Characteristics of fertility transition in China]

Since 1949 and in particular the 1970s, China's fertility rate has undergone rapid and continuous change. This is a direct reflection of China's success in population control. The decline in China's fertility rate regulated the speed of population growth, altered the population structure, and brought population development to be in line with economic development. Data used in this article are from the National 1/1000 Random Sample of Fertility (1982), the 10% Sample of the 1982 Population Census, 1981, 1983 and 1984 statistical yearbooks, and other data from the Statistics Bureau. China's fertility rate dropped an annual average of 2.5/1000 from 1950-81. However, this time, the fertility rate fluctuated, depending on political, social and economic factors. As the nation prospered, the fertility rate remained stable and high; as China suffered severe economic losses, the fertility rate dropped. A steady decline was evident beginning in 1970 as the government began to propagandize the merits of smaller families. Between 1971-83 the average yearly rate of growth was 1.6%. The number of years a woman was fertile was similar for both urban and rural women in 1964 and 1981; moreover, in 1981 both groups showed a sharp drop in fertility between the ages of 27-35. The 1 child rate for urban women rose from 21.9% in 1964 to 86.6% in 1981. Urban women tend to be more receptive to late marriage, late births, and fewer children. This change in the 1 child rate contributed to the drop in the birth rate of 31.1/1000 in 1964 to 20.9/1000 in 1981.     

Social and economic factors affecting China fertility transition]

China's fertility rate, affected by various economic, cultural and social factors, is in a state of flux. In analyzing the major factors affecting the change, and in determining a fixed ratio for the degree of effectiveness of each factor, it is possible to improve birth policy in terms of predicting trends in fertility changes. Based on data gathered in 1981, the following observations were made: 1) A look at gross output value for industry and agriculture by geography shows that the more economically developed an area is, the lower is the fertility rate, and that the less economically developed an area is, the higher is the fertility rate. For example, Yunnan, with an average gross output value per person of 406.5 yuan, has a total fertility rate of 3.814, whereas Shanghai's average gross output value per person is 5566.4 yuan, and its total fertility rate is 1.316. 2) Figures comparing educational levels with total fertility rates show that cities with a greater number of women with a middle school education tend to have a lower fertility rate than cities with fewer such women. For example, Beijing's 516,000 middle school educated women have a total fertility rate of 1.589, compared to Anhui's 186,000 middle school educated women who have a total fertility rate of 2.799. Also, among college educated women, the fertility rate is 41.5/1000, the 1 child rate is 88.6%, and the multiple child rate is 1.2%, whereas those women with a primary school education have a fertility rate of 86.4/1000, a 1 child rate of 44.3%, and a multiple child rate of 26.7%. 3) As towns become urbanized, the fertility rate of those towns tend to decline. For example, Sichuan, with an Urbanization Index of 14.3 has total fertility rate of 2.650; Tianjin's Urbanization Index is 68.7, and its total fertility rate is 1.645. 4) A comparison of women engaged in physical labor to those in non-physical jobs shows that the former tend to have a higher fertility rate: women working at physical labor have a fertility rate of 86.7/1000, compared to a fertility rate of 65/1000 for those in non-physical jobs. 5) China's family planning programs advocating late marriage, late births and 1 child per couple in itself does not influence fertility rates, but taken with economic factors, it will have far reaching consequences. For example, cities with high gross output value tend to have a higher rate of 1 child per couple. 6) As the average age at marriage for women rose from 18 years in 1949 to 23 years in 1981, the rate of women having multiple children has declined in all age groups since 1964.     

An analysis of the fertility of Chinese women]

The 1982 census provided detailed information on fertility in China. It recorded 20,689,704 births in 1981, producing a birth rate of 2.1%, a decrease, respectively, of 43% and more than 50% in comparison with 1952 and 1963. The birth rate has varied widely over the last 30 years, from 3.6% in the early 1950's, to 1.8% in 1961, after a planned birth program was begun, to a record high of 3.7% in 1962 following the economic recovery, to 3.3% in 1970, after a gradual decline through the 1960's. By 1981 the birth rate had declined to 2.1%, clearly resulting from the intense planned fertility promotion begun in the early 1970's. In the mid- and late 50's, urban birth rate was consistently higher than rural, with the mass move to the cities at the beginning of the People's Republic. General economic development after 1957 brought simultaneous declines of both urban and rural rates, both reaching a low point in 1961. Age structure of the population also has an influence, depending on the proportion of childbearing women in the population. In 1981, the fertility of China's childbearing women was 8.3%, lower than that of the developing countries, but higher than the developed countries. By age group, the fertility rates reached 14.7% and 23.9% respectively in women between 20-24 and 25-29 years of age; the legal marriage age is 20. The fertility rate in large cities is generally lower than that of provinces. Higher educational and socio-economic level also exert an inverse influence on fertility rates; in low socio-economic areas the rate reached 3.5%, and in more advanced areas it was held to 2.2%. In all professions with the exception of agriculture, fishing, and forestry, the percentage of families with 1 child was 81.8%. Since planned fertility was implemented, the overall fertility rate has dropped from 3% to 2%. China's fertility mode has changed to that of developed countries, with high intensity between 20 and 29 years of age. Appropriate measures should be taken to lower the fertility rate in different regions.     

Fertility of the Yi women in Liangshan]

An attempt is made to determine the causes for the high fertility rate of the Yi women in Liangshan, China. The Yi are one of China's 54 ethnic groups, the largest group of which are the Hans (making up 95% of China's population). The area surveyed was Liangshan Yi County, having a population of 1.4 million. The survey included Yi women between the ages of 13-29 and compared them on the basis of previously gathered fertility statistics dealing with 1st and 2nd marriages and changes in household arrangements. According to a 1980 report, 16.37% of 36,302 infants of Yi women were the 1st child, 20.33% were the 2nd, 19.05% were the 3rd, 16.55% were the 4th, and 27.36% were the 5th child. These figures show that the Yi women's fertility is still extremely high (and has been for the last 15 years). Their fertility rate is 3.03 times higher than that of the Han women and 1.5 times higher than the national average for women. Possible causes for this rate may be early marriage (the average age for marriage being 19), divorce, and remarriage, and changes in household arrangements (where married women cohabit with men other than their husbands). These findings indicate a great need for family planning in order to prevent further adverse effects on economic growth, living standards, and public health (e.g., malnutrition has been found among some babies).     

Theoretical explanation of rapid decline in China's fertility]

China's fertility decline is widely acknowledged. The 1982 census and a random survey of 1/1,000th of the nation's population set the total fertility rate at 2.6%. Bureau of statistics data collected in 1984 showed the nation's birth rate as 1.7% and total fertility rate 1.94%. Friendly observers call this a miracle; others blame the decline on forced government family planning policy. Scientific pursuit of the causes for the decline is an issue of practical and realistic value. First, favorable conditions for fertility decline have been fostered by the socialist system and are deeply rooted in the country's economic development. China's industrialization and urbanization have brought new lifestyles and liberated individuals and families from the constraints of traditional family life. Couples have chosen to limit the number of children, to enhance the quality of life and education potential of their children, thus altering the traditional high fertility in China. Education of women has played a role in raising women's consciousness; a 1982 census placed the fertility rate of women with high-school level education or above, lower than that for less or uneducated women. Neonatal mortality rate decline is also related to the spontaneous decline in fertility rate, as high fertility has historically been intended to compensate for high child mortality rates. Welfare and social security systems for the elderly have also helped change the traditional mentality of having many children as assurance of life support in old age. Social organizations have accelerated knowledge and methods of planned fertility. Later marriages are also a factor: in 1970 the average marriage age was 19 - 20 and had increased by 1976 to 22 - 23. Other favorable social factors include free birth control and the view of population planning as an essential part of national welfare.     

The impact of infant and child death on subsequent fertility in Ethiopia

This paper uses hazard regression models to assess the impact of experienced infant and child mortality on the risk of subsequent conceptions in Ethiopia. The purpose of this paper is to test for the presence of a fertility response to an infant or child death, net of the effects of truncated breastfeeding on fecundity. Using retrospective birth history data from a national survey in Ethiopia, we find a significantly higher risk of a conception in the months following the death of an index child, even after controlling for postpartum amenorrhoea and breastfeeding status. The fertility response is strongest after the death of the fourth or fifth child, which is when most women in Ethiopia are at or near their desired family size. However, we find no evidence of a fertility response to the death of a nonindex child. We attribute the higher risk of a conception following an index child’s death to the intentional efforts of couples to reduce the waiting time to a next birth and thereby replace the deceased child. However, absent evidence of replacement fertility in response to the death of older nonindex children, we interpret the response to the death of an index child as an emotional response to child loss rather than a conscious strategy to meet a fertility target.

Economic determinants of family size in West Africa

The economic theory of fertility postulates that income and prices, broadly defined, are important determinants of family size. What follows is an attempt to test this theory against the behavior of 717 predominantly urban households in Sierra Leone. Husband's education is used as a proxy for income; the "price" of a child is accounted for by wife's education and wife's wage rate. Other important variables are wife's age, a measure of child "quality," wife's age at first birth, and child mortality. The findings of the study tend to lend support to the economic theory of fertility but contain certain peculiarities which indicate a need for further research.     

On China's family planning policy

The birthrate in China in 1985, according to Li Honggui, Deputy Director of the General Office, the State Family Planning Commission, was 17.8/1000 with a death rate of 6.57/1000 and a natural growth rate of 11.23/1000. The number of births in 1985 was 18,520,000; 59.1% of these births were 1st births, 24% 2nd births, and 16.9% 3rd or more births. Women of childbearing age who pledged to have only 1 child accounted for 15.6% but only for 10% in rural areas. The peak fertility age of Chinese women was 24. Due to the age structure, a birth boom will begin in 1986 and will last for a decade. It is projected that the natural population growth rate will rise to 12.4/1000 in the 1986-96 period. The Chinese government has advocated a "1 child for 1 couple" policy since 1979. Couples who have difficulties can have a 2nd child with approval. Minority nationalities are permitted to have 3 children. The strategy of China's family planning program is to combine the guidance of the government with the motivation of the population. Consequently, communication and education have been emphasized. The situation is reported to be improving. At this time, women are advised to terminate unplanned pregnancies as early as possible. Individuals who refuse to consider the advice will be taxed.     

Communique of the State Family Planning Commission on a nationwide fertility sampling survey of every person per thousand

In 1982, the Chinese State Family Planning Commission conducted a nationwide fertility survey of 1 person/1000 in 28 provinces, municipalities, and autonomous regions. 815 sample units were selected and 310,462 women aged 15-67 were interviewed, 99.9% of those identified. 252,094 (24.77%) were of childbearing age (15-49) with 24.76% 15-19 years old. Among women of fertile age, 31.46% were unmarried, 64.53% were married to their 1st husbands, 2.89% were remarried, .19% were divorced, and .94% were widowed. Average age of 1st marriage increased from 18.4 in the 1940s to 22.8 in 1981. Total fertility rate dropped from 5.44 in the 1940s to 2.63 in 1981. In 1981, the birth rate was 85/1000 women of fertile age. Fertility was much higher among minority nationalities. 118 million of China's 170 million married couples of reproductive age (69.46%) use birth control at present; 50.2% use the IUD, 25.4% tubal ligation, 10.0% vasectomy, 8.2% oral contraceptives, and 2.0% condoms. About 21 million married women should have begun using contraception but have not. 14 million or 42.3% of 33 million 1 child couples have pledged to have only 1 child. If the fertility level of 1981 is maintained and the average woman continues to have 2.63 children, 2.91 in rural areas, China's population will reach 1.2 billion by 1993 and will exceed 1.3 billion by 2000. The Central Committee has a target population of 1.2 billion by 2000.     

Economic Insecurity and the Fertility Intentions of Italian Women with One Child

The present study addresses the issue of economic insecurity and its relationship with the reproductive plans of 5,358 Italian women in couples who have recently had their first child. Data were sourced from the ISTAT Sample Survey on Births, 2005 edition. This article’s originality lies in the conceptualization of economic insecurity and the investigation of its effects on fertility intentions. We propose to capture economic insecurity by considering both the insecurity associated to the two partners’ employment status and a variety of aspects that contribute to the household’s ability to cope with possible unpredictable future events. Then, we investigate whether and how economic insecurity shapes the fertility intentions of women over their entire reproductive life span. With specific respect to women who intend to have one additional child only, we also observe the effect of economic insecurity on their intention to give birth sooner (i.e., within the next 3 years) or later. Our data show the existence of a critical factor in the passage from the generic fertility intentions to the contingent plan to have a child in the next 3 years: only half of women with one child who intend to follow the two-child family model feel ready to plan to have a second child in the next 3 years. The study also reinforces an argument that is frequently made: fertility intentions over the entire lifetime are less conditioned upon contingent constraints, and are often more closely related to individual traits and/or preferences.     

Sibling loss and fertility desires in the high-mortality context of Peru

Despite demographers’ long-standing preoccupation with the effects of child mortality on women’s fertility desires, scholars continue to know little about the consequences of other pervasive mortality exposures. We use nationally representative data from the high-mortality context of Peru to examine whether the desire to have a(nother) child varies as a function of sibling loss and to assess heterogeneity in this association by women’s current number of children and a range of conditions related to siblings’ deaths. Women who have experienced sibling bereavement and have two or more children report higher odds of desiring another child. These effects are not contingent on the age or sex of the deceased sibling but are only significant if the sibling died during the respondent’s lifetime (not before). These findings highlight the theoretical and empirical import of investigating the relationship between fertility desires and a wider range of familial mortality exposures beyond own child mortality.     

关于当前生育影响因素的思考

根据我国生育水平来分析影响当前我国生育的因素,并结合社会经济发展,进一步探讨生育影响因素的未来变动与趋势。影响生育的经济因素、社会因素、自然因素以及资源分配或社会平等的政治因素与人们的生育意愿变化等都有抑制生育率提高的作用。生育政策变动、社会保障、人口健康和安全有促进生育率变化的趋向。     

Fertility Intentions and Residential Relocations

This research addresses the question of whether fertility intentions (before conception) are associated with residential relocations and the distance of the relocation. We empirically tested this using data from two birth cohorts (aged 24–28 and 34–38 in the first survey wave) of the German Family Panel (pairfam) and event history analysis. Bivariate analyses showed that coupled individuals relocated at a higher rate if they intended to have a(nother) child. We found substantial heterogeneity according to individuals’ age and parental status, particularly for outside-town relocations. Childless individuals of average age at family formation—a highly mobile group—relocated at a lower rate if they intended to have a child. In contrast, older individuals who already had children—the least-mobile group—relocated at a higher rate if they intended to have another child. Multivariate analyses show that these associations are largely due to adjustments in housing and other living conditions. Our results suggest that anticipatory relocations (before conception) to adapt to growing household size are importantly nuanced by the opportunities and rationales of couples to adjust their living conditions over the life course. Our research contributes to the understanding of residential mobility as a by-product of fertility decisions and, more broadly, evidences that intentions matter and need to be considered in the analysis of family life courses.     

Marriage patterns and fertility of the world population]

Marriage patterns of the world population may be divided into two major categories; i.e., the traditional marriage pattern, and the European marriage pattern. Characteristics of the traditional marriage pattern are: early marriage, a high percentage of married people, and a low percentage of people who remain single during their lifetime. Characteristics of the European marriage pattern include: late marriage and a higher percentage of females who do not marry in their lifetime. In most parts of Asia and Africa and some Latin American countries, the traditional marriage pattern is dominant, and the birth rate in these countries has remained very high. Most countries in Europe show the characteristics of the European marriage pattern, and the fertility rate in these countries is comparatively low. Some other countries, such as Sri Lanka, are in a process of transformation in their marriage pattern, and their fertility level also shows a transition from a high fertility rate to a lower fertility rate. There is a close relationship between marriage patterns and the level of fertility.     

An evaluation of the recent fertility changes in Afghanistan: a parity-specific analysis

Very limited studies exist on the demography of Afghanistan. Using the only national survey with complete birth history data, the 2010 Afghanistan Mortality Survey, this paper describes the recent fertility changes in the country from a parity-specific perspective. From 1995 to 2009, parity progression ratios, average birth intervals, sex ratio at birth by parity and synthetic lifetime average parity are successively examined. Results show that the progression to higher-order births started to decline in the early 2000s and was accompanied by childbearing postponement. The consistency of the parity analysis is assessed by looking at the sex ratio at birth by parity and comparing the synthetic lifetime average parity to fertility estimates computed from other datasets and/or estimation methods. While the sex ratio at birth indicates strong distortion, casting doubt on the ultimate fertility level, the consistency of the parity-based fertility estimates with other fertility estimates corroborates the fact that misreporting the sex of the child is mainly causing the imbalanced sex ratio at birth and is not significantly affecting the level of fertility. The SPPRs-based analysis provides solid evidence that Afghanistan is in the early stage of its fertility transition.     

The evolution in China's fertility and an analysis of population development]

There have been numerous projections on China's population at the end of century. Their differences are due to different estimations on the effects of fertility determinants. 2 simulation models have been developed, both from micro and macro levels, to estimate the population at the end of the century on the basis of 6 different fertility patterns. 3 possible options for fertility patterns are discussed. 1.) The 1 child per family option means that every couple has 1 child by the year 1989, the population of China will be 1.2 billion in the year 2000. Even if this is a ideal situation, it would not be a feasible policy, as the pressure from the rural population to have more than 1 child has been increasing in recent years. Nevertheless, it is still possible for urban couples to accept having only 1 child. Therefore, encouraging more people to have 1 child should be held as a basic policy. 2.) Under the option of 2 children per family with 2 or 3 years of spacing, the total population in the year 2000 would be 1.2 - 1.4 billion, which is unacceptable in terms of the development situation. 3.) Following a differential fertility policy towards urban, rural, and minority populations would mean that urban couples would have 1 child, rural couples whose first child is a girl or those who are in special circumstance would have 2 children. Minorities would have 2 or 3 children. AMong the above options, number 3 is more likely to be achieved in view of current socioeconomic, cultural, and demographic factors.     

Men’s Migration and Women’s Fertility in Rural Mozambique

Labor migration profoundly affects households throughout rural Africa. This study looks at how men’s labor migration influences marital fertility in a context where such migration has been massive while its economic returns are increasingly uncertain. Using data from a survey of married women in southern Mozambique, we start with an event-history analysis of birth rates among women married to migrants and those married to nonmigrants. The model detects a lower birth rate among migrants’ wives, which tends to be partially compensated for by an increased birth rate upon cessation of migration. An analysis of women’s lifetime fertility shows that it decreases as the time spent in migration by their husbands accrues. When we compare reproductive intentions stated by respondents with migrant and nonmigrant husbands, we find that migrants’ wives are more likely to want another child regardless of the number of living children, but the difference is significant only for women who see migration as economically benefiting their households. Yet, such women are also significantly more likely to use modern contraception than other women. We interpret these results in light of the debate on enhancing versus disrupting effects of labor migration on families and households in contemporary developing settings.     

Family planning achievements as suggested by changes of total fertility and party birth rate]

The dynamic characteristics of China's 5 distinct stages of population development since the People's Republic of China was established in 1949, namely, 1950-1958, 1959-1963, 1964-1970, 1971-1981, and 1982-present, are outlined and discussed. By tracing both the overall rate of population growth and age-specific fertility rates for women aged 15-45 (5-year groups), a clear pattern emerges which indicates that the rates of early and late fertility (ages groups 15-19 and 30-45) are significantly declining. This is interpreted as a key factor in the overall decline in fertility rate. Annual statistics showing the number of children per woman of childbearing age and interval between 1st marriage and 1st birth are compared and discussed. It is concluded that the overall decline in birth rate and fertility rate since the 1970's is attributable to China's successful family planning campaign.     

Economic Development,Gender Inequality,and Demographic Outcomes: Evidence from India

This article examines the determinants of fertility, child mortality, and female disadvantage in child survival in India, using a district‐level panel data set linking 1981 and 1991 censuses. The results question the dominant view that variables directly related to women's agency (specifically, the female literacy rate and the female labor force participation rate) have played the crucial roles here. Instead, variables reflecting the general level of development and modernization are shown to have had the greatest effect in reducing fertility and child mortality during the period of the study. Both economic development and women's agency are seen to have had significant effects in reducing the female disadvantage in child survival. The results suggest, however, that with continued economic development, the two women's agency variables lose their significance in influencing this disadvantage. The policy implications of these findings are considered.     

Socioeconomic determinants of fertility in China

This paper reports the first set of estimates of the socioeconomic determinants of fertility in China using micro-data available from China's 1985 In-Depth Fertility Survey. Based on existing microeconomic theories of fertility, an econometric model was specified and estimated. The results indicate that even after age, marriage duration and child mortality are taken into account, education level of the woman, occupational status of the husband, the place of former and current residence, sex preference for boys, durable goods ownership, and family structure affect fertility. For the middle cohorts (aged 25–34 years in 1985), the relationship between fertility and education takes the form of a J-shaped curve.This paper is drawn from Essay II of my Ph. D. thesis submitted to McMaster University. I am grateful to Frank Denton and Byron Spencer for discussion in connection with the thesis and comments on earlier versions of this paper, to Ronald Lee, the external examiner of the thesis, for many insightful comments, and to Martin Dooley, Lonnie Magee and two anonymous referees for very helpful suggestions. I would also like to thank International Statistical Institute Research Center for supplying the data used in this study.