Individual fairness in Harsanyi’s utilitarianism: operationalizing all-inclusive utility

Fairness can be incorporated into Harsanyi’s utilitarianism through all-inclusive utility. This retains the normative assumptions of expected utility and Pareto-efficiency, and relates fairness to individual preferences. It makes utilitarianism unfalsifiable, however, if agents’ all-inclusive utilities are not explicitly specified. This note proposes a two-stage model to make utilitarian welfare analysis falsifiable by specifying all-inclusive utilities explicitly through models of individual fairness preferences. The approach is applied to include fairness in widely discussed allocation examples.     

Giving in the face of risk

Decisions about how to share resources with others often need to be taken under uncertainty regarding its allocational consequences. Although risk preferences are likely important, existing research is silent about how social and risk preferences interact in such situations. In this paper we provide experimental evidence on this question. In a first experiment givers are not exposed to risk while beneficiaries’ final earnings may be larger or smaller than the allocation itself, depending on the realized state of the world. In a second experiment, risk affects the earnings of givers but not of beneficiaries. We find that individuals’ risk preferences are predictive for giving in both experiments. Increased risk exposure of beneficiaries tends to decrease giving whereas increased risk exposure of givers has no effect. We propose a simple non-linear generalization of a model allowing for other-regarding preferences, ex-post and ex-ante fairness, and risk aversion. We find some support for it in our data when risk is on the beneficiaries’ side but less so when risk is on the givers’ side. Our results point to the importance of the further development of models of social preferences that also incorporate risk preferences.     

Uncertain discount and hyperbolic preferences

This paper studies the interaction between savagean uncertainty and time preferences. We introduce a variation of the discounted subjective expected utility model, where time preferences are state dependent. Before uncertainty is resolved, the individual is unsure about the discount factor that will be used, even when evaluating certain payoffs. The model can account for the present bias and diminishing impatience, even if the future is discounted geometrically. The present bias disappears when the immediate payoff becomes uncertain. Although preferences are not stationary, choices may be time consistent.     

Effects of mediator competence and mediation process on user satisfaction with child custody,finances, and property outcomes

This study draws on survey data from 205 family mediation service users concerning their satisfaction with the outcomes of mediation to address two research questions: (a) how satisfied are service users? and (b) what factors account for users' satisfaction with the outcome of child custody arrangements and the allocation of finances and property? Overall, users' level of satisfaction with outcomes was high. While the mediation process explained a significant variance in satisfaction with the outcomes for child custody and for finances and property, the mediator's perceived professional competence did not predict user satisfaction with the outcomes for either issue. This study contributes to our knowledge on the significance of mediators' process skill, specifically their calm and clear responses to the socioemotional needs of the mediated parties, on the service outcomes for both types of dispute. The implications for mediation training are discussed.     

Fair division of indivisible items between two players: design parameters for Contested Pile methods

Contested Pile methods are two-phase procedures for the fair allocation of indivisible items to two players. In the Generation Phase, items over which the players’ preferences differ widely enough are allocated. “Contested” items are placed in the Contested Pile, which is then allocated in the Splitting Phase. Each phase can be carried out using several different techniques; we perform a comprehensive analysis of the resulting design variants using a computational model. The properties of fairness and efficiency, generally achieved in the Generation Phase, must be traded off against robustness to manipulation. We find that the recently developed Undercut procedure for the Splitting Phase outperforms alternative methods in both fairness and efficiency. In general, procedures that keep the Contested Pile relatively small and incorporate the Undercut procedure score well in both fairness and efficiency, but are prone to manipulation.     

On fairness of equilibria in economies with differential information

The paper proposes a notion of fairness which overcomes the conflict arising between efficiency and the absence of envy in economies with uncertainty and asymmetrically informed agents. We do it in general economies which include, as particular cases, the main models of differential information economies, providing in this framework a natural competitive equilibrium notion which satisfies the fair criterion. The analysis is conducted allowing the presence of large traders, which may cause the lack of perfect competition.     

Ambiguity and decision modeling: A preference-based approach

In this article, we develop a model that permits a decision maker's preferences to depend on the decision maker's ambiguity about the probability of an event that is relevant for decision-making purposes. We deal with ambiguity through preference modeling, with ambiguity leading to modifications in the utilities of outcomes. The behavior of ambiguity premiums and probability premiums as the payoffs are varied depends on the nature of the modifications in utilities. Particular forms of the model that arise under different sets of assumptions about preferences include additive, bilinear, and ratio forms. We conclude with a brief example and some thoughts about potential generalizations and implications of the model.     

Preferences for information on probabilities versus prizes: The role of risk-taking attitudes

Many real-world decisions entail choices between information on either probabilities or payoffs (i.e., prizes). Simplified versions of such decisions are examined to gain insight into preferences for different types of information as a function of risk-attitudes. General and simple decision rules are derived for cases where the utility function is concave (or convex) over the relevant payoff interval.The article further describes several experiments to test business students' intuitions concerning these optimal decision rules. In general, risk-taking attitudes did not correlate significantly with subjects' preferences for information, in violation of theorems regarding mean-preserving spreads of risk. Other tests, e.g., narrowing certain probability ranges, also resulted in preferences contrary to expected utility (EU) theory.     

教育公平缺失的多维度透视

教育公平是社会公平的基础。推进教育公平,事关社会各个阶层的利益。文章对我国社会已存在的教育公平缺失现象进行剖析和透视,有益于在消除缺失和推进公平的进程中作更深入的探索。     

To be fair,generous, or selfish: The effect of relationship on Chinese children’s distributive allocation and procedural application

Previous research has found that children’s sharing with others relies on fairness norms, but also varies according to their social relationships. The current study focuses on the conflict between fairness and relationship, exploring their impacts across two resource allocation contexts. We used a parallel work task to explore the effect of relationship with different recipients (friend, stranger, or disliked peer) on three allocation patterns (generous, fair, or selfish), when children directly allocated resources (distributive allocation), or applied different procedures to recipients (procedural application). Participants consisted of 123 Chinese children between the ages of 6 and 12. We found that in the distributive allocation context, in which participants directly decided the outcome, children primarily considered their relationship with recipients when dividing resources, not fairness. However, in the procedural application context, in which children could choose different allocation procedures for recipients, children primarily preferred fairness, regardless of social relationship. Moreover, when making distributive allocations, 6‐ to 8‐year‐olds were more selfish toward their disliked peers, whereas 9‐ to 12‐year‐olds tended to be more fair and generous toward their friends and strangers. These findings shed light on the link between social relationship and fairness within different allocation contexts among children of Chinese cultural background.     

Differential marginality,van den Brink fairness,and the Shapley value

We revisit the characterization of the Shapley value by van den Brink (Int J Game Theory, 2001, 30:309–319) via efficiency, the Null player axiom, and some fairness axiom. In particular, we show that this characterization also works within certain classes of TU games, including the classes of superadditive and of convex games. Further, we advocate some differential version of the marginality axiom (Young, Int J Game Theory, 1985, 14: 65–72), which turns out to be equivalent to the van den Brink fairness axiom on large classes of games.     

Metapreferences and the reasons for stability in social choice: Thoughts on broadening and clarifying the debate

The standard model of collective choice looks at aggregation procedures which take individual preferences as existing for a specified set of alternatives. In this paper we propose that actors also have preferences for rules of choice or characteristics of choice processes (e.g., the perceived fairness of procedures or the popularity of outcomes) rather than simply for alternatives (outcomes) themselves. We argue that the positing of the existence of meta-preferences can illuminate a number of areas of choice theory. Here we focus on one such area: the problem of “too much” stability in majority rule decision making - a stability which belies the standard theoretical results on the generic instability of majority rule processes. We also show that discussion of the prevalence of stability in collective decision making needs to be clarified because there are at least six distinct types of stability which are sometimes confounded in the literature.     

Process over outcome: How perceptions of procedural fairness influence conservative support for redistributive taxes

Though majorities of Americans express support for redistributive tax policies as a cure for income inequality in the United States, this general support tends to dissipate when the public evaluates their support for specific proposals. The dominant explanations emphasize elite behavior and the disconnect between American values and political representation. An alternative view is that this counter-intuitive finding is entirely consistent with individual values. Some people place higher priority on policy processes than policy outcomes. This paper demonstrates that conservatives think about redistributive tax policy differently than liberals. Conservative support (opposition) for redistributive taxes is based on evaluations of the fairness of processes of government that lead to economic inequality. When conservatives believe that these processes are not fair, they are very supportive of wealth redistribution as a cure for economic inequality, whereas liberal support for wealth redistribution is more outcome-dependent.     

农民工随迁子女教育公平的财政实现机制探析

农民工随迁子女的教育公平是现代城市化进程中社会公平的重要内容与客观要求。教育公平主要通过教育资源的优化配置实现每个受教育者能享受到均等的教育,它包含教育机会公平、教育过程公平和教育质量公平。公共财政理论认为,教育属于准公共物品,这也是财政支持资源相对匮乏的农民工随迁子女的义务教育的理论依据。但由于其特殊性,应建立完善的政府间经费分担机制与财政监督机制。从财政支持农民工随迁子女教育公平的现状来看,教育机会公平显失、教育过程公平脆弱、教育质量公平任重道远。上述问题的根源在于农民工随迁子女财政教育经费投入不足、经费分担机制缺乏且不合理、缺乏专门的预算制度等。因此,针对上述问题,探寻完善财政实现机制,成为当前保障农民工随迁子女教育公平的必然选择。     

Risk aversion in bargaining: An experimental study

This paper reports the results of three experiments designed to test the predictions of the principal game-theoretic models of bargaining concerning the influence of risk aversion on bargaining outcomes. These models predict that risk aversion will be disadvantageous in bargaining except in situations in which potential agreements are lotteries with a positive probability of being worse than disagreement. The experimental results support the models' predictions. However, in the range of payoffs studied here, the effects due to risk aversion may be smaller than some of the focal point effects observed in previous experiments. Implications for further theoretical and experimental work are considered.     

Valuing future cash flows with non separable discount factors and non additive subjective measures: conditional Choquet capacities on time and on uncertainty

We consider future cash flows that are contingent both on dates in time and on uncertain states. The decision maker (DM) values the cash flows according to its decision criterion: Here, the payoffs’ expectation with respect to a capacity measure. The subjective measure grasps the DM’s behaviour in front of the future, in the spirit of de Finetti’s (1930) and of Yaari’s (1987) Dual Theory in the case of risk. Decomposition of the criterion into two criteria that represent the DM’s preferences on uncertain payoffs and time contingent payoffs are derived from Ghirardato’s (1997) results. Conditional Choquet integrals are defined by dynamic consistency (DC) requirements and conditional capacities are derived, under some conditions on information. In contrast with other models referring to DC, ours does not collapse into a linear one because it violates a weak version of consequentialism.     

Risk Premiums and Benefit Measures for Generalized-Expected-Utility Theories

Standard tools for the analysis of economic problems involving uncertainty, including risk premiums, certainty equivalents and the notions of absolute and relative risk aversion, are developed without making specific assumptions on functional form beyond the basic requirements of monotonicity, transitivity, continuity, and the presumption that individuals prefer certainty to risk. Individuals are not required to display probabilistic sophistication. The approach relies on the distance and benefit functions to characterize preferences relative to a given state-contingent vector of outcomes. The distance and benefit functions are used to derive absolute and relative risk premiums and to characterize preferences exhibiting constant absolute risk aversion (CARA) and constant relative risk aversion (CRRA). A generalization of the notion of Schur-concavity is presented. If preferences are generalized Schur concave, the absolute and relative risk premiums are generalized Schur convex, and the certainty equivalents are generalized Schur concave.     

Two-Speed Evolution of Strategies and Preferences In Symmetric Games

Agents in a large population are randomly matched to play a certain game, payoffs in which represent fitness. Agents may have preferences that are different from fitness. They learn strategies according to their preferences, and evolution changes the preference distribution in the population according to fitness. When agents know the preferences of the opponent in a match, only efficient symmetric strategy profiles of the fitness game can be stable. When agents do not know the preferences of the opponent, only Nash equilibria of the fitness game can be stable. For 2 × 2 symmetric games I characterize preferences that are stable.Jel Codes: C72, A13     

Not so cheap talk: costly and discrete communication

We model an interaction between an informed sender and an uninformed receiver. As in the classic cheap talk setup, the informed player sends a message to an uninformed receiver who is to take an action which affects the payoffs of both players. However, in our model, the sender can communicate only through the use of discrete messages which are ordered by the cost incurred by the sender. We characterize the resulting equilibria without refining out-of-equilibrium beliefs. Subsequently, we apply an adapted version of the no incentive to separate (NITS) condition to our model. We show that if the sender and receiver have aligned preferences regarding the action of the receiver, then NITS only admits the equilibrium with the largest possible number of induced actions. When the preferences between players are not aligned, we show that NITS does not guarantee uniqueness, and we provide an example where an increase in communication costs can improve communication. As we show, this improvement can occur to such an extent that the equilibrium outperforms the Goltsman et al. (J Econ Theory 144:1397–1420, 2009) upper bound for receiver’s payoffs in mediated communication.     

Decision,irreversibility and flexibility: The irreversibility effect re-examined

In a seminal article C. Henry (1974) presented the irreversibility effect, which pointed out that under uncertainty, the optimal sequence of decisions depends on not only the payoffs, but also the flexibility, in terms of availability of future options, associated with each decision. But the irreversibility effect pertained to certain particular conditions and definitions. In this paper, a more general model is developed to re-examine the notion of an irreversible decision, its relation with flexibility and the irreversibility effect. It is shown through two propositions that the irreversibility effect need not hold always and the notion of irreversibiity can be used only under certain circumstances to derive the optimal sequence of decisions ex-ante.