conditions turn against them. The problems of the estimated 10 million refugees fall increasingly on developing countries, but must be shared by all nations since their increasing numbers affect domestic and international politics.     

The political and socioeconomic context of legal and illegal Mexican migration to the United States (1942-1984)

The US manpower shortage in industry and agriculture during World War II, combined with Mexico's burden of an excess number of unemployed laborers, provided the basis for serious labor negotiations between the US and Mexico. The result was the Bracero Agreement of 1942, a bilateral agreement involving annual quotas for the temporary hiring of Mexican braceros. On the surface the program worked well. However, there were points of contention between the 2 countries: 1) in opposition to Mexico's policy of placing recruitment centers in the interior of the country, US policy called for placing the centers near the border, to reduce transportation costs; 2) Texas, which received no braceros because of racial discrimination, relied upon illegal aliens for manual labor; 3) Texas flagrantly violated a 1948 agreement when the Border Patrol welcomed aliens across the river despite Mexican officials' threats to close the border; 4) legal braceros were confronted with competition from illegals who were willing to work for a lower wage; 5) in 1954, the Border patrol physically helped aliens across the border, while Mexican policy were physically restraining them; 6) with the conclusion of a new Bracero agreement in March 1954, illegal aliens were no longer needed, so more than 1 million were apprehended and deported to Mexico's interior. The termination of the Bracero Program in 1964 gave new impetus to illegal trafficking and the number of illegals apprehended began to increase steadily in 1965. The migration flow after 1964 was influenced by the following socioeconomic conditions in Mexico: 1) unemployment, 2) very large disparities in income distribution, 3) a discrimination of the rural sector in favor of the urban in the allocation of government funds, and 4) a dependency on foreign capital and technology. Also, it was cheap labor for the US. Neither the US nor Mexico has adopted policies related to either economic development or immigration that would systematically curtail or regulate the flow of Mexican migrants to the US. However, conflicting pressures limit the policy-making process. President Carter was limited in his policy options by the needs of large-scale commercial agriculture. President Reagan's idea of a guest-worker program did not develop into legislation. Mexico's Lopez Portillo administration counted on migration to the US as a substitute for redistributive land reform in its handling of rural political pressures; the migratory flow functioned as an "escape valve" helping to dilute the effects of rapid demographic increase and preserving the status quo.     

The politics of immigration reform

The US is the target for international migration, now more than ever. Population growth and economic stragnation in the Third World are increasing the pressures for out-migration, and current immigration law is wholly incapable of responding to the ever increasing flow of illegal immigrants. Border apprehensions of illegal aliens in the US were up 40% during 1983, and total apprehensions reached 1.25 million by the year's end. Recent public opinion polls have disclosed that an overwhelming majority of the American public demands immigration reform, and yet we as a nation have been distinctly unwilling or unable to respond to this clear public sentiment. This paper discusses the politics of the "Simpson-Mazzoli" Immigration Reform and Control Act, previous immigration legislation, current counterproposals for US immigration policy, and the political realities of immigration reform.     

Mexican Migration for Dummies: What Social Workers and the Public Need to Know

SUMMARY

Amid the derisive, post-911 political debate about border control, national security, and “illegal aliens,” nobody, not even immigrant advocates and protesters, is articulating the macro-level, global economic root cause of undocumented labor migration to America. In simple terms, this essay describes how the contradictory policies of an open border for trade (i.e., NAFTA) and a closed border for immigration result in a predictable undocumented migration bridge between the U.S. and Mexico that must be sensibly regulated for the good of neighboring countries that now share formally integrated economies, yet informally integrated populations. Implications for policy and immigrant serving social workers and other human service providers are discussed.     

American Attitudes toward Guest Worker Policies

In this study we use data from a 2004 New York Times/CBS News national survey to analyze public opinion toward a guest worker program and to compare predictors of support for guest worker and general immigration policies. In general, Americans tend to be divided in their attitudes toward a guest worker program, although support for temporary worker policies is stronger when legalization for unauthorized immigrants is conditioned on certain requirements, and when the program is coupled with enhanced border security. The results of the bivariate probit analysis indicate that individuals who favor reducing the immigration level also tend to oppose instituting a guest worker program. Perceptions of the “costs” of immigration emerged as the most important determinant of individuals’ attitudes toward immigration policies; such beliefs contributed to opposition to a guest worker policy and support for reducing the immigration level. We also found that residents of high‐immigration states and Latinos were more likely to support a temporary worker program. However, these characteristics do not appear to influence individuals’ judgments about the number of immigrants who should be admitted to the United States. Findings regarding the impact of political partisanship and ideology on attitudes toward the two policies were more ambiguous.     

Attitudes of Mexican Americans toward irregular immigration

This inquiry focuses on the attitudes of 314 Mexican Americans toward issues relating to current US immigration policy. Telephone and personal interviews were conducted in Hidalgo and Travis counties, Texas, with Mexican-Americans. Virtually all respondent groups oppose an increased rate of immigration, consider illegal immigration to be an important problem, support stricter enforcement of immigration laws, and believe that undocumented workers take jobs no one else wants. Half of the respondents identify illegal immigration as a regional rather than a personal problem. At the same time, the data suggest significant differences in both direction and intensity of attitudes between Mexican Americans of different generations, income, occupational levels, and region. There is general opposition to the requirement of a national identity card, but widespread support for penalizing employers of undocumented workers and for granting amnesty to undocumented workers. These findings allow an examination of the extent to which the Mexican American leadership, which has been overwhelmingly opposed to the Simpson-Mazzoli bill, accurately reflects the views of the Mexican American people. The leadership and the population at large agree on 2 of the 3 issues, amnesty and the national identity card, but disagree on employer sanctions. 1st, it may be that the leadership holds the kinds of jobs for which undocumented workers are unlikely to compete, so they may not feel threatened. 2nd, they may feel that instituting employer sanctions will create incentives for employers to discriminate in their hiring practices against all Latino-looking job applicants. Non-elite Mexican Americans who support employer sanctions may believe that the only way they can compete for jobs is to make it impossible for elites to be hired. Both groups appear to fear that, regardless of the specifics of immigration reform, Mexican Americans are likely to encounter increased discrimination in the job market.     

He Came, He Saw, He Stayed. Guest Worker Programmes and the Issue of Non-Return

Critics of guest worker programmes have pointed out that many temporary workers do not return home when their contracts expire and thus end up swelling the ranks of undocumented workers in a host country. This article argues that this outcome is not inevitable. Whether or not guest workers return home or stay behind depends to a large extent on how the guest worker programme is administered. By comparing the US Bracero Program with the Canadian Mexican Agricultural Seasonal Workers' Program, it is shown that three aspects of programme administration account for why so many Braceros stayed in the US illegally, while almost all temporary workers employed in Canada return to Mexico at the end of the season. The three aspects are recruitment policies and procedures, enforcement of employment and housing-related minimum standards, and the size of the programme. It is suggested that the administration of the programme, in turn, reflects various interests that shape the State's position on foreign labour. Whereas in the US the Bracero Program was tailored to meet the needs of agribusinesses, the Canadian state responds to a wider variety of interests, including its own concern with the definition of ideal citizenship, as well as the need to protect domestic workers and the Mexican Government's interest in assisting those who are most needy. Additionally, unlike the US, where braceros were employed mainly in agribusinesses, in Canada Mexicans are brought to work on family farms. While desertion was a frequent phenomenon in the US, the paternalistic relationships that Canada-bound workers develop with their employers make desertion unlikely.     

Social effects of migration in receiving countries

This paper examines the impact of post-1945 migration into Western, Middle, and Northern Europe from Southern Europe, Turkey, and Northern Africa, and migration to the traditional immigration countries by Asian and Latin American immigrants, on the social structures of receiving countries. Between 1955 and 1974, 1) traditional migration to the US and Australia became less important for European countries while traditional receiving countries accepted many immigrants from developing countries; and 2) rapid economic revival in Western and Northern Europe caused a considerable labor shortage which was filled by migrant workers especially from Southern Europe, Turkey, and Northern Africa, who stayed only until they reached their economic goals. Since 1974, job vacancies have declined and unemployment has soared. This employment crisis caused some migrants 1) to return to their countries of origin, 2) to bring the rest of their families to the receiving country, or 3) to lengthen their stay considerably. The number of refugees has also significantly increased since the mid-970s, as has the number of illegal migrants. After the mid-1970s, Europe began to experience integration problems. The different aspects of the impact of migration on social structures include 1) improvement of the housing situation for foreigners, 2) teaching migrants the language of the receiving country, 3) solving the unemployment problem of unskilled migrants, 4) improvement of educational and vocational qualifications of 2nd generation migrants, 5) development of programs to help unemployed wives of migrants to learn the language and meet indigenous women, 6) encouraging migrants to maintain their cultural identity and assisting them with reintegration if they return to their original country, 7) coping with the problems of refugees, and 8) solving the problems of illegal migration. Almost all receiving countries now severely restrict further immigration. [Those policies should result in improved development of aid policies towards sending countries. Immigration from other countries to those of the European Economic community should be limited to that for humanitarian reasons.     

Migrants and asylum seekers: policy responses in the United States to immigrants and refugees from Central America and the Caribbean

This article analyzes the complex political environment of US immigration and refugee policies in which tensions exist, especially with regard to Central America and the Caribbean. Recommendations for managing it more effectively in the future are discussed. Several western countries, including the US, have implemented stricter restriction policies as a result of the perceived threats to their economies and cultural homogeneity. In general, US immigration policy has addressed both economic concerns and domestic pressures, whereas US refugee policy has reflected foreign policy concerns. As a result of these policies, there has been an increasing number of immigrants from Mexico, as well as huge numbers of refugees from Cuba and Nicaragua. Yet, there has been limited acceptance of asylum seekers from Haiti, El Salvador and Guatemala. Among the policies passed by the US Congress to reduce illegal immigration and limit assistance to legal immigrants were the Welfare Reform Act, Illegal Immigration Reform, Immigration Responsibility Act of 1996, and the Proposition 187 movement. Revisions in the procedures of the Immigration and Naturalization Service were also made.     

Preliminary results of the IRCA legalization programs at the end of phase I

A remarkable gulf in interpretation and evaluation of the 1986 implementation of the Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) exists between various schools of analysts. Some feel that the law has not changed conditions much, while others consider the legalization program and employer sanctions successful. Altogether, IRCA included 6 specific legalization opportunities. The 2 major ones concerned aliens who had resided illegally in the US since January 1, 1982 and alien farm workers who had worked illegally in the US for at least 90 days between May 1, 1985 and May 1, 1986. Issues concerning the pre-1982 or general legalization program include 1) the 5-year gap between the eligibility cutoff and the start of the legalization program made the principal US legalization program more restrictive than comparable legalization policies in other market economy countries, 2) it did not provide for immediate derivative legislation for family members of an illegal alien eligible for legalization, and 3) analysts disagree on the evaluation and the effectiveness of the public information campaign to inform eligible aliens of the legalization opportunity. The application procedure for the Special Agricultural Worker or SAW was much simpler than for the general legalization program. SAW applicants could apply at US borders. 10% of SAW applications were denied, due to fraud and other reasons, as opposed to 2% for applicants to the major legalization program. Both programs attracted mainly Mexican applicants. The total number of SAW applications received will help to determine future need for alien farm workers. 1 of the most important differences between the SAW and the pre-1982 legalization programs is the legal status of the newly legalized: 1) to secure permanent resident alien status, pre-1982 program applicants must pass civics and English examinations within a set period of time, whereas SAW applicants do not; and 2) SAW applicants are eligible for a broader range of social benefits than those in the major program.     

Irregular migration: policy responses in Africa and Asia

This article reviews population policies designed to curb or respond to irregular migration flows, with particular emphasis on policies adopted by governments in Africa and Asia. An overview of policies on the world level indicates a number of similarities that transcend regional lines and levels of development. Policy decisions are often influenced by the nature and attributes of the undocumented migrant population and by the current social, economic, and political situation in the receiving country. Governments are frequently more tolerant of migrants who possess needed skills or settle in sparsely populated areas that have manpower shortages. Between the 2 policy extremes of amnesty and deportation, several measures have been employed, including stricter border controls, stringent visa requirements, work permit systems, and efforts to ensure that migrants do not violate the conditions of their admission. In many cases, several policy measures are used simultaneously. Ensuring the observance of appropriate measures for the recruitment of migrant workers, their departure from the home country, and placement in employment in the country of immigration is widely regarded as the best way to prevent illegal movements of workers. Temporary worker programs are sometimes advocated to provide legal channels for potential migrants. At the national level, institutions that deal with irregular migrants tend to be limited in their mandate to a law enforcement role. In Africa, most governments have recently strengthened border and documentary controls and attempted to regulate migration through the labor market. In many cases, mass expulsions have been necessary as a result of laissez-faire policies. In Asia, on the other hand, mass deportation has been less common as a result of more stringent security measures and documentary controls. In both countries, policies have been basically reactive in response to rapidly changing political and economic conditions. Needed is an international convention to serve as a guideline for the humanitarian treatment of undocumented workers.     

Rational Migration Policy Should Tolerate Non-zero Illegal Migration Flows: Lessons from Modelling the Market for Illegal Migration

The debate on the immigration policies in OECD countries has turned its attention towards illegal migrants. Given that migration flows are determined by immigration laws, the probability of potential detection, penalties for unauthorized migrants and their employers, and income differences between sending and receiving countries, this paper presents a new approach to the problem of illegal migration, grounded on the economic theory of illegal behaviour. The framework considers the interaction of potential migrants, citizens, employers, and the government. After introducing the supply function of illegal migration and its determinants, the trade-off between social costs and benefits of preventing and combating illegal migration is demonstrated. This trade-off results in an optimal level of migration larger than zero. A complete "market model" of illegal migration is offered by presentation of a demand curve of illegal migration, based on the tolerance of the society towards clandestine foreigners. Equilibrium forces predict a non-zero level of illegal migration. The rule of law of our legal systems, according to which any illegal activity has to be reduced to zero, bears the danger of producing inefficient disequilibria. A reasonable policy of wanted and unwanted migration should address the question of how to allocate scarce resources. Ignoring social optima and equilibrium forces means to abandon public resources that could be used for other public assignments, such as schooling or foreign aid, for instance, i.e., measures that could strike the problem of illegal migration at its root.     

The status and rights of undocumented aliens in the United States

At the most general constitutional level, American immigration law contains 3 structural features that directly affect the rights of aliens, including undocumented ones: 1) the plenary power of the national government over immigration and aliens, 2) the federal system per se, and 3) the separation of powers at the national level. 4 factors that affect the rights of undocumented aliens are 1) the possibility of formal relief from deportation, 2) the possibility of procedural challenges to deportation, 3) the possibility of delay and the resulting ineffectiveness of formal immigration enforcement, and 4) the informal system of enforcement to which the Immigration and Naturalization Service has been forced to resort. Undocumented aliens in the US have full acccess to state and federal courts, possess extensive procedural rights, and have acquired important substantive rights. Recent developments concerning the rights of undocumented aliens under domestic American law raise a number of questions that have not yet been squarely faced, much less resolved in satisfactory ways. These include: 1) the actual utilization by undocumented aliens of public benefits to which they are not legally entitled, 2) the appropriate criteria for determining which rights should be established, 3) the barriers that preve nt undocumented aliens from asserting those rights, and 4) the implications for an effective and fair US immigration policy of expanding undocumented aliens' rights.     

The "albatross" of immigration reform: temporary worker policy in the United States

The author examines the history of U.S. labor and immigration policies, paying particular attention to the evolution of the temporary worker policy. Complications in the immigration reform process caused by efforts to admit more temporary workers are discussed. The position of the Reagan administration, Senate and House consideration of immigration and temporary worker bills, and the political controversies surrounding this issue are reviewed. The author points out that it was not until the major temporary worker proposals were finally removed from the Simpson-Rodino Act that passage of legislation was achieved, and he anticipates that efforts will eventually be made to revive temporary worker policy and thereby rekindle the debate     

Immigration,Bureaucracies and Policy Formulation: The Case of Quebec

Based on an ethnography of one illuminating case – the formulation of new immigration policy statement entitled “Together, we are Quebec” between 2014 and 2016 – this article argues that policy formulation is an important site of power and influence over immigration-related policies for bureaucrats. In dialogue with concepts and theories from public administration, it demonstrates that a broad mandate of reform and modernization, coupled with political tensions surrounding diversity, created opportunities for the bureaucracy to influence Quebec's immigration policy following its interests, relations, expertise and experience. In this case, the bureaucracy's influence operated through two pathways: problem definition and consensus building. While this influence is partially contingent on political and institutional characteristics of the Quebec context, this case shows that scholarship on immigration policy and politics should embrace a much broader reading of the influence of bureaucrats on the content and development of immigration-related policies.