具有联盟优先关系的模糊合作博弈的目标规划求解模型

用合作博弈研究实际管理问题中的分配方案时，常常存在一些不重要联盟或无效联盟，这些联盟影响公平合理的分配方案。因此，联盟的重要程度成为求解合作博弈必不可少的因素。本文考虑了联盟的重要性和局中人参与联盟的不确定性，研究了具有优先关系的模糊联盟合作博弈(简称为模糊合作博弈)。首先，借助于目标规划模型的优先因子可以表征联盟重要程度的思想，通过构建多优先级目标规划模型，得到模糊合作博弈新的解。其次，证明了构建的多优先级目标规划模型的解和模糊合作博弈的核心之间具有重要对应关系。最后，通过数值实例和比较分析，说明本文提出的多优先级目标规划模型求解模糊合作博弈问题的合理性和有效性。研究表明：(1)本文提出的多优先级目标规划模型考虑不同联盟重要程度，得到的解符合“多劳多得”原则，能够更公平合理解决实际管理中的分配问题。(2)本文的目标规划模型同时适用于求解存在联盟特征函数值缺失的合作博弈。与已有合作博弈的解进行比较分析，该模型无需估算无效联盟的特征函数缺失数据得到的分配值更为准确。从而，说明本文给出的目标规划求解模糊合作博弈解的模型，更符合许多管理学问题的实际情况。(3)通过多优先级目标规划模型最优解是否存在可判断模糊合作博弈的核心存在情况，若核心存在则该模型通过目标规划软件包可得到核心内的一个解，这样也得到了一个判断合作博弈核心是否存在的标准。(4)目标规划模型可弥补已有合作博弈解的一些不足，如核心可能为空集，Shapley值和最小二乘预核仁可能不满足个体合理性等。本文构建的多优先级目标规划模型不仅能求解联盟具有优先关系的模糊合作博弈，而且能够求解一般合作博弈的解，该目标规划模型作为合作博弈一种新的求解方法，能更有效地解决实际管理中的分配问题，具有更加广泛的应用价值。     

知识嵌入性、知识流动与战略联盟结构升级的关系研究

知识嵌入性是知识经济时代战略联盟共享有限资源,推动产业结构升级的重要途径。为打开知识嵌入性与战略联盟结构升级关系的黑箱,以知识管理、战略创新及复杂网络等相关理论为基础,对知识嵌入性的构成维度予以划分。进一步地,设定知识嵌入性的构成维度为联盟结构升级的前置变量,引入知识流动作为中介变量,构建知识嵌入性、知识流动与战略联盟结构升级的概念模型。采用结构方程的研究方法,以长三角地区的战略联盟为研究对象,基于295份有效问卷进行实证检验。研究结果表明:基于知识嵌入的构成维度,知识互补性、知识兼容性、知识紧密度与知识协调度对战略联盟结构升级呈显著的正相关关系,知识流动分别在知识互补性、知识兼容性、知识紧密度、知识协调度与联盟结构升级的关系中起部分中介作用。研究明晰了知识嵌入性、知识流动与联盟结构升级的关系,解释了知识嵌入性对联盟结构升级的作用机理,为战略联盟的管理实践提供有益借鉴。     

价值网中主体动态博弈分析

本文运用博弈理论,探讨价值网中主体联盟的博弈描述并构建了相应的动态博弈模型。以网中的关键主体———企业与竞争者之间的互动模式为例,分析了他们之间的动态博弈创造价值增量的机理;然后用Shapley值讨论了合作收益在主体间的分配问题。     

企业文化、价值承诺与品牌成长的路径和机制研究

以远东控股集团为例,通过对质性资料的三重译码分析,得到的研究结论是:远东品牌成长存在着“领导特质→企业文化→价值承诺→组织、制度和结构→管理行为与利益相关者价值创造→利益相关者满意度与积极合作→品牌成长”之间逐级影响的基本路径,并总结出远东品牌成长的五大机制,即建立价值承诺型企业文化、坚持员工是推动品牌成长的核心、导入“全面品牌管理”模式、建立品牌-利益相关者之间良好的互动关系以及努力为利益相关者创造价值.     

强势企业与弱势企业联盟的博弈分析及其启示

在现有战略联盟理论研究中,传统的成本-收益分析方法只是关注联盟伙伴之间的互补性收益,忽视了竞争动态环境下强(弱)势企业联盟的战略选择.实际上,强(弱)势企业建立战略联盟不仅是为了获得互补性收益,更重要的是预防损失,也就是为了预防被排斥在联盟活动之外所带来的潜在损失.而竞争性动态是企业建立战略联盟的一个重要因素,强(弱)势企业的联盟战略需要根据竞争者联盟行为所带来的可预防损失与联盟成本的比较做出相机性战略选择.     

战略联盟价值创造与分配分析

本文首先分析了战略联盟价值创造的源泉,然后从价值创造的角度分析了合作者进入战略联盟的条件和进行利益分配的几个基本规则,并在此基础上进一步分析了战略联盟价值分配管理中有待于进一步研究的问题.     

新经济背景下合资企业与战略联盟的区别

从企业战略角度,以合作战略的两种形式--合资战略(joint venture strategies)和战略联盟战略(strategic alliance strategies)的差别性为分析对象,尝试认识在新经济背景下企业战略创造价值的两种不同方式.合资战略和战略联盟作为两种战略行动,共性是基于合作行为的资源配置方式,属于合作战略的范畴;但两者的差别体现出对企业而言截然不同的价值创造过程.合资战略本质上是企业组织内部化战略的结果,即在组织形式上趋向于母子公司之间关系,价值创造呈降低成本导向机理;战略联盟本质上是企业间关系变化的结果,这种企业间关系以协调为特征,既不同于市场交易关系,也不同于组织内部的层级关系,是内部层级市场和外部产权交换不可替代的产物,价值创造呈潜在的利润导向机理.     

开放型商业模式NICE属性与价值创造关系的实证研究

企业竞争优势或价值创造的源泉在哪里,或者企业绩效异质性的成因是什么?这一问题一直是战略管理领域的研究焦点。移动互联网时代,企业纷纷通过重塑商业模式来实现转型升级或跨界发展,并将其作为价值创造和竞争优势的一种重要来源。因此,本文旨在以开放型商业模式为研究对象,探讨其内在属性与价值创造之间的关系。首先,本文阐述开放型商业模式的内涵及构成;接着,识别出其内在属性特征,即新颖性(N)、锁定性(I)、互补性(C)、效率性(E);同时,重点借助战略网络理论、新木桶理论、平台经济学等理论基础论证NICE与价值创造间的关系及背后的作用机理,提出理论假设;最后,运用调查问卷和结构方程模型的方法实证检验,且演绎结论的管理含义。本文所使用的数据来源于中国最大的服务交易平台:猪八戒网和EMBA、MBA、EDP等项目课堂。研究表明,开放型商业模式新颖性与企业价值正相关、互补性与顾客价值正相关、效率性与企业价值和伙伴价值均呈正相关关系;而新颖性与顾客价值及伙伴价值正相关;互补性与企业价值及伙伴价值呈正相关关系等结论未得到印证。本文的研究回答了"企业竞争优势或价值创造源泉在哪里?"这一问题,并且本文的理论机理分析和实证结论有利于指导企业创新商业模式并获取竞争优势的战略决策。     

基于我国社会信任的交易属性与联盟治理关系实证研究

以信任为调节变量,以联盟结构为中介变量,构建了交易属性(资产专用性)与联盟治理(联盟合同复杂度)之间的概念模型,并运用SPSS 17.0和AMOS 18软件对模型进行了检验分析。研究发现,资产专用性与联盟合同复杂度之间存在显著的正相关关系;资产专用性能够通过联盟结构这一中介变量对联盟合同复杂度产生影响;资产专用性与联盟合同复杂度之间的正相关关系会随着信任的增加而降低;信任对联盟结构与联盟合同复杂度之间以及资产专用性与联盟结构之间的负向调节效应均显著。     

企业的价值链权力及其经济后果研究

基于财务视角探讨价值链中企业之间的权力结构及其经济后果，提出“价值链权力”的概念并构建“价值链权力指数”,从理论上证明了价值链权力指数与公司融资成本成反比，与其价值成正比，且存在“最优价值链权力”使公司价值最大.同时，作者收集2007年～2017年中国A股上市公司相关数据，应用实证方法验证了上述理论.发现企业的价值链权力源自其竞争优势，且通过影响融资成本作用于企业价值.文章具有重要的理论价值和应用价值：一方面，初步构建了“竞争优势–价值链–公司财务–资本市场”之间关系的研究框架，推动公司财务、竞争战略和价值链的交叉研究，并从理论和实证两方面揭示了企业价值链权力对其融资成本和价值的影响，丰富了该领域的学理研究；另一方面，为证券投资决策和企业的营运资本、价值链优化、融资成本和价值创造等管理提供了重要的理论依据和经验证据.     

Stability and Preference Alignment in Matching and Coalition Formation

We study matching and coalition formation environments allowing complementarities and peer effects. Agents have preferences over coalitions, and these preferences vary with an underlying, and commonly known, state of nature. Assuming that there is substantial variability of preferences across states of nature, we show that there exists a core stable coalition structure in every state if and only if agents' preferences are pairwise‐aligned in every state. This implies that there is a stable coalition structure if agents' preferences are generated by Nash bargaining over coalitional outputs. We further show that all stability‐inducing rules for sharing outputs can be represented by a profile of agents' bargaining functions and that agents match assortatively with respect to these bargaining functions. This framework allows us to show how complementarities and peer effects overturn well known comparative statics of many‐to‐one matching.     

Integrative leadership and the creation and maintenance of cross-sector collaborations

This article presents a theoretical framework for understanding integrative leadership and the creation and maintenance of cross-sector collaborations that create public value. We define integrative leadership as bringing diverse groups and organizations together in semi-permanent ways — and typically across sector boundaries — to remedy complex public problems and achieve the common good. Our framework highlights in particular the leadership roles and activities of collaboration sponsors and champions. The framework is illustrated with examples from the development of MetroGIS, a geographic information system that promotes better public problem-solving in the Minneapolis–St. Paul region of the US. A set of propositions is offered to guide further research and to prompt reflective practice.     

Harsanyi power solution for games with restricted cooperation

This paper discusses the Harsanyi power solution for cooperative games in which cooperation among players is based on an arbitrary collection of feasible coalitions. We define the Harsanyi power solution as a value which distributes the Harsanyi dividends such that the dividend shares of players in each feasible coalition are proportional to the corresponding players’ participation index, (i.e., a power measure for players in the cooperation restrictions). When all coalitions can be formed in a game, the Harsanyi power solution coincides with the Shapley value. We provide two axiomatic characterizations for the Harsanyi power solution: one uses component efficiency and participation fairness, and the other uses efficiency and participation balanced contributions. Meanwhile, we show that the axioms of each axiomatization are logically independent. The study also shows that the Harsanyi power solution satisfies several other properties such as additivity and inessential player out. In addition, the Harsanyi power solution is the unique value that admits the \(\lambda \)-potential.     

Two efficient values of cooperative games with graph structure based on $$\tau $$-values

The paper is devoted to value concepts for cooperative games with a communication structure represented by a graph. Under assumptions that the players partition themselves into ‘components’ before realizing cooperation and the worth of the grand coalition not less than the sum of the worths of all components, the fair distribution of surplus solution and the two-step \(\tau \)-value are introduced as two efficient values for such games, each of which is an extension of the graph \(\tau \)-value. For the two efficient values, we discuss their special properties and we provide their axiomatic characterizations in views of those properties. By analysing an example applied to the two values, we conclude that the fair distribution of surplus solution allocates more surplus to the bigger coalitions and favors the powerful players, while the two-step \(\tau \)-value benefits the vulnerable groups and inspires to form small coalitions.     

Accountability,Political Views,and Bureaucratic Behavior: A Theoretical Approach

This study has developed a theoretical framework to predict bureaucratic behaviors with career public officials’ political views (whether career public officials agree or disagree with their overhead political principals’ ideology) and bureaucratic accountability (accountability either to the overhead political principals or to the public sentiment) by adopting and extending Hirschman’s (1970) exit, voice, and loyalty model. Given the two conditions, this study has drawn four propositions of possible bureaucratic responses: loyalty; voice; exit; and silence. In addition, the stay scenario is discussed for passive bureaucrats regardless of the two dimensions. By incorporating relevant examples with the propositions, this study expects to contribute to a better understanding of bureaucratic behavior.     

Cooperative sales promotion with a point-sharing policy: Advantages and limitations

Consumption-point programs have been commonly implemented in retail industries in efforts to promote sales and improve customer loyalty. In Korea, many retailers from different industries use a point-sharing policy to augment the conventional consumption-point program of each retailer. In a multi-retailer coalition under such a cooperative sales promotion policy, by purchasing from one coalition retailer, customers earn points that they can redeem points at other retailers in the coalition. On one hand, the introduction of this policy gives customers great flexibility for redeeming earned points, which can increase the demand at all retailers who promote the policy. On the other hand, the additional product costs associated with the points created by one retailer may spill over and be partly borne by other retailers, possibly distorting the coalition members’ equilibrium decisions under decentralized control. Under the general assumptions about the demand functions, we developed a model consisting of two retailers with fixed retail prices and addressed the retailers’ equilibrium decisions under a pure point-sharing policy. The findings suggest that the policy resulted in a cost spillover phenomenon. Then, we revealed that a pure point-sharing policy may fail to maximize the total profit of the coalition. Moreover, we showed that a pure point-sharing policy does not dominate the individual point scheme, which may explain the reason that point sharing is useful but not ubiquitously used in the real world. Our numerical examples also illustrate the way a pure point-sharing policy influences retailers’ profits when retail prices are decision variables. To improve the overall profit under the point-sharing policy further, we propose a target rebate contract to coordinate a pair of retailers. This contract can maximize the total profit and arbitrarily split the profit between retailers.     

Coalition Formation and Cost Allocation for Joint Replenishment Systems

This paper focuses on the issues of coalition formation and cost allocation in a joint replenishment system involving a set of independent and freely interacting retailers purchasing an item from one supplier to meet a deterministic demand. The papers dealing with this problem are mainly focused on supperadditive games, where the cost savings associated with a coalition increase with the number of players in the coalition. The most relevant question addressed then is how to allocate the savings to the players. In this paper, we propose to go further by dealing with a non‐supperadditive game, where a set of independent retailers have the common understanding to share the cost savings according to the cost‐based proportional rule. In this setting, the global cost optimization is no longer a relevant approach to identify appealing coalitions for any retailer. Here, we provide an iterative procedure to form the so‐called efficient coalition structure and we show that this coalition structure has the nice properties of being (i) weakly stable in the sense of the coalition structure core and (ii) strongly stable under a given assumption. An exact fractional programming based solution is also given to generate such efficient coalitions.     

Toward a Differentiated Understanding of the Value‐Creation Chain

The conventional view of the value‐creation chain suggests offering high‐value propositions at the product level (in terms of benefits provided by elements of the product) to attain high‐value perceptions at the customer level, which should ultimately result in high‐value appropriation at the firm level (i.e. relationship, volume, pricing and financial success). This study challenges this view and provides a differentiated understanding of the value‐creation chain. With a multi‐industry sample of 339 companies and a sample of 626 customers to validate managerial assessments, the authors apply a configurational approach to identify whether and to what extent offering high‐value propositions at the product level is necessary or sufficient for achieving superior value perceptions at the customer level and high‐value appropriation at the firm level. Taking into account the company‐internal and company‐external environment of the value‐creation chain, the study identifies seven value‐creation chain constellations.     

非合作-合作两型博弈的Shapley值纯策略纳什均衡解求解方法

在合作中又有竞争的"经济全球化"时代背景下,经济实体之间越来越多地体现出竞争与合作交织的特点,既有策略的选择,同时也有利益的分配或者成本的分摊,即竞争与合作相互联系。为此,Brandenburger和Stuart提出了非合作-合作两型博弈模型为这类博弈提供了有效的工具。目前非合作-合作两型博弈研究较少,且Brandenburger和Stuart提出的非合作-合作两型博弈存在一些不足：合作博弈用核心求解可能为空或者不唯一。Shapley值是一种重要的合作博弈单值解,满足匿名性、有效性、可加性和虚拟性,表达形式简单且唯一,对一些成本分摊问题和利益分配问题,给决策者提供了一个公平满意的分配方案。因此本文研究将Shapley值作为合作博弈的解时非合作-合作两型博弈解存在的条件。为了分析本文提出的基于Shapley值的非合作-合作两型博弈的新理论框架,首先给出了其特征函数满足的联盟无外部性条件。在满足此条件下,我们进一步证明了非合作-合作两型博弈解存在的条件及性质。结合数值实例比较分析合作博弈用核心和Shapley值求解非合作-合作两型博弈解的优缺点。研究表明：当用Shapley值求解合作博弈解,降低了非合作-合作两型博弈解存在条件。因此,本文的研究不仅弥补了Brandenburger和Stuart提出的非合作-合作两型博弈中合作博弈的核心为空或者不唯一的情况,而且为非合作-合作两型博弈的解提供新的理论框架,从而为既有竞争又有合作的博弈问题提供新的求解方法,因此,本文的研究具有一定的理论价值和应用价值。