Uncertain lifetime, fertility and social security

Investigating the effects of population aging on fertility and economic growth, we show that an increase in life expectancy lowers the fertility rate and raises life-cycle savings, and that a pay-as-you-go social security does not reverse the effect on fertility. Received: 10 March 2000/Accepted: 28 April 2000     

Aging, fertility, social security and political equilibrium

We analyze the effect of population aging on the political choice of the size of a pay-as-you-go (PAYG) social security system, incorporating the heterogeneity of individuals in their preference for having children, and hence the endogenous fertility choices of individuals, into a simple overlapping generations model. We show that population aging may result in an increase in the contribution rate, increasing the share of the retired population who prefer a higher contribution rate; and that, if the system involves redistribution between retirees with different contributions, the increased contribution rate raises the number of individuals who have children, i.e., future contributors.     

The role of fertility and population in economic growth: empirical research from aggregate cross-national data

Two recently improved sets of cross-country panel data are combined in order to re-examine the effects of population growth and fertility on economic growth. Using a 107 country panel data set covering 1960-85, we find that high birth rates appear to reduce economic growth through investment effects and possibly through capital dilution, although classic resource dilution is not evident in the data. Most significantly, however, birth rate declines have a strong medium-term positive impact on per capita income growth through labour supply or dependency effects.We are very grateful to Allen Kelley for his careful and thoughtful comments on an earlier version of this paper (Brander and Dowrick 1991) which led to a complete re-estimation of our models using updated primary data and reconstructed secondary data sets. We are also grateful to three anonymous referees for very helpful comments. This research was begun while Brander was a Visiting Fellow at the Department of Economics, Research School of Social Sciences, Australian National University. Revisions were carried out while Dowrick was visiting the Department of Economics, University of Warwick. Research assistance was provided by Tracy Tiong. Financial support from the Social Sciences Research Council of Canada and UBC Centre for International Business Studies is gratefully acknowledged.     

Pay-as-you-go social security and endogenous fertility in a neoclassical growth model

This paper theoretically studies how unfunded pay-as-you-go social security affects economic growth, the fertility rate, and welfare in a neoclassical growth model. In addition, this paper considers a more general form of child-rearing cost, which is a mixture of time and money. The first observation is that whether the fertility rate increases or not by the expansion of the pay-as-you-go social security depends on (1) the size of the monetary child-rearing cost relative to the time spent on child-rearing and (2) the current fertility and interest rate in laissez faire. The second observation is that income per worker can increase by an expansion in pay-as-you-go social security when the output elasticity of capital is sufficiently small and the payroll tax rate is high. The last finding is that welfare can be improved even though capital is underaccumulated in an economy.     

Frustrated fertility: a population paradox

This Bulletin examines the causes of subfecundity -- the diminished ability to reproduce -- and its effect today and in the past on the fertility, or actual reproductive performance, of individuals and, hence, populations. By definition, all real populations are subfecund since all experience some degree of involuntary biological factors affecting coitus, conception, or the ability to carry a conceptus to live birth which reduces their fecundity below the estimated biological population maximum of 15 children per woman. Affecting both men and women, these factors fall into 5 categories: genetic factors such as blood group incompatibilities and inherited sickle cell anemia or diabetes; psychopathology, including psychic stress and behavioral disorders (e.g., drug and alcohol abuse); infectious diseases such as gonorrhea, malaria, tuberculosis, and postabortion infection; malnutrrition, including the chronic undernutrition of the 3rd World and the overnutrition of developed societies; and hazards posed by increasing amounts of radiation and toxic chemicals in the environment. Reducing subfecundity requires improved living conditions, avoidance of or protection from known hazards, and adoption of medical advances which now can help 40 to 60% of subfecund couples. But even in the U.S. fertility would certainly rise among the 15% of couples now estimated to be involuntarily childless and the 10% who have fewer children than they want, and among disadvantaged groups, and teenagers.     

Endogenous fertility,altruistic behavior across generations,and social security systems

The present paper explores the impact of an intergenerational externality on private fertility decisions, under a pay-as-you-go social security system. The analysis is performed in the framework of a steady state growth model, with overlapping generations. To explain why households have children, altruism between parents and children is assumed. Surprisingly, the effects of altruism are not symmetric. The private fertility decisions are optimal only if children love their parents, because children then make private transfers at exactly the right level.Comments of participants of a seminar on economic theory of Prof. K. Jaeger at Free University of Berlin at July 20, 1989, are gratefully acknowledged. I am indebted to Alessandro Cigno, Frank Klanberg and Elmar Wolfstetter for many helpful suggestions.     

Immigration,below-replacement fertility,and long-term national population trends

The long-term demographic effects of immigration on a population experiencing below-replacement fertility are studied by assuming that the size and age composition of the immigrant population do not change over time. The size of the first-generation immigrant population becomes stationary within a time period not greater than the human life span. Thereafter, the number dying equals the number entering over any given time interval. The stationarity of the native population, among which deaths exceed births, is maintained by the compensating number of births to the immigrant population. The limiting age distribution of the country's population, although stationary, may not decline monotonically with age and may look like a camel's back, with one or two humps.     

Social change,population policies,and fertility decline in Colombia and Venezuela

This paper takes a comparative case-study approach to examine the social and policy correlates of fertility decline. The analysis compares fertility behavior across a mature and young cohort of women in Colombia and Venezuela, two countries that experienced rapid demographic change under dissimilar socioeconomic and population policy conditions. Based on the distinction between birth-spacing and birth-stopping behavior the analysis tests several propositions derived from the adaptation and innovation explanations of fertility decline. Results show that fertility regulation at low parities was largely absent among mature women in both countries, representing an innovative behavior among younger women. The introduction of fertility control, however, was highly dependent on women's socioeconomic position, particularly their educational and occupational characteristics. The strong family planning programs in Colombia resulted in a more rapid extension of contraceptive use, particularly female sterilization, and stopping behavior after two children relative to Venezuela. Results highlight the diversity of conditions under which fertility can decline in developing countries and the importance of family planning and other policy initiatives to understanding the different pathways towards lower fertility.     

Social security and fertility: An international perspective

A number of population scholars have asserted that social security programs such as old-age programs lead to decreased fertility levels because parents need not rely on children for "security" in old age. There is, however, a paucity of empirical data on the above. This paper analyzes 67 countries and shows that social security programs have a measurable negative effect on subsequent levels of fertility. In fact, the social security programs appear to have as much of an independent impact on fertility as do the traditional correlates of fertility (infant mortality, education and per capita income).     

Social security,social welfare and the aging population

This study examines the effects of pay-as-you-go social security programs in aging economies when the middle-aged both educate their dependent children and subsidize the retirement of the old. Using an overlapping generations framework in which agents are three-period lived but timing of death in the third period is uncertain, we analyze the effects of social security tax schemes, under various demographic assumptions, on capital accumulation, education expenditures, social welfare, and economic growth. We find that in many cases social security crowds out education, and reduces economic growth and social welfare. Received: 29 April 1998/Accepted: 3 March 1999     

Effects of public education and social security on fertility

Introducing a fertility decision and child care cost into an overlapping generations model with public education and social security, we examine the effects of these public policies on fertility. We show that an increase in income tax, which finances social security benefits and public investment in education, increases fertility. On the other hand, with a constant tax rate, a change in the allocation from social security benefits to public investment in education decreases fertility and, with a constant social security tax, the effect of education tax on fertility is neutral.      

Sixty years of change in Tibetan fertility: An assessment

Existing knowledge of Tibetan historical population development is mostly based on ‘best-guess’ estimates and is heavily politicized. Using census data, I reconstruct the development of Tibetan fertility in China since the 1940s, with the objective of providing an independent assessment that can be used as benchmark for future studies and debates on Tibetan demography. Following major social and economic transformations starting in the 1950s, Tibetan fertility unexpectedly increased from the late 1950s to the late 1960s. As noted in several existing studies, Tibetan fertility in China then declined swiftly from the early 1980s onwards and has now reached values close to replacement level. Focusing on the 1950–70 period, I examine factors that contributed to shaping the Tibetan fertility increase in more detail. This confirms that changes in nuptiality and disease-related infertility both played a role in pushing up fertility rates among Tibetan women in China.     

Politics and fertility: a new approach to population policy analysis

This paper aims to explain why divergentpopulation policies and programs arise in otherwisesimilar countries and to clarify how such policiesrelate to fertility decline. An analysis wasundertaken of demographic and policy change over a 30year period in four pairs of developing countries: Algeria and Tunisia; Bangladesh and Pakistan; thePhilippines and Thailand; and Zambia and Zimbabwe. Insome countries, popular demand for family planningfacilitated changing policy. In others, independentfactors, such as economic crisis or internationalpressure, pushed policy makers into action onpopulation policy, often in the absence of populardemand. In these countries, governments whichidentified a coherent rationale, usually economic, forreducing population growth, tended to develop moresuccessful policies. Strong and financially securecoalitions of policy elites were important in sharingthe political risk associated with such policies. Analysis of these processes has lessons for policymakers and researchers interested in expeditingimplementation of new approaches to population andreproductive health.     

Women’s fertility, religion and education in a low-fertility population: Evidence from South Australia

The old issue of religion and fertility is examined in relation to women s level of education. In-depth interviews exploring influences on parity for Adelaide parents in 2003–04 suggest that more frequent attendance at religious services in childhood, and affiliation with particular religious denominations, are related to both higher preferred and higher achieved parity, even for women with university education. For some university-educated women, their religious upbringing appears to play a part in negating the traditional relationship between higher education and lower fertility. Quantitative data on religion, fertility and educational level from the 1996 Census for women aged 40–44 in South Australia show that women with No Religion had lower fertility than those With a religion, while university-educated women in New Protestan-New Christian groups had higher fertility than university-educated women in other denominations. The findings provide an understanding of some social conditions that support higher fertility in a low-fertility population. Future fertility research in developed countries should include consideration of the influence of religious affiliation and religiosity at disaggregated levels of inquiry.     

Application of the Own-Children Method for estimating fertility by ethnic and religious groups in the UK

Fertility across and within countries is influenced by a number of socio-economic and cultural factors, including ethnicity and potentially religion. However, apart from census data, little information is available, at least in the UK, to estimate fertility rates and thus fertility trends by ethnic and religious groups between censuses. Previously, the Labour Force Survey (LFS) has been exploited to produce national total fertility rates (TFR) by ethnic groups up to 2001 using the reverse-survival Own-Children Method (OCM). Here the LFS–OCM is assessed and refined to improve accuracy and tested against official statistics. The LFS–OCM is compared with results obtained using more straightforward techniques based on Child-Woman Ratios using the same LFS data, and differences are discussed. The refined method is applied to produce recent fertility profiles by ethnic groups, including trends in the TFR and age-specific fertility rates, showing significant and decreasing differences between groups. Furthermore, the method allows us to reliably investigate TFR within one ethnic group by other criteria, as illustrated by differences in the TFR by religious affiliation of Indian women.     

Posterity and population growth: fertility intention among a cohort of Nigerian adolescents

Population growth is probably the greatest global challenge of the twenty-first century and fertility is a central element of this growth. Fertility is a human attribute which depends almost entirely on social, economic, political, cultural and psychological frameworks, making fertility intention an element of what individuals learn from a very young age as part of their socialisation into society. The fundamental significance of socio-psychological, environmental and cultural factors in what adolescents are assimilating on fertility cannot be exaggerated, yet, relevant information is limited. Eight factors deduced from ecological model and theory of planned behaviour were used to predict fertility intention among a cohort of Nigerian adolescents, using cross-sectional design. Mean fertility intention was 4.06 ± 1.34. Age and religion had no effect, but gender did. Self esteem, perceived parental expectation of fertility, attitude towards fertility and peer-related subjective norm are significant predictors. Media and ethnic attitude are insignificant predictors of, but are significantly related to fertility intention. Attitude towards a four-child family and perceived behavioural control yielded insignificant relationships with, and also failed to predict fertility intention. Perceived parental expectation of fertility, an interpersonal factor of the ecological model is the single most important predictor (β = 0.707, R² = 0.506, r = 0.711, and partial r = 0.710). Fertility intention points towards fertility decline, though sluggish and diminutive, thereby failing to reflect the need of Nigeria’s population pyramid to thin out from the base.

     

Birth spacing and fertility limitation: a behavioral analysis of a nineteenth century frontier population

Our analysis of changing birth interval distributions over the course of a fertility transition from natural to controlled fertility has examined three closely related propositions. First, within both natural fertility populations (identified at the aggregate level) and cohorts following the onset of fertility limitation, we hypothesized that substantial groups of women with long birth intervals across the individually specified childbearing careers could be identified. That is, even during periods when fertility behavior at the aggregate level is consistent with a natural fertility regime, birth intervals at all parities are inversely related to completed family size. Our tabular analysis enables us to conclude that birth spacing patterns are parity dependent; there is stability in CEB-parity specific mean and birth interval variance over the entire transition. Our evidence does not suggest that the early group of women limiting and spacing births was marked by infecundity. Secondly, the transition appears to be associated with an increasingly larger proportion of women shifting to the same spacing schedules associated with smaller families in earlier cohorts. Thirdly, variations in birth spacing by age of marriage indicate that changes in birth intervals over time are at least indirectly associated with age of marriage, indicating an additional compositional effect. The evidence we have presented on spacing behavior does not negate the argument that parity-dependent stopping behavior was a powerful factor in the fertility transition. Our data also provide evidence of attempts to truncate childbearing. Specifically, the smaller the completed family size, the longer the ultimate birth interval; and ultimate birth intervals increase across cohorts controlling CEB and parity. But spacing appears to represent an additional strategy of fertility limitation. Thus, it may be necessary to distinguish spacing and stopping behavior if one wishes to clarify behavioral patterns within a population (Edlefsen, 1981; Friedlander et al., 1980; Rodriguez and Hobcraft, 1980). Because fertility transition theories imply increased attempts to limit family sizes, it is important to examine differential behavior within subgroups achieving different family sizes. It is this level of analysis which we have attempted to achieve in utilizing parity-specific birth intervals controlled by children ever born.(ABSTRACT TRUNCATED AT 400 WORDS)     

Marriage patterns and fertility of the world population]

Marriage patterns of the world population may be divided into two major categories; i.e., the traditional marriage pattern, and the European marriage pattern. Characteristics of the traditional marriage pattern are: early marriage, a high percentage of married people, and a low percentage of people who remain single during their lifetime. Characteristics of the European marriage pattern include: late marriage and a higher percentage of females who do not marry in their lifetime. In most parts of Asia and Africa and some Latin American countries, the traditional marriage pattern is dominant, and the birth rate in these countries has remained very high. Most countries in Europe show the characteristics of the European marriage pattern, and the fertility rate in these countries is comparatively low. Some other countries, such as Sri Lanka, are in a process of transformation in their marriage pattern, and their fertility level also shows a transition from a high fertility rate to a lower fertility rate. There is a close relationship between marriage patterns and the level of fertility.