Gemeinschaft Revisited: A Critique and Reconstruction of the Community Concept

Community remains a potent symbol and aspiration in political and intellectual life. However, it has largely passed out of sociological analysis. The paper shows why this has occurred, and it develops a new typology that can make the concept useful again in sociology. The new typology is based on identifying structurally distinct subtypes of community using a small number of partitioning variables. The first partition is defined by the ultimate context of interaction; the second by the primary motivation for interaction; the third by rates of interaction and location of members; and the fourth by the amount of face-to-face as opposed to computer-mediated interaction. This small number of partitioning variables yields eight major subtypes of community. The paper shows how and why these major subtypes are related to important variations in the behavioral and organizational outcomes of community. The paper also seeks to resolve some disagreements between classical liberalism and communitarians. It shows that only a few of the major subtypes of community are likely to be as illiberal and intolerant as the selective imagery of classical liberals asserts, while at the same time only a few are prone to generate as much fraternalism and equity as the selective imagery of communitarians suggests. The paper concludes by discussing the forms of community that are best suited to the modern world.     

Max Weber's ethics and the peace movement today

Conclusion The decisive change since Weber spoke of our responsibility before history has not been the demise of the German nation state after only seventy-five years but the sudden dawn of the nuclear age. Now the survival of populations, not of nation-states is at stake - a situation not anticipated by Weber and his contemporaries. It is quite possible that many millions, perhaps hundreds of millions, will die because of rational strategic decisions by political and military leaders, but it is no longer possible to legitimate a great war as a matter of honor, as Churchill and Weber did, or as an enterprise to make the world safe for democracy, as Wilson and Roosevelt did. If there can be no more victors, it also becomes impossible to load the responsibility before history on their shoulders, as Weber did in Politics as a Vocation.Today a new concept of responsibility is appropriate, which has a general and a specifically German aspect. The latter involves the German responsibility for the World Wars. Weber had vehemently rejected the Allied charge that Imperial Germany was primarily responsible for the war, even though he was very worried about what might be buried in the German archives. Today it can no longer be denied that Imperial Germany was largely guilty as charged. After the second war, it was impossible to deny the German responsibility. During his tenure as chancellor Helmut Schmidt pointed time and again to the Federal Republic's moral obligation to assure the Soviet Union that it would never again be attacked. Since the German nation does no longer exist, the foreign minister under Schmidt and Kohl, Hans-Dietrich Genscher, now speaks of a German-German community of responsibility (Verantwortungsgemeinschaft), in contrast to the community of fate shared with the Western allies. At the same time the peace movement has used the German responsibility for the Second World War and for organized genocide as a moral argument for a special German duty to help prevent another war.Before the First World War pacifism was propagated by only a handful of intellectuals. Afterwards the Nie wieder Krieg (Never again war) movement was supported by masses of people who had experienced the horrors of the Great War. Today the peace movement is no longer what it was for Weber, a cause for a few pacifist Utopians or of a generation that suffered through a world war. The danger of a nuclear holocaust has given the movement a novel historical significance. If the new kind of pacifism is not merely a matter of humanitarian commitment, which aims at a world without war, but a movement that struggles to help humanity survive, then it is equally a matter of good intentions and of responsibility - and Weber's distinction collapses.Weber could take it for granted that there would be generational succession and hence history in the future. We cannot do so any more. This has created a special kind of responsibility not before our descendants but for the very possibility that new generations will be able to live - a totally new ethical situation. Saving whole populations and even having to ensure the continuance of life has become a new ultimate value, transcending the salvation concerns of religious virtuosi and the political Utopias of revolutionaries as well as the traditional interests of the leaders of nation-states. Before this situation Weber's distinction between the two ethics loses its political applicability. Finally, the new ethical situation forces us to look beyond politics as a vocation as a matter merely of political leadership. Today the peace movement is an endeavor to make politics everybody's vocation in the face of perplexed governments who surrender the people to the rationality of military technology. During the Second World War the atom bomb was constructed in total secrecy. For many years afterwards its further development lay in the hands of a tiny number of political leaders and scientists, who withheld as much information as possible from the public. The tendency toward secrecy has remained strong, but a large part of the public is now fighting for disclosure. If Clemenceau believed that war was too important to be left to generals, the new wisdom has it that the dangers of a nuclear war are too great to leave the armaments race and military strategy to elected politicians without effective public participation.In contrast to Weber's polar concepts, his battle-cry our responsibility before history has not remained part of public memory. Perhaps it should be resurrected today with a changed emphasis as a peaceable call to take responsibility for history. This might help both sides in the current struggles over nuclear defense policies in western Europe and the United States to remember their human commonality in spite of highly emotional confrontations.

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Max Weber's Science of Composition

Starting from the recently translated biography of Max Weber by Joachim Radkau, this essay re‐evaluates Weber's “science of reality” in relation to his personality, the cultural context of the early twentieth century, and the position of Weber's thought in the sociological canon. The argument progresses through sequentially enlarged analyses, which propose that Weber's general style of thinking is a type of dissonant composition that places emphasis on the many relationships between cultural reality and the concepts derived from it, and not as much on its content. The logic of such a compositional approach to reality is based on similar principles found in sound and music, which Weber in fact uses in a more latent as well as more active form, to pursue his aim of a style of thinking as “aesthetics of dissonance”. The latter is a sort of “methodological wedge” that pries open the many layers of reality. As such, Weber's “science of reality” is an early “classical” example of a recent and much needed call for a social science as the “art of listening”.     

近代“青年”观念的形成与展开——以近代日本青年主义发展的过程为例

青年与青年运动既伴随着近代社会的进程而诞生,同时也是作为近代社会的对立、对抗的一方而存在。"青年"理念的产生并不是一个由社会问题而产生的孤立现象,或者是政治运动的权宜之计,而是近代化过程中一种新型思想的诞生,是一种以"青年"理念为核心的概念群的产生。这类概念体系在充满着形形色色"主义"的19世纪可以被称之为"青年主义"。到了19世纪80年代,日本的知识界、舆论界将近代西方哲学和社会理论进行了翻译与再创造,构筑了汉语范围内有关"青年"话语的原生系统。自此,"青年"作为一种思想的形成和发展,贯穿整个20世纪,并且深刻地影响了现代中国的政治社会进程。     

Weber's concept of rationalization and the electronic revolution in western classical music

In examining the electronic revolution in Western Classical music, this article considers many of the important issues which Weber addresses in his work on the sociology of music—particularly the definitional problems related to Weber's concept of rationalization and the disenchantment of the world. The article examines Weber's concepts of rational action and rationalization in relation to music, then through analysis of developments in electronic music, raises questions regarding Weber's conclusions regarding the effect of rationalization in Western culture. Thanks to Leo D. Papa for technical assistance. Thanks also to Larry E. Simons, French Horn and Daniel McCollum, Cello, for providing musical examples. Steven Smith provided some sound criticism.     

韦伯关于中国文化论述的再思考

本文针对韦伯的《中国的宗教:儒教和道教》一书中西文化比较研究中的得失提出了个人的一些管见,指出由于时代的局限,韦伯像他那个时代的大多数欧洲思想家一样具有欧洲中心论的思想倾向,这导致他在论述包括中国宗教在内的东方宗教时显露出极高的睿智和洞见,同时也含有许多曲解和误读。譬如,他判定道教是纯粹的非理性,进而把包括儒释道三家学说在内的东方宗教界定为神秘主义类型,并与西方的禁欲主义宗教—文化类型对列成犄角之势,构成了韦伯视野中的东西方文化—历史比较研究的基本格局。文章认为韦伯对中国文化的这些见解既和他的比较研究的理想类型有关,也与他思想深处源于古希腊的理性哲学和中古希伯来的信仰意识所奠定的欧洲文化统一性具有深刻的联系。     

Styles of Intellectualism in Weber's Historical Sociology

The prevailing concept of the intellectual in contemporary sociology is an ideal type derived from Weber. Intellectuals are understood as politically disinterested, socially unattached individuals, who in their subjective intentions pursue knowledge for its own sake. Weber's ideal type thus provides the action framework for a sociology of knowledge that has been used as a direct counterclaim to Marxist theories of ideology. The author challenges this position, arguing that Weber's sociology of religion embraces important elements of a Marxist theory of ideology and thus presents an ambivalent concept of the intellectual that points toward a historicist sociology of knowledge.     

Afterword: The role of the market in Max Weber's work

Theory and Society -