How Far Has Fertility in China Really Declined?

According to births in the last year as reported in China's 2000 census, the total fertility rate (TFR) in the year 2000 in China was 1.22 children per woman. This estimate is widely considered to be too low, primarily because some women who had out‐of‐quota births according to China's one‐child family policy did not report those births to the census enumerator. Analysis of fertility trends derived by applying the own‐children method of fertility estimation to China's 1990 and 2000 censuses indicates that the true level of the TFR in 2000 was probably between 1.5 and 1.6 children per woman. A decomposition analysis of change in the TFR between 1990 and 2000, based on our best estimate of 1.59 for the TFR in 2000, indicates that about two‐fifths of the decline in the conventional TFR between 1990 and 2000 is accounted for by later marriage and less marriage, and three‐fifths by declining fertility within marriage. The analysis also applies the birth history reconstruction method of fertility estimation to the two censuses, yielding an alternative set of fertility estimates that are compared with the set derived by the own‐children method. The analysis also includes estimates of trends in fertility by urban/rural residence, education, ethnicity, and migration status. Over time, fertility has declined sharply within all categories of these characteristics, indicating that the one‐child policy has had large across‐the‐board effects.     

China's Below‐Replacement Fertility: Recent Trends and Future Prospects

Between 1970 and 1990, China experiencoed a rapid and sharp fertility decline—from total fertility rates of approximately six births to two. The degree to which Chinese fertility has continued to fall after 1990 is controversial. We use survey data from the 1997 National Population and Reproductive Health Survey and from the 2001 Reproductive Health and Family Planning Survey to document recent trends in Chinese fertility. Our estimates provide further evidence that China's fertility is well below‐replacement level at the turn of the twenty‐first century—with TFR levels of approximately 1.5 children per woman. Trends in parity‐specific cohort fertility by age also suggest below replacement completed fertility for cohorts still in the childbearing years. In the article's second section, we identify key components of low period fertility in order to frame our discussion of two questions: 1) in what ways is Chinese low fertility different from/similar to that in other low‐fertility countries? And 2) what are the likely future trends in Chinese fertility?     

Low fertility due to delay in -- not dearth of -- births

Population Council demographer John Bongaarts and his colleague Griffith Feeney argue that recent concern about a lack of births overlooks the fact that many women in developed countries are simply choosing to bear children later than women used to. So-called birth dearths are often caused by temporary delays in childbearing. The two demographers have designed a new way for demographers to account for the timing, or tempo, of childbearing in estimates of fertility. Their tempo-adjusted total fertility rate (TFR) allows demographers to correct skewed fertility trends, such as those leading to projections of birth dearths. The new measure provides a better indication of women's true propensity to bear children. Standard measures of fertility are distorted by changes in tempo. Such changes occur when large numbers of couples delay or accelerate their initiation of family building. The authors used historical data and theoretical arguments to validate the tempo-adjusted TFR, which improves upon the two common measures of fertility. Flaws in the TFR and the completed fertility rate (CFR) are corrected by Bongaarts and Feeney's new measure. To demonstrate their new tool, they examined the below-replacement fertility seen in recent decades in the US. By the mid-1990s, the TFR in almost every developed country had fallen below the replacement level of 2.1 births/woman, and in Italy, Spain, and Germany it fell below 1.5. If such fertility persists, declining population size, extreme population aging, and financial pressure upon social security systems may result. However, if fertility preferences hold at current levels, the very low fertility rates observed in the developed world will approach 2 children/couple.     

试论时期总和生育率、终身生育率与政策生育率的关系

通过对总和生育率(TFR)、终身生育率(CFR)与政策生育率(PFR)的概念及相关数据分析,论证总和生育率与政策生育率是完全不同的概念,不可直接比较。在特定条件下TFR、CFR和政策生育率会产生差异,在一个国家生育水平下降的历史时期,TFR必然小于当年49岁组女性的CFR;"超生率"、"未婚率"、"未育率"和"不孕率"的变化,决定了政策生育率与终身生育率的差异。借鉴日本经济与人口发展相关数据,可以相信由平均初婚年龄推迟、女性有偶率下降导致的生育水平下降很可能成为对我国人口均衡发展的最大潜在威胁。因此,当前以及今后相当的时期内,我国的政策生育率应高于1.8。     

计划生育政策的人口效应

文章试图估计计划生育政策使我国少生了多少人。利用1980~2008年世界140多个国家的数据来模拟在没有计划生育政策影响下经济社会变量与人口变量的相关关系,并据此对中国无计划生育条件下的总和生育率进行测算。将测算出来的无计划生育条件下的总和生育率和中国实际总和生育率分别代入模型进行人口模拟,比较无计划生育条件下和现实条件下人口增长的不同过程和结果。研究表明:无计划生育条件下,我国2008年生育率水平的预测值大概在2.5左右。1972~2008年间,排除经济社会发展的影响,单纯由于计划生育的作用,中国少生了4.58亿人。     

Below-replacement fertility in Thailand and its policy implications

The fertility transition in Thailand has been one of the most rapid among Asian countries that are yet to attain newly industrialized country status. In the early 1960s, the total fertility rate exceeded six births per woman; currently, it stands at 1.9 or slightly below replacement level. At present, it is hard to predict the future trend in fertility as this involves several factors that need much closer study, in particular, fertility preferences, changes in marriage patterns and the wider effects of the current economic crisis in Thailand. Rapid declines in fertility and mortality have had a profound effect on the age structure of the population, notably the increasing elderly proportion. Thailand now faces new challenges and priorities for population policy. Policy responses to concerns arising from below-replacement fertility will be much more complex and involve greater government activism, improved institutional capacities and more resources than in the past. This paper reviews the fertility transition in Thailand and looks at some consequences and policy implications of low fertility, with special reference to the family and the elderly population. National Statistical Office     

Closing a Sociodemographic Chapter of Chinese History

At its recent Fifth Plenary Session held in Beijing, the Eighteenth Central Committee of the Communist Party of China decided to abolish the one‐child policy and allow all couples to have two children, thus closing an important chapter of China's social and demographic history. Recent fertility trends make it clear why it is urgent to abandon this policy. Census and survey data show that China's TFR had already fallen below replacement in 1991. Since the mid‐1990s, TFRs in most years have been lower than 1.5 children per woman. Since 2010, even lower fertility rates have been recorded by the annual population change surveys. Since the mid‐1990s, fertility decline has been increasingly driven by generalized ideational changes resulting from the social, economic, and cultural transformation of recent decades. In recent years many couples who were entitled to have a second child have chosen not to do so. For this reason, the termination of the one‐child policy is unlikely to lead to a major upturn in fertility, but rather to the continuation of a low‐fertility regime with more diverse fertility patterns across different sub‐populations, a pattern that has been observed in many countries.     

Case study: fertility decline in Iran

Iran has experienced one of the most successful family planning programs in the developing world, with 64 percent decline in total fertility rate (TFR) between 1986 and 2000. This paper focuses on Iranians’ unique experience with implementation of a national family planning program. Recognition of sensitive moral and ethical aspects of population issues resulted in successful collaboration of technical experts and religious leaders. Involvement of local health workers, women health volunteers and rural midwives led to great community participation. Demographic and Health Survey (DHS) data in 2000 indicated a TFR of 2.0 births per women and 74 percent contraceptive use among married women. This case study will help policy makers and researchers in Moslem countries and other developing countries with high fertility rate to consider a successful family program as a realistic concept with positive impacts on nation’s health and human development.     

Fertility transition in Arab countries: A re-evaluation

During the two decades extending from the late 1970s, average TFR in Arab countries declined by more than two births per woman. The paper examines changes in the proximate determinants of Arab fertility and evaluates some of the underlying factors that are variously held to have influenced the fertility transition. The proximate and underlying determinants of fertility in Arab countries are compared with those of other regions. Among the factors examined are economic hardship, delayed marriage, and female education and labour force participation. The roles of oil revenues and of the Islamic religion are also considered. An interesting feature is that fertility declined despite continued desires for large families.     

The TFR and birth control]

Total fertility rate if (TFR) is a simple an straight forward measure of women's fertility. However, it is difficult to use the TFR as a target measure in FP programs. If TFR level is set as a target for a particular year, how can women's fertility be regulated to achieve this target? The following analysis suggests a simple model to control the proportion of birth parity. First, the TFR is decomposed into a parity- specific TFR. The parity-specific TFR can be worked out using coefficients of the regression models calculated from data of previous fertility surveys. Once the TFR is given, the parity-specific total fertility can be calculated using a model with coefficients from empirical data. Then the number of births of each parity may be calculated from the parity-specific TFR using the female age structure in a particular year, the survival probability, and the standard fertility model for each parity. When the number of surviving children of each women at child-bearing age is known, the desired proportion of births of each parity can be calculated using the standard birth probability during a years. From these models, it would be possible to calculate how many women can have their first child/year, and how many can have the second. Thus, family planning organizations would be in a position to formulate a birth quota on the basis of the above information.     

中国的生育率:到底下降了多少?

1990年代以来 ,中国的生育水平持续下降 ,已经进入低生育国家的行列。 2 0 0 0年人口普查 ,中国的总和生育率为 1 2 2 ,明显存在漏报。那么中国的生育率到底下降了多少 ?本文利用亲生子女法、生育史重构法和胎次递进比方法分析了 1 990年代生育率的下降过程 ,认为 2 0 0 0年总和生育率最准确的估计应为 1 5 8。通过分解总和生育率的变化 ,认为 1 990年代生育水平的下降 ,2 /5归因于结婚年龄的推迟 ,3/5归因于婚内生育率的下降     

Probabilistic Projections of the Total Fertility Rate for All Countries

We describe a Bayesian projection model to produce country-specific projections of the total fertility rate (TFR) for all countries. The model decomposes the evolution of TFR into three phases: pre-transition high fertility, the fertility transition, and post-transition low fertility. The model for the fertility decline builds on the United Nations Population Division’s current deterministic projection methodology, which assumes that fertility will eventually fall below replacement level. It models the decline in TFR as the sum of two logistic functions that depend on the current TFR level, and a random term. A Bayesian hierarchical model is used to project future TFR based on both the country’s TFR history and the pattern of all countries. It is estimated from United Nations estimates of past TFR in all countries using a Markov chain Monte Carlo algorithm. The post-transition low fertility phase is modeled using an autoregressive model, in which long-term TFR projections converge toward and oscillate around replacement level. The method is evaluated using out-of-sample projections for the period since 1980 and the period since 1995, and is found to be well calibrated.     

用孩次递进比模拟“全面二孩”政策调整初期的生育行为--以湖北省为例

以2014年湖北省卫生和计划生育委员会提供的包括“单独”、“双独”方面的数据为基础,描述了生育政策调整下被压抑的生育潜能释放的规律性和用孩次递进比的方法预测“全面二孩”政策调整初期的生育行为,与意愿分析方法相互比照,丰富了当下生育政策下生育行为预测研究。从分析结果可以看出,假定2016年“全面二孩”生育政策调整,湖北省第一年内会新增二孩出生量52621人,占湖北省2014年总出生量的7?41％;三年内最低会新增139262人的二孩生育量。城乡对比发现,农村新增二孩生育占到将近六成,且由抢生而导致的堆积主要集中在农村,40岁后的高龄抢生情况不严重。     

An Individual Relative Deprivation Index and Its Curve Considering Income Scope

China is characterized by a low fertility intention, a strong preference for sons, as well as a stringent birth control policy. In this study, we used data from a Fertility Intention and Behavior Survey of 2101 questionnaires conducted in 2013 in Shaanxi Province of northwestern China, and event history analysis methods to examine the effect of fertility intention and preference for sons on the probability of having a second child. The results not only validate the correlation of fertility intention with having a second child empirically, even in the low fertility intention and stringent birth control context of China, but also show that women with a preference for sons were less likely to have a second child. Women with son preference turn to sex-selective abortion to ensure that their first child is a son, thus reducing the likelihood of a second child and decreasing the fertility rate. Our findings also shed light on China’s potential fertility policy adjustment.     

低生育水平下我国生育率转变影响机制的地区差异——来自90年代省级面板数据的经验研究

本文利用我国1990—2000年各地区总和生育率、社会经济发展水平和计划生育执行力度的面板数据,分别对东部特大城市、东部地区、中部地区和西部地区进行了实证分析。发现：计划生育政策对各地区生育率的降低都起到了重要的作用;同时,东部地区（包括特大城市）较高的经济、社会发展水平显著的降低了总和生育率,而经济较为落后的中、西部地区,这种作用不明显。     

China's population policy: A model of a constant stream of births

The current population policy of China, which emphasizes one child per family, is facing considerable challenge brought about by socioeconomic reforms. The principal challenge is greater individual freedom created by the reforms. The present article examines this conflict.Based on cohort-period fertility analysis, the author proposes a policy of a constand stream of births which ensures a moderate growth rate and a smooth age structure while enabling each couple to have at least two children. Simulation suggests that, in order to achieve the two goals of limiting population size (to about 1.2 billion in 2000 and 1.4 billion in the 2050s) and allowing more individual fertility choice (2.2 children per family), the annual stream of births should be around 20 million and the mean age of childbearing has to increase from 26 to 30 over the next 10–15 years.The author concludes that, if the policy proposed here succeeds, some social and economic problems associated with the conflict between the reforms initiated by the government and its one-child policy will be mitigated.Paper presented at the 1989 meeting of the Population Association of America.     

The Effect of Urbanization on China’s Fertility

The relationship between urbanization and fertility decline is known to be inverse in developed countries. However, the nature of this relationship in developing countries that already have relatively low fertilities is not well-understood. This study aims to illustrate how much urbanization contributed to China’s fertility decline between 1982 and 2008 and forecasts how much it can contribute to future reductions in fertility. The study examines changes in the total fertility rate (TFR) at both the national and provincial levels, given regional differences in the urbanization rate. The results show that changes in rural fertility behavior accounted for most of the decline in the national TFR between 1982 and 2008. This finding suggests that official birth control policies were instrumental in curbing China’s population growth. However, urbanization was responsible for about 22% of the decrease in TFR during this period, and its effect was especially important during the latter years (2001–2008). In most provinces, urbanization associated with a decline in provincial-level fertility. The forecasts indicate that urbanization will become the primary factor behind future declines in national fertility. Given the negative effect of urbanization on the TFR, it is possible to relax the one-child policy without having adverse implications for population growth.     

中国的生育水平——基于模拟的验证

中国的实际生育水平一直存在争议,2010年的普查数据为我们提供了考察生育水平的新证据。本文根据2000年人口普查资料,使用人口模拟模型,选取不同的生育水平方案,来模拟2001—2010年历年的出生人口数量和2010年的人口总量,以判断2000—2010年生育水平。结果表明,现行的总和生育率在1.7以下,1.6左右,2010年在1.6以下,但降到1.5以下的可能性也非常大。为了避免低生育的更进一步的严重后果,中国应该适时地完善生育政策。     

论计划生育政策的完善与调整——基于公共政策视角

我国妇女生育率已经稳定在更替水平之下20多年且将持续运行。文章从公共政策视角出发探究在低生育水平下未来生育政策和计划生育工作的取向,研究结果认为计划生育政策和计划生育工作的积极效用是值得肯定的。但是,在新的人口形势下必须对其进行改革。从公共政策效用来看,现有严格的计划生育政策对于其他公共政策需求压力增大,带来一系列较高的执行成本,需要适时对其进行调整和完善,把握好公共政策的整体性和预见性,使计划生育工作和政策可以发挥积极的引导和激励作用,促进和实现人口的长期均衡发展。     

Studying the fertility peak in Beijing]

Beijing, China, is experiencing a baby boom in response to 2 periods of large population increase in the mid-1950s and early 1960s. The average number of annual births was 220,000 in the first period and 269,000 in the second period. The causes of the large increase in the population in the first period were an improvement of health conditions which led to a reduction in mortality, immigration flow, and an erroneous population policy. The causes in the second period were recuperative fertility after three years of natural calamity and increased fertility among immigrants. Net migration had an important role in population growth these two periods; it also will have an important impact in future population changes. According to population projections, another baby boom is expected to occur before the end of the end of the century. During the up-coming baby boom period, 1.54 million births are expected, 190,000 per annum. The average increase in population size is expected to 127,000 per year. In the peak year, it may be around 200,000. Thanks to the family planning (FP) program the occurrence of the third baby boom in Beijing has been postponed and the duration will be shortened. From 1972 to 1982, 2.57 million births was averted due to FP, which drastically reduced pressure on the demand for resources and on the momentum of the next baby boom. Another baby booms is not expected during the early half of the 21st century, although an elevated birth rate within the range of normal fluctuation is predicted. The projection was based on the assumption of restricted migration and the enforcement of the FP program. The realization of the projected population will depend on deferred marriage, deferred child-bearing, prolonged birth spacing, the prevention of high parity fertility, the maintenance of the current population policy, and control over the reproductive behavior of the new migrant population.