Social indicators of marital instability,U.S.A., 1920–1969

A social indicators model which included demographic variables (birth rate and aged child ratio), economic variable (unemployment) and marriage rates (control variable) was utilized in explaining changes in divorce rates over time. Analysis of time series data for two distinctive periods in the U.S.A. (1920–1940 and 1946–1969) revealed the following significant results:

1. Demographic changes in the age structure of the population while controlling for marriage rates explains significantly larger amounts of the variance in marital instability than economic changes alone (unemployment).
2. In the post-World War II era unemployment was not found to be a statistically significant predictor of marital instability when control for demographic changes were established.
3. In the post-World War II era marriage rates appear to be a significant predictor of divorce rates when control for demographic changes were maintained.
4. In the post-World War II era marriage rates were found to be more sensitive to changes in economic conditions than marital instability (divorce rate).

     

New realities of the American family

The demographic, social, and economic characteristics of American families have changed dramatically over the past few decades. While the male breadwinner/female homemaker model was long traditionally typical,l contemporary families may be openly made up of single-parents, remarried couples, unmarried couples, stepfamilies, foster families, extended or multigenerational families, or 2 families within 1 household. Families are now most likely to have 3 or fewer children, a mother employed outside of the home, and a 50% chance of parental divorce before the children are grown. These trends are common not only in America, but in most industrialized nations around the world. In fact, family trends are so fluid that the US Census Bureau and workplace policy find it difficult to keep pace. This report presents and discusses social and demographic trends behind the ever-changing face of the American family. Households and types of families are further defined, as are the living arrangements of children, young adults, and the elderly. Marriage, divorce, and remarriage trends, age at marriage rates, and interracial marriage are then discussed. Next examined are declining family size, teenage parents, contraception and abortion, unwed mothers, and technological routes to parenthood. The changing roles of family members and family economic well-being are discussed in sections preceding closing comments on the outlook for the American family.     

中国的家庭结构转变--来自居住方式与人口因素的作用

基于历次人口普查数据,利用SOCSIM微观模拟方法将家庭转变的关键影响因素分解为人口因素和居住方式因素两个方面,并进一步将人口因素分解为人口惯性、生育率、死亡率和结婚率四个层面进行计量分析.结果发现,当前人口变动相对稳定,较小的波动使其在家庭转变中的贡献率相对较小,而居住方式的影响相对较大;对人口因素的进一步分解还发现,人口惯性及生育率水平的作用相对更大,生育率水平、结婚率水平带来的影响与人口因素的总影响方向是一致的,均提高了一人户、一代户、二代户的人口比重,降低了三代及以上户的人口比重.与之相反,死亡率的影响与人口因素的总影响方向是相反的.     

The Changing Pattern of Educational Differentials in Divorce in the Context of Gender Egalitarianization: The Case of Taiwan

Regarding educational differentials in divorce, similar trends have been reported across countries. Some report increasing educational differentials, while others identify an educational crossover pattern. The commonality is that education seems to play a role of stabilizing marriage more than ever before. Using data from the Women??s Marriage, Fertility, and Employment Survey, this study investigates the case of Taiwan by portraying the changing pattern of women??s educational differentials in divorce. There are three major findings. First, among previous marriage cohorts, women with relatively higher levels of formal education are significantly more likely to divorce. Second, the marital-dissolution rates for less educated women are rising faster than the corresponding rates for women with more education. Third, this trend does not stop at the catch-up point and eventually leads to a reversal in the association between education and divorce from positive to negative. In short, such educational differentials in divorce vary dramatically across marriage cohorts. A pattern of educational crossover in divorce has been displayed during the rapid social change in Taiwan. Other than William Goode??s argument raised a half-century ago, the marriage model transformation from specialization toward symmetry in the context of gender egalitarianization has to be taken into consideration in order to obtain a full understanding of the phenomenon.     

The Impact of the Earned Income Tax Credit on Marriage and Divorce: Evidence from Flow Data

While considerable research focuses on the anti-poverty and labor supply effects of the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC), relatively little is known about the program’s influence on marriage and divorce decisions. Furthermore, nearly all work in this area uses stock measures of marital status derived from survey data. In this paper, I draw upon Vital Statistics data between 1977 and 2004 to construct a transition-based measure of marriage and divorce rates. Flows into and out of marriage are advantageous because they are more likely to capture the immediate impact of policy changes. Controlling for state-level characteristics and sources of unobserved heterogeneity, I find that increases in the EITC are associated with reductions in new marriages, although the estimated effect is economically small. I find no relationship between the EITC and new divorces. These results are robust to alternative estimation strategies, data restrictions, and the inclusion of additional policy and demographic controls.     

Economic opportunities,marriage squeezes and the propensity to marry: An economic analysis of period marriage rates in England and Wales

An economic model of the decision to marry has been developed by Gary Becker and is now part of the ‘new home economics’. From it one can deduce that the propensity to marry is a function of the relative earning capacities of men and women, the relative scarcity of unmarried persons of the opposite sex and real income. The effects of changes in these variables on the annual first marriage rates of men aged 16–19, 20–24 and 25–29 and women aged 16–19 and 20–24 respectively are estimated over the post-war period. It is found that women's earning capacity relative to men's has a particularly strong negative effect on marriage rates, and that the decline in first marriage rates during the 1970s was primarily attributable to the growing economic opportunities for women. As demographic studies have suggested, the relative numbers of bachelors and spinsters of particular ages (‘marriage squeezes’) also have a significant impact, and there is evidence of substitution in the ages of marriage partners in response to such ‘squeezes’. The income elasticity of marriage is only found to be significant among men below age 25 and women below age 20, and it increases as we move down the age distribution. This suggests the ‘liquidity constraints’ influence the timing of marriage among young people. In sum, this economic model is able to account for over 90 per cent of the post-war variation in young persons' marriage rates.     

Recent trends in marital disruption

The post-1980 decline in the crude divorce rate must be interpreted in the context of the long-term trend and in terms of what we know about composition effects on crude measures-particularly given shifts in age at marriage and the age composition effects of the baby boom. Data from the June 1985 Current Population Survey permit more detailed, exposure-specific measurements as well as the use of separation as the event terminating marriage. Estimates from these data suggest a decline followed by a recovery. Taking into account well-known levels of underreporting, we find that recent rates imply that about two-thirds of all first marriages are likely to end in separation or divorce. We examine the persistence of major differences in marital stability and evaluate the comparative stability of first and second marriages.     

Do Daughters Really Cause Divorce? Stress,Pregnancy, and Family Composition

Provocative studies have reported that in the United States, marriages producing firstborn daughters are more likely to divorce than those producing firstborn sons. The findings have been interpreted as contemporary evidence of fathers’ son preference. Our study explores the potential role of another set of dynamics that may drive these patterns: namely, selection into live birth. Epidemiological evidence indicates that the characteristic female survival advantage may begin before birth. If stress accompanying unstable marriages has biological effects on fecundity, a female survival advantage could generate an association between stability and the sex composition of offspring. Combining regression and simulation techniques to analyze real-world data, we ask, How much of the observed association between sex of the firstborn child and risk of divorce could plausibly be accounted for by the joint effects of female survival advantage and reduced fecundity associated with unstable marriage? Using data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY79), we find that relationship conflict predicts the sex of children born after conflict was measured; conflict also predicts subsequent divorce. Conservative specification of parameters linking pregnancy characteristics, selection into live birth, and divorce are sufficient to generate a selection-driven association between offspring sex and divorce, which is consequential in magnitude. Our findings illustrate the value of demographic accounting of processes which occur before birth—a period when many outcomes of central interest in the population sciences begin to take shape.     

The ABC of demographic behaviour: how the interplays of alleles, brains, and contexts over the life course should shape research aimed at understanding population processes

This paper proposes core innovations in the strategy of research on demographic behaviour. One aim is a shift of attention away from events and towards a focus on dynamic processes and their interplay: away from a preoccupation with marriage and divorce, births, deaths, migrations, and household structure towards a broader perspective that takes account of partnership and intimacy, parenthood, potential and well-being, position in society and space, and personal ties. Another aim is a much closer engagement with genetics, neuroscience, psychology, and behavioural economics. A third aim is a strategy that pays more attention to pathways within the individual, to the processes entailed when the individual interacts with various contexts, and to progressions that involve the interplay of the pathways and processes through the life course. These shifts of emphasis, which have already begun to occur, require a systematic reassessment of priorities for research on demographic behaviour.     

Parental divorce in childhood and demographic outcomes in young adulthood

We investigated the long-term effects of parental divorce in childhood on demographic outcomes in young adulthood, using a British longitudinal national survey of children. Our analyses control for predisruption characteristics of the child and the family, including emotional problems, cognitive’ achievement, and socioeconomic status. The results show that by age 23, those whose parents divorced were more likely to leave home because of friction, to cohabit, and to have a child outside marriage than were those whose parents did not divorce. Young adults whose parents divorced, however, were no more or less likely to marry or to have a child in a marriage. Moreover, even in the divorced group, the great majority did not leave home because of friction or have a child outside marriage.     

Correlates of divorce in the U.S.S.R.

The theoretical rationale of this study is that conditions associated with divorce reside outside the family within a broader social system where the family finds itself located. The absence of major differences in divorce law from one place to another within the Soviet Union makes it possible to explore this hypothesis by examining areal differentials in divorce rates. Crude divorce rates and crude marriage rates for 1960 have been published in Vestnik Statistiki for 109 political-administrative areas in the Soviet Union. Several indicators of modernization are available for the same areas from the 1959 U.S.S.R. Census of Population. About 80 per cent of the variation among areas with respect to the crude divorce rate is accounted for by six variables: the crude marriage rate, the percentage of urban population, and the employee-worker ratio in the labor force, each of which is positively associated with the divorce rate; and the proportion of poorly educated women, the ratio of children to adult males, and the mean household-family size, each of which is negatively associated with the divorce rate.     

Social class and socio-economic differentials in divorce in England and Wales

Summary The characteristics of a national sample of over 2,000 couples who divorced in 1979 are analysed according to the social class and socio-economic position of the husband. The demographic variables investigated for social class and socio-economic differentials include ages at marriage and divorce, duration of marriage, previous marital status, family size and the presence of a pre-maritally conceived child. In addition, an age-standardized measure, the 'standardized divorce ratio' is used to summarise the relative rates of divorce for the different social classes and socio-economic groups. Using this measure, the rate of divorce for couples in Social Class I is only half that for the average couple, whereas for couples in Social Class V and couples in which the husband is unemployed it is more than double.     

Divorce as risky behavior

Given that divorce often represents a high-stakes income gamble, we ask how individual levels of risk tolerance affect the decision to divorce. We extend the orthodox divorce model by assuming that individuals are risk averse, that marriage is risky, and that divorce is even riskier. The model predicts that conditional on the expected gains to marriage and divorce, the probability of divorce increases with relative risk tolerance because risk averse individuals require compensation for the additional risk that is inherent in divorce. To implement the model empirically, we use data for first-married women and men from the 1979 National Longitudinal Survey of Youth to estimate a probit model of divorce in which a measure of risk tolerance is among the covariates. The estimates reveal that a 1-point increase in risk tolerance raises the predicted probability of divorce by 4.3% for a representative man and by 11.4% for a representative woman. These findings are consistent with the notion that divorce entails a greater income gamble for women than for men.     

Age at marriage as a factor in state divorce rate differentials

The prominent East-to-West gradient in state divorce rates has frequently been partially attributed to an ecological factor called "frontier atmosphere," which incorporates the effects of mobility on social integration. This paper employs linear statistical procedures to show that, after adjustment of state divorce rates for age distribution, the percent ever married among teenage females is the best statistical predictor of 1960 and 1970 divorce rates, whereas "frontierness," conventionally measured by population mobility, is shown to have negligible effect, controlling for other selected legal and nonlegal factors. This finding suggests that previous ecological studies of divorce have overemphasized the effect of mobility and social stability on geographic divorce rate differentials, perhaps due to the neglect of demographic variables such as age distribution and especially age at marriage.     

Defying Gender Norms in Rural Bangladesh: A Social Demographic Analysis

This paper proposes core innovations in the strategy of research on demographic behaviour. One aim is a shift of attention away from events and towards a focus on dynamic processes and their interplay: away from a preoccupation with marriage and divorce, births, deaths, migrations, and household structure towards a broader perspective that takes account of partnership and intimacy, parenthood, potential and well-being, position in society and space, and personal ties. Another aim is a much closer engagement with genetics, neuroscience, psychology, and behavioural economics. A third aim is a strategy that pays more attention to pathways within the individual, to the processes entailed when the individual interacts with various contexts, and to progressions that involve the interplay of the pathways and processes through the life course. These shifts of emphasis, which have already begun to occur, require a systematic reassessment of priorities for research on demographic behaviour.     

Income dynamics in couples and the dissolution of marriage and cohabitation

Several studies have shown that a wife's strong (socio)economic position is associated with an increase in the risk of divorce. Less is known about such effects for cohabiting relationships. Using a unique and large-scale sample of administrative records from The Netherlands, we analyze the link between couples' income dynamics and union dissolution for married and cohabiting unions over a 10-year period. We find negative effects of household income on separation and positive effects of the woman's relative income, in line with earlier studies. The shape of the effect of the woman's relative income, however, depends on the type of union. Movements away from income equality toward a male-dominant pattern tend to increase the dissolution risk for cohabiting couples, whereas they reduce the dissolution risk for married couples. Movements away from income equality toward a female-dominant pattern (reverse specialization) increase the dissolution risks for both marriage and cohabitation. The findings suggest that equality is more protective for cohabitation, whereas specialization is more protective for marriage, although only when it fits a traditional pattern. Finally, we find that the stabilizing effects of income equality are more pronounced early in the marriage and that income equality also reduces the dissolution risk for same-sex couples.     

Demographic and Socio-economic Influences on Recent British Marital Breakdown Patterns

The advantages of large-scale multi-purpose surveys compared with official divorce records for examining marital breakdown are assessed, and the extent of under-recording of the concept of breakdown in the latter source is estimated. Demographic and socio-economic differentials in breakdown are examined and the former are found to be generally more powerful. A proportional-hazards life-table model is used to establish the impact of childlessness on divorce in a more satisfactory way than hitherto. Among fertile couples, the length of the first birth interval is found to be particularly important as a risk factor influencing breakdown. Controlling for demographic factors, such as age at marriage and fertility status, is shown to modify the observed crude differences between social classes. Housing tenure and personal factors associated with the couple's individual circumstances are more important than social class in explaining marital breakdown, with age at marriage retaining a strongly persisting and remarkably constant effect whatever other variables are included in the analysis.     

Fragile Employment,Liquid Love: Employment Instability and Divorce in Israel

The study examines the relationship between the employment stability of first-marriage couples and risk of divorce in Israel. This research question is of particular interest owing to the centrality of the family in Israeli society, rising divorce rates, and increasing employment instability and “deregulation” of the labor market. We capture employment instability through two dimensions: the pattern of employment instability within couples and the continuity of each partner’s employment instability. We utilize this conceptualization to identify the link between employment instability and divorce, focusing on gender and socioeconomic resources. Data were from combined Israeli census files for 1995–2008, annual administrative employment records from the National Insurance Institute and the Tax Authority, and the Civil Registry of Divorce (N = 10,891 couples). Using a series of discrete-time event-history analysis models, findings indicate that husbands’ employment instability, especially when wives have stable employment, increases the risk of divorce; employment stability continuity has opposite gender effects on that risk; and the effect of employment instability on divorce remains significant after taking into account household economic resources. The findings reveal asymmetric gender patterns of the effect of employment instability on divorce, beyond the socioeconomic resources of the household.     

Impacts of Demographic Trends on US Household Size and Structure

We use a household projection model to construct future scenarios for the United States designed to reflect a wide but plausible range of outcomes, including a new set of scenarios for union formation and dissolution rates based on past trends, experience in other countries, and current theory. The period covered is from 2000 to 2100. We find that the percentage of people living in households headed by the elderly may climb from 11 percent in 2000 to 20–31 percent in 2050 and 20–39 percent in 2100, while the average size of households could plausibly be as low as 2.0 or as high as 3.1 by the second half of the century. We assess the sensitivity of household size and structure to various demographic events, and show that outcomes are most sensitive to changes in fertility rates and rates of union formation and dissolution. They are less sensitive to the timing of marriage and childbearing and to changes in life expectancy.