Reproductive ideals and educational attainment among white Americans, 1943-1960

Abstract Would the persistent inverse relation between educational attainment and family size in the United States be removed if actual fertility were equal to ideal? Data on ideal family size from 10 national surveys among white Americans of both sexes (from 1943 to 1960) show that gradeschool level respondents have higher ideals than the more educated even when age, religious affiliation, and farm residence are used as controls. Comparison of these ideals with the actual family size or ever-fertile women in the United States indicates that, on the average, the actual family size of all major educational groups falls below the ideal, but the college-educated are furthest from their ideal. If this group lessened the gap between actual and ideal family size, the educational differential in fertility would decrease, but at the price of increasing the rate of population growth.     

Women’s sex preferences in the United States: 1970 to 1975

This analysis examines the potential effect of sex preselection technology in the United States. The results suggest that controlling the sex of offspring is not the desire of most American women; that if it were employed, there would be a significant increase in sons as first-born and daughters as second children; that the overall sex ratio would be little changed from that occurring naturally except at very low fertility levels with universal use of such technology; and that fertility is only minimally influenced by gender preferences.     

Peers and Fertility Preferences: An Empirical Investigation of the Role of Neighbours,Religion and Education

Individual fertility preference is influenced by observed social norms. The present paper investigates the effect of the observed fertility of peers on a woman’s fertility preference. We explore the role of two peer groups: neighbourhood peers and religious peers. Data from the National Family Health Surveys (1992–1993, 1998–1999 and 2005–2006) in India is employed for empirical estimations using a multinomial logit model. We find that both neighbourhood and religious peers have a significant impact on individual fertility preferences, but their relative importance changes with family size. An increase in peer fertility increases the probability of preferring more children. We further examine the roles of education and wealth as transmission channels between the fertility norms of peers to the fertility preferences of the women and find that education plays an important role in moderating peer influences. These findings can serve as vital inputs in formulating family planning and gender policies.     

The Effect of Couple Disagreement about Child‐Timing Intentions: A Parity‐Specific Approach

Using couple data from a longitudinal study conducted in Italy, a country with persistently low fertility levels, we examined the effect of partners' discrepant child‐timing intentions on reproductive behavior. We found that the effect of couple disagreement on subsequent fertility is parity‐specific and does not depend on whether only the male or the female partner intends to have a(nother) child. The disagreement tends to produce an intermediate childbearing outcome at parities zero and one, while the outcome is shifted more toward agreement on not having a(nother) child at parity two. The empirical evidence suggests that gender equality in reproductive decisionmaking is not driven by partners' equal bargaining power or partners' equal access to economic resources. The findings indicate that the predictive power of child‐timing intentions strongly improves if both partners' views are considered in fertility models, and thus support the adoption of couple analysis in fertility research.     

The Correspondence Between Fertility Intentions and Behavior in the United States

Using data from the 1979 National Longitudinal Survey of Youth, we describe the correspondence between intended family size and observed fertility for US men and women in the 1957–64 birth cohorts. Mean fertility intentions calculated from reports given in the mid‐20s modestly overstate completed fertility. But discrepancies between stated intent and actual fertility are common—the stated intent at age 24 (for both women and men) is more likely to miss than to match completed fertility. We focus on factors that predict which women and men will have fewer or more children than intended. Consistent with life‐course arguments, those unmarried, childless, or (for women) still in school at approximately age 24 were most likely to underachieve their intended parity (i.e., had fewer children than intended at age 24). We discuss how such discrepancies between intentions and behavior may cumulate to produce sizable cross‐group fertility differences.     

Conflicting Preferences: A Reason Fertility Tends to Be Too High or Too Low

Fertility has often seemed to be too high or too low, relative not only to social and economic goals, but also to reproductive preferences. In developing countries actual fertility has often been higher than desired family size, while in developed societies fertility tends to be below replacement level even though people generally say that they want at least two children. In explanations of fertility extremes, or of the discrepancies between desired and actual fertility, the effect of partners' holding different preferences has tended to be overlooked. Individual preferences expected to lead to replacement‐level reproduction may in combination generate substantially higher or lower fertility. In explaining such outcomes, a crucial question is what happens when spousal preferences diverge. Given that personal practices or social norms may systematically favor high or low preferences in the event of disagreement, chance alone will ensure that desired and actual fertility do not coincide.     

The contraceptive prevalence survey project: content and status

The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) selected Westinghouse Health Systems to carry out contraceptive surveys. The primary objectives of the Contraceptive Prevalence Surveys (CPS) are to determine periodically the levels of contraceptive use in the country; to examine the correlates of and differentials in these levels in order to assess the impact of various types of governmental and nongovernmental programs; to identify factors that will facilitate an increase in contraceptive use, particularly factors involved in program planning activities; and to institutionalize in each country the capability to design and implement studies of contraceptive prevalence, to be undertaken at regular intervals by an in-country agency. Each CPS generally collects data on the basic demographic background of the country concerned, knowledge of contraceptive methods, prior contraceptive experience and current method used, past fertility behavior and future fertility intentions, present utilization of various types of service delivery systems, perceived accessibility of contraceptives, and reasons for nonacceptance of contraception. In the CPS project, data collection and field operations have been strongly stressed. Efforts have recently been made to expand the extent and sophistication of CPS data analysis. For example, 2 countries are currently using a series of mathematical techniques called synthetic estimators to estimate subnational levels of contraceptive use by merging CPS and census data. Westinghouse, in cooperation with the University of Michigan, is currently working to develop community characteristics module for inclusion in future CPS projects.     

A New Approach to Explaining Fertility Patterns: Preference Theory

Preference theory is a new approach to explaining current and future patterns of employment and fertility among women in modern societies. Although economists usually claim that preferences cannot be measured, methods for identifying women's and men's lifestyle preferences were developed and applied in British (and Spanish) national surveys, confirming the results of previous British and American studies showing three distinct lifestyle preference groups. The results confirm the heterogeneity of women's preferences and suggest that preferences are the primary determinant of fertility and employment decisions. The implications for policies to raise fertility are discussed.     

Contraceptive determinants in three leading countries

The purpose of this paper is to examine the relative importance of access to family planning and the motivation to restrict fertility in determining contraceptive use in three countries that have led the fertility transitions in their regions: Colombia, Tunisia, and Zimbabwe. A structural equations model is estimated where endogenous fertility intentions are allowed to affect contraceptive method use. Simulation methods are then used to quantify the size of the impact of intentions and access on method choice for the three countries. The results demonstrate that even after controlling for fertility intentions, family planning program variables still have important effects in all three countries.     

Does It Matter What She Wants? The Role of Individual Preferences Against Unmarried Motherhood in Young Women’s Likelihood of a Nonmarital First Birth

Most young people in the United States express the desire to marry. Norms at all socioeconomic levels posit marriage as the optimal context for childbearing. At the same time, nonmarital fertility accounts for approximately 40 % of U.S. births, experienced disproportionately by women with educational attainment less than a bachelor’s degree. Research has shown that women’s intentions for the number and timing of children and couples’ intent to marry are strong predictors of realized fertility and marriage. The present study investigates whether U.S. young women’s preferences about nonmarital fertility, as stated before childbearing begins, predict their likelihood of having a nonmarital first birth. I track marriage and fertility histories through ages 24–30 of women asked at ages 11–16 whether they would consider unmarried childbearing. One-quarter of women who responded “no” in fact had a nonmarital birth by age 24–30. The ability of women and their partners to access material resources in adulthood were, as expected, the strongest predictors of the likelihood of nonmarital childbearing. Nonetheless, I find that women who said they would not consider nonmarital childbearing had substantially higher hazards of fertility postponement and especially of marital fertility, even after controlling for race/ethnicity, mother’s educational attainment, family of origin intactness, self-efficacy and planning ability, perceived future prospects, and markers of own educational attainment and work experience into early adulthood.     

The Census Bureau on Prospects for US Population Growth in the Twenty‐First Century

The U.S. Census Bureau periodically releases projections of the US resident population, detailed by age, sex, race, and Hispanic origin. The most recent of these, issued 13 January 2000, for the first time extend to the year 2100 and also include information on the foreign‐bom population. (Earlier projections were carried up to 2080.) The extensive tabulations presenting the new set, and detailed explanation of the methodology and the assumptions underlying the projections, are accessible at the Census Bureau's web site: http://www.census.gov . A brief summary of some of the main results of these projections is reproduced below from United States Department of Commerce News, Washington, DC 20230. (The Census Bureau is an agency of the Department of Commerce.) Uncertainties as to future trends in fertility, mortality, and net migration over a period of some 100 years are very great, as is illustrated by the massive difference in the projected size of the population for 2100 in the three variants produced. The “middle” projected population figure of 571 million (which represents a growth of some 109 percent over its current level) is bracketed by “lowest” and “highest” alternative projections of 283 million and 1.18 billion, respectively. With somewhat lesser force, the point also applies to the 50‐year time span considered in the well‐known country‐by‐country projections of the United Nations. These projections are also detailed in three variants: low, middle, and high. The UN projections (last revised in 1998) envisage less rapid growth in the United States during the first part of the twenty‐first century than do the Census Bureau's. The projected population figures for 2050 in the three variants (low, middle, and high) are as follows (in millions):

Family influences on family size preferences

Several studies have demonstrated important effects of parents’ childbearing behavior on their children’s childbearing preferences and behavior. The study described here advances our understanding of these family influences by expanding the theoretical model to include parental preferences, siblings’ behavior, and changes in children’s preferences through early adulthood. Using intergenerational panel data from mothers and their children, we test the effects of both mothers’ preferences for their own fertility and mothers’ preferences for their children’s fertility. Although both types of maternal preferences influence children’s childbearing preferences, mothers’ preferences for their children’s behavior have the stronger and more proximate effects. Mothers’ preferences continue to influence their children’s preferences through early adulthood; siblings’ fertility is an additional determinant of children’s family size preferences.     

The Americanization of catholic reproductive ideals

Abstract This paper considers the attitude of Roman Catholics in the United States of America towards family size and suggests that large family ideals are still being put forward by the Church in publications and periodicals. The second part of the paper considers the attitudes of American Roman Catholics towards family size and shows that though there are indications that Roman Catholics regard slightly larger families as ideal than do members of other religions, the difference is not now very great.     

China's Below‐Replacement Fertility: Recent Trends and Future Prospects

Between 1970 and 1990, China experiencoed a rapid and sharp fertility decline—from total fertility rates of approximately six births to two. The degree to which Chinese fertility has continued to fall after 1990 is controversial. We use survey data from the 1997 National Population and Reproductive Health Survey and from the 2001 Reproductive Health and Family Planning Survey to document recent trends in Chinese fertility. Our estimates provide further evidence that China's fertility is well below‐replacement level at the turn of the twenty‐first century—with TFR levels of approximately 1.5 children per woman. Trends in parity‐specific cohort fertility by age also suggest below replacement completed fertility for cohorts still in the childbearing years. In the article's second section, we identify key components of low period fertility in order to frame our discussion of two questions: 1) in what ways is Chinese low fertility different from/similar to that in other low‐fertility countries? And 2) what are the likely future trends in Chinese fertility?     

Is low fertility a twenty-first-century demographic crisis?

Nearly half of the world's population in 2000 lived in countries with fertility rates at or below replacement level, and nearly all countries will reach low fertility levels in the next two decades. Concerns about low fertility, fertility that is well below replacement, are widespread. But there are both persistent rationales for having children and institutional adjustments that can make the widespread intentions for two children attainable, even in increasingly individualistic and egalitarian societies.     

The formation and stability of ideal family size among young people

A sample of 1,123 sixth, ninth, and twelfth graders in two Southern counties was questioned to ascertain how many children they think is ideal. More than three-fourths of the students in each grade had given thought to an ideal number of children for themselves; fewer had thought about the ideal number for the average American couple. Two and three children were the modal responses; mean ideal sizes were 3.02 for self and 3.16 for the average couple. The range of acceptable fertility behavior, “too few” or “too many” children, is defined by medians of 1.56 and 5.96. Ideal and acceptable family sizes increase slightly in the higher grades. A sex difference in ideals appeared only at grade 12; girls wanted more children. Negroes wanted fewer children than did whites at grade 6, more at grade 12. Size of family of orientation was directly related to ideals at grades 6 and 9, but the relation was curvilinear at grade 12. The direct relation between ideals and socioeconomic status became more pronounced at grade 12. Ideal sizes were larger for Catholics than for other religious groups. The study lends at least minimal support to the notion that early socialization affects ideas about family size.     

Family composition and the labor force activity of American wives

This is a study of the employment patterns of American wives in relation to the composition of their families. The data are taken from the 1960 United States Census, both from published tabulations and the 1/1000 sample. The population studied is non-Negro, non-farm, married, husband present women who are under the age of sixty. The methods of analysis used include the comparison of employment rates among subpopulations and a dummy variable regression technique. Aspects of family composition studied include age of the youngest child (in single years in order to determine whether there are discontinuities in the rates of employment when youngest children enter school, etc.), number of children in the family, and the presence of other relatives in the family. The paper concludes with a discussion of the meaning of family status differentials in employment including differential preferences for employment, differential fertility experience, and differential demands on the mother’s time. Some discussion of the use of cross section data of this sort to infer life cycle patterns of employment is included.     

Another Child? Fertility Ideals,Resources and Opportunities

Low fertility in most developed countries has prompted policy concern in relation to labour market supply, pensions, and expenditure on health and welfare services as well as policy debate about both the cost of children and the opportunity costs of parenthood. The extent to which family policy interventions can be effective in slowing or reversing fertility decline is much debated. This paper, based on a fertility module of the Scottish Social Attitudes Survey 2005, examines the current fertility, and ideal and expected fertility of a nationally representative sample of 455 parents of reproductive age and focuses on whether they plan to have another child. It compares the characteristics of those who intend to have another child with those who do not, and how parents with one child differ from those with more children. It addresses three questions about family size: (1) fertility ideals, (2) resources and the economic implications of childbearing, and (3) opportunities for childbearing and the effects of a late start on fertility expectations. It concludes that, despite a sustained period of low fertility in Scotland, childbearing ideals are robust and explanations of low fertility must derive from difficulties in realising those ideals. Difficulties in realising fertility aspirations are associated less with resources than with opportunities for childbearing, especially the timing of first birth. Those who delay their first birth are less likely to realise their ideal family size, and their lower fertility is associated with the opportunity costs of childbearing in terms of foregone qualifications, careers and earnings.     

Fertility patterns among religious groups in Canada

The U shape that has been traced out by the crude birth rate in the United States and Canada is well known. Falling birth rates reached a low point in the mid-1930’s; the rate rose to a peak in 1947 and remained high through the 1950’s. In terms of cohorts, completed family size was smallest for women born around 1910, whose childbearing was concentrated in the 1930’s. With data from the 1961 census of Canada, trends in cohort marital fertility by religion are examined. The U pattern appears for both Protestants and Jews. For Catholics, a reversal in the downward trend of family size had not appeared by 1961, although the U pattern can be discerned for some subgroups such as Catholics living in big cities and persons of Irish ancestry. In the United States, however, changes in family size for all three religious groups and both whites and nonwhites follow the U pattern. Religious differentials in family size in Canada have been decreasing, but they remain much larger than either religious or color differentials in the United States, which show no decrease. The distinctive features of Catholic fertility in Canada are most pronounced among the regionallyconcentrated French Canadians, suggesting an interplay of religious, regional, and ethnic influences.