Group Buying of Competing Retailers

Under group buying, quantity discounts are offered based on the buyers' aggregated purchasing quantity, instead of individual quantities. As the price decreases with the total quantity, buyers receive lower prices than they otherwise would be able to obtain individually. Previous studies on group buying focus on the benefit buyers receive in reduced acquisition costs or enhanced bargaining power. In this paper, we show that buyers can instead get hurt from such cooperation. Specifically, we consider a two‐level distribution channel with a single manufacturer and two retailers who compete for end customers. We show that, under linear demand curves, group buying is always preferable for symmetric (i.e., identical) retailers. For asymmetric retailers (i.e., differing in market base and/or efficiency), group buying is beneficial to the smaller (or less efficient) player. However, it can be detrimental to the larger (or more efficient) one. Despite the lower wholesale price under group buying, the manufacturer can receive a higher revenue. Interestingly, group buying is more likely to form when retailers are competitive in different dimensions. These insights are shown to be robust under general nonlinear demand curves, except for constant elastic demand with low demand elasticity.     

零售商竞争模型中的定价分析

文章在两个零售商竞争的基础上分析了增值服务对最优零售价格和各自市场需求的影响,同时也将两个同质零售商的竞争推广到多个零售商的状态,得到了使整个零售商系统可以达到各自最优利益的参数关系,并得到了最优价格向量波动的最大上限,其结论有利于供应链中的各方对市场稳定性的了解.     

Online Manufacturer Referral to Heterogeneous Retailers

Since the development of the Internet, thousands of manufacturers have been referring consumers visiting their websites to some or all of their retailers. Through a model with one manufacturer and two heterogeneous retailers, we investigate whether it is an equilibrium for the manufacturer to refer consumers exclusively to a retailer or nonexclusively to both retailers. Our analysis indicates that nonexclusive referral is the manufacturer's equilibrium choice if the referral segment market size is sufficiently large; otherwise, exclusive referral is the equilibrium choice. In exclusive referral, the manufacturer would refer consumers to the more cost‐efficient and smaller retailer. In the presence of infomediary referral, it is less likely for both exclusive and nonexclusive referrals to be an equilibrium, as the infomediary referral segment grows. We also show our qualitative results are robust even if there were price discrimination among consumers, referral position disparity, local consumers, and asymmetric referral market sizes.     

关于一种销售商合作方式的研究

本文针对一种销售商合作方式--同层转运展开研究.我们假设供应链成员采用(Q,R)订货策略,这对以往的研究是一个扩展.通过理论分析和仿真研究,我们验证了近似算法的有效性,指出这种做法确实有助于改善销售商的服务水平.文章最后探讨了进一步研究的方向.     

A Note on Optimal Selling to Asymmetric Retailers

I consider a channel with one manufacturer selling the same product to two retailers engaged in imperfect competition. The retailers are asymmetric because one has a lower marginal selling cost (or a higher demand potential) than the other. I design the manufacturer's optimal selling mechanism, whereby the manufacturer must offer the same contract options to both retailers. I fully characterize the manufacturer's optimal selling mechanism for varying degrees of retailer asymmetry and competition intensity. I find that under certain conditions, the manufacturer is better off selling a larger quantity through the high‐cost (or low‐demand potential) retailer. I also show how the optimal mechanism can be implemented using a menu of two‐part tariffs with quantity controls.     

零售商嵌入专业技术的营销策略研究

考虑零售商和技术提供商的二元结构,本文构建理论模型分析零售商嵌入专业技术的营销策略选择问题,并探讨技术嵌入以及技术营销策略对决策结果的影响。研究发现,技术提供商作为博弈的领导者在获取边际利润方面具有优势且相对稳定;并且对技术提供商而言,让零售商进行技术营销的策略是最优的。然而,对于零售商而言,不同技术营销渠道下的利润大小会受到技术产出、技术营销、以及营销努力博弈的影响,因此零售商的策略选择较为复杂。在一定的条件下,零售商可以嵌入产出贡献度较大的专业技术,并优先选择自己进行技术营销以增加技术营销贡献度。这一策略有利于零售商快速实现利润最大化,并与技术提供商实现双赢。     

双渠道模式下定价与提前期联合优化研究

在双渠道模式下,本文对零售商的价格和提前期决策进行研究。根据零售商线上服务范围的不同,双渠道服务模式可以划分为近端服务模式、中端服务模式和远端服务模式。本文分析了零售商在三种服务模式下最优的价格和提前期决策,并对三种服务模式进行对比。结果表明,如果零售商的配送速度较低,零售商应该选择近端服务模式。如果零售商的配送速度较高,则在中端和远端服务模式中进行选择,且随着成本的增加,提前期均会缩短,这是因为零售商的服务范围会随着配送成本增加而缩小,此外,配送速度的增大也会导致提前期缩短;而价格在两种模式中变化趋势不同,中端服务模式下价格呈现非递增趋势,而远端服务模式下价格呈现非递减趋势。因为在中端服务模式下,零售商更加愿意提供降价来吸引更多的线下需求,而远端服务模式则是提升价格来保证产品的边际收益。研究结论可为零售企业提供有效的科学的参考和理论指导。     

退货问题下的在线零售商最优采购量研究

供销渠道的多样性,使制造商与零售商间关系复杂性不断加大,信息不对称引发的问题越来越突出,电子商务中在线零售商退货问题成为影响在线采购的关键因素。考虑在线零售商退货问题对在线采购策略的影响,研究单位产品生产成本信息对称和不对称时在线零售商的最优采购量问题。在信息对称时,应用极大值原理求得在线零售商最优采购量;在信息不对称时,应用委托代理理论中的揭示原理构建在线零售商采购决策模型,通过最优控制理论得到在线零售商的最优采购量,并对该问题进行算例分析。研究结果表明,成本信息不对称时在线零售商的采购量比信息对称时在线零售商的采购量有所下降,因此在线零售商可提供契约促进双方实现具有改善的帕累托次优结果。     

Implications for the Role of Retailers in Quality Assurance

We investigate a manufacturer–retailer channel to explore the role of a retailer in assuring the quality of a manufacturer's product as a quality gatekeeper. Such a gatekeeping activity can entail a reduction in the defective rate for consumers, if the retailer charges the manufacturer a penalty for each identified defect that is no smaller than the market penalty for an unidentified defect. As a result of the retailer's gatekeeping, the change in the negotiated wholesale price only depends on the manufacturer's individual benefit, whereas the change in the retailer's optimal retail price is associated with the channel‐wide benefit. When the impact of quality relative to retail price on demand is higher, the retailer benefits more from her gatekeeping activity, thus having a greater incentive to take on the quality gatekeeping responsibility. Moreover, the retailer's gatekeeping generates a larger increase in the demand as well as each firm's profit, when the retailer has a stronger relative bargaining power.     

全渠道零售商退货方式和定价研究

本文以全渠道零售商不同渠道的定价为背景,以企业利润最大化为目标,以顾客退货给零售商带来的损失为出发点,从三种不同的退货方式分析退货损失对零售商不同渠道最优定价和利润的影响。首先分析传统的原渠道退货(即：从购买产品的渠道退货),然后分析所有顾客都通过线上渠道退货,进而分析所有顾客都通过线下渠道退货。研究表明：三种退货方式下,当零售商与顾客的线上单位产品净退货损失之和小于线下单位产品净退货损失之和时,全渠道零售商选择全部退货到线上渠道可获得最大利润;当零售商与顾客的线上单位产品净退货损失之和大于线下单位产品净退货损失之和时,全渠道零售商应选择全部退货到线下的退货方式以获得最大利润;传统的退货方式不会让零售商获得最大利润。本文研究对于全渠道零售虑顾客退货损失的基础上,设置最合理的退货方式和不同渠道之间的最优定价有一定的指导意义和实际应用价值。     

基于获取决策优先权的零售商战略联盟效益分析

对于由一个供应商和多个零售商组成的单一产品、单周期供应链,在确定型市场、零售商成本对称以及供应商具有关于零售商成本结构完全信息的情况下,考虑了同时带来运作成本与决策权分配变化(基于获取决策优先权)的零售商定货数量决策联盟。利用博弈论方法,研究了获取决策优先权的零售商战略联盟对参与联盟的零售商、未参与联盟的零售商、供应商以及供应链整体收益的影响。证明这种零售商战略联盟不可能使供应链中所有成员都同时增加收益。但在一定的条件下,联盟能实现某种部分"多赢";使供应链整体、供应商和参与联盟的零售商收益增加,或使供应商和参与联盟的零售商收益增加。     

How Japanese partners help US manufacturers to raise productivity

Cross-border alliances are useful strategies for technological innovation and as a basis for the adaptation of foreign technologies. This study provides evidence that through strategic alliances US automotive firms are effectively adopting manufacturing technologies from Japan, and are adapting them to the US industrial context.

The results show that US firms without foreign affiliations use fewer modern manufacturing technologies than US firms with Japanese strategic alliance partners. Furthermore, US firms with Japanese strategic alliance partners believe that manufacturing cycle times for product introduction are more efficient that US firms without foreign affiliations.     

考虑公平关切行为下竞争零售商的最优联合购买策略研究

本文考虑一个由两个竞争的零售商和一个供应商组成的两级供应链,其中供应商可通过提供批量折扣契约向两家竞争的零售商销售产品,而零售商表现出纵向公平关切(即当获得利润小于供应商的利润时,其获得一个负效用)。并且,考虑的两个零售商为了获得较低的批发价格可能更喜欢团购,进而它们将选择最佳订单数量来最大化其自身的效用。利用经典的纳什议价解决方案作为公平参考点,本文主要研究竞争与公平关切行为将如何影响零售商的联合购买策略。研究发现,当零售商追求公平时,联合购买策略优于单独购买策略,且越大竞争强度使得使用联合购买策略的优势越明显。此外,当零售商表现出不同的公平关切程度时,若批量折扣比例比较低,对公平关切敏感的零售商的效用总是小于对公平关切不敏感的零售商的效用;否则,对公平关切敏感的零售商的效用总是大于对公平关切不敏感的零售商的效用。     

Replenishment Strategies for Micro‐Retailers in Developing Countries

When formal distribution channels are absent in developing countries, micro‐retailers travel a long distance to replenish their stocks directly from suppliers. This “informal” replenishment strategy is inefficient due to high imputed travel costs involved in the replenishment process. To improve efficiency, one “hybrid” replenishment strategy has emerged under which one of the micro‐retailers in a neighborhood, while continuing its own retail business, also operates as a wholesaler to serve other micro‐retailers in the neighborhood. A major obstacle for the transition from the informal strategy to the hybrid strategy is that the micro‐retailers are reluctant to source from a wholesaler who also competes with them in the retail market. Thus, it is not clear when the micro‐retailers adopt the hybrid strategy instead of the informal strategy. Meanwhile, the micro‐retailers may prefer the “formal” strategy: a traditional replenishment strategy under which one of the micro‐retailers relinquishes its retail business and operates purely as a wholesaler. We examine a situation when competing micro‐retailers contemplate with the three potential aforementioned replenishment strategies. Our equilibrium analysis of the two‐store model reveals that the dominant strategy is: (a) the hybrid strategy when the travel cost is high; (b) the formal strategy when the travel cost is medium; and (c) the informal strategy when the travel cost is low. This key insight is shown continue to hold when we extend the two‐store model to incorporate other issues including: quantity discounts from the supplier, variable operating costs, price competition, local monopolies, and different decision sequences. One additional finding is that the transition from the informal strategy to the hybrid strategy could benefit consumers if the micro‐retailers receive quantity discounts from the supplier. Furthermore, when there are more than two stores, we show that the formal strategy is never dominant. Moreover, when the number of stores increases, the hybrid strategy becomes more preferable to the informal strategy.     

不同决策目标下受资金约束零售商的最优采购策略研究

在提前订购和延时采购两种情景下,分别考虑最大化期望收益和最小化违约概率两种决策目标,对受资金约束零售商的最优采购量和相匹配的融资策略进行分析,结果表明,相比于以最大化期望收益为决策目标,以最小化违约概率为决策目标的零售商在提前订购中将奉行"保守"的采购量和融资策略（仅耗尽自有资金量采购而不融资）,而在延时采购中采取"激进"的采购量和融资策略（与最大化期望收益下一致）;在此基础上,对不同决策目标下受资金约束零售商的最优采购时机问题进行研究发现,在最大化期望收益下,零售商的最优采购时机由产品采购成本、市场容量均值、市场容量方差、自有资金量、银行贷款利率等多个参数共同决定,而在最小化违约概率下,零售商将始终选择延时采购。     

连锁企业多品种库存分布研究

近几年来,连锁经营在我国得到了迅猛发展.本文以我国零售企业开展连锁经营迫切需要解决的多品种库存分布问题为出发点,从供应链管理的角度,在分析和借鉴前人研究成果的基础上,提出一整套适合我国连锁经营配送业务的算法模型.同时,根据配送中心实际运作的需要,采用联合订(补)货与联合配送结合的方式,有效解决了多品种库存分布问题.     

鼓励零售商提前订货策略的进一步研究

运作柔性对有生产能力限制的制造商来说是至关重要的,制造商一般希望下游零售商能够提前订货,从而减少其生产计划中的不确定性.由于市场需求存在波动,零售商预测需求往往有不可避免的误差,提前订货会给零售商带来一定的风险.因此,在Viswanath Cvsa等的研究基础上,研究提前订货的零售商具有率先进入市场的优势,制造商的生产连续或存在中断的情况下,制造商的最优行动策略.     

新零售模式下在线零售商融资均衡与协调策略研究

针对电商平台主导的新零售模式,考虑一个在线零售商和一个第三方物流企业（3PL）组成的二级供应链中,银行或3PL企业为面临资金约束的在线零售商提供融资,建立三者之间的Stackelberg博弈模型。研究发现：当在线零售商选择积极型3PL企业融资时,其订购量和系统各参与成员的期望利润更优;当满足协调条件时,若初始资金为常数,3PL企业的利率与运输费之间存在线性递减关系;当满足弱协调条件时,针对不同的初始资金,积极型3PL企业可以设计出多种融资协调合同;资金充足的在线零售商会更偏向协调的积极型3PL企业融资,而不是拒绝任何外部融资。