Privatisation in Developing Countries: Performance and Ownership Effects

Over the last twenty years, privatisation, defined as the transfer of public assets (firms) from the government to private investors, has been on the reform agenda of more than 120 developing countries. The switch of ownership induces major changes in the corporate governance of firms, and in their incentives to restructure and improve efficiency and performance. This article evaluates this experience, focusing on its impact on corporate performance and governance, identifying several issues yet to be resolved.     

Privatisation and economism: an investigation amongst 'producers' in two privatised public utilities in Britain

Both academic and political debate about the effects of privatisation upon employees in privatised companies has taken place in something of an empirical vacuum. In particular, there is a lack of systematic enquiries into the major privatised utilities. Despite the lack of evidence, a number of claims have been advanced, both about the impact of privatisation upon the political attitudes of employees, and about its effects on working conditions, worker motivation and behaviour. This paper presents the results of a survey of 442 employees in two privatised public utilities. It is divided into two parts, looking first at the more general social and political attitudes of these employees, then presenting their views on the impact of privatisation on the company they work for, and on their working lives. The findings reported here lend little support either to new right claims about privatisation's transformative powers or to the view that ‘for most people … privatisation will make very little difference at all’ (Saunders and Harris, 1990).     

Firm Ownership and Rent Sharing

In this paper we analyse—theoretically and empirically—how the degree of private versus public ownership of firms affects the degree of rent sharing between firms and their workers. Using a particularly rich linked employer-employee dataset from Portugal, covering a large number of corporate ownership changes across a wide spectrum of economic sectors over more than 20 years, we find that rent sharing is significantly higher in firms with a larger share of private ownership. Estimates from our most preferred empirical specification suggest that an increase in the private ownership share of 10 percentage points increases (on average) the rent-sharing elasticity by 0.0002. Based on a theoretical analysis that incorporates union-firm wage bargaining and efficiency wage effects within the same modelling framework, this result cannot be explained by private firms being more profit oriented than public ones. However, the result is consistent with a scenario whereby privatisation leads to less job security for workers, implying stronger efficiency wage effects.     

Which Domestic Firms Benefit from FDI? Evidence from Selected African Countries

The existing literature on the effects of FDI inflows on domestic firms' performance offers ambiguous evidence. Macro‐level studies suggest that the characteristics of inward FDI and the ‘absorptive capacity’ of the host economy matter in determining the sign (or the mere existence) of these effects. Studies based on micro‐level data have so far mostly focused on finding a nexus between FDI inflows and the productivity of domestic firms, suggesting that the effects might be highly heterogeneous. This article, using a recent firm‐level survey conducted by UNIDO in 19 sub‐Saharan African countries, explores the channels through which multinational enterprises may exert an impact on local firms: products’ market, input availability and costs, access to finance and export opportunities, and analyses the strategic reactions of domestic firms induced by the presence of foreign affiliates.     

Innovation Policy Challenges in Transition Countries: Foreign Business R&D in the Czech Republic and Hungary

R&D expenditures of national firms decreased considerably and structural changes of R&D financing followed the fall of planned economy in the transition period of Central Eastern European economies. In the middle of the 1990s, business R&D started to grow in the Czech Republic and Hungary due to investments of foreign affiliates and restructuring of domestic companies. Nowadays multinational companies have a decisive share in business R&D in these countries, which entails special challenges for national innovation policy. In this paper, we look through the development of the Czech and Hungarian innovation policy considering MNEs R&D. We use case studies of the Czech automobile industry, the Hungarian pharmaceutical industry, and the new MNE-related university units and private universities to show how these companies influence innovation systems in transition economies.      

Social network and family business: Uncovering hybrid family firms

What does it mean for a private enterprise in China to be embedded in a family? Our purpose here is twofold: (1) use social network analysis to describe what it means for a firm to be embedded in a family, (2) reveal from the application a new kind of firm, not family, yet akin to family. Armed with data on a large probability sample of private enterprises — a third of which meet ownership and employment criteria of being family businesses — we uncover a category of “hybrid family firms” that look modern in the style of firms that exclude family, but operate socially in ways similar to family firms. Our conclusion from summary statistics on the sample is that there are no differences in average performance level or network advantage for the three categories of businesses: family firms, hybrid family firms, and family-excluded firms. The fact that CEOs of family firms and hybrid family firms more often turn to family as key business contacts is a fact about network composition that raises no question about network mechanisms. Whether the CEO turns to more or fewer family contacts, government help is more likely with stronger political connections, and business success and survival are more likely with a large, open network. That said, the look-modern, act-traditional hybrid family firms stand alone in prospering with a CEO embedded in a closed business network. Recognition of hybrid family firms adds to the literature’s illustrations of social network analysis used to distinguish types of businesses and business people, and extends the population of organizations within which governance and strategy are likely to be better understood when viewed through a family logic.     

Commodity chains,foreign investment and labour issues in Eastern Europe

In terms of ownership and operations, many companies in Eastern Europe have now been integrated into the world economy. In this article, informed in part by a critical engagement with the Global Commodity Chains (GCC) perspective, we explore the nature and significance of international linkages among firms in Eastern Europe. In particular, we argue that it has been the legacies of the state socialist past embedded in the inherited macro‐ and microeconomic structures, on the one hand, and the strategies of multinational firms on the other, rather than the international linkages in any simple sense, that have been the main influencing factors. While we do not deny the existence of inter‐firm relations similar to the ones described in the GCC literature, we point out that these relationships are much more complex than assumed in that approach and that this complexity is a product of the very different historical backgrounds and modes of incorporation into the world economy of the various Eastern European societies. Drawing on empirical evidence from Hungary and focusing specifically on employment and other labour issues, we argue that there are a variety of firm development paths in Eastern Europe and that these have differing implications for the integration of firms, regions and countries of Eastern Europe into the world economy.     

China's Way of Economic Transition

China started economic transition in 1978 to implement a Chinese type of socialist market economy system, i.e., a market-oriented economy consisting of collectively community-owned enterprises (CCOE) and state-owned enterprises (SOE) in a totalitarian political system with the Communist Party of China as the ruling power. The main contents of the economic transition can be briefly described as follows: (1) gradual decentralization of economic decision from central economic planning to market-oriented decision by delegating competence to managers of SOE and CCOE without privatization of public ownership, (2) liberalization of cross border economic activities (open-door policy), (3) allowance for Chinese to erect private enterprises (PE) on the one side and foreigners to set up foreign invested enterprises (FIE) on the other side, as well as (4) reorganization of SOE and CCOE. In comparison to the former Soviet Union and the Central and Eastern European countries, the following points of China's way of economic transition are of special interest. First, China's way of transition is a ``gradual trial and error' approach without a transition program set for long term but flexible and gradual way which is called a ``touch stones to cross river' approach. Field experiments have been carried out at first. A reform will be implemented after successful experiments. Second, the rural community becomes reorganized by breaking down communes, implementing a ``household responsibility system' in the agricultural sector and setting CCOE in the rural areas to carry out industrialization without movement out of rural labor (the slogan for this kind of transition is lee tuh puh lee shian [``move out from agriculture but not out of rural area']. Third, China's economic development is characterized by a huge expansion of CCOE in the eighties and newly founded PE consisting of FIE since the nineties, while only a very limited share of SOE has been privatized via the reorganization of the sector. China's way of economic transition has been a process of decentralization of the economic system from a central planning economy to one of decentralized market-oriented decision by delegating competence to management of SOE and CCOE without privatization of the ownership to increase efficiency. Fourth, China has been heavily loaded by a fragile banking system with a huge amount of nonperformance loan which implies a high risk of banking system crisis. Fifth, China's economic transition has been seen as a tool to keep the power of the Communist Party China with a periodically instable totalitarian political system and has permanently been confronted with risk of a political collapse. Human rights have not been protected in China. The FIE have crucially contributed to the growth of industrial production, export, and also the economic growth in China since 1979, especially since 1992. Economic special zones have significantly induced the rapid growth inflow of FDI which has financed the establishment of new enterprises instead of financing privatization of the SOE in China. Thus, it is not exaggerated to say that the FDI inflow has mainly contributed to the performance of the Chinese economic transition and the FIE have been the engine of the Chinese economic development.     

On large enterprises: new findings from a European comparison

The recent evolution of Italian capitalism shows the increasing relevance of large enterprises at three levels: the economic and institutional environment, the ownership structure, and the financing policy. A comparison of the financial structure of Italian large enterprises with those of other European countries (France, Germany, and Spain), using Bank for the Accounts of Companies Harmonised data, shows their financial fragility, where the prevalence of debt over equity justifies the still strong and close relationship between ownership control and management in their strategies and the prevalence of obsolete bank–firm relationships based on short-term external finance and multiple business lendings. These factors slow down firms’ expansion and consequently the need for companies to grow so as to face the new global market. Finance is confirmed as a determinant of growth both in size and in organisation. We conclude that a pivotal role for the growth of Italian firms lies in a “revised” relationship between size, governance, and the firms’ financial structure.     

Why Transition Countries May Specialize in Low-Quality Production

Politicians and economists of transition countries fear a low-quality trap for their economies. We present a model of international trade with two countries and two qualities of goods model where high-quality production exhibits economies of scale and low-quality production does not. Depending on transaction costs, the low-quality good will be produced either in the low-wage economy (i.e., the transition country) only or it will not be traded at all. Regarding the high-quality good, we discuss three potential reasons why transition countries may be trapped in the production of low quality when economies of scale in production prevail: (a) international trade policy (i.e., GATT / WTO); (b) external economies due to quality uncertainty; (c) external economies due to demand effects (big push). All reasons favor incumbents over entrants and thus lead to a low-quality trap for transition economies due to the existence of incumbents located in industrialized countries.     

A Model of the Macroeconomic Effects of Privatization on Employment in Transition and Developing Countries with an Application to China

It is generally agreed that privatization of state-owned enterprises improves economic efficiency, but it is also widely feared that it exacerbates unemployment especially in transition and developing economies. This paper proposes a theoretical model of the macroeconomic relationships between privatization, efficiency, output, and employment. The model explains how privatization affects employment in transition and developing economies through different, and often opposing, channels. As a result, job losses at firms being privatized may result in overall job gains or losses in the economy, depending on the macroeconomic conditions. We apply this model to China and find that the model provides an intuitively appealing explanation for the job gains and losses caused by privatization in China during its transition. The model further suggests policies to maximize the gains and minimize the costs of privatization.     

NEW FACTS ABOUT FIRM RISK ACROSS COUNTRIES AND OVER THE BUSINESS CYCLE

The characteristics of firm‐level risk over the cycle and across countries are studied in this paper. Low idiosyncratic firm‐level risk is found to be a feature of highly developed, stable economies, whereas the countercyclicality of firm‐level risk is associated with flexible as well as stable economies. These facts are uncovered with the help of a theoretical model where small, risk‐averse firms display procyclical risk, whereas larger, risk‐neutral firms have countercyclical risk patterns that depend on the rigidity of the business environment. The predictions of the model are then confirmed by the data using a large international firm‐level database (ORBIS) together with the World Bank Doing Business Database, during the “Great Recession” across 55 countries. The findings are critical for the growing literature of uncertainty driven business cycles, and show that firm‐level uncertainty cannot be treated as an exogenous parameter. (JEL D21, D22, E32, F44, L11, L25)     

Public and private agri-environmental regulation in post-socialist economies: Evidence from the Serbian Fresh Fruit and Vegetable Sector

Using primary survey data and interview evidence this paper analyses the implementation and enforcement of public and private environmental regulation in the Serbian Fresh Fruit and Vegetable (FFV) sector. This provides a basis for engaging in a wider debate on the nature of agri-food regulation in post-socialist economies. Depictions of the restructuring of agri-food supply chains as a shift from public to private regulation are rejected. Rather two distinct supply chains co-exist: a small number of export oriented producers operate subject to extensive private regulation while the majority of FFV farmers occupy regulatory voids, immune to both private and private control. Those farmers operating under extensive private regulation are more likely to obey appropriate public regulation. Findings highlight the differentiated nature of regulatory regimes that can co-exist within a national production sector.     

Building Social Capability for Economic Catch-up: The Experience and Prospects of the Post-socialist Countries

The post-socialist countries are, by the standards of the EU, poor countries. The major developmental task facing these countries is, therefore, that of catching up with their more prosperous neighbours. The scope for catch-up is defined in terms of the levels of social capability exhibited by these societies and their capacity to establish technological congruence with the leading firms from the advanced industrial economies. S&T systems in the broadest sense are shown to be key factors in relation to both social capability and technological congruence. Detailed analysis of the transition countries indicates that the catch-up process is hampered across the board by specific gaps in social capability and elements of technological incongruence. These can in turn be traced to specific structural trends, in particular in relation to foreign investment, and to specific weaknesses of institutional development, cutting across the public/private dividing line, notably in relation to R&D systems and banking systems. Consideration of all these factors suggests that there can be no assumption that the transition countries will automatically catch up with western Europe, and that some disfavoured transition countries may, indeed, continue to fall behind.     

Disabling governance: Privatisation of city markets and implications for vendors’ associations in Kampala, Uganda

Contemporary international models of governance prescribe the devolution of service provision to a range of non-state actors and the adoption of market-oriented policies. This paper explores the politics that have arisen from changes in the governance framework in Kampala, the capital of Uganda. The focus is on the privatisation of the management of city markets and on the relations between the multiple actors involved—private contractors, vendors’ associations, cooperatives and state actors. In particular, the paper looks into the implications of the privatisation process for vendors and their associations. It argues that, while the latter have sometimes adjusted to the changes by turning into cooperative societies or creating their own management firms, increasingly, however, private interests external to the markets are taking over the management functions, sidelining or even repressing, vendors’ associations. The general picture is one of weakening associations and endangered possibilities for broad-based organising and interest representation.     

Production efficiency and constraints on profit taxation and profit distribution in economies with Ramsey taxation

In economies with Ramsey taxation, decreasing returns to scale, and private ownership, we show that second-best production efficiency is desirable when the grouping of private firms induced by the profit taxation power of the government is at least as fine as the grouping of firms induced by the institutional rules of profit distribution in the economy. The classic results of Dasgupta and Stiglitz (Rev Econ Stud 39:87–103, 1972) (of firm-specific profit taxation) and Diamond and Mirrlees (Am Econ Rev 61:8–27, 1971a; Am Econ Rev 61:261–278, 1971b) and Guesnerie (A contribution to the pure theory of taxation, 1995) (of uniform 100 % profit taxation) follow as special cases of our model. Moreover, second-best analysis shows that optimal profit taxation is a substitute for optimal intermediate input taxation. In smooth economies, proportional, lump-sum, and affine modes of profit taxation are equivalent. We rework Mirrlees (Rev Econ Stud 39:105–111, 1972) counterexample, which is posed in the context of a non-smooth economy, to show that second-best production efficiency continues to remain desirable under an affine structure of profit taxation.     

Market economies and pro-social behavior: Experimental evidence from Central Asia

This study seeks to extend the body of knowledge of pro-social behavior in comparative market settings by reporting on a high-stakes ultimatum game and revelation game experiments in two transition economies: Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. While controlling for cultural differences and framing effects, we find statistically significant differences in fairness and honesty behavior between the two countries. Specifically, subjects in Uzbekistan (in an earlier stage of transition to a market economy) are fairer and more honest than their later-stage Kazakh counterparts. Our experimental findings have implications for the literature on pro-social behavior and market economies, and more generally, on the transmission process between formal and informal institutions.     

The institutional antecedent to firms’ interorganizational network portfolios: Evidence from China

Although the amount of research on interorganizational networks has increased significantly in recent years, few studies have examined the antecedents to interorganizational network portfolios—organizations’ configuration of their relationship networks with other organizations. To address this gap, this study examines how firms’ interorganizational network portfolios vary across three types of ownership structures (i.e., state-owned, private, and multinational enterprises) in China. Cluster analysis of the data on 212 leading firms operating in China revealed two types of network portfolios firms maintain. Specifically, firms maintaining robust cross-sector portfolios had more extensive networks with organizations in the nonprofit and public sectors than firms maintaining limited cross-sector portfolios. Moreover, regression results suggested that firms across different ownership structures had distinct numbers and types of organizational partners, particularly nongovernmental organization (NGO) partners. Theoretical and practical implications are derived from the findings.     

The communication industry in economic integration: The case of West Germany

National economies can be viewed as networks of interdependent relations among the firms, industries and sectors that make up the total economic system. Within this economic system. The communication industry plays a central role by providing message and media products and services, i.e. the linking and coordinating infrastructure.Some limited research has been conducted on the nature and importance of the communication industry in the total economic network of a nation. The study reported here, however, represents the first application of currently existing network analysis techniques to this problem on a large-scale basis. The data used for this study represent the interorganizational relationships among 365 West German firms, with a 1970-based stock value of $333,000 or more. Interorganizational linkages are a function of (1) direction of ownership, and (2) magnitude of ownership (percentage of stock owned weighted by the value of the owned firm).The data analysis reveals that there are a number of dominating industrial groups, including a communication industry. The inter-firm relationships of the communication industry have been mapped and measured. The analysis demonstrates that there is relatively little dominance in and widespread integration with other major economic clusters of the economy. These findings are considered as being preliminary since only publically reported data were available, i.e. privately controlled firms are not included in the analysis. A number of measures for connectedness and integrativeness are presented that suggest themselves in addition to the technique of network analysis per se as potential alternative measures. Media scholars as well as economists may want to utilize network analysis as a method to study various forms of economic concentration and ownership in national industries.     

Competition and privatization amidst weak institutions: evidence from Mongolia

Mongolia's mass privatization program was implanted in a country that lacked the very basic institutions of capitalism. This paper examines the effects of competition and ownership on the efficiency of the newly privatized enterprises, using a representative sample of enterprises and controlling for possible selection biases. Competition has quantitatively large effects; perfectly competitive firms having nearly double the efficiency of monopolies. Enterprises with residual state ownership appear to be more efficient than other enterprises, reflecting an environment where the government was pressured to focus on efficiency and institutions gave little voice to outsider owners.