FOREIGN INVESTMENT AND TRADE DEPENDENCE

This article explores the relationship between foreign capital investment and trade dependence in less developed economies. Dependency and world system theorists have argued that foreign investment from the advanced capitalist states promotes export and import dependent forms of development. Using cross-national data for 65 less developed nations between 1960 and 1977, the analysis supports this general claim. Total direct foreign investment has a significant positive impact on the measures of export, import and total trade dependence. However, when the total foreign investment measure is disaggregated by sectoral destination (agriculture, manufacturing, petroleum/extraction) only investment in petroleum/extraction has the expected effect on trade dependence. This finding suggests that a large part of the effect of foreign investment may be due to the structuring influence of investment in mineral/extractive forms of production.     

INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS TRADE,FOREIGN AID,AND ENFORCEMENT

Using a general equilibrium model of a developing narcotics‐producing and ‐exporting economy, we analyze the economic effects of policies designed to restrict the production and trade of narcotics: foreign aid tied to anti‐narcotics law enforcement activities, demand reduction policies, and alternative development policies. We characterize the problem as one of serious factor market distortions introduced by illicit production and enforcement. While aid to enforcement generally reduces the production and export of narcotics, it is less effective for economies with market power, and under plausible conditions may raise narcotics output and have negative welfare implications for the recipient. (JEL F1)     

KNOWLEDGE CAPITAL,INTERNATIONAL TRADE,AND FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT: A SECTORAL ANALYSIS

The knowledge‐capital (KC) model of multinational enterprises (MNEs) is now a widely adopted empirical approach to explain the location and production decisions of global firms based on both horizontal and vertical motivations. Although most of the existing studies have focused on highly aggregated national data, we extend this model to sectoral data consisting of broad manufacturing industries and explicitly account for the dynamic nature of international investment data. The empirical results from a dynamic panel data analysis indicate that the predictions of the KC model regarding MNE behavior vary by the type of industry. Production processes in electronics and transportation equipment are more characterized by efficient vertical specialization of research and development activities and assembly, whereas other sectors display more complex motivations. (JEL F14, F23, L23)     

TRADE COSTS AND TRADE COMPOSITION

In this paper, we investigate whether countries' trade costs act like other national endowments by affecting the composition of countries' exports. Using an econometric approach that controls for endogeneity by accounting for potentially relevant omitted variables, we find strong evidence for a sample of 37 industrialized and transition countries that national trade costs systematically affect the composition of trade and can be viewed therefore as a source of comparative advantage. Industries located in countries with low trade costs capture significantly higher shares of world exports, where this effect is stronger in trade cost intensive industries. (JEL F11, F14)     

TRADE OVERLAP AND INTRA-INDUSTRY TRADE

Theorizing about and empirically measuring "intraindustry trade" is pointless if "factor proportions" vary more within than among "industries." Available data show this to be the case.     

THE EFFECTS OF FOREIGN UNIVERSITIES ON DOMESTIC HUMAN CAPITAL ACCUMULATION

This article considers the effects upon human capital in a host country when foreign universities open branches within this country. We create a model where aspiring students differ according to inherent ability and choose endogenously how much time to devote to preparing to win admittance to a university. Universities can either be domestic or foreign, and payoffs for the student differ between them. The presence of these foreign universities can potentially increase effort—and so human capital—by providing more incentive to study. However, they can also lead to brain drain as students could be more likely to emigrate upon graduation relative to those who attend a domestic university. We apply this model to China and use parameter values in simulations to assess to what extent inflow of foreign universities provide benefits to China. (JEL D82, I23, I25)     

COMPETITION AND TEACHER PAY

Competition‐based school reform could have a significant impact on teacher earnings. If school districts behave as typical oligopsonists, then increased competition could lead to higher salaries. However, if teachers receive a share of the economic rents generated by the monopoly power of school districts, then increased competition could lower teacher salaries. This study uses panel data from 670 Texas school districts and more than 335,000 teachers to examine the relationship between school competition and teacher pay. The analysis suggests that an increase in competition results in higher wages for most teachers but lower wages for teachers in relatively concentrated markets. (JEL I2, J3)     

IMPERFECT COMPETITION AND BASING-POINT PRICING

This article investigates the relationship between imperfect competition and basing point pricing. Basing-point pricing can emerge if firms at the base site are Bertrand competitors, firms at non-base locations are less than perfectly competitive with each other and are von Stackleberg leaders with respect to base site production, and the products produced at the base and non-base locations are perfect substitutes. Basing-point pricing is associated with competitive prices by base site firms but with markups by non-base site firms equal to their phantom freight charges.     

TRADE ADJUSTMENT,POLITICAL PRESSURE,AND TRADE PROTECTION PATTERNS

This paper introduces trade adjustment considerations as active determinants of trade policy. Using novel U.S. data sets, I show that, despite their small monetary value, trade‐induced unemployment and trade‐adjustment costs can incite an incumbent politician to grant protection to an unorganized industry, even in the presence of political pressure by organized sectors. This finding complements the theoretical predictions from Grossman and Helpman (American Economic Review, 84, 1994, 833–50) who argue that the government should protect organized industries but should subsidize imports in unorganized sectors. (JEL D73, F13, F14, F16, J68)     

INSTITUTIONAL QUALITY AND TRADE: WHICH INSTITUTIONS? WHICH TRADE?

Using a panel of countries over 1990–2000, this paper examines the extent to which different dimensions of the institutional framework affect total exports, exports of manufactured goods, and exports of nonmanufactured goods. It is observed that exports of manufactured goods are positively affected by the quality of institutions but neither total exports nor nonmanufactured exports. The latter may even correlate negatively with the quality of institutions. The results are robust to estimation methods. ( JEL F14, F15, O17)     

SPATIAL COMPETITION AND STRATEGIC FIRM RELOCATION

Firms compete spatially for customers who have some degree of brand loyalty. The number and attractiveness of the alternatives available to these customers dictates the level of competition facing firms. In this study, data on ticket pricing in four professional sports leagues are used to empirically examine the existence of spatial competition in sports, and the impact of space on team relocations. Results, allowing for structural breaks over time while using spatial autoregressive techniques, suggest that sports franchises spatially compete when pricing their tickets, and that spatial characteristics, including the level of spatial competition, have influenced the relocation of teams. (JEL D40, L11, R30, L83)     

THEORY AND EXPERIMENTS ON SPATIAL COMPETITION

We present theoretical and experimental results on spatial competition between two firms. Firms choose locations simultaneously along a line representing a linear market. Identical consumers with non-increasing demand functions are uniformly distributed along this line. We solve for symmetric equilibrium payoffs in an infinitely repeated game for the case of linear demand and an arbitrary discount factor. The set of equilibriums found includes both competitive and collusive payoffs. In laboratory experiments in which the final period was unknown to the players in advance, we observed both competitive and collusive outcomes. Non-binding communication led to collusion.     

INTERNATIONAL TAX COMPETITION AND THE DEFICIT BIAS

I analyze the dynamic effects of tax competition on public budget deficits. I find that stronger tax competition leads to a fiscal deficit bias at the early stages of financial liberalization. When countries differ in terms of capital mobility, further liberalization leads to external imbalances and diverging fiscal deficits while corporate tax rates converge. Consistent with theory, I find that stronger tax competition increases deficits in a sample of OECD countries, controlling for tax revenues and other standard determinants of fiscal deficits. (JEL E62, F62)     

COMPETITION AND THE CIGARETTE TV ADVERTISING BAN

The 1970 ban on television advertising for cigarettes constitutes a quasi-experiment allowing the effect of advertising on competition to be evaluated. Assuming the ban reduced the efficacy of industry advertising, an analysis of various proxies for competition before and after the ban enables one to deduce whether advertising promotes or limits competition among cigarette firms. The results indicate that in this case the restriction of advertising reduced competition.