Closing a Sociodemographic Chapter of Chinese History

At its recent Fifth Plenary Session held in Beijing, the Eighteenth Central Committee of the Communist Party of China decided to abolish the one‐child policy and allow all couples to have two children, thus closing an important chapter of China's social and demographic history. Recent fertility trends make it clear why it is urgent to abandon this policy. Census and survey data show that China's TFR had already fallen below replacement in 1991. Since the mid‐1990s, TFRs in most years have been lower than 1.5 children per woman. Since 2010, even lower fertility rates have been recorded by the annual population change surveys. Since the mid‐1990s, fertility decline has been increasingly driven by generalized ideational changes resulting from the social, economic, and cultural transformation of recent decades. In recent years many couples who were entitled to have a second child have chosen not to do so. For this reason, the termination of the one‐child policy is unlikely to lead to a major upturn in fertility, but rather to the continuation of a low‐fertility regime with more diverse fertility patterns across different sub‐populations, a pattern that has been observed in many countries.     

Science,Modernity, and the Making of China's One‐Child Policy

China's one‐child‐per‐couple policy represents an extraordinary attempt to engineer national wealth, power, and global standing by drastically braking population growth. Despite the policy's external notoriety and internal might, its origins remain obscure. In the absence of scholarly research on this question, public discourse in the United States has been shaped by media representations portraying the policy as the product of a repressive communist regime. This article shows that the core ideas underlying the one‐child policy came instead from Western science, in particular from the Club of Rome's world‐in‐crisis work of the early 1970s. Drawing on research in science studies, the article analyzes the two notions lying at the policy's core—that China faced a virtual “population crisis” and that the one‐child policy was “the only solution” to it—as human constructs forged by specific groups of scientists working in particular, highly consequential contexts. It documents how the fundamentally political process of constituting population as an object of science and governance was then depoliticized by scientizing rhetorics that presented China's population crisis and its only solution as numerically describable, objective facts. By probing the human and historical character of population research, this article underscores the complexity of demographic knowledge‐making and the power of scientific practices in helping constitute demographic reality itself.     

Social Security in China: Government White Paper

The largest financial problem faced by many aging societies is how to support their older, retired members. That support was once wholly a matter for individual families, with perhaps a minimal safety net offered by charitable institutions. Increasingly, in the usual course of economic development, the requisite transfers become a responsibility of the state—financed either through tax revenues or by pensions offered by (or required of) employers. The combination of lengthening life expectancy at later ages and falling fertility, however, makes those transfers ever more onerous as fewer workers are expected to support greater numbers of retirees. The situation is often likened to the approaching collapse of a Ponzi scheme. Not surprisingly, governments see an attractive solution in what is in effect a reprivatization of responsibility—not back to the family but right to the individual, through a system of individual retirement accounts (albeit with considerable state supervision). The financial trans‐fers—savings and later dissavings—then take place over each person's life cycle. Establishing a social security system—through pay‐as‐you‐go transfers, individual retirement accounts, or some combination of the two—is a major institution‐building and administrative task for a developing country, the more so in the context of rapid population aging. China is certainly a case of rapid aging, with the proportion of the population over age 60 projected to rise from 10 percent in 2000 to 20 percent by 2025 and 30 percent by 2050. The document excerpted below, a 2004 White Paper issued by the government of China, describes China's current social insurance provisions and the proposed expansion of coverage (beyond government employees and the urban formal sector) over coming years. In urban areas, it envisages pension coverage of “all eligible employees,” with an increasing emphasis on personal accounts. (Not mentioned is the situation of the large “floating population” of informal rural‐to‐urban migrants.) In rural areas, reliance on family support perforce continues: in 2003, only 2 million farmers are reported as drawing old‐age pensions. A safety‐net provision for the destitute elderly with no family provides for another 2.5 million. The document mentions various experimental schemes in rural areas. One, for medical insurance, covers 95 million residents; another offers an annual “reward” to those over 60 who have only one child (or two girls). The excerpts comprise sections I (Old‐age Insurance) and X (Social Security in Rural Areas) and the Conclusion of the White Paper, China's Social Security and Its Policy, issued by the Information Office of the State Council, Beijing, September 2004.     

家庭变迁背景下的中国家庭政策

在人口转变和经济社会变迁的过程中,中国家庭规模不断缩小、家庭结构逐渐简化、传统家庭功能趋于弱化。这对维系社会正常运作的各项社会政策带来巨大冲击,并由此将家庭政策的完善与改革提上议程。尽管改革开放以来,中国的家庭政策在影响人口发展、提供家庭保障和促进性别平等等方面有所建树,但仍未脱离含蓄型和补缺型模式的囿限。文章认为,中国的家庭政策体系应实现向明确型和发展型转变。首先应创建专门的家庭政策机构,在此基础上明确将家庭整体作为基本的福利对象、以发展家庭能力为目标进行家庭投资、推进家庭政策的适度普惠性,并尽量避免其他政策安排与家庭政策的相互制约乃至冲突。     

The elimination of contraceptive acceptor targets and the evolution of population policy in India

In 1996 the government of India announced a new national population policy that eliminated numerical targets for new contraceptive acceptors. This paper examines the history of target setting in India and factors that led to the elimination of targets. The analysis is based on published and unpublished reports on India's population policy and the family planning programme and interviews with senior Indian and foreign officials and population specialists. Five factors are identified as playing a role in the evolution from target setting to a target-free policy: (1) the research of India's academics; (2) the work of women's health advocates; (3) the support of officials in the state bureaucracy who approved the target-free approach; (4) the influence of the donors to India's family planning programme, especially the World Bank; and (5) the International Conference on Population and Development.     

Thinking about several problems of the research of our family planning strategy]

On the basis of 1982 census data, it is estimated that from 1987-1997 13 million women will enter the age of marriage and child-bearing each year. The tasks of keeping the population size around 1.2 billion by the year 2000 is arduous. Great efforts have to be made to continue encouraging one child/couple, and to pursue the current plans and policies and maintain strict control over fertility. Keeping population growth in pace with economic growth, environment, ecological balance, availability of per capita resources, education programs, employment capability, health services, maternal and child care, social welfare and social security should be a component of the long term development strategy of the country. Family planning is a comprehensive program which involves long cycles and complicated factors, viewpoints of expediency in guiding policy and program formulation for short term benefits are inappropriate. The emphasis of family planning program strategy should be placed on the rural areas where the majority of population reside. Specifically, the major aspects of strategic thrusts should be the linkage between policy implementation and reception, between family planning publicity and changes of ideation on fertility; the integrated urban and rural program management relating to migration and differentiation of policy towards minority population and areas in different economic development stages. In order to achieve the above strategies, several measures are proposed. (1) strengthening family planning program and organization structure; (2) providing information on population and contraception; (3) establishing family planning program network for infiltration effects; (4) using government financing, taxation, loan, social welfare and penalty to regulate fertility motivations; (5) improving the system of target allocation and data reporting to facilitate program implementation; (6) strengthening population projection and policy research; (7) and strengthening training of family planning personnel to improve program efficiency.     

R. F. Harrod on Reviving the Birth Rate

Continuing below‐replacement fertility and projected declines in population size are demographic features of many European countries and Japan. They are variously met with complacent acceptance, calls for higher rates of immigration, or—often last and least—proposals for increasing the birth rate. Fertility was also low in the 1930s, and some of the policy debate from that period resonates today. In England and Wales, fertility then had been declining for half a century. Over the decade 1931–40, it averaged 1.8 children per woman—moreover, with net emigration. Worries over this situation and its likely consequences led to the setting up in 1944 of a Royal Commission on Population, charged with considering “what measures, if any, should be taken in the national interest to influence the future trend in population.” In a memorandum submitted to the Commission in that year, the economist R. F. Harrod set out a detailed proposal to encourage childbearing through a scheme of family endowments. Part of the introductory section of Harrod's submission, arguing the case for state intervention and for material rather than ‘spiritual’ measures, is reproduced below. An evident problem in offering economic incentives for childbearing is that, to induce a given behavioral change, well‐off families would require much larger incentives than the poor. Hence child endowments that aspire to effectiveness across the income distribution have to be skewed toward the upper end. Harrod argues that this is as it should be, that policy should establish neutrality between large and small family sizes, and that this is a conceptually separate issue from poverty alleviation. ‘We should seek a re‐distribution of national income favourable to the parents of larger families and the plan should be put into effect whether or not another re‐distribution as between rich and poor is proceeding at the same time.’ He remarks on the implausibility of the government's being able to ‘talk up’ fertility— thereby generating some kind of costless ideational change, a ‘spiritual aufklärung.’ Later pans of the submission not reprinted here cover the specific details of the proposal. The proposed annual benefit per child (intended for every child after the second, with half‐rates payable for the second child) is paid for 18 years. It is substantial and increases with the child's age—at ages 13–18, for most of the income range it amounts to 20–30 percent of the father's income (or mother's, if hers is higher). Harrod also discusses further the rationale for making the endowments (and the compulsory contributions—a flat 5 percent of income—that finance them) proportional to income. To make his case Harrod draws on the dysgenic and population‐quality arguments popular at the time: worry about ‘race decline’ and ‘a general lowering of standards and of efficiency if the parents who are best equipped in experience, knowledge and culture are relatively infertile.’ In the event, the Commission recommended a flat schedule of family allowances, together with tax exemptions for dependent children calculated to provide some income‐based benefit. These were justified on population as well as equity and welfare grounds, ‘since the handicaps of parenthood have played a large part in the fall of average family size below replacement level.‘ Population quality issues—the subject of several other submissions—were sidestepped by calling for further research. By the time the Commission's report was finally published, in 1949, the baby boom was well underway: average fertility over 1946–50 was 2.4. Roy Forbes Harrod (1900–78) was one of the foremost economists of his day. His career was largely spent at Christ Church College, Oxford. A student and sometime colleague of Keynes, his best‐known early work was centered on identifying a dynamic equilibrium growth path for the economy—building on Keynes's static equilibrium analysis. As stylized (by others), this came to be called the Harrod‐Domar growth model, a formulation basic to growth theory. Harrod was editor of the Economic Journal for the period 1945–66. He was active in politics and as an economic adviser to both Labour and Conservative governments. He was knighted in 1959. The extract is reprinted from volume 5 of the Papers of the Royal Commission on Population (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1950), pp. 80–85.     

Does family planning work in a Chinese way

The demographic and economic characteristics of China make it necessary to do family planning work in China in a Chinese way. Special characteristics of China and corresponding strategies are detailed 1) China is rather underproductive and underdeveloped, with a huge population, whose growth must be curtailed while industrial and agricultural production is enhanced. 2) In the next 10 years, a large number of young people will center childbearing age, prompting a government policy favoring late marriage and one child per couple. 3) China is large and heterogeneous, and regional authorities should have some population policymaking functions to take sociocultural differences into account. 4) Male child preference ideology in rural areas has been gently combated with a resulting increase in family planning rate from 65.1% to 74.2% from 1979 to 1983. Family planning authorities have made considerable progress, as demonstrated by figures such as a drop of women's total fertility rate from 5.68 in the 60s to 2.07 in the 70s. The task at hand remains large: the population at the end of 1983 was 1,024,950,000. However, family planning is an element of state policy, the marriage law, and the constitution, and mored an more, societal ideology. Government policy equates family planning with child wellness and societal welfare and attempts supportiveness of couples showing positive birth limiting attitudes. An ample system of family planning programs and resource persons furnishes education, a variety of high quality methods are available, and contraceptive research is some of the best in the world.     

独生子女规模估算及其对政府奖励性支出的影响——以苏州市为例

本文将抽样调查资料与人口普查资料相结合,利用多种统计方法、多方案推算苏州市独生子女存量规模以及未来各年数量,并据此测算了未来各年政府可能的配套奖励性支出。研究结果表明：独生子女大规模进入婚育年龄将势必引起政策生育率的上升,未来各年政府用于独生子女家庭及其父母养老等计划生育政策奖励性支出将逐年增加．财政负担日益加重。建议政府对计划生育配套奖励政策适时进行调整,由现行的提供物质奖励向提供优质服务和社会保障转变。     

A summary analysis of the 3rd inquiry

20 ESCAP member countries responded to the "Third Population Inquiry among Governments: Population policies in the context of development in 1976." The questionnaire sent to the member countries covered economic and social development and population growth, mortality, fertility and family formation, population distribution and internal migration, international migration, population data collection and research, training, and institutional arrangements for the formulation of population policies within development. Most of the governments in the ESCAP region that responded indicate that the present rate of population growth constrains their social and economic development. Among the governments that consider the present rate of population growth to constrain economic and social development, 13 countries regarded the most appropriate response to the constraint would include an adjustment of both socioeconomic and demographic factors. 11 of the governments regarded their present levels of average life expectancy at birth "acceptable" and 7 identified their levels as "unacceptable." Most of the governments who responded consider that, in general, their present level of fertility is too high and constrains family well-being. Internal migration and population distribution are coming to be seen as concerns for government population policy. The most popular approaches to distributing economic and social activities are rural development, urban and regional development and industrial dispersion. There was much less concern among the governments returning the questionnaire about the effect of international migration than internal migration on social and economic development.     

How Far Has Fertility in China Really Declined?

According to births in the last year as reported in China's 2000 census, the total fertility rate (TFR) in the year 2000 in China was 1.22 children per woman. This estimate is widely considered to be too low, primarily because some women who had out‐of‐quota births according to China's one‐child family policy did not report those births to the census enumerator. Analysis of fertility trends derived by applying the own‐children method of fertility estimation to China's 1990 and 2000 censuses indicates that the true level of the TFR in 2000 was probably between 1.5 and 1.6 children per woman. A decomposition analysis of change in the TFR between 1990 and 2000, based on our best estimate of 1.59 for the TFR in 2000, indicates that about two‐fifths of the decline in the conventional TFR between 1990 and 2000 is accounted for by later marriage and less marriage, and three‐fifths by declining fertility within marriage. The analysis also applies the birth history reconstruction method of fertility estimation to the two censuses, yielding an alternative set of fertility estimates that are compared with the set derived by the own‐children method. The analysis also includes estimates of trends in fertility by urban/rural residence, education, ethnicity, and migration status. Over time, fertility has declined sharply within all categories of these characteristics, indicating that the one‐child policy has had large across‐the‐board effects.     

China's population policy: A model of a constant stream of births

The current population policy of China, which emphasizes one child per family, is facing considerable challenge brought about by socioeconomic reforms. The principal challenge is greater individual freedom created by the reforms. The present article examines this conflict.Based on cohort-period fertility analysis, the author proposes a policy of a constand stream of births which ensures a moderate growth rate and a smooth age structure while enabling each couple to have at least two children. Simulation suggests that, in order to achieve the two goals of limiting population size (to about 1.2 billion in 2000 and 1.4 billion in the 2050s) and allowing more individual fertility choice (2.2 children per family), the annual stream of births should be around 20 million and the mean age of childbearing has to increase from 26 to 30 over the next 10–15 years.The author concludes that, if the policy proposed here succeeds, some social and economic problems associated with the conflict between the reforms initiated by the government and its one-child policy will be mitigated.Paper presented at the 1989 meeting of the Population Association of America.     

Good Mothers,Bad Mothers

This paper reports on an analysis of representations of child abuse in English-language newspapers in Malaysia. Certain media images of mothers recur: bad mothers who are unable to protect their children; and good mothers, who are feminine representatives of a maternalised national government which is charged with interceding on behalf of abused children. Mothers implicated in child abuse are harshly judged by the maternalist regime. Our findings resonate with previous feminist analyses of child abuse but manifest differently in a non-Western, non-Christian context. In Malaysia, motherhood plays a crucial role in nationalist political culture; women and mothers carry increasing economic, social and political burdens in the rapidly modernising state. Fathers are largely marginal or absent in media reporting of child abuse, while mothers are represented as fully responsible for the care of children, particularly when problems occur. The media's blaming of child abuse on social changes while valorising traditional families reflects a conservative, patriarchal perspective, occluding discussion of the contexts of child abuse and thus mitigating against comprehensive solutions.     

Cultural Diversity and Population Policy in Nigeria

Nigeria's ambitious population policy, adopted in 1988, had its origins in the international population and development thinking of the time, set out in documents such as the World Population Plan of Action and the Kilimanjaro Programme of Action. The policy has had at most a modest effect in curbing the country's high fertility. This failure, it is argued, stems from the policy's implicit assumption of a single, monolithic cultural reality and its disregard of male reproductive motivation. Belief systems in Nigeria are extraordinarily diverse in detail but share a common interest in the fertility of crops, livestock, and people. Patterns of social organization are similarly varied. For an effective population policy, the government needs to find ways of incorporating distinct elements of the cultures of the different ethnic groups, leveraging rather than suppressing the country's cultural diversity.     

中国独生子女家庭与二孩家庭生育模式百年模拟与选择

不少人对中国的独生子女政策可能造成家庭负担过重忧心忡忡。通过独生子女家庭和“二孩加间隔”家庭未来百年发展变化模拟评价后认为：如果生育模式选择得当,独生子女家庭“四、二、二” 负担结构有可能基本避免,未来独生子女家庭的负担,也不会比历史上经历过的较重的负担更重。生育模式选择不当,生二个孩子,并不能保证比生一个孩子负担轻。从百年人口对资源环境和杜会经济发展的压力看,“二孩加间隔” 的政策无论如何组合和选择,所形成的人口压力都要显著大于独生子女政策,而独生子女家庭的生育模式如果选择得当,它的家庭负担不见得比生育模式选择不当的二孩家庭重多少。因此,政府应坚持稳定现行生育政策,坚持提倡一对夫妇只生一个孩子;同时应按最优生育模式,对生育年龄和间隔进行适当的调整。     

Below-replacement fertility in Thailand and its policy implications

The fertility transition in Thailand has been one of the most rapid among Asian countries that are yet to attain newly industrialized country status. In the early 1960s, the total fertility rate exceeded six births per woman; currently, it stands at 1.9 or slightly below replacement level. At present, it is hard to predict the future trend in fertility as this involves several factors that need much closer study, in particular, fertility preferences, changes in marriage patterns and the wider effects of the current economic crisis in Thailand. Rapid declines in fertility and mortality have had a profound effect on the age structure of the population, notably the increasing elderly proportion. Thailand now faces new challenges and priorities for population policy. Policy responses to concerns arising from below-replacement fertility will be much more complex and involve greater government activism, improved institutional capacities and more resources than in the past. This paper reviews the fertility transition in Thailand and looks at some consequences and policy implications of low fertility, with special reference to the family and the elderly population. National Statistical Office     

独生子女伤残状况及对计生扶助政策的需求分析

利用苏州市吴中区独生子女伤残家庭的问卷调查和小组访谈资料,对独生子女伤残状况及这些家庭对计生扶助政策的需求进行实证分析。结果表明：近七成独生子女伤残时的年龄在15岁以下,其中先天残疾占51．3％;重度残疾比例超过五分之二;智力残疾和精神残疾独生子女合计占比近六成;残疾后生活难以自理者比重接近三成。进一步分析发现,独生子女伤残家庭最需得到的帮扶依次为：为独生子女伤残家庭提供生活补助、为伤残独生子女父母提供养老保险补贴、提高独生子女家庭的医疗救助水平。基于以上结论．提出相关对策建议。     

The family planning law should be issued as soon as possible]

China is facing a baby boom in the next ten years. Now is a perfect time to formulate legislature on family planning (FP) to strengthen the current policy and regulations in order to slow the momentum of excessive population growth. As a result of current economic reform and implementation of the rural household responsibility system, the migrant population has increased tremendously. The fact that millions of rural farmers are shifting to non-agricultural areas created new challenges to the effectiveness of traditional measures of the FP program. Promulgating laws and legislature will facilitate the job of FP. The law should stress the restriction of population growth and encouraging one child per couple. In the rural area it is not feasible to implement the one child policy indiscriminately. Under the policy of one child for a majority of the couples, no third birth is permitted. Local governments should be given the authorization to grant permission for second births for special cases within the birth planning quota. Allowing people living in poor and less developed areas to have more children and granting mothers of handicapped children permission to have an additional child were in fact facilitating the deterioration of the quality of the population. Some current policy in rural income distribution and social welfare was beneficial to large-sized family. Such policies should be changed to give incentives to small-sized families.     

Unmet Need for Family Planning in Developing Countries and Implications for Population Policy

Unmet need for family planning has been a core concept in international population discourse for several decades. This article reviews the history of unmet need and the development of increasingly refined methods of its empirical measurement and delineates the main questions that have been raised about unmet need during the past decade, some of which concern the validity of the concept and others its role in policy debates. The discussion draws heavily on empirical research conducted during the 1990s, much of it localized, in‐depth studies combining quantitative and qualitative methodologies. Of the causes of unmet need other than those related to access to services, three emerge as especially salient: lack of necessary knowledge about contraceptive methods, social opposition to their use, and health concerns about possible side effects. The article argues that the concept of unmet need for family planning, by joining together contraceptive behavior and fertility preferences, encourages an integration of family planning programs and broader development approaches to population policy. By focusing on the fulfillment of individual aspirations, unmet need remains a defensible rationale for the formulation of population policy and a sensible guide to the design of family planning programs.