双重委托代理下独立董事治理效应研究

为深入理解独立董事在双重委托代理关系下的治理功用,并为构建具有中国特色的公司治理结构提供理论借鉴,运用双重委托代理理论对独立董事治理效应进行分析,结果表明:一方面为监督CEO而提高董事会中独立董事比例,CEO会越不愿意与董事会共享公司内部信息,使得独立董事难以直接降低第1类代理成本;另一方面,为监督大股东侵占而必须进行的独立董事"独立化"有可能在抑制第2类代理问题的同时,削弱大股东治理机制的有效性,诱发严重的股东与经理层之间的利益冲突,间接增加第1类代理成本。     

Women on corporate boards: key influencers or tokens?

This paper investigates how the increasing ratio of women directors on corporate boards is associated with decision-making dynamics, specifically the perceived participation and influence of the women on the board. We test hypotheses using a sample of 458 women on Norwegian corporate boards where the ratio of women directors among board members ranges from 11 to 100%. Overall, we find that women perceive that they have a high level of information sharing, a low level of self-censorship, and a high level of influence across the different ratios of board membership held by women directors. These results support the notion of women directors as significant influencers. However, the results also show that women directors perceive that they do receive more information and engage in more informal social interaction when the ratio increases, and perceived influence does also increase when the ratio increases.     

董事激励与公司业绩--实验的证据

我们在实验框架下检验了董事会成员的激励对股东财富和CEO报酬的影响,以及该报酬与公司业绩之间的敏感度.文中提出了两种任命董事的方法,一种由CEO任命,另一种由最大的股东自动担任董事.由董事会决定CEO的报酬,而CEO负责企业的生产、投资和分红决策.投资者根据接收到的每个公司的分红、资本收益这些信息,通过买卖这些企业的股票来调整他们的资产组合. 我们发现,薪酬与业绩之间的敏感度随董事持股比例的增加而上升.此外,当大股东作为董事会成员时,经济体所产生的财富(股东财富是其中的一部分)更大;而当CEO选择董事时,结果是缺乏效率的.本文讨论了关于董事职能和相关代理成本这一研究结果,以及标准会计框架下,限制执行人员报酬和报表标准化要求.     

Board of directors and insider trading with share repurchase programs

This study examines the relationship between insider trading and board of directors’ characteristics around stock repurchase announcements. It is hypothesized that information disparity between insiders and shareholders from share repurchases announcements creates opportunities for insiders to time their trading. However, there is little evidence on whether board characteristics reduce the probability of insider trading with repurchase announcements. Using data from firms listed on Forbes 500 between 1998 and 2004, we found that insider trading is related to share repurchase announcements. In order to focus on board of directors’ role, we controlled for board characteristics that may change the repurchase decision. Our results provide corroborative evidence of insider net selling around repurchase announcements and the advantages of board characteristics to offset insider trading. In particular, the results suggest that board tenure, directors’ ownership and board directorship change positively insider trading around repurchase announcements. Hence, Securities and Exchange Commission should consider rigorous restrictions on share repurchase announcements and be aware of potential influence of the corporate governance device.     

外资参股、董事会特征与商业银行经营绩效——基于中国121家商业银行的实证分析

董事会是公司治理的核心,本文首次从外资股东参与董事会治理的视角,在运用固定效应模型和手工收集面板数据的基础上,使用分组比较研究方法,实证检验了2007-2016年121家商业银行外资参股、董事会特征与经营绩效的关系,结果发现引入外资参股的商业银行中：（1）董事会规模、非执行董事占比、董事会会议频率、专业委员会数目均与经营绩效之间存在显著正相关关系;（2）董事会中外资董事占比的增加,董事会规模、董事会会议频率、专业委员会数目与经营绩效之间的正相关关系均会显著减弱,然而非执行董事占比与经营绩效之间的正相关关系则会显著增强。据此,本文建议商业银行引入外资参股后：（1）应鼓励外资参与董事会治理,适当扩大董事会规模;向外资股东提供适量的非执行董事席位;适度增加董事会会议频率;积极完善专业委员会体系。（2）控制董事会中外资董事占比的不合理增加,确保外资董事与独立董事之间的实质性独立。     

Corporate governance and board accounts: exploring a neglected interface between boards of directors and management

There is an absence of research about what information boards of directors have access to and how they use that information. The purpose of this paper is to explore and theorize about the content and use of information to boards of directors. The paper introduces and elaborates on the concept of ‘board accounts’, which is defined as the information supplied to boards of directors by top-management. The paper locates the board accounts in the Swedish institutional setting and demonstrates how the concept can be operationalized in an empirical setting. On the basis of a unique material of archived board records in a Swedish company, the paper explores the board accounts over a period of 10 years (1989–1998). It is found that while use of the board accounts in the case study company changes considerably over time, the content of the board accounts remains largely unchanged. This raises questions about where and when directors receive information, the reliability of the information in the board accounts, and recent attempts to integrate corporate governance and management accounting (CIMA, Performance reporting to boards: a guide to good practice, 2003; CIMA strategic scorecard: boards engaging in strategy, 2005; Seal, Management Accounting Research 17(4):389–408, 2006). Finally, the paper discusses the merits of historical archive-based approaches in this field and possibilities for future research.

Can you catch two birds with one stone? The impacts of nominating committee composition on board monitoring and resource provision

While it has long been recognized that boards of directors perform two primary functions – monitoring and resource provision – little research has systematically examined the relationship between these two functions in public corporations. Given the growing external emphasis on the monitoring function by investors and advocates of corporate governance reforms, it is important to understand how such an emphasis impacts the resource provision function. In addition to identifying the composition of the nominating committee as a key to understanding the relationship, we propose two mechanisms through which the formation of an independent nominating committee in response to the external emphasis on monitoring leads to a decline in board resource provision. One mechanism is through a decline in information sharing between top managers and the nominating committee in new director selection, which results in a divergence between board capital and the firm's specific resource needs. The other is through decreased trust between the CEO and the board, which results in a less collaborative CEO-board relationship. To alleviate this negative impact that an external emphasis on monitoring has on resource provision, we propose that boards can bring non-CEO executives back onto nominating committees as inside directors. Our theoretical analysis contributes to the understanding of how the composition of the nominating committee influences board monitoring and resource provision, and has important implications for corporate governance research and practices.     

中小商业银行公司治理机制与经营绩效关系的实证分析

理论和实证研究证明,良好的公司治理对金融体系稳健运行有十分重要的作用.商业银行公司治理的研究和实践既是银行业改革的迫切要求,也是银行业改革的核心内容之一.本文用36家商业银行2005年的截面数据,对股权结构、董事会、监事会和高管人员薪酬激励等四个治理机制与银行绩效之间的关系进行了实证研究.结果表明,国有与非国有控股商业银行绩效不存在显著差异,第一大股东对银行绩效的影响并不显著,但外部大股东能显著地提高银行绩效.董事会与监事会规模与银行绩效正相关,但独立性难以得到保证.此外,高管人员薪酬激励不能改善银行绩效.     

董事会里的"战争"——序贯与惩罚机制下董事会决策行为的实验分析

本文利用实验研究方法首次在独立董事人数占优的董事会中引入序贯和惩罚机制,探讨了董事会科学决策的促成因素及制度环境.实验结果发现,序贯与惩罚机制引入后,董事决策正确率较静态实验分别提高了39.09%和34.26%,但两者的作用原理不同:序贯机制着力于改善董事会的私人信息结构,通过将独立董事"知情化",从而使决策行为独立于董事类型;惩罚机制则是利用独立董事的社会偏好进行治理,使决策行为与项目类型无关.与Gillette等人的研究结果不同,好项目的通过率并不是100%,原因可能与序贯时的针锋相对策略、惩罚时的社会偏好存在有关.     

How does interpersonal justice affect outside directors’ governance behavior? A cross-cultural comparison

We examine the impact of interpersonal justice among outside directors on the board and between a director and the CEO regarding the director’s monitoring and resource provision behaviors in different cultural contexts. We argue that directors from individualistic countries are more influenced by CEO interpersonal justice while directors from collectivistic countries are more affected by the board interpersonal justice. Our main effect results indicate that interpersonal justice with board members is positively related to both monitoring and resource provision by a director, while CEO interpersonal justice is related only to resource provision. Our results also show different effects on the director’s behaviors between three countries, i.e., Canada, Singapore, and Spain. We found that CEO interpersonal justice is positively associated with resource provision in Canada, while board interpersonal justice is positively related to both monitoring and resource provision in Singapore and Spain. These results suggest that directors discharge their board duties differently by how they are treated by other directors and the CEO and that their governance behaviors vary by culture. This study contributes to the literature on comparative corporate governance by showing the differences in directors’ behaviors in different cultural contexts.     

SOCIAL NETWORKS IN THE BOARDROOM

This paper provides evidence that social networks strongly affect board composition and are detrimental to corporate governance. Our empirical investigation relies on a large data set of executives and outside directors of French public firms. This data source is a matched employer–employee data set that provides detailed information on directors/CEOs as well as information about the firm employing them. We find a strong and robust correlation between the CEO's network and that of his directors. Networks of former high‐ranking civil servants are the most active in shaping board composition. Our identification strategy takes into account not only firm and directors’ fixed effects but also the matching of firms and director in terms of one observable and one unobservable characteristic. Turning to the direct effects of such network activity, we find that firms in which these networks are most active pay their CEOs more, are less likely to replace a CEO who underperforms, and engage in less value‐creating acquisitions. These findings suggest that social networks are active in the boardroom and have detrimental effects on firms’ governance.     

Board attributes and foreign shareholdings in Malaysian listed firms

This study examines the association between foreign shareholdings and several characteristics of board of directors in the context of a developing capital market. Using data of 777 listed firms on Bursa Malaysia for the financial year 2008, the study predicts that foreign shareholdings are positively related to board independence, multiple directorships, and financial literacy of the board of directors. The study finds a strong positive relationship between multiple directorships and foreign shareholdings. Contrary to our expectation, the association between board financial literacy and foreign shareholdings is negative and significant. With regard to the link between board independence and foreign shareholdings, we find weak evidence to support our prediction that there is positive relationship between board independence and foreign shareholdings. The multivariate results also show strong positive relationships between foreign shareholdings and number of foreign directors on boards, and between foreign shareholdings and audit quality. The study also documents a significant negative association between foreign shareholdings and firm size, and between foreign shareholdings and book-to-market ratio. The findings of the study supports the view that multiple directorships is an important asset to firms in emerging markets partly due to limited pool of potential talents and experts which in turn could signal reputational capital and quality of directors. Since there is a mandated presence of finance and accounting qualified director on the audit committee, foreign shareholders can somewhat rely on the oversight of audit committee instead of depending entirely on the board of directors for the quality of financial statements and financial reporting oversight. Finally, the presence of foreign directors on a board of directors may signal a firm’s commitment to adopt good corporate governance practices. It is also possible that foreign investors can influence corporate governance through their participation on the board of directors.     

Women on boards and bank efficiency in ASEAN-5: the moderating role of the independent directors

Corporate governance codes around the world promote women’s presence in corporate board. The extant literature suggests women directors contribute to improve monitoring and advisory role of the board. This study aims to examine the role of independent women directors in improving banks’ efficiency. Using 102 commercial banks from ASEAN-5 countries for a period of 1999–2012, we run generalized method of moments models to test the relationship between the variables. Our results show that banks with independent women directors on board contribute significantly to the bank’s efficiency level. Contrary to the literature, we found that the appointment of women directors or independent directors alone does not significantly enhance banks’ efficiency. The result suggests that women directors are more effective on boards if they are also appointed as independent directors. This finding implies that a combination of corporate governance mechanism is more powerful than relying on a single element of corporate governance.     

Symbolic Management and the Glass Cliff: Evidence from the Boardroom Careers of Female and Male Directors

This paper uses archival board data to demonstrate that women who take positions as directors of UK companies have shorter tenures than their male counterparts. The authors show that female directors face a much higher risk of dismissal as they approach nine years of service on the board, when their long service deprives them of the all‐important classification as ‘independent’. At this point, their position on the board becomes precarious. Male directors do not suffer the same increase in boardroom exit. This gender‐specific difference is clearly shown to be linked to the independence status. It is argued that these observations are consistent with the notion that female directors are being used in the symbolic management of corporate governance and that, at nine years, when the cloak of independence disappears, women directors are then exposed to the biases that arise from role congruity issues.     

现代公司治理结构与会计舞弊关系的实证研究

本文以我国证券交易所成立至2003年12月31日期间被证监会公开查处的财务报告舞弊的上市公司为样本,比较全面地选取了分别代表公司治理结构中董事会特征、监事会特征、经理层特征、股权结构等方面的14个指标对公司治理结构与会计舞弊之间的关系进行了实证研究。研究结果发现内部人控制度、国家股比例、股权制衡度与财务报告舞弊显著正相关,法人股比例、股权集中度、高级管理层持股比例与财务报告舞弊显著负相关。     

The Service Role of Outside Boards in High Tech Start‐ups: A Resource Dependency Perspective

Despite growing interest in the board of directors of entrepreneurial firms, the role of outside board members in high tech start‐ups has been largely neglected. This dearth of research is surprising since the high level of resource dependency these ventures face is likely to heighten the potential contribution outside board members can make. We argue that, for high tech start‐ups, the service role the board plays will be crucial in overcoming resource dependencies. In contrast to existing studies that tie the outside boards’ servicing role to board characteristics, we propose that greater attention needs to be paid to the resource profile of the venture. Building on resource dependency theory, we find that the extent to which the outside board members fulfil a service role is dependent on the initial human, financial and technological resource base of the entrepreneurial venture. Specifically, we find that ventures with less diversified teams, teams with lower levels of R&D experience and higher levels of financial experience and ventures earlier in the technological development process receive higher levels of support from the outside board.     

董事会规模、内生性与公司绩效研究

纵观有关董事会治理机制的经验研究文献,可以发现绝大多数学者都面临着变量的联合内生性问题.重点关注在内生条件下,董事会规模和公司绩效的关系.使用中国上市公司2004年度数据研究发现,董事会规模是一个影响公司治理的重要因素,但是,与现有的研究文献不同,没有发现董事会规模与公司绩效显著相关.这个结果表明,平均而言,中国公司选择了最优的董事会规模.董事会规模在截面上的变化只是反映了公司运营环境的不同,而非公司对这些治理机制的不合理运用.     

Corporate social responsibility,board of directors,and firm performance: an analysis of their relationships

This paper aims to contribute to the empirical evidence relating corporate social responsibility (CSR), board composition, and firm performance. Using a sample of Spanish listed firms included in the IBEX 35 over the period 2005–2010 the results show that the percentage of independent directors affect firm CSR activities, and that this effect is moderated by the resources available to the firm (measured by return on assets). Also, the CSR has a mediating role on the relation between the independence of the board of directors and firm value. These results hold for other board characteristics (board size and women as directors).     

Why and when female directors are less engaged in their board duties: An interface perspective

Female representation on boards is perhaps one of the most studied topics in board-governance research. At the same time, much is unknown about female directors' task engagement within boards. Drawing from psychological theory on societal gender beliefs, our study tests whether the impact of director gender on supervisory task engagement hinges on status dynamics in two relational interfaces: the director–board interface and the director–CEO interface. According to this perspective, female directors show less task engagement because gender is a diffuse status cue that creates status differentiation within the director–board interface. Multi-source board survey data (n = 61 boards, n = 315 directors) confirms that, within the confines of the boardroom, female directors do, indeed, receive lower-status ratings than male directors. This effect is weaker when boards have a female chair. Furthermore, lower status explains perceived lower task engagement of female directors, but this link critically hinges on the CEO–director interface. The impact of status differences is more pronounced when directors intersect with a relatively dominant CEO. All in all, the results demonstrate that relational interfaces play a key role for female directors’ task engagement in their board duties.