Existence of homogeneous representations of interval orders on a cone in a topological vector space

Necessary and sufficient conditions are presented for the existence of a pair <u,v> of positively homogeneous of degree one real functions representing an interval order on a real cone K in a topological vector space E (in the sense that, for every x,yK, xy if and only if u(x)v(y)), with u lower semicontinuous, v upper semicontinuous, and u and v utility functions for two complete preorders intimately connected with . We conclude presenting a new approach to get such kind of representations, based on the concept of a biorder.This research has been supported by the Integrated Action of Research HI2000-0116 (Spain-Italy). Also, the work of coauthors Candeal and Induráin has been partially supported by the research project PB98-551 Estructuras ordenadas y aplicaciones (M.E.C. Spain, December 1999).     

Social welfare rankings of income distributions A new parametric concept of intermediate inequality

This paper installs a new concept of intermediate inequality, which we refer to as η-inequality equivalence, in the notable form of equivalence of the Lorenz partial ordering and social welfare dominance. The η-inequality equivalence is a parameterized generalization of Krtscha’s (1994) non-linear compromise between the relative and absolute inequality views. For each η ∈ [0,1], we place a class of social evaluation functions satisfying the S-concavity as well as the property that an increase in incomes while leaving η-inequality intact raises welfare. We prove that one income distribution dominates another for all social evaluation functions in iff the former has a higher mean and a higher η-Lorenz curve. We prove also that the class is strictly increasing in the sense of inclusion as η decreases.I am grateful to Kiyoshi Kuga for his helpful comments and suggestions. I am also grateful to an anonymous referee and an associate editor for many valuable comments and suggestions that have much improved the paper. A previous version of this paper was presented at the annual meeting of the Japanese Economic Association, October 7, 2001, Tokyo, Japan. I wish to thank Takashi Toyoda for his helpful comments and suggestions at the meeting. This research was supported in part by the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology in Japan (Grant-in-aid for Scientific Research No.12630032).     

A quantitative theory of preferences: Some results on transition functions

We investigate a general theory of combining individual preferences into collective choice. The preferences are treated quantitatively, by means of preference functions (a,b), where 0(a,b) expresses the degree of preference of a to b. A transition function is a function (x,y) which computes (a,c) from (a,b) and (b,c), namely (a,c)=((a,b),(b,c)). We prove that given certain (reasonable) conditions on how individual preferences are aggregated, there is only one transition function that satisfies these conditions, namely the function (x,y)=x·y (multiplication of odds). We also formulate a property of transition functions called invariance, and prove that there is no invariant transition function; this impossibility theorem shows limitations of the quantitative method.Research supported in part by the National Science Foundation.     

Why Do They Start It? Explaining Reported Early-Teen Sexual Activity

This paper seeks an account of why young teens initiate consensual sexual activity. It does so by constructing statistical models aimed at distinguishing those who report having initiated sexual activity from those who have not in four samples of eighth graders from an Upstate New York county. Theoretical selection of the model variables is guided by insights from problem syndrome, control and differential association theories. From our findings we conclude the following: (1) Risk behaviors foreseen by the problem syndrome approach, including having used marijuana and having been drunk, are significant, powerful predictors of early-teen sexual activity. (2) The social setting of consensual sexual activity differs by sex at the eighth grade level. For example, having a boyfriend is a more consistent, powerful predictor variable for girls than is having a girlfriend for boys and there is evidence to support the hypothesis that boys initiate sexual activity in the context of status-seeking while girls are more likely to do so as a way of attaining approval. (3) Our findings do not give clear primacy to parents or peers as an influence on early-teen consensual sexual activity. Both control theory, usually associated with parental-influence variables, and differential association theory, usually associated with peer-influence variables, receive support. (4) The results of the research spanning a 2-year period of intensive community antiteen-pregnancy efforts by a Zero Adolescent Pregnancy (ZAP) campaign are consistent with the conclusion that such a multifaceted approach might help lower early-teen initiation of sexual activity.     

Regional Religions?: Extending the “Semi-involuntary” Thesis of African-American Religious Participation

This research examines religious affiliation and church attendance among African-Americans in three different regions of the United States to evaluate the thesis that the Black church represents a semi-involuntary institution shaped by historical dynamics of segregation in the rural South. We extend the analyses of others who have found the rural South to have distinctive church participation patterns by examining two nationally representative data sets (the 1972–1996 General Social Surveys and the 1984 National Alcohol Study). We explore both level and type of church attendance of African-Americans, and how patterns differ by region. Further, we refine prior analyses by (1) differentiating between members of historically White and conservative churches from those in the black mainline, (2) examining racial segregation, and (3) focusing on the type of church attendance (rather than just overall level). Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) and logistic regression models support the thesis that the rural South exhibits some distinctive patterns that make the semi-involuntary institution notion a useful concept, although patterns not predicted by the thesis are also found. The semi-involuntary thesis is also used to illuminate some church attendance patterns observed outside the rural South.     

Privacy and privilege: Patients', professionals', and the public's rights

Conflict between the individual's right to privacy and the public's right to know is increasing as insurance companies and other third parties are demanding more information about patients and clients and data banks are storing it for retrieval and later use. Social workers are ethically bound to protect the privacy of their relationships with patients and clients and the confidentiality of their communications. But there are situations in which the obligation to society is deemed greater than the individual's right to privacy, and even in states in which their patients' and clients' communications are granted privilege by law, the social worker can be required by law to divulge confidential information or risk being held in contempt of court. This paper will discuss the individual's right to privacy, privilege and its exceptions, and present examples of court decisions related to these issues.     

Queering Identities: The Roles of Integrity and Belonging in Becoming Ourselves

This article presents a picture of the complexities and contradictions in the daily lives of people in the Seacoast area of New Hampshire who identify as, or are identified as, lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender queer, questioning, and allied people (LGBTQQA). In this study, the author uses a grounded theory approach to focus on the Create Our Destiny conference. Clear patterns emerged, such as the importance of coming out, labels, and gender identity. A common theme underlying these areas was the tension people experienced between seeking a sense of belonging and maintaining their personal sense of integrity. This study shows that people in the Seacoast want to be fully and wholly themselves, or as the author represents their interests, to strive toward singularity. The author argues that striving towards singularity requires people to grapple with their unexamined codes and principles, such as those pertaining to compulsory heterosexuality and gender duality, by increasing and valuing self-awareness and reflexivity.     

Permutation cycles and manipulation of choice functions

Let be a social preference function, and let v() be the Nakamura number of . If W is a finite set of cardinality at least v() then it is shown that there exists an acyclic profile P on W such that (P) is cyclic. Any choice function which is compatible with can then be manipulated. A similar result holds if W is a manifold (or a subset of Euclidean space) with dimension at least v()-1.Presented at the Fifth World Congress of the Econometric Society, MIT, Cambridge, Mass., August 17–24, 1985. This material is based on work supported by NSF Grant SES-84-18295 to the School of Social Sciences, University of California at Irvine. Particular thanks are due to David Grether, Dick McKelvey and Jeff Strnad for helpful discussion and for making available their unpublished work.     

Subcyclic sets of linear orders

A set T of linear orders of [n] = {1,2, . . . ,n} is subcyclic if every 3-set in [n] has one order that appears in no order in T. With g(n) the maximum cardinality of a subcyclic set for n, Raz [8] proved that g(n)<cⁿ for some c>0, thus resolving a longstanding conjecture of a similar upper bound for maximum acyclic sets. The present paper proves that g(4)=14 and g(5)=42 with both maxima attained only by subcyclic sets with a particular structure for all quadruples in [n]. We conjecture a similar result for larger n, in which case g(n) is the n^th Catalan number and min(c)=4 for Raz’s bound.     

Notions of equal,or equivalent,opportunities

We formulate and study three concepts of equity designed to capture certain notions of equal, or equivalent, opportunities. The central concept is that of a family of choice sets. Given such a family , a feasible allocation z is alternatively required to be such that (i) there is B such that each agent i maximizes his satisfaction in B at z _i , (ii) there is B such that each agent i is indifferent between z _i and the maximizer of his satisfaction in B, (iii) for each agent i there is B _i such that z _i maximizes agent i's satisfaction in the union of the B _j and z _i is in B _i . Most of the standard concepts of equity can be obtained as particular cases of these general definitions by appropriately choosing . We identify conditions on guaranteeing that the resulting allocations be efficient. We apply the definitions to economies with only private goods, and to economies with public goods.This is a revised version of an earlier paper circulated under the title of Notions of equal opportunities. Early drafts were presented at the Conference on Economic Models and Distributive Justice, held in Bruxelles and Namur, January 1987, and at the Public Choice Society meeting in Tucson, Arizona, March 1987. The author thanks the participants, in particular T. Schwartz, for their comments, and NSF for its support, under grant No. 85 11136 and 88 09822. The suggestions of two anonymous referees, D. Diamantaras, L. Gevers, and H. Konishi are also gratefully acknowledged.     

An extended formulation of Arrow's theorem for k-social welfare functions

Past studies in social choice theory are generally based on the assumption that any two alternatives must be incompatible. We are concerned with the concept, k-social choice based on the assumption that just k alternatives out of p (1kp–1) are compatible. The purpose of this paper is to show an extended formulation of Arrow's theorem for k-social welfare functions.     

Social factors in facial display and communication: A reply to Chovil and others

This paper discusses the Chovil (1991) study, questioning the assumption that the notion of facial display as communication is incompatible with that of facial display as readout of motivational/emotional response. It is argued that (a) the Chovil paper oversimplifies the view of the competition; (b) social factors can facilitateor inhibit expression depending upon the nature of the emotion being expressed and the expressor's personal relationship with the other; and (c) social factors produce strong social emotions, so that any manipulation of sociality must also manipulate emotion.Preparation of this paper was supported in part by NIMH grant MH-40753 to Ross Buck, and by the University of Connecticut Research Foundation.     

The development of a capacity for concern in antisocial children: Winnicott's concept of human relatedness

Winnicott's refreshing view of clinical practice includes the unique notion that delinquency is a sign of hope. Several of Winnicott's interpersonal concepts fit together to develop this thought: holding environment, capacity for concern, the use of the object, and hate in the counter transference. In this paper these four concepts are described and the case of a ten-year-old antisocial youngster is used to illustrate Winnicott's thinking and tie some of his illusive ideas into a difficult but familiar kind of practice situation. The therapeutic approach used was a mixture of case management and play therapy. What is different however is the way in which the therapist interpreted the youngster's behavior and stimulated his rich fantasy life.     

Touristic authenticity,touristic angst,and modern reality

The tourist has become the symbol of a peculiarly modern type of inauthenticity. This paper explores the criticisms that have been directed at the reality experiences of the tourist. In so doing, the following inexhaustive typology of touristic realities is developed: 1) the first-order or true tourist, 2) the second-order or Angst-ridden tourist, 3( the third-order or anthropological tourist, and 4) the fourth-order or spiritual tourist. Each of these types represents a progressively more intense search for reality through travel. Each is, however, criticized for participating in its own form of inauthenticity.After exploring the reality experiences and criticisms of each of these travellers, the paper turns the tables on the cultured despisers of tourism to argue that perhaps the lowly first-order tourist is not so inauthentic after all. True, this traveller may not be having a real heroic adventure, but such is not the goal. Rather, the reality experienced by the first-order tourist is a pleasurable liberation from the normal concerns of everyday life which simultaneously reaffirms commitment to that reality. Quite frequently the first-order tourist is less concerned about having a real experience in the visited place than in experiencing family and friendship relationships-relationships completely ignored by the anti-touristic tourists in their search for authenticity in someone else's reality.The author would like to thank Peter L. Berger, Harry C. Bredemeier, Warren I. Susman, and M. Kathy Kenyon for their comments and suggestions on earlier versions of this paper. This research was supported in part by NIMH grant no. 5 T32 NH14660.     

The partisanship of silence: Symbolic politics of school desegration in Boston

This article analyzes the symbolic aspects of the school desegration controversy using disputes in Boston as a case in point. The symbolic communication between actors in the public forum contains implicit views of the rights and obligations of different participants in the controversy, and the role of various individuals and collectives in the history of the controversy. These views also provide a framework for understanding the position of specific actors, which may constrain their ability to participate effectively in the controversy. This article analyzes these constraints with respect to those actors who attempted to establish a mediator role between pro-integration and anti-busing forces.Prepared under grants from the National Institute of Education (NIE-6-00-3-0187, NIE-6-76-0038), National Institute of Mental Health, (R01-MH-27618) and the Carnegie Corporation.     

The Practice of Multimodal Approaches, the Challenge of Cross-Cultural Communication, and the Search for Responses

The development of multimodal approachespresents an opportunity for human beings to increasetheir competence in managing complexity, while at thesame time brings a challenge of cross-culturalcommunication. Some claim that two approaches have beenproposed for tackling this challenge: an approach offrameworks and an approach ofdiscourse. Some go further to contenddropping frameworks and taking up discourse. This paper argues that, if it istrue that there exist these two approaches, neither theframeworks nor the discourseapproach alone is sufficient. It is suggested thatresearchers and practitioners may be better equipped byparticipating in discourses with and among frameworks.Employing three metaphors, this paper proposes that, inthe way force-fields andconstellations require and imply each other, both frameworks anddiscourse are necessary for human beings to act as aPeircian fiber-cable in socialproblem-solving.Requests for reprints should be addressed to Zhichang Zhu, Department of Information Systems, Lincoln School of Management, Lincoln LN6 7TS, United Kingdom.     

What are opportunities and why should they be equal?

In order to clarify the concept of equal opportunities we need an accurate definition of opportunity. Opportunities can be defined in terms of qualifying actions through which an agent can achieve an advantageous position. It is concluded that equal opportunities is often used as a catchword in cases when opportunities are not really equal, and no one tries seriously to make them so. In many of these cases it would have been more accurate to speak of open opportunities and procedural justice. These are important enough aspects of social justice, that should be appreciated for what they are, rather than being falsely represented as equal opportunities.Received: 13 April 2001     

Marxism and methodological individualism

Conclusion Analytical or rational choice Marxism explicitly proposes to synthesize non-Marxist methods and Marxist theory. It is therefore in-appropriate to attack it solely by demonstrating that the methods advocated were not Marx's: this is, after all, acknowledged at the outset. (For this reason I have tried to show that both the assumption of MI and the process of reduction are problematic on their own empiricist or positivist terms, and have therefore largely been discarded as viable projects by philosophers of science.) Any attempt to synthesize two such distinct research traditions nonetheless demands some consideration of the metatheoretical problems that one might expect it to encounter, and this is particularly so if Marxist theory is to be recast on the basis of the positivist and empiricist assumptions explicitly rejected by Marx. Curiously, however, the analytical Marxist literature does not address such problems: indeed, metatheoretical considerations are notably absent. Discussions focus instead on particular tools of analysis, e.g., rational choice theory and game theory, as if these were neutral with respect to the underlying philosophical commitments of the two traditions. In fact, of course, these methods do reflect such commitments; after all, the justification for rational choice Marxism, infusing Marxian analyses with scientific rigor, reflects the rejection of the conception of science embodied in the Marxist tradition. By way of a conclusion I therefore briefly discuss the uneasy relationship between rational choice Marxism and classical Marxist theory. I argue that this relationship cannot be one of synthesis because the empiricist assumptions of rational choice Marxism violate the hard-core of the Marxist research tradition in at least three important ways: 1) most generally, its atomistic ontology directly contradicts the relational ontology of Marxist theory; 2) the empiricist conception of science undermines the Marxist conception of social science as critique; and 3) more specifically, rational choice and game theory mark a retreat from the social and relational philosophical anthropology of Marx back to the liberal individualist tradition initiated by Hobbes.The most fundamental incompatibility between analytical Marxism and classical Marxism resides in the differences dividing the atomistic or individualist ontology underpinning empiricism and MI from the relational ontology on which Marxist theory is based. The incompatibility of these commitments demands that a choice be made between them: either only observable individuals exist and are explanatory, or unobservable social structures and relations also exist and have explanatory import, but not both. The commitment to incompatible ontological assumptions prevents the rational choice Marxist project from initiating a progressive problem-shift in the Marxist tradition because these ontological positions form part of the hard-core of each tradition, and as such are irrefutable by [prior] methodological decision. Although changes in some of the assumptions of a research tradition are necessary to stimulate a progressive problem-shift, these changes may not occur in the hard-core, which remains by definition inviolable. That is, an ontological shift indicates not a change of direction within a research tradition, but a change from one research tradition to another. The adoption of a competing ontological stance thus results not in the reinvigoration of Marxist theory, but in its replacement with a competing research tradition. Rational choice Marxism thus cannot, as its practitioners would wish, be the means by which what is true and important in Marxism [can] be more firmly established.A second fundamental difference between choice-theoretic and classical Marxist theory concerns the status of critique in their conceptions of social science. A central component of the Marxist problématique and its notion of science is the critique of existing social structures and institutions with an eye to their (usually revolutionary) transformation. Marx believed, for example, that from the moment that the bourgeois mode of production and the conditions of production and distribution which correspond to it are recognized as historical, the delusion of regarding them as natural laws of production vanishes and the prospect opens up of a new society, [a new] economic social formation, to which capitalism is only the transition.A critique of existing social forms, however, requires both a critique of central explanatory concepts and an ontology in which the social structures and relations to be transformed are real and thus amenable to investigation. Because social relations are themselves the result of human practices, rather than natural, this critical perspective provides an understanding of the options available for radical system transformation. An individualist framework, by denying reality to social structures and relations and taking certain social institutions as natural, relegates social change to piecemeal engineering or incrementalism because it prestructures both the nature of the questions that can be asked about change and the answers that are possible. And in fact, the conservative implications of such a framework were an explicit objective of its proponents. Major structural changes are considered illusory, at best, because they presuppose a holistic or structural, and thus meaningless, conception of society. An empiricist and individualist conception of science therefore produces problemsolving theory rather than critical theory. Individualism subverts the critical element so central to Marxist theory.Finally, rational choice and game theory violate a third element in the hard-core of Marxist theory - its social or relational model of man. For Marx, the essence of man is the ensemble of social relations that are spécific to particular historical social formations. These relations constitute individuals; they confer onto them definite characteristics, motives for action, and so on. Marx thus conceived of human nature as social and mutable, rather than natural and fixed, and rejected the notion of abstract individuals considered in isolation of the social relations in which they are embedded. In fact, the idea of isolated, individual human beings is itself the product of a particular historical context. Rational choice and game theory, however, rest upon just the liberal model of man that Marx rejected. In this model, each person is assumed to be an immutable, isolated (atomistic), and self-interested calculator whose rationality is defined instrumentally. As with their respective ontological commitments, each of these contradictory conceptions of man forms part of the irrefutable hard-core of a distinct research tradition, and thus cannot be altered without stepping outside of that tradition. How, if at all, these two incompatible conceptions of human nature can be fused is thus a problem that must, at the least, be addressed by rational choice Marxists.All this does not mean, however, that game theory is completely incompatible with Marxist analysis. There clearly exist, within the purview of Marxist theory, situations of strategic interaction that would benefit from a game-theoretic representation. The issue of class compromise examined by Przeworski is a good example, as are the collective action problems faced by the capitalist and working classes. There is room here for game theory for two reasons. First, these are situations in which the context and rules of the game, the actors, and the preferences have been established by prior theoretical analyses. Secondly, they occur in societies, specifically modern, western, capitalist ones, in which actors are constituted as reasonable approximations of the rational, calculating maximizers assumed by the liberal model of man underlying rational choice and game theory. Game theory can thus provide a more or less precise representation of, and rigorously clarify the logic of, situations of strategic interaction in particular modern societies. This, however, makes it viable as an end-point of, but not as the foundation for, certain narrowly defined aspects of Marxist analysis.The role of choice-theoretic methods in Marxist theory is thus necessarily limited. The reason is simple - the Marxist problématique revolves around more general, structural questions that precede choice-theoretic analyses because these presuppose the structures and relations underlying the manifest forms of historical social formations and the behavior of individuals within them. That is, Marxist theory is concerned primarily, although not exclusively, with structural analyses, and these must necessarily be completed prior to the analysis of the intentional behavior or interactions of specific individuals. As Oilman says: In history, conceived of as history of the species, [man] is abstracted as a human being as distinct from other animals. In history, conceived of as history of classes, man is abstracted as a class being, the real subject of history on this dimension being classes. In history, conceived of as the history of capitalism... man is abstracted as the typical subject of capitalism... In history, conceived of as the history of modern English (or French or American) capitalism, man is abstracted as particular nations, religions and parties as well as factions of classes, and has begun to acquire the distinguishing qualities that justify individual names and domiciles. Only on this level of abstraction of history can we begin to speak about motivation and choice.Exaggerated claims for the use of game theory (or rational choice theory) thus neglect the fact that all inputs into a choice-theoretic analysis have in fact been established, prior to that analysis itself, by an unreduced structural theory, in this case Marxism. The context of the game, the rules of the game, the preferences of the players, and even the production and identification of the relevant actors all presuppose the structural analysis provided by Marxist theory. Logically, the game starts only after the actors have been constituted, and their order of preferences has been formed as a result of processes that cannot be considered as part of the game. Indeed, not only are these processes not part of the game, but, as was discussed earlier, they cannot be understood within a strictly individualist approach. In additon, as is evident in Elster's own discussion of the solutions to the collective action problem of the working class, the analysis of social change so central to Marxist theory cannot be grasped by game theory. Elster claims that this collective action problem can be surmounted either through a change in the preferences of the working class or through the effective exercise of leadership, thus producing a shift from a prisoner's dilemma to an assurance game. The change that produces either of these shifts is, however, clearly located outside of the game itself. That is, the PD or assurance games do not explain or contribute to our understanding of the actual change that produced the shift to class consciousness and effective collective action. At best, these games function as tools that can highlight the fact that a change has occurred; an additional explanation of that change is still required. Game theory therefore cannot provide solid microfoundations for any study of social structure and social change because all of the traditional givens of game-theoretic Marxism must be established outside the boundaries of game theory by an unreduced, relational Marxist theory that is recognized as meaningful on its own terms.     

Creating Accessible Queer Community: Intersections and Fractures with Dis/Ability Praxis

This article explores the intersections and fractures that disability theory and activism present to queer community. The authors begin by drawing upon a multiple axis approach from feminist theory, then discuss the problem of defining disability and queer. They then explore the intersections and fractures of these identities and theories, hoping to raise awareness among queer activists and scholars and introduce them to conceptual and practical tools. In particular, disability studies offers a way to reconceptualize and ground theory and practice in the messiness of real bodies and to make visible the mythic normate against which cultural Others are defined.     

Emotional Climate in a European Problem Area: East Berlin and West Berlin Three Years After Reunification

In autumn of 1992, three years after the unification of Germany, during a period of violent attacks against foreigners, 120 students from East Berlin and West Berlin and 20 foreign students living in West Berlin answered the Emotional Climate Questionnaire developed by de Rivera and Fernandez-Dols. Foreign respondents expressed a positive attitude toward their government/state and believed in prosocial behavior to a greater extent than respondents from East Berlin and West Berlin. Whereas East Berlin students disagreed only somewhat with statements in favor of selfishness and egoism, West Berlin students strongly disagreed with them. We attribute the differences that were found in the answers of the foreign students to their national values. In addition, we regard the differences between the emotional climates of East Berlin and West Berlin as reflecting a climate of instability among East Berliners. We interpreted selfishness as a kind of polarized behavior indicating a climate of instability. A factor analysis revealed 5 factors of an emotional climate: Nation's Future, Just World, Reactive Egoism, Scepticism, and Basic Egoism. The concept of emotional climate is discussed on the basis of the current data.