GENDER MATCHING AND COMPETITIVENESS: EXPERIMENTAL EVIDENCE

This paper experimentally investigates if and how people's competitiveness depends on their own gender and on the gender of people with whom they interact. Participants are given information about the gender of the co‐participant they are matched with, they then choose between a tournament or a piece rate payment scheme, and finally perform a real task. As already observed in the literature, we find that significantly more men than women choose the tournament. The gender of the co‐participant directly influences men's choices (men compete less against other men than against women), but only when the gender information is made sufficiently salient. A higher predicted competitiveness of women induces more competition. Giving stronger tournament incentives, or allowing the participants to choose the gender of their co‐participant, increases women's willingness to compete, but does not close the gender gap in competitiveness. (JEL C70, C91, J16, J24, J31, M52)     

Gender inequalities in pensions: different components similar levels of dispersion

While the average gender gap in pensions is quite well documented, gender differences in the distribution of pensions have rarely been explored. We show in this paper that pension dispersion is very similar for men and women within the French pension system of a given sector (public or private). Gender differences are less marked among retired civil servants than among former private sector employees. However, the determinants of these inequalities are not the same for men and women. Using a regression-based decomposition of the Gini coefficient, we find that pension dispersion is mostly due to dispersion of the reference wage for all retirees but gender differences exist. For women, in particular, pension dispersion is also due to the dispersion in contribution periods. We also decompose the Gini coefficient by source of pension to measure the impact of institutional rules (minimum pensions, survivor’s pension) on the extent of pension inequality. Unexpectedly, we find that the impact of minimum pensions is limited, although slightly larger for civil servants than for private-sector employees. Survivor’s pension schemes, on the other hand, contribute positively to pension dispersion among retired women.     

Advice from women and men and selection into competition

Advice processes are omnipresent in our professional and private lives. We use a laboratory experiment to study how gender and gender matching affect advice giving and how gender matching affects advice following about entry into a real-effort tournament. For advice giving we find that women are less likely than men to recommend tournament entry to advisees than are intermediate performers. Furthermore, women maximize less often the expected earnings of advisees than intermediate performers. For advice following we find that men enter the tournament significantly more often than women in the intermediate-performance group do. Gender matching does not seem to affect advice giving or following. Overall, when it is less clear what the better advice or decision is, gender differences emerge. These results are consistent with findings in other areas that document that gender differences emerge in situations that are more ambiguous.     

The gender wage gap by education in Italy

This paper studies the gender wage gap by educational attainment in Italy using the 1994–2001 ECHP data. We estimate wage distributions in the presence of covariates and sample selection separately for highly and low educated men and women. Then, we decompose the gender wage gap across all the wage distribution and isolate the part due to gender differences in the remunerations of the similar characteristics. We find that women are penalized especially if low educated. When we control for sample selection induced by unobservables, the penalties for low educated women become even larger, above all at the bottom of the wage distribution.     

SELF-SELECTION AND THE EFFICIENCY OF TOURNAMENTS

The literature has shown that the overall efficiency of exogenously imposed tournaments is reduced by a high variance in performance. This article reports results from an experiment analyzing whether allowing subjects to self-select into different payment schemes is reducing the variability of performance in tournaments. We show that when the subjects choose to enter a tournament instead of a piece-rate payment scheme, the average effort is higher and the between-subject variance is substantially lower than when the same payment scheme is imposed. Mainly based on risk aversion, sorting is efficiency enhancing since it increases the homogeneity of the contestants . ( JEL M52, J33, J31, C81, C91)     

Women’s Tertiary Education Masks the Gender Wage Gap in Turkey

This paper investigates the gender wage gap for full-time formal sector employees, disaggregated by education level. The gap between the labor force participation rate of women with tertiary education and those with lower levels of education is substantial. There is no such gap for men. Hence, existing gender wage gap studies for Turkey, where we observe lopsided labor force participation rates by education levels, compare two very different populations. We disaggregate the whole sample by education level to create more homogenous sub-groups. For Turkey, without disaggregation, the gender wage gap was 13% in 2011, and women are significantly over-qualified relative to men on observed characteristics. Once we disaggregate the sample by education level, we show that the gender wage gap is 24% for less educated women and 9% for women with tertiary education in full-time formal employment. Observed characteristics only explain 1 % of this gap in absolute terms. We further disaggregate the data by public and private employment. The gender gap is higher in the private sector. However, women with tertiary education in the public sector are significantly better qualified compared to men, and consequently the adjusted gender wage gap is higher for women with tertiary education in the public sector. Our estimates also indicate a rise in the gender wage gap between 2004 and 2011.     

Wage Inequality and Performance in Nonprofit and For‐Profit Organizations

This article examines the effects of several forms of wage inequality on service quality and employee effort. We suggest that two popular theories, tournament and fair wage/equity, are not necessarily competing. Each theory accurately describes aspects of employee behavior, but because of sectoral differences in organizational objectives and employee attitudes, tournament theory's predictions are relatively stronger in the for‐profit sector, while fair wage/equity theory's predictions are relatively stronger in the nonprofit sector. Using an employer–employee matched data set of nursing homes linked to a federal regulatory database and a resident survey, we found that ownership moderates the relationship between wage inequality and service quality. Although wage inequality positively affects service quality in the for‐profit sector, the reverse is true among nonprofit organizations. We also found that overall wage inequality in the workplace has a more pronounced influence on employee discretionary effort than does the employee's place in the distribution of wages.     

Gender differences in willingness to compete: The role of public observability

A recent literature emphasizes that gender differences in the labor market may in part be driven by a gender gap in willingness to compete. However, whereas experiments in this literature typically investigate willingness to compete in private environments, real world competitions often have a more public nature, which introduces potential social image concerns. If such image concerns are important, and men and women differ in the degree to which they want to be seen as competitive, making tournament entry decisions publicly observable may further exacerbate the gender gap. We test this prediction using a laboratory experiment (N = 784) that varies the degree to which the decision to compete, and its outcome, is publicly observable. We find that public observability does not alter the magnitude of the gender gap in willingness to compete in an economically or statistically significant way.     

GENDER DIFFERENCES IN EXPERIMENTAL WAGE NEGOTIATIONS

We examine behavioral gender differences and gender pairing effects in a laboratory experiment with face‐to‐face alternating‐offers wage bargaining. Our results suggest that gender differences in bargaining behavior are role‐dependent. We find that women obtain worse bargaining outcomes than men when they take on the role of employees, but not when they act as employers. Differences in bargaining outcomes can be explained by the bargaining parties' initial offers and counteroffers. We do not find evidence for behavioral differences between men and women in the process of alternating offers after first offers and counteroffers are made.(JEL J16, C78, C91)     

A distribution-sensitive examination of the gender wage gap in Germany

This paper provides a new examination of the gender pay gap for Germany based on a family of distribution-sensitive indicators. Wage distributions for men and women do not only differ by a fixed constant; differences are more complex. We show that focusing on the bottom of the wage distribution reveals a larger gender gap. Our distribution-sensitive analysis can also be used to study whether the statistical disadvantage of women in average pay might be ‘offset’ by lower inequality. Over a broad range of plausible preferences over inequality, we show however that ‘inequality-adjusted’ estimates of the gap can be up to three times higher than standard inequality-neutral measures in Eastern Germany and up to fifty percent higher in Western Germany. Using preference parameters elicited from a hypothetical risky investment question in our sample, inequality-adjusted gender gap measures turn out to be close to those upper bounds.     

The Gender Wage Gap in the United States and Cross Nationally

Scholarship in sociology and economics has long explored the gender wage gap. Recent research suggests that these inequalities are indicative of important differences not only between men and women, but among women and men, reflecting rising levels of income inequality among workers in the post‐industrial era. We argue that the most interesting debates in the gender wage gap – those exploring differences among subgroups by class, race, and/or parenthood status (such as the motherhood wage penalty), as well as those considering differences across countries – can bring new insights to the study of wage inequality, as well as to understandings of what drives gendered wage inequality.     

Der Einfluss der beruflichen Geschlechtersegregation auf den „Gender Pay Gap“

Occupational sex segregation is generally seen as an important determinant for the gender specific wage differential (“gender pay gap”). Therefore, the present study examines factors explaining wage penalties in typical women’s occupations in Germany. Dealing with sociological and social psychological status theories it is assumed that women’s occupations are paid less because of typical feminine work content that is devalued on the labor market—whereas typical masculine work content dominating in men’s occupations is monetary highly valued. Hypotheses are tested with data from the German Socio-Economic Panel Study (SOEP) 2000–2010 applying linear fixed effects models. Occupational characteristics, like gendered work content, are merged from the BIBB/BAuA-Erwerbstätigenbefragung (Employment Survey) 2005/2006 and the Microcensus to the SOEP. The analysis reveals the mediating effect of gendered work content on wage penalties in gross hourly wages for employees in women’s occupations—but only for men. This gender specific effect is explained with different expectations for competence and effort concerning gendered work content with which women and men are confronted. Lower norms for overwork in women’s occupations partly explain wage penalties in those occupations especially for women. Finally, an Oaxaca/Blinder decomposition shows that gendered work content explains the “gender pay gap” significantly.     

GRIND OR GAMBLE? AN EXPERIMENT ON EFFORT AND SPREAD SEEKING IN CONTESTS

We conduct a contest experiment to study if spread seeking and effort can be managed when participants can invest in increasing both the mean and the spread of an uncertain performance variable. Subjects are treated with different prize schemes and in accordance with theory, we observe higher investments in spread for the winner-take-all scheme. Both types of investments can be controlled with a three-level prize scheme. However, the control management is imperfect and behavior is characterized by inertia. We also explore the correlation between effort and spread across subjects and find that is robustly positive.     

The reverse wage gap among educated White and Black women

Using the 2004 National Sample Survey of Registered Nurses and the 2004–2005 American Community Surveys, we estimate the Black–White wage gap among females with at least some college education. We find that Black female nurses earn 9% more at the mean and median than White female nurses, controlling for selection into nursing employment. Among K-12 teachers, Black females earn 7% more than White females at the median. There is no Black–White wage gap among all women with a bachelor’s degree. Differences in opportunities for education and marriage between White and Black women may explain why highly educated Black females earn on par with highly educated White females.     

The gender pay gap in nonprofit executive compensation in South Florida

In general, systemic imbalance in pay between men and women is well established, but the literature on pay imbalance is mixed for nonprofit executives. Difference in organizational size could be a relevant factor in explaining pay imbalance, as previous research suggests average female nonprofit executives lead smaller organizations. The present study examines the role of governance accreditation on the gender gap in chief executive pay, using a 2 × 2 analysis of covariance to control for organizational size (as measured by annual revenue) when comparing samples of accredited and nonaccredited organizations in South Florida. We found a wage gap for gender, with female executives averaging 12% less compensation than male executives, after controlling for organizational size. No significant effect was found for accreditation; although the only significant difference between genders was in the nonaccredited sample, the findings hint that any trend towards pay equity would be due to a pattern of the male executives in the accredited sample being paid less than their counterparts in nonaccredited organizations.     

Stagnation only on the surface? The implications of skill and family responsibilities for the gender wage gap in Sweden, 1974–2010

The wage differential between women and men persists in advanced economies despite the inflow of women into qualified occupations in recent years. Using five waves of the Swedish Level‐of‐Living Survey (LNU), this paper explores the gender wage gap in Sweden during the 1974–2010 period overall and by skill level. The empirical analyses showed that the general gender wage gap has been nearly unchanged for the past 30 years. However, the gender difference in wage in less qualified occupations fell considerably, whereas the gender pay gap remained stable for men and women in qualified occupations. The larger significance of family responsibilities for wages in qualified occupations is one likely explanation for this result.     

The gender citation gap: Why and how it matters

The weight of evidence suggests that articles written by men and women receive citations at comparable rates. This suggests that research quality or gender-based bias in research evaluation and citing behaviors may not be the reason why academic women accumulate fewer citations than men at the career level. In this article, I outline a career perspective that highlights women's disadvantages in career progression as the root causes for the gender citation gap. I also consider how the gender citation gap may perpetuate the unequal pay between genders in science. My analysis of two different datasets, one including paper and citation information for over 130,000 highly cited scholars during the 1996–2020 period and another including citation and salary information for nearly 2,000 Canadian scholars over the 2014–2019 period, shows several important findings. First, papers written by women on average receive more citations than those written by men. Second, the gender citation gap grows larger with time as men and women progress in their careers, but the opposite pattern holds when research productivity and collaborative networks are considered. Third, higher citations lead to higher pay, and gender differences in citations explain a significant share of the gender wage gap. Findings demonstrate the critical need for more attention toward gender differences in career progression when investigating the causes and solutions for gender disparities in science.     

Parenthood wage penalties in a double income society

We estimate how parenthood affects hourly wages using panel data for Norwegian employees in the years 1997–2007. Though smaller than for most other OECD countries, we find substantial wage penalties to motherhood, ranging from a 1.2 % wage reduction for women with lower secondary education to 4.9 % for women with more than four years of higher education. Human capital measures such as work experience and paid parental leave do not explain the wage penalties, indicating that in the Norwegian institutional context, mothers are protected from adverse wage effects due to career breaks. We do however find large heterogeneity in the effects, with the largest penalties for mothers working full time and in the private sector. Contrary to most studies using US data and to previous research from Norway, we find a small wage penalty also to fatherhood. Also for men, the penalty is greater for those who work full time and in the private sector. A substantial share of the fatherhood wage penalty is explained by paternity leave.     

DO GENDER‐VARIANT PREFERENCES FOR COMPETITION PERSIST IN THE ABSENCE OF PERFORMANCE?

The well‐established gender gap in preferences for competition has been attributed to gender‐variant feelings about performing in competitive environments. Using a novel task with agency, in which subjects experience competition but cannot perform, we find evidence that performing may be sufficient but not necessary to generate gender‐variant preferences for competition. This suggests that the gender‐gap cannot be eliminated by correcting beliefs alone; that eliminating performance—for example, routinizing tasks—may not eliminate the gender gap; and that there may be heretofore unidentified determinants of preferences for competition—for example, men may prefer payment schemes that are based on social comparison. (JEL J16, C91, J24)     

Union wage premiums by gender and race: Evidence from PSID 1980–1992

We find that the overall union wage premium is relatively stable (ranging from 22.3 to 28.4 percent), but there seems to be a convergence of union wage premiums across different demographic groups between 1980 and 1992. Nonwhite men (whose premium ranges from 23.5 to 36.2 percent) show the largest gain, followed by white women (17.1 to 30.5 percent), white men (19 to 26.4 percent), and nonwhite women (10 to 20 percent). One explanation for this convergence of union wage premiums might be the “equalization hypothesis” associated with unions. This converging trend could have important implications for the future of unions. If union membership can explain a portion of the gender/racial wage gap, and if women/nonwhites can obtain, through union membership significant wage premia, increased female/nonwhite union participation in highly unionized sectors that offer high union wage gains could, in time, greatly decrease the gender/racial wage differential. This study was supported in part by National Science Foundation funds [OSR-9350540]. An earlier version of this paper was presented at the Southern Economic Association conference in New Orleans in 1995. We thank Emilia Lulcheva and Michael Lauze for their able research assistance and William Warren for his valuable editorial comments on an earlier draft of this paper. The usual caveat applies.