A self-funding reward mechanism for tax compliance

We compare in a laboratory experiment two audit-based tax compliance mechanisms that collect fines from those found non-compliant. The mechanisms differ in the way fines are redistributed to individuals who were either not audited or audited and found to be compliant. The first, as is the case in most extant tax systems, does not discriminate between the un-audited and those found compliant. The second targets the redistribution in favor of those found compliant. We find that targeting increases compliance when paying taxes generates a social return. We do not find any increase in compliance in a control treatment where individuals audited and found compliant receive symbolic rewards. We conclude that existing tax mechanisms have room for improvement by rewarding those audited and found compliant.     

Less cheating? The effects of prefilled forms on compliance behavior

As a consequence of digital transformation, individuals are often confronted with prefilled forms or prefilled data entry masks. In situations where cheating and lying are of concern, prefilling might reduce dishonest behavior. In a controlled experiment, we investigate how correctly and incorrectly prefilled forms influence compliance behavior. We frame our experiment as filing the annual income tax return. We show that correct prefilling enhances compliance. However, in cases of incorrect prefilling, we observe asymmetric effects. If prefilled income is lower than true income, we find no positive compliance effect, and compliance is on the same level as with blank forms. If prefilled income is higher than true income, prefilling still has a positive effect on compliance. In that case, compliance is on the same level as with correctly prefilled forms and higher than with blank forms. Our study contributes to the literature on cheating and lying by showing that prefilled forms affect compliance.     

Social networks and occupational choice: The endogenous formation of attitudes and beliefs about tax compliance

The paper analyses the emergence of group-specific attitudes and beliefs about tax compliance when individuals interact in a social network. It develops a model in which taxpayers possess a range of individual characteristics – including attitude to risk, potential for success in self-employment, and the weight attached to the social custom for honesty – and make an occupational choice based on these characteristics. Occupations differ in the possibility for evading tax. The social network determines which taxpayers are linked, and information about auditing and compliance is transmitted at meetings between linked taxpayers. Using agent-based simulations, the analysis demonstrates how attitudes and beliefs endogenously emerge that differ across sub-groups of the population. Compliance behaviour is different across occupational groups, and this is reinforced by the development of group-specific attitudes and beliefs. Taxpayers self-select into occupations according to the degree of risk aversion, the subjective probability of audit is sustained above the objective probability, and the weight attached to the social custom differs across occupations. These factors combine to lead to compliance levels that differ across occupations.     

The influence of tax authorities on the employment of tax practitioners: Empirical evidence from a survey and interview study

Tax practitioners play a crucial role in the degree of taxpayers’ compliance – a role that has increased as tax systems worldwide have become more complex. However, little is known about tax authorities’ impact on taxpayers’ decisions to employ tax practitioners. Based on earlier research on motivations to employ a tax practitioner and the extended slippery slope framework of tax compliance, we conducted two studies which provide some answers. A survey study – comprising a representative sample of 500 Austrian self-employed taxpayers – revealed that financial gain is not the most important reason to employ a tax practitioner but instead the motivation to avoid problems with the tax authorities. Related to that, we also find that taxpayers’ perception of tax authorities wielding coercive power motivates them to employ tax practitioners. In the interview study with 33 self-employed taxpayers and 30 tax auditors, taxpayers indicated that they sought to avoid contact with tax officers by employing tax practitioners. This finding was supported by tax officers who reported preferring interaction with tax practitioners over direct contact with taxpayers. The two studies point to the complex relationship between taxpayers, tax authorities and tax practitioners, and allow the drawing of theoretical and practical implications.     

Honesty or dishonesty of taxpayer communications in an enforcement regime

In many settings the true likelihood of capture when engaging in an illegal activity, such as tax evasion, is not well known to an individual. “Official” statements from the tax administration regarding enforcement effort provide some information. In addition, “informal”, or “unofficial”, communication among taxpayers can supplement these official announcements, but individuals do not know with certainty whether such unofficial information is honest (or accurate) versus dishonest (or inaccurate). We examine the truthfulness of an individual’s revelation of unofficial information to other individuals, along with the factors that affect any revelation, focusing on the intrinsic motivations for revelations. Our experimental design allows us to examine the type and the honesty of messages that an individual chooses to send to other individuals regarding their own audit outcome and their own compliance behavior. Our results indicate that most individuals send accurate messages about their own audit outcomes and their own compliance behaviors. Nevertheless, many individuals are also systematically dishonest about being audited; that is, we observe a significant tendency for individuals to claim that they were audited when they were not. We also observe a strong interaction between individuals’ audit outcomes and their compliance behaviors, so that individuals who engaged in tax evasion and who were audited were more truthful in their communications than those whose tax evasion went undetected.     

Misperception of chance and loss repair: On the dynamics of tax compliance

Previous experimental studies on tax behavior have been particularly concerned with determining the absolute effect of detection rate and punishment on tax filing, leading to mixed results. In this paper, we shed some additional light on the effectiveness of audit probability and sanctions by drawing upon a dynamic setting with particular focus on the time lag between audits. Our results showed that tax compliance decreased immediately after a random audit, suggesting that subjects were prone to misperception of chance. Sanctions decreased compliance to a lesser extent; they were, however, associated with the tendency of subjects to repair their losses by increasing their capital stock.     

Changing attitudes to risk at older ages: The role of health and other life events

This paper investigates risk attitudes at older ages in 14 European countries. Older individuals report lower willingness to take risks in all countries. Using panel data we are able to show that this relationship between financial risk attitudes and age is not due to cohort effects or selective mortality. We also show that key mechanisms driving this change with age are health changes and other life events – in our preferred specification around half of the overall evolution of risk attitudes with age can be explained by health shocks, retirement, and widowhood or marital change that occur increasingly frequently as individuals age. These life-events are a particularly important explanation of the evolution of risk attitudes for women.     

How income and tax rates provoke cheating – An experimental investigation of tax morale

Anecdotal evidence suggests that tax morale diminishes with income and with levels of taxation. We designed an experiment that enables identification of causal effects. Subjects carry out a sequence of real effort tasks. The income earned varies with individual differences in effort (combined with variances related to skill or luck) and with the exogenously given length of the tasks. For each task, subjects privately roll a die, whose value determines the tax rate, which is then reported by subjects. This provides subjects with an incentive to cheat. Tax morale diminishes with higher effort, which might find ethical justification, but also with longer tasks, which would not. We implement treatments that vary the range of taxation. Contrary to widespread belief, participants’ tax morale is invariant to these treatments. Our findings are best explained by a psychological force that tempts rich people to cheat more. This force does not seem to be related to fairness ideals that are prominent in theories of distributional justice nor to absolute levels of taxation.     

Tax morale and fairness in conflict an experiment

Most people pay their taxes most of the time, even if the expected disutility from enforcement is too low to deter tax evasion. One potential reason is tax morale and, more specifically, rule following. In a lab experiment, we show that the willingness to pay taxes just because participants are told they are supposed to pay is indeed pronounced. Yet compliance is reduced if participants learn that income is heterogeneous. The effect is driven by participants with the lowest income. The reduction obtains irrespective of the tax regime. If the tax is proportional to income, or progressive, participants become more skeptical about the willingness of participants with high income to comply.     

The effect of education,income inequality and merit on inequality acceptance

A large number of observational and experimental studies have explored the determinants of individual preferences for redistribution. In general, inequalities are more likely to be accepted by people of higher socioeconomic status, in richer societies and when inequalities are perceived as justifiable owing to differences in productivity. Almås et al. (2020) show that in a relatively unequal society (the United States), the highly educated accept inequality significantly more than the less educated, whereas, in a relatively equal society (Norway), the less educated accept inequality more, but not significantly more, than the highly educated. Here, we replicate this finding using data from experiments conducted in four locations across three countries all distinct from the ones studied by Almås et al. However, a closer look at the data indicates that the origin of the interaction effect varies depending on which societies one compares. Data for Norway and the United States indicate that meritocratic values among the highly educated are less prevalent in more equal societies and that this is the driver of the triple interaction effect. In contrast, in our data the interaction effects have multiple drivers.     

No mood effects in the field: The case of car inspections

We study mood effect in the field to measure its economic impact and address shortcomings in the existing literature, which typically uses one single mood proxy and ignores selection effects. Using over 50 million car inspections in Sweden and England and multiple mood proxies, we study whether car inspectors are more lenient on good mood days and if car owners self-select into those days. We find evidence of a “Friday effect” in England and a small selection bias, but no support for consistent mood effect. Our findings highlight the importance of considering the expectations of rational actors who may exploit mood effect and the need to study mood in the field using different settings and multiple proxies to avoid hasty conclusions.     

The arithmetic of outcome editing in financial and social domains

Outcome editing refers to a set of mental rules that people apply when deciding whether to evaluate multiple outcomes jointly or separately, which subsequently affects choice. In a large-scale online survey (n = 2062) we investigate whether individuals use the same outcome editing rules for financial outcomes (e.g., a lottery win) and social outcomes (e.g., a party with friends). We also test the role of numeric ability in explaining outcome editing. Our results show that people’s preferences for combining or separating events depend on whether those events are in the financial or the social domain. Specifically, individuals were more likely to segregate social outcomes than monetary outcomes, except for when all outcomes were negative. Moreover, numeric ability was associated with preferences for outcome editing in the financial domain but not in the social domain. Our findings extend the understanding of the arithmetic operations underlying outcome editing and suggest that people rely more on calculations when making choices involving multiple financial outcomes and more on feelings when making choices involving social outcomes.     

Tracing risky decisions for oneself and others: The role of intuition and deliberation

This study contributes to the understanding of how individuals make choices for themselves and on behalf of others in a risky environment. In a laboratory eye-tracking experiment, we investigate whether risk preferences, decision error, and information processing differ between decisions made for oneself and on behalf of others. While we find no differences in risk preferences when deciding for oneself or for someone else, individuals have a greater decision error when deciding for others. Process data partly explains these differences. Individuals spend less time, have less fixations, and inspect less information when deciding for others. We detect similar processing patterns when comparing intuitive and deliberative decision making. We argue that the processing of decisions for oneself is more effortful and involves more extensive deliberation which, in turn, is related to less decision errors.     

Subject-specific performance information can worsen the tragedy of the commons: Experimental evidence

The main aim of this article is to investigate the behavioral consequences of the provision of subject-specific information in the group effort levels chosen by players in an experimental CPR game. We examine two basic treatments, one with incomplete information and the other with complete information. In the former, subjects are informed only about their own individual payoffs and the aggregate extraction effort level of the group, and in the latter they are also informed about the individual effort levels and payoffs of each subject. Given this setting, the basic question we attempt to answer is: Will the provision of subject-specific performance information (i.e. individual’s effort levels and payoffs) improve or worsen the tragedy of the commons (i.e. an exploitation effort level greater than the socially optimum level)? In order to motivate our hypotheses and explain our experimental results at the individual level, we make use of the theory of learning in games, which goes beyond standard non-cooperative game theory, allowing us to explore the three basic benchmarks in the commons context: Nash equilibrium, Pareto efficient, and open access outcomes. We use several learning and imitation theoretical models that are based on contrasting assumptions about the level of rationality and the information available to subjects, namely: best response, imitate the average, mix of best response and imitate the average, imitate the best and follow the exemplary learning rules. Finally, in order to econometrically test the hypotheses formulated from the theoretical predictions we use a random-effects model to assess the explanatory power of the different selected behavioral learning and imitation rules.     

Spillovers from targeting of incentives: Exploring responses to being excluded

A growing set of policies involve transfers conditioned upon socially desired actions, such as attending school or conserving forest. However, given a desire to maximize the impact of limited funds by avoiding transfers that do not change behavior, typically some potential recipients are excluded on the basis of their characteristics, their actions or at random. This paper uses a laboratory experiment to study the behavior of individuals excluded on different bases from a new incentive that encourages real monetary donations to a public environmental conservation program. We show that the donations from the individuals who were excluded based on prior high contributions fell significantly. Yet the rationale used for exclusion mattered, in that none of the other selection criteria used as the basis for exclusion resulted in negative effects on contributions.     

A self-interest analysis of justice and tax compliance: How distributive justice moderates the effect of outcome favorability

Compliance with tax authorities has been studied mainly in the fields of economics and psychology. The focus has respectively been on self-interest motives and justice concerns in tax compliance. We argue that both concerns are less divergent than is often thought. Specifically, we studied the moderating role of distributive justice on the relationship between outcome favorability and tax compliance in two cross-sectional surveys. It is generally believed that favorable outcomes increase compliance because they decrease what can be gained from non-compliance. The present research addresses the role of distributive justice in this process. Since people believe that distributive fairness guarantees their long-term outcomes, favorable present outcomes now imply favorable future outcomes and unfavorable present outcomes now imply unfavorable future outcomes. Thus, we expected fair outcomes to result in a strong relationship between outcome favorability and compliance. On the basis that unfair outcomes are believed to result from chance, outcome favorability should have a weaker relationship with compliance when outcomes are unfair. Even when controlling for other variables, this prediction was supported by both studies.     

Procrastination, prompts, and preferences: Evidence from daily records of self-directed learning activities

This paper presents evidence showing that a libertarian paternalistic intervention having significant but uneven effects on the student procrastination of a coursework assignment. We observe the degree of procrastination in a language course at a Japanese university with individuals’ electronic records of daily activities. With a quasi-experiment that generates variations in the frequency of interventions and the preference of students towards the course, we examine the effects of in-class verbal prompts by an instructor on the timing of task completion. We find that prompts affect behavior, especially when reinforced, but the responsiveness depends on the class preferences and the timing of interventions.     

The willingness to pay–willingness to accept gap revisited: The role of emotions and moral satisfaction

While many earlier studies have found that people’s maximum willingness to pay for having a good is often substantially lower than their minimum willingness to accept not having it, more recent experimental evidence suggests that this discrepancy vanishes for standard consumption goods when an incentive-compatible design without misconceptions is used. This paper hypothesises that there is nevertheless a discrepancy for goods with a perceived moral character, such as contributions to a good cause, and moreover that the reason for this discrepancy can largely be explained by differences in emotions and moral perceptions. The results from a real-money dichotomous-choice experiment, combined with measurements of emotions and morality, are consistent with these hypotheses.     

An exploration of the robustness of alternative laboratory methodologies: Matching funds and the provision of public goods

The voluntary provision of a pure public good is studied in the presence of an anonymous external donor. New data generated using experimental procedures employing both extra-credit and cash incentives, as well as asynchronous access to real-time decision rounds lasting several days, are compared to previous data generated using traditional cash-only, synchronous-access laboratory procedures. The effect on resource allocations to the public good of introducing external matching funds is examined in two different settings, lump-sum matching and one-to-one matching. The new data confirm the robustness of results previously reported in Baker et al. (2009) to the change in laboratory procedures and incentives. The new data are then used to extend the parameter space in which the two matching mechanisms are studied, including: varying within-round information regarding the current level of public-good allocations and varying group size from four to twenty group members. Allocations in lump-sum matching are no worse, and sometimes better, than one-to-one matching in these new treatments.     

Gender differences in willingness to compete: The role of public observability

A recent literature emphasizes that gender differences in the labor market may in part be driven by a gender gap in willingness to compete. However, whereas experiments in this literature typically investigate willingness to compete in private environments, real world competitions often have a more public nature, which introduces potential social image concerns. If such image concerns are important, and men and women differ in the degree to which they want to be seen as competitive, making tournament entry decisions publicly observable may further exacerbate the gender gap. We test this prediction using a laboratory experiment (N = 784) that varies the degree to which the decision to compete, and its outcome, is publicly observable. We find that public observability does not alter the magnitude of the gender gap in willingness to compete in an economically or statistically significant way.