Own‐Choice Marriage and Fertility in Turkey

Goode's foundational work on the fertility transition identified own‐choice marriage as a factor driving fertility decline, part of a widening repertoire of choice pertaining to marriage and childbearing. Yet research supporting this connection in today's transitional societies is scarce and somewhat contradictory, and it is unclear how other marital traditions, such as consanguineous marriage, shape this relationship. This study evaluates Goode's theorized connection using pooled Demographic and Health Survey data from Turkey, comparing children ever born, use of contraception, and parity progression across four types of marriage: own‐choice and arranged marriage and marriage to a cousin versus an unrelated spouse. Results are largely consistent with the idea that a move toward own‐choice marriage reflects a widening repertoire of choice that also leads to fertility decline. However, they also show that hybrid models like own‐choice marriage to a cousin tempers these effects.     

Marriages and fertility among Turkish and Moroccan women in Belgium: results from census data

The patterns of family formation and fertility behavior of Turkish and Moroccan women in Belgium are changing rapidly. The census data (1991) indicate a fertility decline. The reasons are changes in the nuptiality patterns, contraceptive behavior, and migratory flows. The changes are not identical in both communities. Young cohorts postpone their marriage, but this is most prominent among Moroccan women. On the other hand, young Turkish women have a clear preference for smaller families. The changes also differentiate according to migrant "generation" and level of education. The changes are not restricted to Belgium but are also observed in the countries of origin.     

Chinese women's participation in fertility discussions

In an attempt to better understand the process through which the family planning (FP) programs and socioeconomic developments in China affect fertility, women's participation in fertility discussions with their husbands are examined as an intermediate factor in a study based on results of a random survey of 6654 ever-married women of reproductive age from 7 cities and 30 counties of Guangdong. First, it must be noted that Chinese couples do have individual choices (albeit quite limited ones) about their fertility; they can choose to follow or ignore government policy or they can choose to remain childless. The present study has 3 major hypotheses: 1) the more a woman is involved in fertility discussions with her husband, the fewer children she will have; 2) urban women with a higher educational status will be more likely to have such discussions; and 3) women who are contacted individually by FP personnel are more likely to be involved in fertility discussions. After a discussion of data collection and variables (number of living children, education of wife and husband, age at marriage, residence, living with parents, contacted by FP personnel, and discussion with husband), the results are presented in terms of zero-order correlation coefficients indicating their relationships. The bivariate analysis supported the hypotheses. Multiple regression analysis showed that age at marriage, education of wives and husbands, FP contacts, and participation in discussions remain significant fertility determinants (but the correlation between fertility and residence becomes trivial). A further regression model indicated that a woman's educational attainment is the most significant positive indication of their participation in fertility discussions. These results imply that as women's status continues to improve in China and the deeply-rooted patriarchal tradition loses hold, increased gender equity and education will influence a fertility decline. FP personnel could also encourage women to actively participate in fertility discussions with their husbands.     

Women's Status,Fertility Decline,and Women's Health in Developing Countries: Direct and Indirect Influences of Social Status on Health

Abstract In the present three‐wave study of 72 developing countries, we use growth curves to examine how changes in fertility and level of fertility mediate the effect of women's social status on women's health as measured by infant mortality, maternal mortality, and female life expectancy. We find that level of female education, average age at marriage, and the percentage of married women using contraceptives influence attained level of fertility, with controls for economic growth and dependency status. Change in fertility, however, is predicted only by average age at marriage and by level of education. Change in fertility, in turn, predicts improvement in all three women's health indicators, while the level of fertility predicts improvement in maternal mortality and infant mortality. In addition to the mediating effects of fertility, both age at marriage and education contribute directly to reduced level of infant mortality; level of primary education contributes directly to reduced levels of maternal mortality; and use of contraceptives contributes directly to improvement in female life expectancy. These findings provide strong evidence that women's social status makes direct contributions to women's health which cannot be attributed to economic growth, dependency status, and/or the mediating effects of level and change in fertility. The policy implication for developing countries is that greater gains can be made in women's health, particularly maternal health, by improving women's social status, especially in rural areas.     

Fertility,education, and social change

Level of education in India affects the age at marriage, the role of women, the desire to maintain and raise the standard of living, mobility , and cultural values all of which contribute to a couple's motivation to practice birth control. A review of differential fertility studies carried out in different parts of India indicates that generally the level of education and fertility are inversely related. However, the conclusions showing mean fertility at different levels of education are not uniform and this suggests that there is a critical level of education above which self-motivation, the conscious effort at family limitation on the part of the couple, determines the fertility level. Couples with less education may be inspired to practice birth control after reaching a certain parity. In India, level of education, by raising the age of marriage, widening the non-familial role of women, raising the desired standard of living, increasing geographical mobility and inculcating the small family norm, either directly affects fertility or induces the need for a small family. These variables are a direct result of education and operate most effectively upon couples educated at the level of professional and post-graduate degrees. The small family norm can also be instilled in couples with secondary and college levels of education and family planning will be practiced after the desired number of children is reached. Both self-motivation and sustained motivation are almost absent in couples with only primary or less education. Studies indicate that this section of the population will practice birth control only at high parity levels with outside encouragement.     

Education and fertility: policy implications for developing countries

Efforts to reduce the high rates of population growth in Africa are largely hampered by a social and political climate which does not recognize high birth rates as a problem. Only 2 countries (Kenya and Ghana) are actively antinatalist officially, the rest being actively pronatalist or taking no firm stand. The author argues that support for family planning will grow only when governments support mass education programs. A framework showing the linkages between fertility and formal education is developed. On the demographic level, pursuit of higher levels of education delays entry into marriage, directly and through pursuit of occupations which do not encourage early marriage. Lowered infant mortality through improved utilization of modern health care by the educated also leads to reduced fertility. On the sociocultural level, migration to urban centers among the educated leads to new cultural norms and constraints on large families from the pursuit of modern careers. The author asserts that the inverse relation between education and fertility is well known, and that national support for mass education is needed to speed economic development, change the position of women and alter peoples' values.     

Why is the Divorce Rate Declining in Indonesia?

This article examines trends in marital dissolution in Indonesia. Analysis considers the impact of educational expansion, delayed marriage, urbanization, increasing employment before marriage, legislative change, and increased free choice in marriage on the decline in marital disruption. Trends such as delayed marriage and educational expansion account for about one third of the decline in marital dissolution. Moreover, factors associated with marital disruption are shifting in importance. In particular, age at marriage and marital duration are becoming less reliable predictors of marital stability, whereas education is becoming more important. We conclude that the shifting forces governing marital formation and dissolution in Indonesia have modified the linkages between the conjugal couple, broader kinship systems, and modes of economic support such that traditional patterns sustaining high levels of marital instability are no longer in effect.     

What Explains the Decline in First Marriage in the United States? Evidence from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics, 1969 to 2013

Rates of entry into first marriage have declined sharply in the United States during the past half century, and there is evidence of broad gaps in marriage entry by race and education. Although a large literature explores the influences on marriage for single cohorts, there is little research that tests explanations for this decline across multiple cohorts. The authors use individual and contextual measures of employment and incarceration to predict transitions to first marriage in the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (1969–2013). They test two prominent theories of why marriage rates have declined: the decreased availability of “marriageable” men and the increased economic standing of women. They find that men's reduced economic prospects and increased risk of incarceration contributed to the decline in first marriage rates during the past 45 years in the United States, although these basic measures of economic and carceral conditions cannot explain the entire decline.     

Population change in Burma: a comparison of the 1973 and 1983 censuses

"A comparison of the 1973 and 1983 censuses provides ample evidence of a decline in fertility in Burma [Myanmar]. The proportion of children in the population fell substantially in the ten-year period accompanied by a significant increase in the mean age at marriage as indicated by the higher female...mean age at marriage. An analysis of the regional variations in population density indicates inter-regional movement of population. While there is marked success in the literacy programmes as indicated by the sharp reduction in the prevalence of illiteracy, especially among the females, changes in the industrial and occupational structure of the labour force suggest worsening economic conditions. Under these circumstances, it is surmised that the fall in fertility, without any concerted government policy for inducing such a decline, may be a first-level and benign response of a more literate and hence more informed population to rising aspirations and the inability of the economy to accommodate these aspirations."     

How female education reduces fertility: models and needed research

Although the correlation between female education and fertility has been documented, the operators that link greater female education to lower fertility at either the individual or aggregate levels have not been specified or submitted to systematic empirical tests. Discovering which aspects of female education account for reduced fertility requires a refined conceptualization of the education-fertility relationship as well as identification of all the causal variables and operators that mediate the effects of female education. A series of propositions from the research literature regarding indirect effects of female education on fertility through effects on age at marriage or first conception, labor force participation, social mobility, economic utility of children, exposure to mass media, knowledge and use of contraception, husband-wife communication, and infant mortality are set forth along with their rationale and empirical support. These propositions are supplemented by 1 on the direct effects and 3 on the interaction effects of female education on fertility. A block-recursive model is presented by means of which the 12 propositions can be brought together and assessed. A methodology for applying appropriate statistical procedures to World Fertility Survey or other high quality data arranged in the form of multivariate models in order to decompose the direct, indirect and joint effects of female education is then proposed and discussed.     

Having Kids Later. Economic Analyses for Industrialized Countries

Main trends are presented on fertility, age of the mother at having her first child, and time that young people spend in fulltime education. Fertility is declining and is now well below the population replacement rate in all European countries. To some extent the fertility decline is caused by postponement of motherhood in the sense that the decline would have been smaller if mothers of successive generations were not getting increasingly old. But why are women and men forming families so late, and what role is played by the extension of formal education?     

Women's status and fertility in the Sudan

This paper summarizes the history of women's education in Sudan; data on the relationship between their educational levels and fertility; and data on the relationship between fertility and women's employment. In general, the data point to an inverse relationship between the education of women and fertility. This relationship exists when considering the education of husbands. In terms of employment, women who report no work experience have the highest fertility, those who are self-employed or are family workers have an intermediate level of fertility, while those women who work for others have the lowest level of fertility. Education appears to be more closely associated with fertility than employment. The author concludes that as the status of women shifts to perceptions based on education and gainful employment, fertility will decline. However, in the Sudan, strong traditional values, based on women's roles related to childbearing and childrearing, will continue to sustain a relatively high fertility rate. (author's)     

The impact of female education on fertility: a natural experiment from Egypt

This paper presents new evidence on the impact of female education on fertility in Egypt using the change in the length of primary schooling as the source of exogenous variation in education. Beginning in 1988, the Egyptian government cut the number of primary school years from six to five, moving from a 12-year system of pre-university education to an 11-year system. This policy change affected all individuals born on or after October 1977. Using triennial pooled cross-section data from 1992 to 2014 and a nonparametric regression discontinuity approach, we compare education and fertility of women born just before and right after October 1977. Our analysis shows that female education significantly reduces the number of children born per woman. The reduction in fertility seems to result from delaying maternal age rather than changing women’s fertility preferences. We also provide evidence that female education in Egypt does not boost women’s labor force participation or affect their usages of contraceptive methods. Female education, however, does appear to increase women’s age at marriage which might explain the delay of maternal age.     

Fertility adaptation of Turkish and Moroccan women in the Netherlands

"After a short overview of fertility trends among Turkish and Moroccan immigrants in the Netherlands, based upon population and vital registration data, determinants of these trends are analysed using survey data on cumulative fertility as well as on desired fertility." The author concludes that although "a long time series of data is not yet available due to the fairly recent history of the migration of Turkish and Moroccan women to the Netherlands, it appears that their fertility level is declining. Migrant fertility levels are lower than in the countries of origin.... Factors in the decline of overall immigrant fertility are variables related to the country of destination: work and education, insofar as this education was received in the Netherlands." (SUMMARY IN FRE AND SPA)     

Education and changing reproductive behavior in Ghana

It has recently been posited by several researchers that a fertility transition is under way in Ghana. Such fertility decline would be the first instance on the west coast of Africa. Data from the 1988 Ghana Demographic and Health Survey allows closer assessment of this earlier speculation. Review of the data suggests that earlier assertions of the existence of fertility transition were premature and hastily drawn from fragmented evidence. Little evidence exists to support any hypothesis of a fertility turnaround in ghana. The findings are, however, cautiously optimistic with some indication that continued increases in the proportion of women with some secondary education may yet induce a fertility transition in the country. The author notes the lack of individual motivation to reduce fertility in Ghana and questions the merit of continuing family planning programs in such an atmosphere. Measures to reach men in family planning messages and to expand the level of women's education are recommended. Success in reducing fertility in Kenya as a result of increasing women's education is noted.     

The effect of marriage on fertility intentions: an approximation with cross-sectional data

"Cross-sectional data are used to create a quasi-longitudinal design to explore the effect of marriage upon fertility intentions. It is found that as a result of marriage, men are likely to become more inclined towards fertility while women become less so. These results are in part due to differential values regarding marriage and the family." The data are for 800 individuals who were students at a university in the western United States in 1974.     

The Decoupling of Marriage and Parenthood? Trends in the Timing of Marital First Births, 1945–2002

Family formation changed dramatically over the 20th century in the United States. The impact of these changes on childbearing has primarily been studied in terms of nonmarital fertility. However, changes in family formation behavior also have implications for fertility within marriage. The authors used data from 10 fertility surveys to describe changes in the timing of marital childbearing from the 1940s through the 21st century for non‐Hispanic White and non‐Hispanic Black women. Based on harmonized data from the Integrated Fertility Survey Series, the results suggest increasing divergence in fertility timing for White women. A growing proportion of marriages begin with a premarital conception; at the same time, an increasing proportion of White women are postponing fertility within marriage. For Black women, marital fertility is increasingly postponed beyond the early years of marriage. Evaluating the sequencing of marriage and parenthood over time is critical to understanding the changing meaning of marriage.     

Cohort fertility of men and women in the Federal Republic of Germany. A measurement with data from empirical social research]

The availability of mates and the consequences for cohort fertility by sex in Germany is analyzed using pooled data from various fertility surveys conducted since 1900. "All German male cohorts born before 1930 have a greater number of children than their female counterparts. German men up to cohorts around 1930 experienced favourable conditions of the marriage market due to the consequences of the two World Wars....The general decline of births beginning around 1970 will, however, turn around this relative position. Leaving the preferred age-difference between spouses unchanged smaller female cohorts will now be able to select partners from greater (and older) cohorts of potential male partners. These changing relative positions are already visible in the differences between male and female cohort fertility." (SUMMARY IN ENG)     

Korea's Strong Familism and Lowest-Low Fertility

Abstract:  The emergence of lowest-low fertility in southern and eastern Europe dramatically changed the relationship between fertility and its covariates. Today, low fertility countries are characterized by low female labor force participation, low gender equity, robust marriage institution, and strong familism. It is assumed that the discrepancy between an advanced socioeconomic system and robust family patterns is an important cause of lowest-low fertility. The Republic of Korea is a typical case where the conventional family pattern causes disharmony with socioeconomic development and depresses fertility. The direct cost of children has been rising rapidly because of the Confucian value of education and strong family ties. The tight labor market conditions and the increasing uncertainty about the future are depressing nuptiality as well as marital fertility. The robustness of traditional gender role division checks the improvement in compatibility between work and the family and sustains the high opportunity cost of childbearing. Although the Korean government announced an ambitious pronatal program in 2006, the budget is so limited that its effect is questionable. Furthermore, a large part of the difference between moderately low and lowest-low fertility is attributed to cultural patterns and is beyond family policy.     

Changing Gender Norms and Marriage Dynamics in the United States

Using a regional measure of gender norms from the General Social Surveys and marital histories from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics, this study explored how gender norms were associated with women's marriage dynamics between 1968 and 2012. Results suggested that a higher prevalence of egalitarian gender norms predicted a decline in marriage formation. This decline was, however, only true for women without a college degree. For college‐educated women, the association between gender norms and marriage formation became positive when gender egalitarianism prevailed. The findings also revealed an inverted U‐shaped relationship between gender norms and divorce: An initial increase in divorce was observed when gender norms were predominantly traditional. The association, however, reversed as gender norms became egalitarian. No differences by education were found for divorce. The findings partially support the gender revolution framework but also highlight greater barriers to marriage for low‐educated women as societies embrace gender equality.