Below-replacement fertility in east and southeast asia: Consequences and policy responses

Fourteen countries in Asia have total fertility rates at or below replacement level. This is more pronounced in China, Japan, the Republic of Korea, Singapore and Thailand. The implications are far-reaching and profound as they affect the age structure of the population, giving rise to population ageing, labour force shortages, increased elderly dependency ratios and feminization of the aged population. Evidence from European countries suggests that although fertility may rebound, in most countries it is highly unlikely that fertility will recover sufficiently to reach replacement level in the near future. Mortality reduction will continue to be an overriding policy goal, which would further enhance the ageing process. Therefore, the greatest challenge will be to pension systems, old-age care systems, and health systems or health insurance. This paper first examines the fertility transition in five low-fertility countries. It then discusses the policy measures that these countries have adopted in response to low fertility and population ageing. The paper concludes with the policy implications for healthcare, social care, income security and caregiving facility, and the scope for further study.     

Probabilistic Projections of the Total Fertility Rate for All Countries

We describe a Bayesian projection model to produce country-specific projections of the total fertility rate (TFR) for all countries. The model decomposes the evolution of TFR into three phases: pre-transition high fertility, the fertility transition, and post-transition low fertility. The model for the fertility decline builds on the United Nations Population Division’s current deterministic projection methodology, which assumes that fertility will eventually fall below replacement level. It models the decline in TFR as the sum of two logistic functions that depend on the current TFR level, and a random term. A Bayesian hierarchical model is used to project future TFR based on both the country’s TFR history and the pattern of all countries. It is estimated from United Nations estimates of past TFR in all countries using a Markov chain Monte Carlo algorithm. The post-transition low fertility phase is modeled using an autoregressive model, in which long-term TFR projections converge toward and oscillate around replacement level. The method is evaluated using out-of-sample projections for the period since 1980 and the period since 1995, and is found to be well calibrated.     

生育率演变的生态学逻辑及人口增长的长期趋势

人口增长的长期过程一直是充满困惑与引发争论的话题,将人类复归到生态系统的普通成员,按照生态学逻辑构建一个由替代生育率内生引导、人口容量外生制约的人口增长新模型,以代替用具体社会经济因子解释短周期人口变动的传统思路,探讨生育率转变的一般模式及人口发展的长期趋势。工业革命以来,全球人口已经或正在经历着第一次、第二次生育率转变,全球生育率演变可以聚类为欧美、亚非拉、撒哈拉以南非洲和东亚四种区域模式;在计划生育政策的推动下,我国在短短的三十年内完整经历了两次生育率转变。极限替代生育率是生育率演变的长期目标,但当前已有一些国家跌破更替水平,这也许会成为各个国家的普遍经历,预示着人口容量约束的日益显性化;世界及主要国家的人口规模正在日益逼近其容量极限,并会在惯性驱动下突破容量限制,达到峰值后再以负增长方式趋近人口容量,同期的生育率也将向极限替代生育率递增复归。按趋势模拟世界和中国的可持续人口容量分别约为65亿人和12亿人。研究设计出测量人口增长惯性的新指标——人口增长惯性系数,它是生育率与实时替代生育率之比或出生率与死亡率之比,相比常用的人口惯性因子更为简便易行。     

Below-replacement fertility in Thailand and its policy implications

The fertility transition in Thailand has been one of the most rapid among Asian countries that are yet to attain newly industrialized country status. In the early 1960s, the total fertility rate exceeded six births per woman; currently, it stands at 1.9 or slightly below replacement level. At present, it is hard to predict the future trend in fertility as this involves several factors that need much closer study, in particular, fertility preferences, changes in marriage patterns and the wider effects of the current economic crisis in Thailand. Rapid declines in fertility and mortality have had a profound effect on the age structure of the population, notably the increasing elderly proportion. Thailand now faces new challenges and priorities for population policy. Policy responses to concerns arising from below-replacement fertility will be much more complex and involve greater government activism, improved institutional capacities and more resources than in the past. This paper reviews the fertility transition in Thailand and looks at some consequences and policy implications of low fertility, with special reference to the family and the elderly population. National Statistical Office     

The end of population growth in Asia

This paper presents probabilistic population projections for five regions of Asia (South Asia, Central Asia, China region, Pacific OECD and Pacific Asia) and Asia as a whole. Over this century, Asia will experience very heterogeneous demographic development: Central Asia is expected to almost double in population and South Asia will become by far the world’s most populous region, rapidly surpassing the China region. Simultaneously, the Pacific OECD countries are likely to shrink in population size and experience extreme population ageing. The proportion of the population aged 60 and above in these countries (with Japan having the greatest weight) is expected to reach 50 per cent of the total population (with the 95 per cent uncertainty interval ranging from 35 to 61 per cent). The China region will experience a more rapid speed of ageing, with the proportion aged 60 and above expected to increase by a factor of four from 10 per cent in 2000 to 39 per cent in 2100.     

Case study: fertility decline in Iran

Iran has experienced one of the most successful family planning programs in the developing world, with 64 percent decline in total fertility rate (TFR) between 1986 and 2000. This paper focuses on Iranians’ unique experience with implementation of a national family planning program. Recognition of sensitive moral and ethical aspects of population issues resulted in successful collaboration of technical experts and religious leaders. Involvement of local health workers, women health volunteers and rural midwives led to great community participation. Demographic and Health Survey (DHS) data in 2000 indicated a TFR of 2.0 births per women and 74 percent contraceptive use among married women. This case study will help policy makers and researchers in Moslem countries and other developing countries with high fertility rate to consider a successful family program as a realistic concept with positive impacts on nation’s health and human development.     

Asian and Pacific population targets

2 population targets for the Asian and Pacific regions were established in 1981-82: 1) by the Asian Conference of Parliamentarians on Population and Development at Beijing, China to attain 1% population growth rate for the Asian region by the year 2000, and 2) by the 3rd Asian and Pacific Population Conference at Colombo, Sri Lanka, to attain replacement level of fertility by the year 2000. In an attempt to ascertain whether these targets can be achieved and/or related, the Population Division of the UN's Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP) prepared population projections in which the 2 targets are achieved. These projections were prepared by aggregating the total population of member countries. When net reproduction rate (NRR) equals 1 (replacement level fertility) it will lead to a stable population with a growth rate of zero. In the short-term a population with replacement level fertility will continue to increase if it has a young age structure due to previous higher levels of fertility. Some projections for the period 1980-2005 are: 1) population growth rate will decrease from 1.78% to 1.05%, 2) total fertility rate will decrease from 3.63-2.11, 3) male life expectancy will increase from 59.8-67.3, and 4) infant mortality rate will decrease from 67.3-34.5. For the ESCAP region, a target of NRR of 1 would be easier to achieve than a growth rate of 1%. The UN projects the total population of the region to be 3,382,000,000 in the year 2000. If the NRR can be lowered to 1 by then, however, the total population would be 3,342,000,000 and if the growth rate can be reduced to 1% by the end of the century the resulting population would be 3,300,000,000. Major demographic benefits will be attained in terms of the age structure of the population if a 1% growth rate is achieved; the proportion under age 15 was 37.1% in 1980 but will be 27.2% in 2000 with a dependency ratio of 48.8 compared to 70.8 for 1980.     

Explanations of the fertility crisis in modern societies: A search for commonalities

Near‐global fertility decline began in the 1960s, and from the 1980s an increasing number of European countries and some Asian ones achieved very low fertility (total fertility below 1.5) with little likelihood of completed cohort fertility reaching replacement level. Earlier theory aiming at explaining this phenomenon stressed the incompatibility between post‐industrial society and behaviour necessary for population replacement. Recent theory has been more specific, often concentrating on the current Italian or Spanish situations or on the contrast between them and the situation in either Scandinavia or the English‐speaking countries, or both. Such an approach ignores important evidence, especially that from German‐speaking populations. The models available concentrate on welfare systems and family expenses, omitting circumstances that may be unique to individual countries or longer‐term factors that may be common to all.     

Ethnic population projections for the UK, 2001–2051

This paper reports on projections of the United Kingdom’s ethnic group populations for 2001–2051. For the years 2001–2007 we estimate fertility rates, survival probabilities, internal migration probabilities and international migration flows for 16 ethnic groups and 355 UK areas. We make assumptions about future component rates, probabilities and flows and feed these into our projection model. This model is a cohort-component model specified for single years of age to 100+. To handle this large state space, we employed a bi-regional model. We implement four projections: (1) a benchmark projection that uses the component inputs for 2001; (2) a trend projection where assumptions beyond 2007 are adjusted to those in the UK 2008-based National Population Projections (NPP); (3) a projection that modifies the NPP assumptions and (4) a projection that uses a different emigration assumption. The projected UK population ranges between a low of 63 millions in 2051 under the first projection to a high of 79 million in the third projection. Under all projections ethnic composition continues to change: the White British, White Irish and Black Caribbean groups experience the slowest growth and lose population share; the Other White and Mixed groups to experience relative increases in share; South Asian groups grow strongly as do the Chinese and Other Ethnic groups. The ethnic minority share of the population increases from 13% (2001) to 25% in the trend projection but to only 20% under our modified emigration projection. However, what is certain is that the UK can look forward to be becoming a more diverse nation by mid-century.     

A demographic perspective on the Muslim world

A demographic perspective is relevant to understanding the position of Muslims in today’s world. This paper examines the size and growth of Muslim populations, and whether most Muslims live in overwhelmingly Muslim countries. It also examines indices of poverty and human development for Muslimmajority countries, and the growth of the youth population; finally, it examines the key components of population growth: mortality and fertility. Mortality has declined sharply over the past 15 years in many Muslim countries, though not in all, and Muslim countries are no longer prominent among the ‘outliers’ with higher mortality than expected on the basis of their income levels. Fertility rates are also declining sharply in a number of major Muslim-majority countries, raising interesting issues about attitudes of different schools of Islamic jurisprudence, village-level religious leaders and ordinary Muslims towards contraception and abortion, as well as the role of socio-economic development and family planning programs in fertility declines. Despite these declines, past high fertility in many Muslim-majority countries leaves as a legacy a rapidly growing adolescent population and a burgeoning, inadequately educated labour force.     

The Projection Problem

While world population has continued to increase, fertility has been falling. Projections out to the year 2050 currently assume that fertility will continue to decline to, or below, replacement. 1) Past projections have been very wrong. Estimates of population growth have alternated between being far too low and far too high. 2) Similarly, public anguish has alternated between extreme fears of over- and under-population, neither supported by eventualities. 3) We do not understand the causes of the current fertility decline and so have little reason to project its continuation. 4) Many of the Asian countries, which are exemplars of the current decline, are exceptional because of coercion and/or vast infusions of Western capital. 5) The population decline may as readily plateau at 3 children as at 2 children. With an unknowable future, an emphasis on future population is misplaced. Concerns should be for the present. Poor families and a stressed environment are struggling with current population levels right now. Complacency about the future is unjustified by the facts and may derail efforts to ensure the continuation of the fertility decline.     

Study on Standard of Population Aging

Do an increase in ageing in developed countries and"getting old before getting rich"in developing countries indicate that f luctuations in the population age structure have produced a qualitative change?What is a qualitative change and what is a quantitative change?Here we propose a new concept of Shadow Population,then establish a new standard for evaluating population age structure,finally present a typical five stage population age structure type transition model.The model simulation shows that all world regions are still in the adult stage and that population ageing belongs to the category of quantitative change.However,sustained low fertility will lead to a qualitative change in the ageing population.The current pressure of population aging in the adult stage placed on the pension security system shows that this system is truly not a sustainable system,Gradually raising the retirement age and Long-term stability in replacement fertility is the key to solving the socioeconomic development dilemma presented by future population ageing in low fertility regions or countries,but the latter is more urgent.     

Demographic change and response: Social context and the practice of birth control in six countries

This paper expands on Kingsley Davis’s demographic thesis of change and response. Specifically, we consider the social context that accounts for the primacy of particular birth control methods that bring about fertility change during specific time periods. We examine the relevance of state policy (including national family planning programs), the international population establishment, the medical profession, organized religion, and women’s groups using case studies from Japan, Russia, Puerto Rico, China, India, and Cameroon. Some of these countries are undergoing the second demographic transition, others the first. Despite variations in context, heavy reliance on sterilization and/or, abortion as a means of birth control is a major response in most of these countries. The key roles of the medical profession and state policy are discussed, along with the general lack of influence of religion and of women’s groups in these countries.     

The Effect of Urbanization on China’s Fertility

The relationship between urbanization and fertility decline is known to be inverse in developed countries. However, the nature of this relationship in developing countries that already have relatively low fertilities is not well-understood. This study aims to illustrate how much urbanization contributed to China’s fertility decline between 1982 and 2008 and forecasts how much it can contribute to future reductions in fertility. The study examines changes in the total fertility rate (TFR) at both the national and provincial levels, given regional differences in the urbanization rate. The results show that changes in rural fertility behavior accounted for most of the decline in the national TFR between 1982 and 2008. This finding suggests that official birth control policies were instrumental in curbing China’s population growth. However, urbanization was responsible for about 22% of the decrease in TFR during this period, and its effect was especially important during the latter years (2001–2008). In most provinces, urbanization associated with a decline in provincial-level fertility. The forecasts indicate that urbanization will become the primary factor behind future declines in national fertility. Given the negative effect of urbanization on the TFR, it is possible to relax the one-child policy without having adverse implications for population growth.     

Below-replacement fertility and prospects for labour force growth in Taiwan

Fertility in Taiwan had declined to replacement level in 1983. In 1986–1997, the total fertility rate dropped to 1.7–1.8, with continuing decreases observed in 1997–2001. Fertility will probably be sustained at the 2001 level of 1.48 or even decline further in the future. If the current fertility and labour-force participation rates persist, the size of the labour force will increase only slightly in the next 15 years and begin to shrink soon after 2015. After 2034, the labour force will fall below the current level and Taiwan will face a labour shortage. Though efficient, the policy option of importing more foreign workers is fraught with political sensitivities, especially given the current economic downturn and rising unemployment. Another policy approach, to increase the participation rates for women and mature men, would lead to growth in the labour supply sometime after 2030 and, combined with a modest increase in fertility, would prevent the labour force from falling below its current size in the next 50 years. Notwithstanding that any increase in fertility will have a delayed effect on labour supply, strong incentives are still required to affect fertility behaviour.     

On Nonstable and Stable Population Momentum

This article decomposes total population momentum into two constituent and multiplicative parts: “nonstable” momentum and “stable” momentum. Nonstable momentum depends on deviations between a population’s current age distribution and its implied stable age distribution. Stable momentum is a function of deviations between a population’s implied stable and stationary age distributions. In general, the factorization of total momentum into the product of nonstable and stable momentum is a very good approximation. The factorization is exact, however, when the current age distribution is stable or when observed fertility is already at replacement. We provide numerical illustrations by calculating nonstable, stable, and total momentum for 176 countries, the world, and its major regions. In short, the article brings together disparate strands of the population momentum literature and shows how the various kinds of momentum fit together into a single unifying framework.     

Biodiversity decline and population externalities

To understand the problem of the global biodiversity decline, we set up a north–south model of population and income determination. Although biodiversity decline is mainly caused by primitive agricultural activities in some poor countries, we show that policies of resource management or Pigouvian taxes, targeted solely at rectifying such activities, are often ineffective. Since the production activities in these poor countries are correlated with parents’ fertility decisions, any efficient rectifications must involve a change in parents’ reproduction choice as well. Responsible editor: Junsen Zhang     

稳定低生育水平 理性与实践的思辩

作者对稳定低生育水平进行了界定 ,认为在 2 1世纪一个相当长的历史时期内 ,定义低生育水平为等于或低于更替生育水平。作者还结合我国 30年计划生育政策演变的历史进行实事求是的理性的思辩 ,并指出稳定低生育水平是人口和计划生育工作 30年实践的科学总结     

Replacement Migration Revisited: Simulations of the Effects of Selected Population and Labor Market Strategies for the Aging Europe, 2002–2052

This paper contains the selected results of research concerning the impact of international migration on population dynamics and labor force resources in 27 European countries over the 2002–2052 period. The study presents a set of simulations prepared under various assumptions on target population size and selected proxy indicators of population and labor force structures. The concept of “replacement migration’’ is used to illustrate the magnitude of the expected deficit and structural imbalance of the population and labor force in the first half of the 21st century. The results are the basis for making general recommendations for future population, migration, and labor market policy strategies in Europe, taking into account the long-term plausibility of the proposed solutions. It is argued that only a combination of policies aimed at increasing fertility and labor force participation, together with reasonable-level immigration, can help meet socioeconomic challenges posed by population aging.