Desired family size in Thailand: Are the responses meaningful?

Data for both rural and urban women in Thailand indicate that the large majority of respondents are able to provide numerical responses to questions on desired family size. Although there is evidence that some women tend to rationalize the number of children they have when stating the number they would want if they were recently married, the vast majority of respondents prefer a number which is different from the number of living children they had at the time of the interview. Women who had already reached or exceeded their desired number were almost universal in stating they wanted no additional children, whereas only a minority of women who had yet to reach their desired family size said they wanted no more children. Finally, the proportion of women who practiced family planning is substantially greater among women who had already achieved or exceeded their desired family size than among women who had fewer than their desired number. The results thus suggest that, in Thailand at least, responses to family size preferences need to be interpreted with caution but nevertheless can be of use to the population analyst.     

We must complete the population control system to control the population peak and achieve our population goal]

Since 1986, China has experienced another baby boom which is expected to last till 1997. If no effective measure is implemented to check population growth, the population target of around 1.2 billion will not be achieved. The author proposed four population regulation mechanisms that need to be strengthened. First, ideological education needs to be used to change people's perceptions about family size, so that couples would willingly accept small families. Second, financial incentives and penalties need to be used to direct people to regulate their fertility. The incentive and penalty technique directly affect the interests of the family and is likely to produce rapid results. Third, legislation can be used to regulate reproductive behavior, the laws and legislation which restrict social behavior should be utilized for population control purposes. Once legislation on fertility regulation is passed, those who violate the law can be penalized. Furthermore, legislation gives family planning (FP) workers legitimacy in implementing the program and can help avoid disputes in the process of FP program implementation. Fourth, provision of contraception and abortion services is an important mechanism to ensure the realization of the objectives of population growth control. Meanwhile, the effectiveness of contraceptive methods and the acceptance of abortion depends on the research and development of contraceptive technology and on abortion techniques. These fertility regulatory mechanisms have not be adequately established, and their functions have not been fully utilized. The current FP program is hampered by simplistic ideological education, abusive use of incentives and penalties, lack of legislation, and unmet needs in contraceptive development. To achieve the population targets, these mechanisms need to be strengthened.     

The prediction of completed fertility

There has been considerable interest in the relation between familysize desires and completed fertility. Longitudinal data from the Princeton Fertility Study provide a unique opportunity to compare the number of children desired after the birth of a second child to the size of completed families. The average number of children desired by women after the birth of their second child predicts very well the average size of their completed families. The average family size desired at the first interview and average estimated completed family size some eight years later are identical for the total sample, and vary hardly at all within religious or education subgroups. One-third of the variance in the completed fertility of couples is "explained" by wife's family-size desires and the proportion of explained variance increases to two-fifths when we include the husband's first interview desires and the interval between marriage and second birth. Yet in spite of the relatively high correlation between desires and achievement, only 41 percent of these women achieved exactly the number of children they desired at the first interview, while 14 percent had two children more or fewer than originally desired. Nevertheless, data on contraceptive efficiency indicate that desires after the birth of the second child constitute meaningful goals in terms of which the respondents regulate their subsequent behavior-efficacy of contraceptive practice shows substantial improvement after the desired number has been achieved.     

Books and publications received

Efforts to control rampant population growth in sub-Saharan Africa have been stymied by confusion between the potential causes and consequences of high fertility in the region. A controversy has surfaced over the causal direction of the fundamental relationship between human fertility and size of landholdings. Members of one school of thought claim that farm couples modify their fertility behaviour according to the amount of land they own or operate. Yet others argue that the size of landholdings varies as a function of family size (an indicator of the availability of family labour). In the present study we use a two-stage least-squares regression on data from a 1988 survey of 747 farm households in Rwanda to disaggregate and compare the strengths of these two possible paths of influence. The results show that landholdings exert a positive influence on human reproduction, but not the reverse. Moreover, this influence is slightly stronger for couples who own all the land they operated, probably because they have larger incomes from equity in the land. The size of the farm is unrelated to the size of the family's potential farm labour force (measured as the number of household members aged 15–65) or to the husband's total desired number of children. These findings suggest that farm size boosts the number of living children not by creating a demand for more children but by increasing the supply of children through higher natural fertility and child survival.     

The emergence of Sub-Replacement Family Size Ideals in Europe

Period fertility started to drop significantly below replacement in most Western European countries during the 1970s and 1980s, while most fertility surveys, value studies and opinion polls have found that the number of children considered ideal for society or for one's own family has remained above two children per woman. These surveys have led to the expectation that, sooner or later, period fertility would recover in Europe. The most recent data from the Eurobarometer 2001 survey, however, suggest that in the German-speaking parts of Europe the average ideal family sizes given by younger men and women have fallen as low as 1.7 children. This paper examines the consistency and the credibility of these new findings, which – if they are indeed indications of a new trend – may alter the current discussion about future fertility trends in Europe.     

Fertility and desired fertility: Longitudinal evidence from Thailand

Summary The validity and usefulness of 'desired additional children' and 'ideal family size' as predictors of fertility are analysed in this paper on the basis of longitudinal survey data from Thailand. First, the extent of measurement error in these variables is considered, and it is concluded that the error variance and the true variance are of similar orders of magnitude. Secondly, the changes in attitudes subsequent to births and deaths of children are investigated. It is found that the number of additional children desired is decreased by births and increased by deaths, but less than would be expected if 'desired additional children' represented an unchanging target family size. 'Ideal family size' is almost unaffected by births and deaths. Thirdly, the contribution of attitudinal variables to behavioural models is examined. It is found that desired fertility is explained no better than fertility in a standard economic model. A birth function separating desired children from identifiable physiological factors as explanatory variables indicated that the former was just significant. A model of contraceptive acceptance also found desired fertility to be a significant determinant. Thus, desired fertility can be successfully integrated into behavioural models. But on the whole, its explanatory power was weak, and it was concluded that the independent use of this variable does not significantly improve on models which relate fertility to socio-economic variables directly.     

A research on the assurance of family planning and providing for the aged]

An important cause of resistance to China's family planning (FP) program in rural areas is the need to have children to support parents in their old age. Provision of insurance for old age support will facilitate the implementation of the FP program among the rural population. A trial project was initiated in five cities and counties in Fujian province i 1986. The program included schemes for both eligible couples and for single children. The township or the village pays a lump sum or monthly premium to the insurance company for each couple, which enables them to collect 30-35 Yuan/month after they reach 55 years of age. To further expand the insurance program, a survey was conducted in 1987 to determine whether rural farmers would be willing and able to pay the insurance premium themselves. 77% of the respondents reported that they could afford to pay 60% of the premium. Among them, 59% were willing to pay. It was suggested that besides individual purchase of the insurance plan, the rural communities could contribute to the payment of the premium from the fines for unplanned births, from the local tax, and from the country government budget. Preferential treatment should be given to the couples of two daughters who receives sterilization; the communities should pay for a larger share of their premium. The current insurance scheme needs to be reformed so that the plan can offer more than the individual's bank savings. To do so, the insurance company needs to be able to invest their premium income and obtain higher returns. The employees of the insurance company need to improve their work efficiency to win the trust of the people in the program.     

Current primary investigation on the view of family planning of Chinese peasants]

The ideal number of children for 850 couples among 10 cities or counties and 20 villages in China were surveyed. Of the 850, only 1 wanted unlimited children, which accounted for 0.12% of the couples. About 33 desired more than 5, which accounted for 3.9%. However, most of the couples, about 81.4%, prefer 2 or 3 children. 3.2% of the couples were happy with 1 child in their life. In China, peasants still want more children because of their economic situation. There is no retirement and health insurance in the countryside, and the major labor force is in field work. Some consider males as better able to keep family heritage intact. Also, there is difference between agricultural and nonagricultural couples. Comparing the percentage of couples who want 2-3 children, 80% in agricultural sector and 92% in nonagricultural sector desired this number. The remainder of the agricultural group desired more than 3 children. Since economic reform started in the countryside in the early 80s, effects on fertility are seen. One is that peasants want more children because of a rising need for labor. On the other hand, many more opportunities are available to change careers and obtain more education, lowering fertility. However, a rise in fertility is predicted as people concentrate more on economic reform and economic development, increasing their need for children.     

The TFR and birth control]

Total fertility rate if (TFR) is a simple an straight forward measure of women's fertility. However, it is difficult to use the TFR as a target measure in FP programs. If TFR level is set as a target for a particular year, how can women's fertility be regulated to achieve this target? The following analysis suggests a simple model to control the proportion of birth parity. First, the TFR is decomposed into a parity- specific TFR. The parity-specific TFR can be worked out using coefficients of the regression models calculated from data of previous fertility surveys. Once the TFR is given, the parity-specific total fertility can be calculated using a model with coefficients from empirical data. Then the number of births of each parity may be calculated from the parity-specific TFR using the female age structure in a particular year, the survival probability, and the standard fertility model for each parity. When the number of surviving children of each women at child-bearing age is known, the desired proportion of births of each parity can be calculated using the standard birth probability during a years. From these models, it would be possible to calculate how many women can have their first child/year, and how many can have the second. Thus, family planning organizations would be in a position to formulate a birth quota on the basis of the above information.     

广东“80后”生育意愿及其影响因素研究

改革开放后出生的一代人的生育意愿和意愿生育数量将表现出与父辈们不同的特征。本文采用广东省人口和计划生育委员会支持的调研数据,并通过实证研究发现：个人受教育程度、家庭收入、户籍状况、家庭结构及财产状况等因素共同影响着初育年龄意愿、理想生育数和生育性别意愿。总体来看,教育程度与经济因素是影响“80后”生育意愿的主要因素。同时,家庭养老压力也在一定程度上影响到他们的生育意愿。     

How female literacy affects fertility: the case of India

Recent studies indicate that there is a direct correlation between increased literacy and decreased fertility. This link was demonstrated in study that covered 90% of India's population. Studies in other developing countries have confirmed this finding. In addition, high literacy rates have been found to correspond to high infant survival rates. Researchers also found that there was little change in the relationship between literacy and fertility when they were both controlled for different levels of urbanization. The problem is that only 1 in 4 Indian women are literate. However, India's government has a program in place the goal of which is to have universal literacy. In Kerala, female literacy is the highest (65%). And at 3.4 children/women, it has 1 of the lowest fertility rates. For the 14 states studied, the total fertility rate was 5.0 children/woman, the child mortality rate was 126/1000, and the female literacy rate was 22%. In contrast in Rajasthan where female literacy is 11% (the lowest of the 14 states studied) fertility is the highest at 6.0 children/woman. No state with higher than average fertility had higher than average female literacy rates. Literate women are likely to have more surviving children because they are more aware of good health practices, and they tend to live in better circumstances. As a result, couples need fewer births to reach their desired family size.     

American Family Building Strategies in 1900: Stopping or Spacing

Contemporary populations frequently space the births of children, and also attempt to stop childbearing after achieving a desired family size. While stopping behavior was evident in European populations in the late nineteenth century, little is known about the degree to which they attempted to space their children at specific interval lengths. This paper compares spacing patterns among various groups of white U.S. women in 1900, who were distinguished by varying family sizes and levels of fertility control. On the whole, there is little evidence of childspacing differences among native white populations, except for some very low parity women. The findings support the continued analysis of age patterns of fertility as the major means for determining the onset of conscious family limitation.     

The relationship of family planning to savings and consumption in Taiwan

This study relates fertility behavior to modern economic behavior, namely, saving and consumption of modern durables, for a sample of couples in Taiwan. It uses only couples who say they want no more children, and these couples are further classified by current use of contraception and by whether or not they already had excess fertility. Couples who are successful fertility planners, i.e., those who have no unwanted children and are current users of contraception, are distinctive with regard to modern economic behavior as compared to couples who do not use contraception or have excess fertility. Successful planners are more likely to save and to have more modern durables; these differentials remain when adjustments are made for the effects of family income, wife’s age, wife’s education, and duration of marriage. It seems that the kind of planning behavior which enables a couple to successfully plan their family size also enables them to manage their economic affairs so that they can save and enjoy more modern consumption goods.     

How parenthood experiences influence desire for more children in Australia: A qualitative study

The low-fertility debate in developed countries has focused on the limits to family size posed by the financial costs of raising children, and difficulties combining work and family. Little attention has been given to the physical and socio-psychological experiences of conception, pregnancy, birth and early parenthood, and their potential effect on parity progression. Womens rising education and workforce participation rates are often seen as key factors in fertility decline, offering attractive alternatives to motherhood, but research suggests that they also undermine levels of knowledge, confidence and interest in motherhood. Demographers have made almost no link between people having fewer children than they might otherwise have had and their previous childbearing and childrearing experiences. Interviews conducted in South Australia in 2003–04 with parents of both small and large families show that fertility and family size are influenced both negatively and positively by experiences of having had children. The paper argues that if low fertility rates are to be stabilized or raised in developed countries, then researchers and policymakers must consider the physical and socio-psychological costs of having children for parents, and provide support mechanisms so that experiences of parenthood contribute as little as possible to fertility gaps and delayed fertility.     

Pakistan's population growth: the need for action

Despite the existence of a national family planning program that dates to 1965 Pakistan has not seen a reduction in the fertility rate. One of the poorest countries in the world, Pakistan has 1 of the highest population growth rates in the world at about 3.0% annually. For over 2 decades, the average woman in Pakistan has given birth to more than 6 children. At the current fertility rate, the country's current population of 120 million will increase to over 150 million by the year 2000, and it will increase to 280 million by 2020. And even if today every woman were to begin having only 2 children, the population would still reach 160 million before leveling off. But reducing fertility in Pakistan will prove difficult. One of the leading obstacles is the low status of women. Few women in Pakistan have advanced education or professional jobs. Only 1/4 of those women without education or who are not working have any knowledge concerning contraception. Family size and composition also fuel the high rate of fertility. On the average, women desire 5 children (the fact that women average more than 5 suggests an unmet need for contraception). And due to social, cultural, and economic conditions, Pakistanis generally prefer male offsprings. Islamic opposition to family planning has also contributed to the continued high rates of fertility. Finally, administrative and management weaknesses have hindered Pakistan's family planning program. In order to overcome these obstacles, Pakistan will have to enlist the commitment of political, religious, and community leaders. The status of women will have to be improved, and the attitudes of people will need to change.     

The nature of family planning management in China]

Family planning (FP) program management in China uses the power of the state to manage population reproduction. the characteristics of program management are as follows. 1) The FP program is for the benefit of the state, community and individual, 2) the FP program is a process of birth planning under social planning rather than an individual family's planning, 3) FP include both restriction on the number of people and the improvement of the quality of the population. 4) FP is a public affair. Government organizations at all levels of coordination and mobilize the FP program so that people of all walks of life can participate. 5) People participate in the FP program management by expressing their views in the people's congress, through communication with administration leadership, and through self-education. The special features of FP program management in China are also reflected in its concerns with a variety of target populations, its need for cooperation from people and its need for involvement of all institutions and enterprises. As the human reproductive cycle is long, making a long- term strategic policy for FP is no less important than long-term economic planning. The management of the program should emphasize direction and persuasion, the provision of services and help to people, and the efforts to involve government or public organizations in promoting planning programs.     

A survey of the family planning work done in Dongguan County

The total fertility rate of women of childbearing age of Dongguan County in China has been decreasing gradually from 5.9 during the period following the liberation in 1949 to 2.05 in 1982. In order to encourage young couples to implement the policy of family planning consciously, the people's government of Dongguan county decided in July 1980 that all cadres and employees in county towns who received 1-child certificates would be exempted from house rent of 45 square meters from the time they get their certificates and would be allocated a living space of a 2-children family until their children reached age 16. It also stipulated that every couple could enjoy 1 month's holiday every year for 3 years and during the holiday, their salary, bonus and rate of attendance would not be affected. Because women bear less children today, they are relieved from heavy household chores and become the main working force in collective production. As a result, the development of town-run enterprises was stimulated and the total industrial output value of these enterprises increased. The average monthly salary of each female worker is about 100 yuan. In 1984, the average income per capita of the country rose to 649.2 yuan. The implementation of family planning work has eased the tension in the education field. Previously, because of the large number of school-age children in rural areas, teachers had to teach 2 classes. In the past 4 years, great emphasis was laid on intellectual investment. During this period, 2351 schools were built and several fundraising projects were implemented. Since 1981, more than 200 new running water projects were built, and new public services have been developed, including old age homes.     

Conflicting Preferences: A Reason Fertility Tends to Be Too High or Too Low

Fertility has often seemed to be too high or too low, relative not only to social and economic goals, but also to reproductive preferences. In developing countries actual fertility has often been higher than desired family size, while in developed societies fertility tends to be below replacement level even though people generally say that they want at least two children. In explanations of fertility extremes, or of the discrepancies between desired and actual fertility, the effect of partners' holding different preferences has tended to be overlooked. Individual preferences expected to lead to replacement‐level reproduction may in combination generate substantially higher or lower fertility. In explaining such outcomes, a crucial question is what happens when spousal preferences diverge. Given that personal practices or social norms may systematically favor high or low preferences in the event of disagreement, chance alone will ensure that desired and actual fertility do not coincide.     

The poor as a “perfect contraceptive population” and zero population growth

A goal of the federal family planning program is to enable women to have only those children they want, with priority given to the poor. Is that compatible with the goal of those who want zero population growth? This analysis shows that prevention of all unwanted births to women in low-income families would have yielded completed fertility much above that required for zero population growth.     

Intensive Parenting: Fertility and Breastfeeding Duration in the United States

Using 30 years of longitudinal data from a nationally representative cohort of women, we study the association between breastfeeding duration and completed fertility, fertility expectations, and birth spacing. We find that women who breastfeed their first child for five months or longer are a distinct group. They have more children overall and higher odds of having three or more children rather than two, compared with women who breastfeed for shorter durations or not at all. Expected fertility is associated with initiating breastfeeding but not with how long mothers breastfeed. Thus, women who breastfeed longer do not differ significantly from other breastfeeding women in their early fertility expectations. Rather, across the life course, these women achieve and even exceed their earlier fertility expectations. Women who breastfeed for shorter durations (1–21 weeks) are more likely to fall short of their expected fertility than to achieve or exceed their expectations, and they are significantly less likely than women who breastfeed for longer durations (≥22 weeks) to exceed their expected fertility. In contrast, women who breastfeed longer are as likely to exceed as to achieve their earlier expectations, and the difference between their probability of falling short versus exceeding their fertility expectations is relatively small and at the boundary of statistical significance (p = .096). These differences in fertility are not explained by differences in personal and family resources, including family income or labor market attachment. Our findings suggest that breastfeeding duration may serve as a proxy for identifying a distinct approach to parenting. Women who breastfeed longer have reproductive patterns quite different than their socioeconomic position would predict. They both have more children and invest more time in those children.