Induced inefficiency as a response to the union threat

Milkman and Mitchell (1995) extend Rosen’s (1969) threat-effect hypothesis to suggest that the threat of unionization can induce inefficient underutilization of labor by nonunion firms. If firms follow this strategy, the apparent paradox of competitive coexistence in the face of higher union wages reflects induced nonunion firm inefficiency rather than superior union firm efficiency. Furthermore, this strategy decreases demand for nonunion workers in a partially unionized industry. A generalized cost function analysis of data from sawmills in the Pacific Northwest yields evidence that nonunion firms use this strategy.     

The contribution of exclusive representation to union strength

In this paper we show that exclusive representation and other union security agreements contribute substantially to union strength. A regression analysis of the growth of unionism among teachers during the 1970s measures just how potent exclusive representation and dues checkoff agreements are in stimulating union growth in the public sector. Further discussion prompts the conclusion that these powerful measures are especially inappropriate in the public sector, for they excessively coerce employees’ representation and benefit employers, not employees.     

The community as a source of union power

In recent years, the labor movement has expressed interest in using the community as a source of union power in dealing with employers. This paper explores labor’s historical relationship with the community, examines the emphasis on more effective uses of the community in core union activities, identifies the communities with which labor aligns itself in coalitions, and discusses the strategies employed to form alliances with community groups. Finally, an analysis of some of the key barriers and limitations that affect prospects of the formation and effectiveness of union-community coalitions is presented. The author acknowledges and is grateful for the research assistance of Trudy Labovitz and Ellen Hufnagel. Also, appreciation is expressed to the following persons for valuable comments on an earlier draft: Roger Ahlbrandt, Jr., Robert Atkin, Paul Clark, Donald McPherson, Robert Perloff, Vida Scarpello, and Gerald Schoenfeld.     

The welfare economics of the future

Conclusion Reasons and Persons is one of the most important works of recent moral philosophy. No economist whose work impinges on moral philosophy can afford to ignore it.I have benefited very greatly from discussion with members of the Economics and Philosophy Departments of Bristol University about Reasons and Persons and about this review. And I am particularly grateful to Deborah Mabbet, Adam Morton and Amartya Sen for their comments     

The division of union rents

In this paper, a median voter model that recognizes the trade-off between higher wages and lower levels of employment is presented. It is argued that a seniority-based layoff rule creates the opportunity for mutually beneficial side-payments between older and younger workers. As a result, older workers reap more of the rents of unionization than do younger workers. The resulting distribution of union rents is found to be consistent with existing empirical evidence. We would like to thank Mike Baye and Gene Grossman for most useful comments on earlier versions of this paper. Any remaining errors, of course, are solely our responsibility.     

The compensation of national union presidents: Moderating effects of union size

Over the last forty years numerous reseachers from the fields of economics, finance, and human resources management have proposed and empirically evaluated a number of models in efforts to identify determinants of executive compensation. Recently, similar research efforts have been undertaken to identify compensation determinants for union officers, both at the local and national levels. As an extension of these works, this study found measures of union financial strength, job complexity, performance and tenure in office to be directly related to national union presidents’ compensation. Although union income and relative union member earnings were the strongest determinants of officer compensation for the sample of unions as a whole, analyses of three subgroups of unions based on size revealed very different findings for large as opposed to small and medium-sized unions.     

Behavioral economics and the economics of Keynes

The aim of this paper is two-fold: it first evaluates some of the psychological insights offered by Keynes in his economic theories, and secondly it weighs up these insights in the light of recent research in behavioral and experimental economics. We found that many of the psychological ideas set forth by Keynes in his economic works, especially in The General Theory, have a defensible behavioral foundation and fit broadly the actual behavior of economic agents in the real world as suggested by recent empirical evidence. As a consequence, we argue that Keynesian economics can benefit from this interaction, especially for issues related to judgment under uncertainty and building solid microfoundations for macroeconomics.     

The contribution of behavioral economics to tax reform in the United Kingdom

This paper examines the contribution of behavioral economics to tax reform by examining two major reforms in the United Kingdom which may be seen as natural experiments – the reform of local taxation and the introduction of value added tax. The case for both was based strongly on mainstream economic analysis but one was a failure and the other a success. The introduction of the local community charge, or ‘poll tax’ as it became known, was such a failure that not only did it have to be repealed but it was also a factor in the downfall of Mrs. Margaret Thatcher as Prime Minister. The introduction of value added tax took more account of behavioral factors and was successful. The paper concludes that a wider approach based on behavioral as well as mainstream economics may have considerable advantages in developing tax policy.     

The changing scope of union organizing

This paper presents a profile of the change in the scope of union organizing and provides empirical support for the numerous observations about the declining importance of jurisdictions in the selection of organizing targets. The scope of organizing is measured in terms of the distributions of the NLRB certification elections of 18 selected unions for 1973–1975 and 1983–1985. Diversity and concentration in organizing and its impact on election outcome are examined. The authors thank Azia Merchant for his assistance.     

AFSCME as a political union

AFSCME has emerged as the third largest union in the U. S. and the largest public-sector affiliate of the AFL-C1O. Since the 1960s, its leadership has vigorously pursued organizing and political action. Despite its highly visible role in U.S. politics, little systematic research exists on the union in this context. I examine AFSCME's political apparatus, the scope of its electoral and legislative involvement, its political ideology and legislative priorities, and its political effectiveness. I also explore the controversy regarding the use of compulsory dues for political purposes, and AFSCME's resulting rebate procedure. I find that AFSCME donates a considerable portion of its resources to political action (between 10 percent to a third of its budget at the international level), that its political ideology is focused heavily on expanding the rights and economic status of public employees, and that AFSCME has emerged as a prominent, if not the prominent, political union in the U.S. labor movement.     

The deceptively simple economics

conclusion My approach for the first time connects profit maximization to work force composition given full information. Physical productivity, which dominates so much popular dis-cussion of this issue, matters, but demand-side factors are also important. Defining a firm’s optimal work force composition is nonsensical until at least the product’s char-acteristics, the extent to which different markets value them, and the extent to which groups inherently differ in their capacity to provide them are precisely defined.     

The inflation-unemployment trade-offs of union members

Social preference functions between inflation and unemployment are estimated for individuals classified by union status using Gallup Poll presidential popularity data. We expected union members to assign higher weights to unemployment and lower weights to inflation than those who are not union members, but we found the reverse. Union members weight unemployment relative to inflation less than nonunion members because they weight unemployment less. Given the emphasis that trade union leaders place on reducing unemployment rather than inflation, this suggests a divergence in views between union leaders and the rank and file. The authors are indebted to Jeff Moore and an anonymous referee for helpful comments on earlier versions of this paper. Any remaining errors are our own. Smyth’s research was aided by the LSU Foundation.     

The application of building economics

This paper does not propose a solution to the problem, rather it identifies the scope of the problem. It is one which must be tackled urgently and methods must be devised for making information readily and easily handled. At this workshop, a brief presentation will be made of a possible solution which has been proposed for a public sector estate. It is hoped that the discussion will focus on: a method of establishing the size of the problem on an international scale; the key facts about an estate which management needs to know in order to manage the estate; and the means by which strategic management information should be collected, stored, updated and disseminated.     

The economics of faking ecstasy

In this paper, we develop a signaling model of rational lovemaking. In the act of lovemaking, a man and a woman send each other possibly deceptive signals about their true state of ecstasy. For example, if one of the partners is not in ecstasy, then he or she may decide to fake it. The model predicts that (1) a higher cost of faking lowers the probability of faking; (2) middle-aged and old men are more likely to fake than young men; (3) young and old women are more likely to fake than middle-aged women; and (4) love, formally defined as a mixture of altruism and demand for togetherness, increases the likelihood of faking. The predictions are tested with data from the 2000 Orgasm Survey. Besides supporting the model's predictions, the data also reveal an interesting positive relationship between education and the tendency to fake in both men and women.     

The economics of short-term leasing

Short-term leasing is an everyday occurrence. Tax savings cannot account for the ubiquity of leasing by temporary users. Monopoly explanations are inconsistent with concurrent leasing and selling markets for perfect substitutes. Leasing economizes upon the costs of detecting, assuring, and maintaining quality, costs of search, and costs of risk-bearing. This view is based on standard economic reasoning and has numerous specific implications.     

The economics of employment protection

Empirical investigation of the labor market consequences of employment protection has mushroomed since Lazear's (1990) pioneering study. Having sketched the theoretical background, we chart the course of the modern empirical literature. We focus mainly on dismissals protection, distinguishing between the themes of employment and unemployment development and labor market dynamics proper. Our discussion of employment and unemployment largely deals with the effect of employment protection on levels of these outcome indicators. We distinguish between overall and compositional effects (e.g., by demographic group and type of contract), between developing and industrialized nations, and identify some key control variables. Our discussion of labor market dynamics focuses on the speed of adjustment issue and on gross flows. It also formalizes the link between analyses of levels of and changes in variables. At all times potential offsets to the adverse effects of employment protection receive consideration.