双边信息不对称的供应链契约机制效率:基于实验研究北大核心CSSCI

契约机制是协调供应链企业行为的重要理论方法,却很少被实验验证。本文通过实验室实验的方法验证双边不对称信息下的供应链契约机制的效率。首先,简化了制造商和销售商双方各自成本信息不对称的数学模型,并基于此给出相应的契约机制和相应的数值算例,以此作为实验设计的基础。其次,按照实验经济学基本规范设计实验并进行了20轮有效实验。实验结果显示:(1)随着实验进行,被试真实共享信息的频率有逐渐增大的趋势,并在实验后半段频率趋于稳定。全程实验中,制销角色双方在真实共享信息比例都在63%以上.(2)被试的个体收益会受到对方信息是否真实共享的影响。如果任一方或双方谎报信息,双方收益都会受损。通过实验,我们发现如果决策者理性进行决策---最大化其期望收益,则会真实的共享信息。因此,理论契约机制在激励制销双方真实共享信息上总体是有效的,其效率损失的主要原因是被试个体的非理性行为。     

考虑销售商风险规避的双边信息不对称的供应链协调

非对称信息和风险态度成为影响供应链协调的重要因素,而契约机制设计是实现协调的一种方法。本文在双边成本信息不对称情形下研究供应链契约机制的设计问题。考虑了由一个风险中性的供应商和一个风险规避的销售商组成的二级供应链,供应商和销售商分别拥有私人的生产成本信息和销售成本信息。在分散决策下,供销双方为获得更好的私人利得从而有隐藏信息的动机。为实现信息的真实揭示,文中引入了利他委托人这一概念,从而供应链成为协调主体。借助AGV机制思想,设计了具有激励性质的转移支付,并且基于均值-方差方法建立了非对称信息下的供应链模型。我们发现销售商风规避度在一定范围时,所设计的激励机制能够实现供销双方信息的真实揭示,但并不能完全保证双方的事后非负收益。为解决这一问题,给出一种以期望信息租金比为基础的事后收益分配规则,设计了补偿参数。结合转移支付和补偿参数,提出了一个契约机制。我们发现当销售商风规避度不超过上界k_r时,该机制能真实的揭示信息,并且能够保证供销双方的事后合理的收益分配。此外,当供销双方真实揭示信息时,风险规避度较大的销售商组成的供应链有更低商品交易量和供应链收益。最后,给出数值算例,验证信息揭示的激励有效性并对风险规避度进行敏感性分析。本文的研究将对双边不对称信息下的供应链管理提供一定的理论基础和实践指导。     

承销商与发行人的信息不对称程度测算——基于双边随机前沿模型

本文基于双边随机前沿模型对2005-2018年我国新股发行市场上承销商和发行人之间的信息不对称程度进行了实证测算。研究结果表明：承销商和发行人所掌握的信息因素对承销费用率的形成具有重要影响;在承销费用率的议定过程中,承销商具有绝对的信息优势,并使费用率平均增加0.85%;承销商信息优势随新股定价制度改革而增强,这是近些年新股发行费用率不断上升的原因之一;高声誉和无政府关系背景的承销商在信息掌握上具有更多优势。降低企业发行成本需改善承销市场的信息分布,逐步减少对新股定价的过多限制。     

考虑双边信息谎报行为的供应链定价决策研究

低碳政策的实施,使企业纷纷采取措施减少和控制碳排放。碳减排成本信息是供应商不公开的信息,而制造成本信息则是制造商不公开的信息,这种信息不对称的现象使供应链上的各个成员在决策上变得更加困难,同时也增加了风险。研究发现,制造商单方面高报制造成本信息时,会降低产品零部件的批发价格,降低减排量,而制造商低报制造成本信息时,会使得产品的批发价格都增加,减排量增加,一定程度上促进了减排;供应商单方面高报减排成本信息时,会使得产品的批发价格都降低,减排量降低;而供应商低报减排成本信息时,会使得产品的批发价格都增加,减排量增加,一定程度上促进了减排。     

碳信息不对称下的供应链谎报决策与协调研究

低碳环境下,供应链上下游企业之间面临碳排放量及碳价格信息不对称带来的风险。针对该问题,文章在碳交易环境下,基于"基准法"的碳配额分配机制,构建以制造商为主导的两级供应链模型,在碳信息不对称下分析供应链成员的谎报行为及其对供应链绩效的影响,研究表明,若制造商拥有碳信息优势并在满足最优谎报方程的前提下采取谎报行动,制造商的利润没有得到实质的提升,且其谎报决策并不对供应链绩效产生影响;而当零售商拥有碳信息优势时,一定会为了提高自身利润而谎报碳信息,且在最优谎报方程下能提高零售商及供应链总利润,同时降低制造商的利润,但该谎报行为不能使供应链绩效达到最优。针对零售商的谎报行为,文章采用收益共享契约进行协调,使供应链绩效达到最优,并验证了该契约对激励零售商真实反馈碳信息的有效性。     

非对称信息下供应链融资优化决策研究

本文提出供应链融资的概念框架,并对非对称信息条件下供应链内部融资存在的信息优势及其对供应链价值的影响进行分析。基于供应链内部融资的信息优势和收益来源,构建出供应链融资基本模型,并分别考虑信息成本和不考虑信息成本情形建立供应链融资优化决策模型。研究表明,不考虑信息成本情形下,供应链内部融资的价值增加表现为融资主体间的利率套利和融资外部收益;考虑信息成本情形下,受资方向出资方转换信息增加的边际成本与出资方降低的边际报酬相等时的均衡解是出资方信息转换的最优决策点,此时将实现供应链价值最大化。     

供应链委托代理激励契约问题分析

在供应链中,零售商的努力水平系数在很大程度上决定了市场需求,但因信息的不对称,使得供应商无法观察到零售商的实际行为,进而影响到供应商的期望受益和供应链的平衡.本文利用信息经济学的委托代理理论,比较了在信息对称与信息不对称情况下的线性契约,深入研究了一类两级供应链(包括一个供应商和一个零售商)激励契约机制的设立,分析了外部的不确定性等因素对于报酬率、努力水平系数、固定收入、供应商期望收益、零售商的实际收入以及代理成本的影响.     

信息不对称条件下的供应链利益共享契约研究

本文通过讨论供应链中零售商的销售成本为不对称信息时,供应链收益共享契约的参数制订问题,为供应商制定供应链契约参数提出了一些建议.     

第四方物流企业作业承接不完全信息双边讨价还价分析

第四方物流(4PL)企业承接物流作业后要依靠第三方物流(3PL)企业来完成物流作业,因而4PL企业承接物流作业的价格决策会受到它与3PL企业交易情况的影响.本文利用不完全信息双边讨价还价博弈得出了4PL企业承接物流作业的价格,分析了价格的影响因素和4PL企业与生产企业达成交易的条件.通过对比4PL企业已知其与3PL企业交易情况和未知其与3PL企业交易情况时的报价,得出了在与生产企业交易过程中,4PL企业在前一情况下的报价高于后一情况下的报价的结论,并分析了产生这一结论的原因.     

Sharing shipment quantity information in the supply chain

This paper evaluates the benefit of a strategy of sharing shipment information, where one stage in a supply chain shares shipment quantity information with its immediate downstream customers—a practice also known as advanced shipping notice. Under a periodic review inventory policy, one supply-chain member places an order on its supplier every period. However, due to supplier's imperfect service, the supplier cannot always exactly satisfy what the customer orders on time. In particular, shipment quantities arriving at the customer, after a given lead-time, may be less (possibly more) than what the customer expects—we define this phenomenon as shipment quantity uncertainty. Where shipment quantity information is not shared with customers, the only way to respond is through safety stock. However, if the supplier shares such information, i.e. customers are informed every period of the shipment quantity dispatched, the customer may have enough time to adapt and resolve this uncertainty by adjusting its future order decisions. Our results indicate that in most circumstances this strategy, enabled by information technologies, helps supply-chain members resolve shipment quantity uncertainty well. This study provides an approach to quantify the value of shared shipment information and to help supply-chain members evaluate the cost-benefit trade-off during information system construction. Numerical examples are provided to indicate the impact of demand/shipment parameters on strategy implementation. While previous studies mainly focus on the information receiver's perspective, we evaluate a more general three-tier linear supply chain model via simulation, studying how this strategy affects the whole supply chain: the information sender, the information receiver and the subsequent downstream tier.     

Information sharing in a supply chain with a make-to-stock manufacturer

We study ex ante information sharing in a supply chain consisting of a downstream retailer and a make-to-stock upstream manufacturer. The retailer has imperfect demand information and may choose to share it with the manufacturer. Based on the information sharing arrangement, the manufacturer makes the wholesale price and the stocking level decisions. Then the retailer decides the order quantity and the manufacturer fulfills the order up to the available stock level. We find that the retailer has an incentive to voluntarily share the information with the make-to-stock manufacturer if the magnitude of demand uncertainty is intermediate. This stands in sharp contrast with the existing studies which show that the retailer never shares information when the manufacturer is make-to-order. Our results highlight the interdependence between the retailer׳s incentive to share information and the manufacturer׳s operational and marketing decisions.     

Impacts of demand uncertainty on retailer's dominance and manufacturer-retailer supply chain cooperation

Recent studies in marketing and distribution channels have shown that the balance of power between manufacturers and retailers is shifting. Based on this observation, we investigate a two-echelon supply chain with a manufacturer and a retailer in this paper. We first develop retailer-dominant non-cooperative game models by introducing a sensitivity of retailer's order quantity to manufacturer's wholesale price; then we analyze two cooperative scenarios, in which the Nash bargaining model is utilized to implement profit sharing between the manufacturer and the retailer. Under the assumption that the manufacturer and the retailer are risk-neutral, we find that the manufacturer and the retailer can bargain to cooperate at any level of retail-market demand uncertainty with exogenous retail price. However, the cooperation is conditional on retail-market demand uncertainty with endogenous retail price: it can be implemented if the fluctuation of retail-market demand is relatively small, and the measure of retail-market demand uncertainty does not exceed an upper bound. Theoretical and numerical analyses show that the retailer's dominance over the manufacturer increases with the increase in the sensitivity of retailer's order quantity to manufacturer's wholesale price under a limitation of retail-market demand uncertainty. Numerical analyses also show that the retailer's dominance decreases with the increase in retail-market demand uncertainty.     

Vertical cost information sharing in a supply chain with value-adding retailers

We consider a supply chain consisting of one supplier and two value-adding heterogeneous retailers. Each retailer has full knowledge about his own value-added cost structure that is unknown to the supplier and the other retailer. Assuming there is no horizontal information sharing between two retailers, we model the supply chain with a three-stage game-theoretic framework. In the first stage each retailer decides if he is willing to vertically disclose his private cost information to the supplier. In the second stage, given the information he has about the retailers, the supplier announces the wholesale price to the retailers. In response to the wholesale price, in the third stage, the retailers optimize their own retail prices and the values added to the product, respectively. Under certain conditions, we prove the existence of equilibrium prices and added values. Furthermore, we obtain the condition under which both retailers are unwilling to vertically share their private information with the supplier, as well as the conditions under which both retailers have incentives to reveal their cost information to the supplier, thus leading to a win–win situation for the whole supply chain.     

The impact of timely information on organisational performance in a supply chain

Information produced by ERP systems is termed JIT-information, since it is provided at the right time in the right place with a minimum of waste. The JIT-information construct is defined and described and a measurement scale is developed. A JIT-information performance model is proposed and assessed using a structural equation modelling methodology. The results indicate that the model fits the data well: (1) supply chain management strategy positively impacts JIT-information, (2) JIT-information directly impacts both logistics and organisational performance, and (3) logistics performance directly impacts organisational performance.     

A network-based approach to integrated supply chain design

The inherent complexity of supply chains, combined with their economic importance, has prompted research in supply chain management. While there has been a significant amount of work reported in modelling supply chains, the effectiveness of these models in addressing the complex area of supply chain management is questionable. What is giving added urgency to the need for research in this area are the recent developments in communications that offer the promise of connecting suppliers, assemblers and customers in a seamless network of information that can form integrated supply chain management. This paper aims to address the deficiency in modelling by proposing a methodology that models the integrated supply chain as an abstracted network, called a Trans-Net. The Trans-Net approach offers three main potential advantages. First, the multiple participants in a supply chain can be modelled without undue complexity. Second, it is an approach that allows users to examine the interactions between different considerations so that important attributes such as cost and lead-time can be readily calculated and bottleneck areas identified. Third, it applies a mathematical formalism to the problem, with the potential of being relatively straightforward to computerize.     

生产商规模不经济的双渠道供应链协调策略选择

供应链协调是提高供应链整体利润、改善供应链各方利益的根本手段.旨在探讨生产商具有生产规模不经济特性的双渠道供应链协调策略.给出了集中决策下双渠道供应链的市场价格与整体利润,以及分散决策下批发价契约与收益共享契约的设计方法.提出了协调度的概念,即契约使供应链协调的程度.证明了批发价契约的协调度小于1,不能实现供应链的协调;而收益共享契约的协调度等于1,但相对于批发价契约,收益共享契约不能同时改善零售商和生产商的利润,导致收益共享契约不可实施.为找到双渠道供应链可实施的协调策略,提出了带固定补偿的收益共享契约的设计方法和用纳什讨价还价协商模型确定固定补偿的方法.结果表明,该契约的协调度等于1,并且相对于批发价契约能同时改善零售商和生产商的利润.另外,研究还表明:生产不经济的弹性系数与销售价格成正比、与供应链的整体利润成反比,并且不同渠道间的竞争越激烈,双渠道供应链的销售价格和需求反而越高,双渠道供应链的总利润也越高,并且,带固定补偿的收益共享契约同样可以协调线性成本下的双渠道供应链.最后用算例验证了本文结论的正确性和有效性.     

Single or dual sourcing: decision-making in the presence of supply chain disruption risks

The focus of this paper is placed on evaluating the impacts of supply disruption risks on the choice between the famous single and dual sourcing methods in a two-stage supply chain with a non-stationary and price-sensitive demand. The expected profit functions of the two sourcing modes in the presence of supply chain disruption risks are first obtained, and then compared so that the critical values of the key factors affecting the final choice are identified. Finally, the sensitivity of the buyer's expected profit to various input factors is examined through numerical examples, which provide guidelines for how to use each sourcing method.     

The value of VMI beyond information sharing in a single supplier multiple retailers supply chain under a non-stationary (Rn,Sn) policy

This study aims to determine the value of vendor-managed inventory (VMI) over independent decision making with information sharing (IS) under non-stationary stochastic demand with service-level constraints. For this purpose, we utilize mixed-integer linear programming formulations to quantify the benefits that can be accrued by a supplier, multiple retailers and the system as a whole by switching from IS to VMI. More specifically, we investigate the incremental value that VMI provides beyond IS in terms of expected cost savings, inventory reductions, and decrease in shipment sizes from the supplier to the retailers by conducting a large number of computational experiments. Results reveal that the decision transfer component of VMI improves these performance measures significantly when the supplier׳s setup cost is low and order issuing efficiency is high. The benefits offered by VMI are negligible under the problem settings where the supplier׳s order issuing efficiency is low and the production setup serves solely a single replenishment under IS.