THE AMBIGUOUS CONSEQUENCES OF ANTI-DUMPING LAWS

The anti-dumping law is most often applied in oligopolistic industries, while most analyses focus on the monopoly model. I analyze a duopoly model where a foreign firm engages in price-based dumping. Under Cournot behavior, the anti-dumping law has ambiguous price and welfare effects. When the home firm is a Stackleberg leader, two disquieting effects emerge. First, the home firm can use the anti-dumping law to curtail competition even when the foreign firm does not initially engage in dumping. Second, the anti-dumping law can increase profits of both firms at the expense of domestic consumers.     

THE DEMAND TO REGULATE FRANCHISE MONOPOLY: EVIDENCE FROM CATV RATE DEREGULATION IN CALIFORNIA

The motivation to price control a franchise monopoly is examined in the context of three distinct economic views of regulatory behavior. These views are tested against data from the California cable television market, over the years 1980–85, during which a subset of monopoly firms converted from regulated to unregulated pricing for basic cable service. As the price constraints of regulation appear to be insignificant in a welfare analysis, the demand for such controls by municipalities is derived from their utility in enforcing vote-maximizing transfer schemes–a Peltzmanian political outcome with a Stiglerian economic welfare result.     

BERTRAND COMPETITION WITH ASYMMETRIC MARGINAL COSTS

This article tests the prediction of three discrete asymmetric duopoly price competition games in the laboratory. The games differ from each other in terms of the size of the cost asymmetry that induces a systematic variation in the difference between the firms' marginal costs. While the standard theory requires the low‐cost firm to set a price just equal to the high‐cost firm's marginal cost, which is identical across all three games, and win the entire market, intuition suggests that market price may increase with a decrease in the absolute difference between the two marginal costs. We develop a quantal response equilibrium model to test our competing conjecture. (JEL L11, L12, C91, D43)     

A model of monopoly and “efficient” unions with endogenous union coverage: Positive and normative implications

We present a model of a rent-maximizing union that organizes to increase its coverage of an industry and analyze monopoly and “efficient” unions in this setting. Our model is unique in that we allow for a competitive industry with free entry and find union and nonunion firms coexisting with product market equilibrium. This is achieved by incorporating the insight that firms are heterogeneous in productive characteristics. An important implication of our model is that an “efficient” union that covers a nontrivial share of the market is not efficient and may in fact be less efficient than a monopoly union.     

COLLUSION, EFFICIENCY AND PRICING BEHAVIOR: EVIDENCE FROM THE BANKING INDUSTRY

This paper examines the validity of competing hypotheses used to explain the observed positive relationship between concentration and profits. Using price proxies from the banking industry, we find that leading (secondary) firms in a market act as price-setters (price-takers). This is true regardless of market concentration. We interpret this as evidence of the superior efficiency of leading firms and conclude that the higher profits earned by these firms is due to their superior efficiency and not collusive behavior.     

TRANSPARENCY IN MARKETS FOR EXPERIENCE GOODS: EXPERIMENTAL EVIDENCE

We propose an experimental design to investigate the role of information disclosure in the market for an experience good. The market is served by a duopoly of firms that choose both the quality and the price of their product. Consumers differ in their taste for quality and choose from which firm to buy. We compare four different treatments in which we vary the degree to which consumers are informed about quality. Contrary to theoretical predictions, firms do not differentiate quality under full information. Rather, both tend to offer products of similar, high quality, entailing more intense price competition than predicted by theory. Under no information, we observe a “lemons” outcome where quality is low. At the same time, firms manage to maintain prices substantially above marginal cost. In two intermediate treatments, quality is significantly higher than the no‐information level, and there is evidence that prices become better predictors of quality. Taken together these findings suggest that information disclosure is a more effective tool to raise welfare and consumer surplus than theory would lead one to expect. (JEL L15, C91, D82)     

INFORMATION VALUE UNDER DEMAND UNCERTAINTY AND ENDOGENOUS MARKET LEADERSHIP

In an oligopoly model with firms choosing to produce in one of two periods, we identify the circumstance under which a firm's having early information regarding stochastic demand results in market leadership. High demand volatility leads to Stackelberg competition with the information‐advantaged firm leading. In the N‐firm case an equilibrium with multiple leaders and multiple followers emerges endogenously. In a duopoly information acquisition game we identify conditions that determine whether neither, one, or both firms will pay to acquire early information and note that one firm's obtaining early information may generate a positive externality benefitting its competitor. Both symmetric and asymmetric outcomes are possible and Stackelberg market leadership may occur in equilibrium, but only when firms have different costs of information. Our finding that an information advantage may convey leadership which then affects the value of information to the players applies to other settings exhibiting first‐mover advantage such as certain public good provision games. (JEL C72, D82, L13)     

Promotion to Partner in Professional Service Firms

A shift away from up-or-out, theconventional promotion system in professional servicefirms, has been explained as part of a wider set ofchanges in internal labor market arrangements andmanagement methods. This is investigated empirically in a sample oflarge partnerships in one profession. Up-or-out was usedby less than one-third of the sample of firms but iscommon among the largest firms. Internal reforms to the professional firm do not fully explainits rarity; up-or-out appears to be adaptable to newforms of management and internal labor market policies.This raises a number of questions about the utility of theoretical explanations of how professionalservice firms work or are changing.     

INDUSTRIAL STRUCTURE AND MONOPOLY POWER IN THE FEDERAL BUREAUCRACY: AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS

Predictions of various models of public sector supply rely on the assumption of bureau monopoly power. This assumption is tested first by measuring industrial structure of the federal public sector using the concentration ratio and Herfindahl index, and second by examining the relationship between the resulting estimates and bureau monopoly power. The findings indicate that monopoly structure of the federal bureaucracy is more limited than is generally assumed. Interpretations on the basis of traditional industrial organization theory and contestable market theory suggest that bureau monopoly power is questionable and may not be the source of observed inefficiencies in bureau supply.     

THE NONPROFIT FIRM: A POTENTIAL SOLUTION TO INHERENT MARKET FAILURES

This article analyzes the differences in products offered by nonprofit and for-profit firms in a monopolistically competitive industry where goods are differentiated both by product attributes and by the degree to which benefits are public. Because nonprofit firms receive donations, they provide a Pareto improvement of the equilibrium product set: nonprofit firms will be less biased against goods with a high social good component than will their for-profit counterparts, hi addition, the optimal donations function which equates the nonprofit equilibrium product set to the set which maximizes societal welfare is derived.     

THE LIMITS TO GROWTH

This article examines aggregate real estate firm mortality rates in a group of metropolitan areas during the 1960s and 1970s. Real estate firms play a critical role in the local growth machine, yet no research has examined the environmental limits which these firms experience. A set of ecological hypotheses are constructed which detail the influence of task and institutional environments on aggregate firm mortality rates. The findings show the sensitivity of firms to their local context, although standard market forces are not operating. In addition, period differences suggest that larger societal forces interact with the local land market, increasing aggregate mortality rates over time. Results support recent observations of the local land market made by the "new urban sociology."     

Globalizing Firms and Small Communities: The Apparel Industry's Changing Connection to Rural Labor Markets*

Abstract This paper explores changing relationships between apparel firms and rural labor markets in Wisconsin over the last decade. Mainstream explanations of recent changes in the apparel industry suggest that rural communities will lose tedious or physically demanding, low‐skilled apparel manufacturing jobs but will gain more information‐intensive and desirable “apparel service” employment. Through case studies of apparel firms located in two Wisconsin communities, the paper argues that current changes in the industry not only affect communities unevenly but, even in regions where apparel service firms have provided significant numbers of new jobs, these jobs are less well paid, more casually structured, and less secure than manufacturing employment has been. The paper argues that current concepts of the economic embeddedness of firms in communities need to be refined to permit consideration of the kinds of leverage and voice that community organizations have in confronting new forms of corporate capital. The two case studies demonstrate that corporate embeddedness and its labor market outcomes are linked to changes in the global market in which firms compete.     

ZONING UNDER SPATIAL PRICE DISCRIMINATION

This paper investigates zoning in a duopoly model of spatial price discrimination. We find that the zone in which the firms are not allowed to locate depends on the bias of the regulator. A bias toward firms is deduced when locations around the central area are forbidden, and a bias toward consumers exists when firms are only allowed to locate at places around the central area. The design of the zoned area guarantees that firms locate optimally and works under simultaneous or sequential choice of locations by the two firms. (JEL L13, R38)     

AN OPTIMAL MIDDLEMAN FIRM PRICE ADJUSTMENT POLICY: THE "SHORT-RUN INVENTORY-BASED PRICING POLICY"

This paper examines the optimum pricing policies of middleman firms who carry an inventory of goods bought for resale. Each period the firm in the theoretical model is required to post a price before it observes its realized demand. In disequilibrium situations, the firm's profit-maximizing pricing policy is shown to be a "short-run inventory-based pricing policy" which requires the firm to post a price below the long-run equilibrium price upon observing its actual beginning inventory level above its optimum level, and to post a price above the long-run equilibrium price upon observing its actual inventory level below its optimum level. The final section suggests that the use of such policies by middleman firms will lead to market price adjustments which are both consistent with the "law of supply and demand" and which are based on explicit maximizing behavor.     

CREDIBLE SIGNALS OF THE RELEASE OF NEW VERSIONS

Prices can credibly signal whether a durable‐goods monopolist will offer an improved good in the future. When the future release of a new version is private information, a monopoly seller will reveal a failure to develop and market a new version with a lower price than he or she would charge in full information. A firm would be willing to pay more to innovate when consumers are uncertain than if they are informed ex ante because a failure to innovate is punished by a low equilibrium price. Consumers' uncertainty about innovation intensifies an unsuccessful innovator's Coasian problem and increases consumer welfare. (JEL D82, L12, L15)     

Union membership,economic rents,and migration behavior

This study represents an extension of the human capital paradigm as it relates to an individual’s decision to migrate. It differs from previous studies by incorporating union membership, a labor market variable, into the model. In effect, the National Labor Relations Act of 1935 granted a monopoly bargaining position to unions. The theoretical implication of a union’s monopoly bargaining position is that union wage levels will increase relative to nonunion wages. The increase of relative wages results in union membership granting a property right that possesses positive net present value and hence reduces an employed union member’s probability of migrating. Additionally, the supra-competitive remuneration of union members results in a surplus of labor supplied to union firms. Employers respond by using quality screening to hire workers from the larger labor pool. As a result, unemployed union members will on average possess higher levels of human capital, which will increase their probability of migrating above that of their unemployed nonunion cohorts.     

ESTIMATING MARKET POWER IN HOMOGENOUS PRODUCT MARKETS USING A COMPOSED ERROR MODEL: APPLICATION TO THE CALIFORNIA ELECTRICITY MARKET

This study proposes a novel econometric approach to estimating market power in homogenous product markets. We use a composed error model to estimate the stochastic part of firms' strategic pricing equation. This part is formed by two random variables: a traditional error term, which captures random shocks, and a random conduct term, which measures the degree of market power. This approach allows for the conduct parameter to vary flexibly across firms and within firms over time, and avoids ad hoc structural restrictions for identifying firms' conduct. The empirical application of our approach is based on a well‐known California wholesale electricity market data set, which has been rigorously used to study market power. Our results suggest that realization of market power varies over both time and firms, and reject the assumption of a common or time‐invariant conduct parameter. (JEL C34, C51, L13, L94)     

RENT-SEEKING FIRMS, CONSUMER GROUPS, AND THE SOCIAL COSTS OF MONOPOLY

Do consumers' consumer-surplus (CS)–defending activities increase the social costs of monopoly compared to when consumers are inactive? Given just one rent-seeking firm, consumers ' CS-defending activities generally increase the social costs of monopoly, but given two or more rent-seeking firms, such activities generally reduce the social costs. (JEL D72, L12)     

An empirical analysis of union election outcomes in the electric utility industry

Unions in the electric utility industry consistently won a greater percentage of elections between 1970 and 1989 than did unions in other industries. Several factors significantly affected union victory rates at electric utilities: when the election was held, the union involved, the size of the utility, the percent of the state’s labor force unionized, the number of eligible voters, whether the election involved multiple-unions, and whether the election was Regional- or Board-directed.     

Minimum wages and the wessels effect in a monopsony model

The Wessels model suggests that firms respond to increases in the minimum wage rate by decreasing the level of fringe benefits — an action which produces an inefficiency effect that lowers workers’ utility and the supply of labor. Standard models of monopsony, however, argue that wage floors prevent the exercise of market power and increase employment. I show that wage floors, even with fringe benefit curtailment, may increase employment by lowering the marginal expense of labor. Employee utility and employment will rise somewhat but not as much had the firm acted competitively in setting both wages and fringes.