众筹及其风险分析与防范

随着互联网的快速发展以及资金供求矛盾的激化,众筹这一新兴的筹资方式应运而生。相比国外,我国的众筹尚处于萌芽状态,但是从2011年至今,也相继有众筹平台产生,比如众筹网、追梦网和淘梦网等十余家平台。虽然众筹拓宽了资金融资渠道,尤其是对小微企业和创业者而言。但是在我国,对于众筹也颇受争议,其中最大的争议就是它的合法性和风险问题。本文将对众筹的定义和分类做简单介绍,并分析相关的风险,然后指出解决的思路。     

众筹模式之中国特色

2013年，网站Kickstaner公布近2万个项目共筹资48亿美元。在中国，这个市场会有多大？目前中国现有的众筹平台大至分为四类：捐赠众筹、回报众筹、股权众筹、债权众筹。这些众筹模式都是怎么样的？而其中又暗藏哪些风险呢？     

策略延迟下众筹项目的定价和激励决策

本文研究了投资者的策略延迟行为对众筹项目的定价以及激励决策的影响。策略延迟是指投资者在投资过程中自动按照估值在相应阶段投资,并且部分投资者会刻意延迟投资来搭便车的行为。本文采用了一个两阶段模型来刻画投资者的投资行为,并进一步对比序列到来模式（投资者没有策略延迟）与同时到来模式（投资者有策略延迟）中的贝叶斯均衡。研究结果表明,当发起人采用价格激励的方式提高成功率时,投资者的策略延迟行为可能会影响最优的激励策略。当存在固定目标约束时,如果投资者没有策略延迟行为,发起人应该激励前期投资者,通过弥补他们等待成本的方式提高成功率;反之如果投资者出现策略延迟行为,对项目估值较高的投资者会自动在前期投资并且愿意承受更高的价格,此时发起人应该反过来激励后期投资者。当不存在目标约束时,不论投资者是否有策略延迟行为,发起人都应该始终激励前期投资者以获得更高的成功率以及期望收益。     

社群学习环境下的互联网众筹定价策略研究

互联网众筹以创新产品为纽带汇聚了大量长尾消费者,这种兴趣导向的网络群体营造了活跃的"社群学习"氛围。本文基于群体信息交互特性刻画了众筹社群学习机制,进而构建模型分别考察了消费者决策行为与发起人两阶段定价策略。研究发现:(1)社群学习效果与社群规模、社群活跃度以及社群交互效率呈正相关关系;(2)消费者购买决策受到耐心程度、体验价值与定价策略的影响,其众筹参与意愿与社群活跃度和社群交互效率呈负相关关系;(3)相比于不存在社群学习情境下发起人一定采用"先高后低"的撇脂定价策略,存在社群学习情境下的发起人可能倾向采用"先低后高"的渗透定价策略。进一步数值仿真分析表明:消费者耐心、社群活跃度与社群交互效率对发起人定价与福利有着重要影响。本文为互联网众筹中较为常见的"先低后高"定价模式提供了独到理论解释:社群学习所引致的策略效应和信息效应延迟了消费者购买决策,从而驱使发起人制定较低众筹价格(相对于后期销售价格)以确保一定众筹参与率。     

产品众筹中价格歧视策略的优化研究

产品众筹是一种常见的众筹形式,它要求企业为支持者提供创新型产品或服务作为回报。合理的定价策略是产品众筹的关键,本文分别从项目成功率和利润最大化角度研究价格歧视的优化问题。针对产品众筹全有或全无（All-or-Nothing,AoN）的机制下采用价格歧视策略时,价格差值和低价销售定额的最优决策问题。本文首先采用随机模型定义购买概率函数,分析支持者在购买过程中的影响因素;然后从项目支持者效用角度出发,应用两阶段模型讨论价格差值的相关影响因素,研究发现两级价格差值会受到级联效应、项目的特征以及支持者特征的影响。并且从支持者估值类型方向对基础模型进行了扩展,讨论了不同估值类型的支持者在不同价格差值范围内的选择行为;再则从项目的利润最大化角度出发讨论价格差值问题,研究发现价格差值受支持者数量和项目目标值的影响;最后通过计算相对利润函数解出最优低价销售定额的数量。     

投资人视角下股权型农业众筹风险因素分析——基于AHP-DEMATEL模型

股权型农业众筹风险集中了农业生产与股权众筹双重风险,而投资人作为其中的弱势群体面临的风险更为复杂。故基于投资人视角,采用AHP-DEMATEL对股权型农业众筹风险因素进行识别、分析,并提出针对性的建议,以期为风险防范措施的制定提供借鉴意义。     

医疗众筹项目信息对捐赠效果的影响研究

基于精细加工可能性模型,分析影响医疗众筹捐赠效果的信息处理中心路径和边缘路径,并比较不同严重程度的疾病对浏览者处理信息时可能造成的差异。通过轻松筹平台上获取的真实项目数据,用稳健标准误多元回归进行数据分析和假设检验。研究表明:在非严重疾病项目中,“健康”信息与捐赠金额之间是一种倒U形关系,项目中的图片数量和资金公示会正向影响捐赠行为,女性比男性更容易获得帮助;而在严重疾病项目中不存在这些影响关系。此外,不论疾病的严重程度如何,项目的文本长度、筹款动态和社会背书均会对捐赠金额产生正向影响。     

厂商产品线设计的委托代理分析

本文通过委托代理理论研究了厂商的产品线设计问题。在厂商进行产品线设计时,厂商需要根据不同的消费者偏好设计不同的产品,但是厂商不能明确的分别消费者的偏好,因此厂商与消费者存在着信息不对称现象,为了攫取利益的最大化,厂商通过提供甄别契约,让消费者进行自选择,有效的对消费者进行了区分(即对市场进行了有效分割)。本文以简单的案例分析入手,然后将其推广。对在信息不对称情况下厂商如何提供甄别契约进行产品线设计进行了较为详尽的分析,并对其中的经济学意义进行了解释。     

商业银行信息披露监控机制的构建研究

商业银行充分有效的信息披露是进一步完善市场经济机制、强化对银行的市场约束,提高金融透明度的必然要求,也是国际银行监管发展的趋势。运用博弈论与信息经济学的原理,研究商业银行信息披露监控中的一阶段博弈和多阶段的重复博弈问题。根据博弈结果,认为按既定的行为规则下设计信息披露监控机制,可以构成稳定的均衡,博弈的双方都有遵守机制的内在动力。     

Distributed Development and Product Line Decisions

Distributed product development is becoming increasingly prevalent in a number of industries. We study how the global distribution of product development impacts the profit‐maximizing product line that a firm offers. Specifically, we formulate a model to understand the linkage between cost arbitrage as a driver of distributed development and consequent market implications such as customer perceived quality loss to remotely developed products. Analysis of the model reveals that a firm should expand the product line for a development‐intensive good only at intermediate values of cost advantage and quality loss. We modify the base model to include development capacity constraints as a driver of distributed development and find that the results are robust to this change. Our analysis affirms the need for product managers to incorporate the implications of distributed development in making their product line design decision.     

考虑企业竞争的产品线延伸策略研究

越来越多的企业延伸其产品线以满足消费者不同需求,本文采用博弈论探讨了企业产品线延伸策略的有效性。在竞争情形下,两个企业均有机会进行产品线延伸抢夺市场份额。通过消费者效用理论构建了两个企业的需求函数,并得到了均衡解及其利润。研究发现：Nash博弈下,当延伸成本较高时,竞争性企业会放弃产品线延伸;当延伸成本适中时,进行产品线延伸的企业将获得更多利润,而不进行产品线延伸的竞争对手将遭受损失;当延伸成本较低时,虽然企业最优的选择是延伸其产品线,但是两个企业会陷入“囚徒困境”——产品线延伸非但没有获得更多利润反而使利润减少了;另外,当两企业进行Stackelberg博弈时,本文核心结论依然成立,但两企业陷入囚徒困境的可能性增大。     

The Interplay between Information Acquisition and Quality Disclosure

This study investigates the interactions between a manufacturer's information acquisition and quality disclosure strategies in a supply chain setting in which the manufacturer privately knows his product quality but is uncertain about consumer preferences. We argue that the manufacturer should treat his information acquisition and quality disclosure decisions as an integrated process because these decisions can significantly influence a retailer's rational inferences about product quality and can have conflicting effects on his own profitability. Although information acquisition helps a manufacturer subsequently craft better pricing and quality disclosure strategies, it also leaks certain product information to the retailer, thus helping the retailer better estimate product quality. Therefore, in equilibrium, a manufacturer may choose not to acquire any consumer information, even when such acquisition is costless. Moreover, we find that this adverse effect of acquisition is highly dependent on the cost of disclosure and consumers’ preference differentiation. Increased consumer preference differentiation may have a non‐monotonic relationship with the manufacturer's profit, and information acquisition can become detrimental to the manufacturer once the disclosure cost is sufficiently high.     

Quality Testing and Product Rationing by Input Suppliers

Quality testing by suppliers has significant ramifications for downstream supply chain participants and retail consumers. This article focuses on such implications accounting for the fact that suppliers often enjoy discretion in quality testing and reporting. Under a discretionary testing and reporting environment, we show that a supplier can improve the market's perception of product quality by engaging in self‐imposed production cuts. Production cuts dampen supplier incentives to engage in excessive quality testing, putting the supplier and the market on a more equal information footing. This reduces the market's need to skeptically discount product quality to protect itself. The improved market perception, then, reduces quality testing demand, introducing cost savings. The result that costly production cuts can improve quality perceptions indicates that the groundwork for influencing market perceptions may have to be laid upfront, even prior to acquiring private information, providing a contrast to routine signaling models.     

The Design and Introduction of Product Lines When Consumer Valuations are Uncertain

This article presents a model of the design and introduction of a product line when the firm is uncertain about consumer valuations for the products. We find that product line introduction strategy depends on this uncertainty. Specifically, under low levels of uncertainty the firm introduces both models during the first period; under higher levels of uncertainty, the firm prefers sequential introduction and delays design of the second product until the second period. Under intermediate levels of uncertainty the firm's first product should be of lower quality than one produced by a myopic firm that does not take product line effects into consideration. We find that when the firm introduces a product sequentially, the strategy might depend on realized demand. For example, if realized demand is high, the firm's second product should be a higher‐end model; if demand turns out to be low, the firm's second product should be a lower‐end model or replace the first product with a lower‐end model.     

Product Design Awards and The Market Value of The Firm

Product design has increasingly been recognized as an important source of competitive advantage. This study empirically estimates the impact of effective design on the market value of the firm. We use a firm's receipt of a product design award as a proxy for its design effectiveness. Based on data from 264 announcements of design awards given to commercialized products between 1998 and 2011, we find that award announcements are associated with statistically significant positive stock market reactions. Depending on the benchmark model used to estimate the stock market reaction, the market reaction over a two‐day period (the day of announcement and the preceding day) ranges from 0.95% to 1.02%. The market reaction is more positive for smaller firms and for firms whose award winning products are consumer goods. However, a firm's growth potential, industry competitiveness, and whether a firm is a first time or repeated award winner do not significantly affect the market reaction.     

预测信息披露与盈余管理

本文从信息披露的角度出发,通过一个委托-代理模型分析预测信息的披露与盈余管理的关系。我们的分析认为,由于我国上市公司管理层披露的预测信息在一定程度上减少了管理层与投资者间的信息不对称程度,且管理层故意错误地披露预测信息需要承担额外的成本。因此,在一定的条件下,管理层披露预测信息将有利于减少管理层盈余管理行为。相关的实证研究数据也证实了我们的结论。     

In‐House Globalization: The Role of Globally Distributed Design and Product Architecture on Product Development Performance

Changes in the global economy and technological advances are stimulating increased geographic distribution of new product design and development efforts. For large organizations that design and develop complex products, this geographic distribution has added a new layer of complexity to product development operations. In this empirical study of a large auto manufacturer, we examine the operational performance implications of splitting the design of vehicle subsystems across multiple geographic locations. Our results indicate that global distribution diminishes the chance of completing tasks on time and degrades subsystem design quality. Finally, by examining the interplay between subsystem centrality and global distribution, we found that higher centrality in the product architecture amplifies the impact of global distribution on subsystem error rates.