谈判势力视角下双边平台独占交易合约的效应研究北大核心CSSCI

针对双边平台的独占交易行为可能引发的反竞争效应,从平台与商家谈判博弈的角度出发,将独占交易行为按独家战略合作协议与强制性独占交易合约进行分类,探究平台实施独占交易行为的前提条件及产生的效应影响。研究发现:(1)在一定均衡条件下,平台提供非独占交易合约是对双方均有利的决策;(2)不同类型独占交易合约的签订取决于平台之间谈判能力的差异以及专有内容量的差异;(3)独家战略合作协议的签订不会对市场竞争造成负面影响,而强制性独占交易合约的签订会弱化横向平台间的市场竞争,限制纵向商家的归属并降低商家的利润。     

竞争环境下双边平台增值服务质量投资竞争研究

为了提高竞争环境下双边平台效益与竞争优势,讨论了平台企业对双边用户增值服务质量投资竞争决策问题。在考虑三种不同用户归属条件的基础上,构建了双边平台增值服务投资竞争模型。通过比较分析发现：当双边用户单归属时,无论对平台单边还是双边进行增值服务投资,投资高质量增值服务均是两平台的占优策略。当单边用户多归属时,若对消费者边进行增值服务投资,则投资低质量增值服务为平台的占优策略;若对供应商边或双边进行增值服务投资,则投资高质量增值服务为平台的占优策略。当双边用户多归属时,无论对平台单边还是双边进行增值服务投资,投资低质量增值服务均是两平台的占优策略。     

用户偏好连续分布下两竞争双边平台的企业社会责任与定价决策研究

平台履行企业社会责任是影响用户选择的重要因素。基于双边市场理论和博弈分析方法,建模研究两竞争双边平台均不履行、均履行及一个履行一个不履行企业社会责任三种情形下的定价竞争,其中双边用户对平台履责的偏好服从连续分布,并进行模型求解和数值仿真,分析平台企业社会责任行为对竞争均衡及社会福利的影响。结果表明：两平台竞争下,履责平台的企业社会责任水平、定价水平、用户规模和利润随自身企业社会责任成本系数单调递减;非履责平台的定价水平、用户规模和利润随履责平台企业社会责任成本系数单调递增。两平台竞争下平台履行企业社会责任是占优策略,但两平台均履行企业社会责任比不履行时的利润低,即存在囚徒困境,但消费者剩余和社会福利将显著增加。     

考虑组内网络外部性和消费者多归属行为的网络通信平台定价策略

考虑网络通信平台作为连接通信网络用户(消费者)和增值服务提供商(卖方)的双边平台,除了具有组间网络外部性,还具有较强的组内网络外部性的特征,分别建立了垄断、寡头竞争市场的双边平台定价模型,分析了市场结构和部分消费者的多归属行为对平台定价及其利润的影响。研究表明：双边用户的定价在垄断环境下不受网络外部性的影响,而寡头市场下会随着组内网络外部性的增强而提高;当消费者与平台间的匹配成本高于其组内网络外部性带来的正面效用时,平台对消费者多归属时双边用户的定价总是低于其单归属时的定价。平台利润在垄断情形下与消费者(卖方)之间的组内网络外部性呈现单调递增(减)关系,而寡头竞争情况下完全相反,且平台利润会由于消费者的多归属而减少。     

平台企业竞争有效性及投资策略性效果研究

平台企业通常会对其各类市场实施交叉补贴。本文建立一般模型,证明了当双边市场中存在交叉补贴情形的平台企业竞争,将导致受补贴市场的补贴程度下降。这一结论打破了传统理论中竞争降低市场价格,提高市场效率的判定。同时,以降低成本投资为例,研究表明了平台企业策略性效果与传统理论研究的不同:受补贴市场的降低成本的投资,可能令竞争对手的利润增加,而且对自身利润的间接效应与对竞争对手的利润策略性影响可能方向不一致。     

寡头竞争模型下的非对称R&D分析

本文考虑的是Stackelberg寡头竞争模型下的产品市场合作对研发投入,利润,消费者剩余和福利的影响.我们发现在非时称R&D情况下,产品市场合作的产业利润总是高于产品市场竞争的情形.产品市场合作对R&D投入、消费者剩余以及福利的影响取决于知识溢出程度和R&D效率参数的大小.假如知识溢出程度足够大,R&D的效率参数足够小,产品市场的合作对生产商,消费者和社会来说比在非合作状态下更有利.     

谈判势力视角下平台独占交易行为效应研究——兼论中国B2C市场的"二选一"与反垄断规制

近年来,B2C平台为阻止商家多归属而提出的"二选一"行为受到业界广泛关注.从理论层面看,平台"二选一"行为折射出双边市场结构下独占交易行为的效应问题.本文以Hotelling模型为基本框架,从平台与商家谈判博弈的角度出发,引入纳什讨价还价模型,探究平台独占交易行为效应.研究发现:商家相对于平台的议价能力是决定商家和平台达成独占交易的重要因素.当商家的议价能力居中或较弱时,平台要求商家签订独占交易协议的动机较强.从竞争效应角度看,独占交易行为会打破"竞争瓶颈",抑制市场竞争,削减竞争平台的市场份额以及利润水平.从福利效应角度看,当消费者搜索成本较低时,随着交叉网络外部性参数以及平台价格补贴的递增,独占交易并非总是降低消费者福利以及社会总福利.基于上述分析结论,结合B2C平台独占交易案例,提出了相应反垄断规制建议.     

组内网络外部性对双边市场定价的影响分析

将组内网络效应引入双边市场定价模型中,研究组内网络效应和组间网络效应共同作用下的双边市场定价策略问题,突出分析组内网络效应对双边平台企业定价策略的影响;建立两阶段的定价博弈模型,得到组内网络效应和组间网络效应共同作用下的双边市场竞争价格均衡。研究结果表明,组内网络外部性强度对消费者价格和厂商价格的影响取决于双边用户接入平台后的市场结构,即在双边用户单平台接入市场结构和厂商多平台接入的竞争性瓶颈结构下,组内网络外部性对双边市场定价的影响是不相同的;在这两种市场结构下,双边平台竞争获得的利润水平与组内网络外部性成正比,与组间网络外部性成反比。同时,双边用户的价格在单平台接入和多平台接入的市场结构下的大小关系取决于厂商组内网络外部性的强度。     

双边市场下电视传媒平台兼并的福利效应分析

从双边市场视角研究了电视传媒平台企业兼并及其产生的效应,探讨了电视传媒平台企业的兼并与单边市场内企业兼并的不同之处.研究表明:从平台企业自身的角度出发电视平台企业的兼并能带来更大的利润;从广告商用户的角度来看,电视平台企业之间的兼并并不会损害广告商的利益,反而降低了广告费,增大了广告量,提高了广告商的利润;与社会福利最大化的广告量进行比较,在广告商较少的一定条件下,电视平台企业之间的兼并重组将低于社会福利最大化的广告量,存在广告量供应不足.     

平台经营者合并的福利分析：市场定位与账户互通

经营者合并是平台发展的常见途径,也是平台监管的重点对象。现有文献缺乏对平台合并后经营策略的研究,难以构建有效的福利分析框架。本文创新性地运用萨洛普模型考察了平台经营者合并后的两个主要策略：市场定位与账户互通,研究平台合并对价格水平和用户福利的影响,并提出可供监管参考的判别标准。本文发现,平台经营者合并后会选择增大内部平台之间市场定位的差异化程度,以降低彼此的竞争,提高利润水平,这将导致用户福利下降;若合并平台允许账户互通,则有利于用户福利的提升。特别是,合并后价格水平的变化可以作为平台合并对用户福利影响的判断标准。此外,相比于网络外部性的提升,规模效应带来的成本下降是提升用户福利更为关键的因素。最后,本文利用京东和1号店合并前后在售的同质商品日度价格数据对理论模型进行了经验验证。本文的结论为平台经营者集中的监管提供了基于平台经营策略和价格水平的重要政策工具。     

双边市场中平台企业搭售行为分析

搭售是现实中双边平台企业常用的促销策略之一。通过构建一个两阶段完全信息动态博弈模型,将买方分为搭售喜好型和搭售无差异型,从垄断和竞争两种情形研究了双边平台企业采取搭售策略时,具有不同搭售偏好的买方对最优均衡解的影响以及相应的社会福利变化。研究发现:不论是垄断情形还是竞争情形,搭售对买卖双方均衡进入价格的影响都不确定,而搭售产品的定价则按照传统单边市场的定价方式制定;垄断情形下,搭售能增加买方数量、卖方数量及双边平台企业的利润,而竞争情形下,搭售产品成本较小的双边平台企业将获得较大买方数量、卖方数量及利润。在两种情形下的买方总效用、卖方总效用以及社会总福利均随搭售喜好型买方数量的增加而增加。     

P2P Marketplaces and Retailing in the Presence of Consumers' Valuation Uncertainty

Can peer‐to‐peer (P2P) marketplaces benefit traditional supply chains when consumers may experience valuation risk? P2P marketplaces can mitigate consumers' risk by allowing them to trade mismatched goods; yet, they also impose a threat to retailers and their suppliers as they compete over consumers. Further, do profit‐maximizing marketplaces always extract the entire consumer surplus from the online trades? Our two‐period model highlights the effects introduced by P2P marketplaces while accounting for the platform's pricing decisions. We prove that with low product unit cost, the P2P marketplace sets its transaction fee to the market clearing price, thereby extracting all of the seller surplus. In this range of product unit cost, the supply chain partners are worse off due to the emergence of a P2P marketplace. However, when the unit cost is high, the platform sets its transaction fee to be less than the market clearing price, intentionally leaving money on the table, as a mechanism to stimulate first period demand for new goods in expectation for some of them to be traded later, in the second period, via the marketplace. It is not until the surplus left with the sellers is sufficiently high that the supply chain partners manage to extract some of this surplus, ultimately making them better off due to a P2P marketplace. We further analyze the impact of a P2P marketplace on consumer surplus and social welfare. In addition, we consider model variants accounting for a frictionless platform and consumer strategic waiting.     

Outsourcing Competition and Information Sharing with Asymmetrically Informed Suppliers

This paper studies an outsourcing problem where two service providers (suppliers) compete for the service contract from a client. The suppliers face uncertain cost for providing the service because they do not have perfect information about the client's type. The suppliers receive differential private signals about the client type and thus compete under asymmetric information. We first characterize the equilibrium of the supplier competition. Then we investigate two of the client's information sharing decisions. It is shown that less information asymmetry between the suppliers may dampen their competition. Therefore, the client does not necessarily have the incentive to reduce information asymmetry between the suppliers. We characterize the conditions under which leveling the informational ground is beneficial to the client. We also find that under the presence of information asymmetry (e.g., when the suppliers have different learning abilities), sharing more information with both suppliers may enhance the advantage of one supplier over the other and at the same time increase the upper bound of the suppliers' quotes in equilibrium. Consequently, the suppliers compete less aggressively and the client's payoff decreases in the amount of shared information. The findings from this study provide useful managerial implications on information management for outsourcing firms.     

The Role of Contract Negotiation and Industry Structure in Production Outsourcing

Despite the spread of cost‐driven outsourcing practices, academic research cautions that suppliers' cost advantage may weaken manufacturers' bargaining positions in negotiating outsourcing agreements, thereby hurting their profitability. In this study, we attempt to further understand the strategic impact of low‐cost outsourcing on manufacturers' profitability by investigating the contractual form of outsourcing agreements and the industry structure of the upstream supply market. We consider a two‐tier supply chain system, consisting of two competing manufacturers, who have the option to produce in‐house or to outsource to an upstream supplier with lower cost. To reach an outsourcing agreement, each manufacturer engages in bilateral negotiation with her supplier, who may be an exclusive supplier or a common supplier serving both manufacturers. Our analysis shows that wholesale‐price contracts always mitigate the competition between manufacturers regardless of whether they compete with price or quantity. In contrast, two‐part tariffs intensify the competition when the manufacturers compete with quantity, but soften it when they compete with price. As a result, when outsourcing with two‐part tariffs, the manufacturers may earn lower profits than they would from in‐house production, although the suppliers are more cost efficient. This suggests that managers have to be wary about the downside of using coordinating contracts such as two‐part tariffs when pursuing low‐cost outsourcing strategies. Our analysis also sheds some light on the profitability of using an exclusive supplier for outsourcing. When outsourcing with wholesale‐price contracts, the competing manufacturers are better off outsourcing to an exclusive supplier. However, when outsourcing with two‐part tariffs, the manufacturers may earn higher profits by outsourcing to a common supplier than to an exclusive one when the manufacturers' bargaining power is sufficiently strong (weak) under quantity (price) competition.     

PLATFORM OWNERSHIP

We develop a theoretical framework of trade on a platform on which buyers and sellers interact, and compare the impact of different platform ownership structures. If two‐sided network effects are strong, monopoly ownership induces more trade than dispersed ownership and is therefore socially preferable. Independent of the strength of network effects, monopoly ownership dominates a club‐like ownership structure where incumbent owners can exclude potential entrants. Under dispersed ownership, vertical integration tends to increase welfare as it allows the internalization of demand externalities. Allowing incumbent platform owners to exclude potential entrants hurts buyers but can raise welfare. (JEL: L10, D40)     

TRADE QUOTAS AND BUYER POWER,WITH AN APPLICATION TO THE E.U. NATURAL GAS MARKET

We consider a market in which domestic buyers negotiate contracts with foreign sellers, and explore how trade quotas can help to increase the buyers' countervailing power. We use the Shapley value to describe bargaining power and the distribution of the trade surplus in such a bilateral oligopoly. By exploiting strategic externalities among the buyers, bilateral trade quotas can improve the buyers' bargaining positions. In contrast, aggregate trade restrictions on all buyers' trade never improve buyer surplus. Minimum quotas on imports from fringe suppliers can benefit nonaffected buyers, as these enjoy positive externalities. We apply these insights to the E.U. market for natural gas and show that the effects of trade quotas on E.U. gas importers' power can be significant.     

政府治理视角下平台电商信用监管的动态演化博弈研究

为破解不完全信息下平台电商的信用“监管困局”,本研究在平台电商、消费者与政府三元主体联动关系的基础上,分别构建政府动态惩罚机制与激励机制下平台电商与消费者的演化博弈模型,并分析平台电商与消费者之间策略选择的影响因素及演化路径。研究表明：在政府监管下,平台电商与消费者通过长期的反复博弈、调整的过程,最终博弈系统演化轨迹呈逐渐收敛的趋势。具体而言,政府动态惩罚机制下,当政府惩罚力度逐渐增加时,平台电商倾向于选择“自律”策略;政府动态激励机制下,当政府对平台电商的激励逐渐增加时,平台电商倾向于选择“自律”策略。更为重要的是,当政府的惩罚力度大于激励政策力度时,政府实施惩罚性政策但没有激励政策的效果要优于政府实施激励政策但不实施惩罚性政策的效果。而当政府的惩罚力度小于激励政策力度时,政府实施激励政策但不实施惩罚性政策的效果与政府实施惩罚性政策但没有激励政策的效果几乎接近。由此可见,政府应将惩罚机制与激励机制相结合适度监管,以此追求信用监管的动态平衡。另外,消费者对平台电商的声誉评价具有两面性：当消费者对平台电商声誉评价越高时,平台电商倾向于选择“自律”策略;而消费者对平台电商声誉评价越低,平台电商反而倾向于选择“不自律”策略。     

Managing the Revenue of Sales Platforms: Insights into Service Fees

Online sales platforms have grown substantially in recent years. These platforms assist sellers to conduct sales, and in return, collect service fees from sellers. We study the fee policies by considering a fee‐setting platform, on which a seller may conduct a sale with a reserve price to a group of potential buyers: the seller retains the object for sale if the final trading price is below the reserve price. The platform may charge two types of fees as in current practice: a reserve fee as a function of the seller's reserve price and a final value fee as a function of the sale's final trading price. We derive the optimality condition for fee policies, and show that the platform can use either just a final value fee or just a reserve fee to achieve optimality. In the former case, the optimal final value fee charged by the platform is independent of the number of buyers. In the latter case, the optimal reserve fee is often a decreasing, instead of increasing, function of the seller's reserve price. An increasing reserve fee may make the seller reluctant to use a positive reserve price and hurt the platform's revenue. In general, the optimal fees are nonlinear functions, but in reality, linear fees are commonly used because of their simplicity for implementation. We show that a linear fee policy is indeed optimal in the case that the seller's valuation follows a power distribution. In other cases, our numerical analysis suggests close‐to‐optimal performance of the linear policy.     

竞合模式对平台供应链线上分销策略的影响研究*

针对一个由制造商、网络零售商和平台企业组成的平台供应链,本文构建了一个非合作模型和三种合作策略(制造商与网络零售商合作、制造商与平台企业合作、网络零售商与平台企业合作)下的非合作模型,探讨不同合作策略对各成员企业线上分销策略以及整个平台供应链利润的影响,同时基于均分剩余值分配机制,研究了不同合作策略下的联盟稳定性。结果表明：(1) 在合作动机方面,制造商总会选择合作策略,与供应链中的另外两个成员形成联盟,但网络零售商和平台企业只有在较低的佣金比率下才会形成联盟。(2) 从联盟稳定性方面,制造商与网络零售商的联盟在较低的佣金比率下稳定;制造商与平台企业的联盟在中等的佣金比率下稳定;佣金比率过高时,每个成员都不会形成联盟。(3) 从供应链系统利润来看,制造商和平台企业合作下的线上分销策略最优。