Development of Three‐Dimensional Completion of Complex Objects

Three‐dimensional (3D) object completion, the ability to perceive the backs of objects seen from a single viewpoint, emerges at around 6 months of age. Yet, only relatively simple 3D objects have been used in assessing its development. This study examined infants’ 3D object completion when presented with more complex stimuli. Infants (N = 48) were habituated to an “L”‐shaped object shown from a limited viewpoint; then they were tested with volumetrically complete (solid) and incomplete (hollow) versions of the object. Four‐month‐olds and 6‐month‐old girls had no preference for either display. Six‐month‐old boys and both sexes at 9.5 months of age showed a novelty preference for the incomplete object. A control group (N = 48), only shown the test displays, had no spontaneous preference. Perceptual completion of complex 3D objects requires infants to integrate multiple, local object features and thus may tax their nascent attentional skills. Infants might use mental rotation to supplement performance, giving an advantage to young boys. Examining the development of perceptual completion of more complex 3D objects reveals distinct mechanisms for the acquisition and refinement of 3D object completion in infancy.     

The emergence of object‐based visual attention in infancy: A role for family socioeconomic status and competing visual features

The development of spatial visual attention has been extensively studied in infants, but far less is known about the emergence of object‐based visual attention. We tested 3–5‐ and 9–12‐month‐old infants on a task that allowed us to measure infants’ attention orienting bias toward whole objects when they competed with color, motion, and orientation feature information. Infants’ attention orienting to whole objects was affected by the dimension of the competing visual feature. Whether attention was biased toward the whole object or its salient competing feature (e.g., “ball” or “red”) changed with age for the color feature, with infants biased toward whole objects with age. Moreover, family socioeconomic status predicted feature‐based attention in the youngest infants and object‐based attention in the older infants when color feature information competed with whole‐object information.     

Online measures of looking and learning in infancy

Infants in laboratory settings look longer at events that violate their expectations, learn better about objects that behave unexpectedly, and match utterances to the objects that likely elicited them. The paradigms revealing these behaviors have become cornerstones of research on preverbal cognition. However, little is known about whether these canonical behaviors are observed outside laboratory settings. Here, we describe a series of online protocols that replicate classic laboratory findings, detailing our methods throughout. In Experiment 1a, 15-month-old infants (N = 24) looked longer at an online support event culminating in an Unexpected outcome (i.e., appearing to defy gravity) than an Expected outcome. Infants did not, however, show the same success with an online solidity event. In Experiment 1b, 15-month-old infants (N = 24) showed surprise-induced learning following online events—they were better able to learn a novel object's label when the object had behaved unexpectedly compared to when it behaved expectedly. Finally, in Experiment 2, 16-month-old infants (N = 20) who heard a valenced utterance (“Yum!”) showed preferential looking to the object most likely to have generated that utterance. Together, these results suggest that, with some adjustments, online testing is a feasible and promising approach for infant cognition research.     

Infants' identification of gender in biological motion displays

Infants' knowledge of social categories, including gender-typed characteristics, is a vital aspect of social cognitive development. In the current study, we examined 9- to 12-month-old infants' understanding of the categories “male” and “female” by testing for gender matching in voices or faces with biological motion depicted in point light displays (PLDs). Infants did not show voice–PLD gender matching spontaneously (Experiment 1) or after “training” with gender-matching voice–PLD pairs (Experiment 2). In Experiment 3, however, infants were trained with gender-matching face–PLD pairs and we found that patterns of visual attention to top regions of PLD stimuli during training predicted gender matching of female faces and PLDs. Prior to the end of the first postnatal year, therefore, infants may begin to identify gender in human walk motions, and perhaps form social categories from biological motion.     

Melanie Klein and the Black Mammy: An Exploration of the Influence of the Mammy Stereotype on Klein’s Maternal and Its Contribution to the “Whiteness” of Psychoanalysis

This article seeks to show the influence of the black mammy stereotype on Melanie Klein’s theorization of the maternal object. It takes as its starting point the underrepresentation of black analysts and their negative experiences within psychoanalysis and links this to the wider cultural phenomenon of “whiteness,” defined as the denial of racialized experience. It then explores a symbol of this whiteness, the colonial stereotype of the black mammy, and demonstrates that she was a well-known figure in the interwar Britain in which Klein developed her ideas. It suggests that the colonial dynamics between the mammy and white people are repeated in Klein’s formulation of the maternal object and infant, and argues that we can see evidence of this in Klein’s analysis of Dick and in her theorization of the maternal object as split and as a combined parent figure. It then shows that a “negress” is central to the article used by Klein in her formulation of reparation, but that Klein transformed this article, replete with questions of racial identity, into a theory of “universal” psychic processes by reading the “negress” as mammy. It argues that the mammy may well have been a potent figure for Klein both professionally and personally due to the modernist trend of using “blackness” to break from tradition and due to a precedent of the mammy facilitating Jewish assimilation into whiteness. The Kleinian theory of the maternal object, inflected with the racial dynamics embodied by the mammy, can therefore be seen as contributing to psychoanalysis’ silence on race, perpetuating the invisibility of whiteness to white subjects and legitimating (psychic) violence toward the black other.     

Perceptions of Children’s Parental Preferences in Lesbian Two‐Mother Households

This study explores how lesbian mothers perceive their 3½‐year‐old children’s parental preferences in families in which one mother is genetically linked to the child. Thirty lesbian couples (60 women) were interviewed about their children’s parental preferences, their explanations of why preferences for one parent existed (or not), and their affective and behavioral reactions to such preferences. Many women acknowledged that their children, as infants, preferred their birth mothers due to biological factors (i.e., breastfeeding) or differential time spent with the child. Despite this initial preference, most women perceived little stability in children’s preferences over time, such that children preferred both mothers equally. Findings support the power of “social motherhood” in fostering maternal connections that transcend biological relatedness over time.     

Limits on Composition of Conceptual Operations in 9‐Month‐Olds

Complex systems are often built from a relatively small set of basic features or operations that can be combined in myriad ways. We investigated the developmental origins of this compositional architecture in 9‐month‐old infants, extending recent work that demonstrated rudimentary compositional abilities in preschoolers. Infants viewed two separate object‐occlusion events that depicted a single‐feature‐change operation. They were then tested with a combined operation to determine whether they expected the outcome of the two feature changes, even though this combination was unfamiliar. In contrast to preschoolers, infants did not appear to predictively compose these simple feature‐change operations. A second experiment demonstrated the ability of infants to track two operations when not combined. The failure to compose basic operations is consistent with limitations on object tracking and early numerical cognition (Feigenson & Yamaguchi, Infancy, 2009, 14, 244). We suggest that these results can be unified via a general principle: Infants have difficulty with multiple updates to a representation of an unobservable.     

HISTORY DEPENDENCE AND THE FORMATION OF SOCIAL PREFERENCES: AN EXPERIMENTAL STUDY

We study the minimal contributing set (MCS) game, a three‐person sequential step‐level public goods game. The behavior of critical third players changes with experience in this game even though they face no strategic or payoff uncertainty. We explore why these changes occur by manipulating subjects' experience in the first half of the experiment. The treatments give subjects very different initial experiences, but all treatments move subjects' choices toward experienced subjects' play in the control sessions. Long‐run play is indistinguishable across treatments. Our results are more consistent with the “discovered preferences” hypothesis ( Plott 1996 ) than either the “constructed preference” or “reference point” hypotheses. (JEL H41, C72, C92)     

The meaning of “fundamental preferences”

We present the definition and meaning of “fundamental preferences” that are interpersonally comparable, ordinal and endemonistic. We also dispel a number of misunderstandings concerning them. In the article “A cause of preference is not on object of preference” (Soc Choice Welfare (1993) 10: 57–68), Professor Broome misinterprets the notion of “fundamental preferences” in confusing an observer's device for a psychological transformation of the observed (as if an economist studying wealth meant that he becomes wealthy, or if physicians had to be sick — this is well shown in his interpretation of a sentence of mine in p 65 where the crucial switch to the first person is his own). Considering a new set of variables that includes both structural parameters and former variables, hence variables of different kinds, assumes nothing new concerning the observed object; namely, it says neither that the consumption of bread becomes “a cause” of the taste for jam, nor that the individual likes (or dislikes) his own tastes, or anything like this (the accusation of “fantasy”). We shall suggest that certain other views receive a similar treatment in this paper. This misunderstanding is regrettable, since the consideration of fundamental preferences is unavoidable in social ethics, both when one has to compare all-encompassing individual situations, and for the preferences of the hypothetical identical individuals in an Original Position device where they evaluate at once what they might have and what they might be I wish to thank Professor Broome for comments on an earlier version of this note. . Therefore, perhaps the full argument must be stated again (see the works in references). To begin with, we should face the issue relevant for social ethics directly, rather than dealing with it in devious ways. The question arises if: (1) distributive justice is a question (he who says it is not wants to impose his own view of it), (2) individual happiness has any relevance for the quality of society (imagine a society of despaired people). Then, one can show that the relevant issue turns out to be: can one say that a person is happier than another? These persons are in specific situations.     

5‐Month‐Olds’ Categorization of Novel Objects: Task and Measure Dependence

To examine key parameters of the initial conditions in early category learning, two studies compared 5‐month‐olds’ object categorization between tasks involving previously unseen novel objects, and between measures within tasks. Infants in Experiment 1 participated in a visual familiarization–novelty preference (VFNP) task with two‐dimensional (2D) stimulus images. Infants provided no evidence of categorization by either their looking or their examining even though infants in previous research systematically categorized the same objects by examining when they could handle them directly. Infants in Experiment 2 participated in a VFNP task with 3D stimulus objects that allowed visual examination of objects’ 3D instantiation while denying manual contact with the objects. Under these conditions, infants demonstrated categorization by examining but not by looking. Focused examination appears to be a key component of young infants’ ability to form category representations of novel objects, and 3D instantiation appears to better engage such examining.     

A Comparison of Visual Familiarization and Object‐Examining Measures of Categorization in 9‐Month‐Old Infants

Three studies were conducted to determine whether differential patterns of categorization observed in studies using visual familiarization and object‐examining measures hold up as procedural confounds are eliminated. In Experiment 1, we attempted as direct a comparison as possible between visual and object‐examining measures of categorization. Consistent with previous reports, 9‐month‐old infants distinguished a basic‐level contrast (dog–horse) in the visual task, but not in the examining task. Experiment 2 was designed to reduce levels of nonexploratory activity in an examining task; 9‐month‐olds again failed to distinguish categories of dogs and horses. In Experiment 3, we adopted a paired‐comparison test format in the object‐examining task. Infants did display a novel category preference under paired testing conditions. The results suggest that the different patterns of categorization often seen in looking and touching tasks are a reflection, not of different categorization processes, but of the differential sensitivity of the tasks.     

How Visual is Visual Prediction?

Infants are readily able to use their recent experience to shape their future behavior. Recent work has confirmed that infants generate neural predictions based on their recent experience (Emberson, Richards, & Aslin, 2015) and that neural predictions trigger visual system activity similar to that elicited by visual stimulation. This study uses behavioral methods to ask, how visual is visual prediction? In Experiment 1, we confirmed that when additional trials provide additional visual experience with the experimental shape, infants exhibit a robust novelty preference. In Experiment 2, we removed the visual stimulus from some trials and presented the predictive auditory cue alone, allowing the effects of neural prediction to be assessed. We found no evidence of looking preferences at test, suggesting that visual prediction does not contribute to the computation of visual familiarity. In Experiment 3, we provided infants with a degraded visual stimulus to test whether visual prediction could bias visual perception under ambiguous conditions. Again, we found no evidence of looking preferences at test, suggesting that visual prediction is not biasing perception of an uncertain stimulus. Overall, our results suggest that visual prediction is not visual, in the strictest sense, despite the presence of visual system activation.     

Face Preferences for Infant‐ and Adult‐Directed Speakers in Infants of Depressed and Nondepressed Mothers: Association with Infant Cognitive Development

Face preferences for speakers of infant‐directed and adult‐directed speech (IDS and ADS) were investigated in 4‐ to 13.5‐month‐old infants of depressed and nondepressed mothers. Following 1 min of exposure to an ID or AD speaker (order counterbalanced), infants had an immediate paired‐comparison test with a still, silent image of the familiarized versus a novel face. In the test phase, ID face preference ratios were significantly lower in infants of depressed than nondepressed mothers. Infants' ID face preference ratios, but not AD face preference ratios, correlated with their percentile scores on the cognitive (Cog) scale of the Bayley Scales of Infant & Toddler Development (3rd Edition; BSID‐III), assessed concurrently. Regression analyses revealed that infant ID face preferences significantly predicted infant Cog percentiles even after demographic risk factors and maternal depression had been controlled. Infants may use IDS to select social partners who are likely to support and facilitate cognitive development.     

Early Understanding of Subject and Object Wh‐Questions

In this study, we used the splitscreen preferential looking paradigm to test 13‐, 15‐, and 20‐month‐olds' developing understanding of simple matrix what‐questions of the forms “What hit the X?” (subject‐question) and “What did the X hit?” (object‐question). Infants responded appropriately to subject‐questions by 15 months of age, and to both subject‐ and object‐questions by 20 months. At no age did infants look longer toward the object overtly mentioned in the question, as might be expected based on a surface account of early language acquisition. This suggests that infants may have some understanding of these complex structures long before they are produced.     

A Cross‐Linguistic Study of Word‐Mapping in 18‐ to 20‐Month‐Old Infants

This study was designed to examine whether infants acquiring languages that place a differential emphasis on nouns and verbs, focus their attention on motions or objects in the presence of a novel word. An infant‐controlled habituation paradigm was used to teach 18‐ to 20‐month‐old English‐, French‐, and Japanese‐speaking infants’ novel words for events. Infants were habituated to two word‐event pairings and then presented with new combinations that involved a familiar word with a new object or motion, or both. Children could map the novel word to both the object and the motion, despite the differential salience of object and motion words in their native language. A control experiment with no label confirmed that both object and motion changes were detectable.     

Pointing as Epistemic Request: 12‐month‐olds Point to Receive New Information

Infants start pointing systematically to objects or events around their first birthday. It has been proposed that infants point to an event to share their appreciation of it with others. In this study, we tested another hypothesis, according to which infants’ pointing could also serve as an epistemic request directed to the adult. Thus, infants’ motivation for pointing could include the expectation that adults would provide new information about the referent. In two experiments, an adult reacted to 12‐month‐olds’ pointing gestures by exhibiting “Informing” or “Sharing” behavior. In response, infants pointed more frequently across trials in the Informing than in the Sharing condition. This suggests that the feedback that contained new information matched infants’ expectations more than mere attention sharing. Such a result is consistent with the idea that not just the comprehension but also the production of early communicative signals is tuned to assist infants’ learning from others.     

Fourteen‐Month‐Olds Know What “We” Have Shared in a Special Way

People often express excitement to each other when encountering an object that they have shared together previously in some special way. This study investigated whether 14‐month‐old infants know precisely what they have and have not shared in a special way (and with whom). In the experimental condition an adult and infant shared an object (the target) excitedly because it unexpectedly reappeared in several places. They then shared 2 other objects (the distractors) in a more normal fashion. Later, the adult reacted excitedly to a tray containing all 3 objects and then made an ambiguous request for the infant to hand “it” to her. There were 2 control conditions. In 1 of them, a different adult, who knew none of the 3 objects, made the ambiguous request. In the other control condition, the adult who made the request had previously experienced the objects only alone, while the infant looked on unengaged. Infants in the experimental condition chose the target object more often than the distractors and more often than they chose it in either control condition. These results demonstrate that 14‐month‐old infants can identify which one of a set of objects “we”—and not just I or you alone—have had a special experience with in the past.     

Transfer of Social Learning Across Contexts: Exploring Infants' Attribution of Trait‐Like Emotions to Adults

We explored whether 15‐month‐olds expect another person's emotional disposition to be stable across social situations. In three observation trials, infants watched two adults interact. Half the infants saw one of the adults (“Emoter”) respond negatively to the other adult's actions (Anger group); half saw the Emoter respond neutrally to the same actions (Neutral group). After a change in social context, infants participated in novel tasks with the (now‐neutral) Emoter. Infants in the Anger group were significantly more likely to relinquish desirable toys to the Emoter. We hypothesize that, in the initial observation trials, infants learned that the Emoter was “anger‐prone” and expected her to get angry again in a new social situation. Consequently, infants readily gave the Emoter what she wanted. These findings reveal three key features of infants' affective cognition: (1) infants track adults' emotional history across encounters; (2) infants learn from observing how people interact with others and use this to form expectations about how these people will treat them; and (3) more speculatively, infants use appeasement to cope with social threat. We hypothesize that infants form “trait‐like” attributions about people's emotional dispositions and use this to formulate adaptive responses to adults in novel social contexts.     

Infants Use Category Label Knowledge to Interpret Absent Reference

This research investigated infants’ (16 and 20 months) use of category information in responding to references to absent objects. Infants were asked to find an object in the box (e.g., “Find an apple!”). When allowed to search, they found either an object from the mentioned category (a plastic apple) or a different object. Infants in both age groups searched again in the box trying to find another object more often on nonreferent than on referent trials (Experiment 1). However, when nonreferents were categorically related to referents, only older infants detected a mismatch and searched again (Experiment 2). These findings suggest that infants use category knowledge when processing references to absent objects.     

Eighteen‐Month‐Old Infants Correct Non‐Conforming Actions by Others

At around their third birthday, children begin to enforce social norms on others impersonally, often using generic normative language, but little is known about the developmental building blocks of this abstract norm understanding. Here, we investigate whether even toddlers show signs of enforcing on others interpersonally how “we” do things. In an initial dyad, 18‐month‐old infants learnt a simple game‐like action from an adult. In two experiments, the adult either engaged infants in a normative interactive activity (stressing that this is the way “we” do it) or, as a non‐normative control, marked the same action as idiosyncratic, based on individual preference. In a test dyad, infants had the opportunity to spontaneously intervene when a puppet partner performed an alternative action. Infants intervened, corrected, and directed the puppet more in the normative than in the non‐normative conditions. These findings suggest that, during the second year of life, infants develop second‐personal normative expectations about their partner's behavior (“You should do X!”) in social interactions, thus making an important step toward understanding the normative structure of human cultural activities. These simple normative expectations will later be scaled up to group‐minded and abstract social norms.