Identification of domain restrictions over which acyclic, continuous-valued, and positive responsive social choice rules operate

We consider a social choice problem in various economic environments consisting of n individuals, 4≤n<+∞, each of which is supposed to have classical preferences. A social choice rule is a function associating with each profile of individual preferences a social preference that is assumed to be complete, continuous and acyclic over the alternatives set. The class of social choice rules we deal with is supposed to satisfy the two conditions; binary independence and positive responsiveness. A new domain restriction for the social choice rules is proposed and called the classical domain that is weaker than the free triple domain and holds for almost all economic environments such as economies with private and/or public goods. In this paper we explore what type of classical domain that admits at least one social choice rule satisfying the mentioned conditions to well operate over the domain. The results we obtained are very negative: For any classical domain admitting at least one social choice rule to well operate, the domain consists only of just one profile.     

Pairwise Strategy-Proofness and Self-Enforcing Manipulation

“Strategy-proofness” is one of the axioms that are most frequently used in the recent literature on social choice theory. It requires that by misrepresenting his preferences, no agent can manipulate the outcome of the social choice rule in his favor. The stronger requirement of “group strategy-proofness” is also often employed to obtain clear characterization results of social choice rules. Group strategy-proofness requires that no group of agents can manipulate the outcome in their favors. In this paper, we advocate “effective pairwise strategy-proofness.” It is the requirement that the social choice rule should be immune to unilateral manipulation and “self-enforcing” pairwise manipulation in the sense that no agent of a pair has the incentive to betray his partner. We apply the axiom of effective pairwise strategy-proofness to three types of economies: public good economy, pure exchange economy, and allotment economy. Although effective pairwise strategy-proofness is seemingly a much weaker axiom than group strategy-proofness, effective pairwise strategy-proofness characterizes social choice rules that are analyzed by using different axioms in the literature.     

Bayesian implementation in exchange economies with state dependent feasible sets and private information

This paper considers the problem of implementation for exchange economies with state dependent feasible sets. Agents are assumed to have private information about their endowments. We provide necessary and sufficient conditions for social choice rules that are Bayesian implementable by feasible mechanisms for such an environment. We compare our main result to the Nash implementation result derived in an environment of complete information.     

Topological aggregation of preferences: the case of a continuum of agents

 This paper studies the topological approach to social choice theory initiated by G. Chichilnisky (1980), extending it to the case of a continuum of agents. The social choice rules are continuous anonymous maps defined on preference spaces which respect unanimity. We establish that a social choice rule exists for a continuum of agents if and only if the space of preferences is contractible. We provide also a topological characterization of such rules as generalized means or mathematical expectations of individual preferences. Received: 30 November 1994/Accepted: 22 April 1996     

The relation between monotonicity and strategy-proofness

The Muller–Satterthwaite Theorem (J Econ Theory 14:412–418, 1977) establishes the equivalence between Maskin monotonicity and strategy-proofness, two cornerstone conditions for the decentralization of social choice rules. We consider a general model that covers public goods economies as in Muller–Satterthwaite (J Econ Theory 14:412–418, 1977) as well as private goods economies. For private goods economies, we use a weaker condition than Maskin monotonicity that we call unilateral monotonicity. We introduce two easy-to-check preference domain conditions which separately guarantee that (i) unilateral/Maskin monotonicity implies strategy-proofness (Theorem 1) and (ii) strategy-proofness implies unilateral/Maskin monotonicity (Theorem 2). We introduce and discuss various classical single-peaked preference domains and show which of the domain conditions they satisfy (see Propositions 1 and 2 and an overview in Table 1). As a by-product of our analysis, we obtain some extensions of the Muller–Satterthwaite Theorem as summarized in Theorem 3. We also discuss some new “Muller–Satterthwaite preference domains” (e.g., Proposition 3).     

Reference functions and possibility theorems for cardinal social choice problems

 In this paper, we provide axiomatic foundations for social choice rules on a domain of convex and comprehensive social choice problems when agents have cardinal utility functions. We translate the axioms of three well known approaches in bargaining theory (Nash 1950; Kalai and Smorodinsky 1975; Kalai 1977) to the domain of social choice problems and provide an impossibility result for each. We then introduce the concept of a reference function which, for each social choice set, selects a point from which relative gains are measured. By restricting the invariance and comparison axioms so that they only apply to sets with the same reference point, we obtain characterizations of social choice rules that are natural analogues of the bargaining theory solutions. Received: 8 August 1994/Accepted: 12 February 1996     

A robust theory of resource allocation

The theory of social choice introduced in [5, 6] is robust: it is completely independent of the choice of topology on spaces of preferences. This theory has been fruitful in linking diverse forms of resource allocation: it has been shown [17] that contractibility is necessary and sufficient for solving the social choice paradox; this condition is equivalent [11] to another — limited arbitrage — which is necessary and sufficient for the existence of a competitive equilibrium and the core of an economy [13, 14, 15, 16, 17]. The space of monotone preferences is contractible; as shown already in [6, 17] such spaces admit social choice rules. However, monotone preferences are of little interest in social choice theory because the essence of the social choice problem, such as Condorcet triples, rules out monotonicity.The author is Director, Program on Information and Resources, and Professor of Economics, Columbia University. 1994-5 Salinbemi Professor, University of Siena, Italy. Research support from NSF grants Nos. 92 16928 and from the Leif Johansen Award at the University of Oslo, Norway, are gratefully acknowledged.     

Welfare-domination under preference-replacement: A survey and open questions

The objective of this paper is to describe various applications of a requirement of solidarity pertaining to situations in which the preferences of some of the agents may change. It says that the welfares of all agents whose preferences are fixed should be affected in the same direction: they should all weakly gain, or they should all weakly lose. We show how this condition, which we name “welfare-domination under preference-replacement”, can help in evaluating allocation rules. We discuss it in several contexts: private good allocation in classical economies, public good decision, binary choice with quasi-linear preferences, economies with indivisible goods, economies with single-peaked preferences, both in the private good case and in the public good case, and economies with time. For some of these models the implications of the property are well understood. For others, we state a number of open problems. Received: 2 January 1997/Accepted: 26 February 1998     

Market arbitrage, social choice and the core

 This paper establishes a clear connection between equilibrium theory, game theory and social choice theory by showing that, for a well defined social choice problem, a condition which is necessary and sufficient to solve this problem – limited arbitrage – is the same as the condition which is necessary and sufficient to establish the existence of an equilibrium and the core. The connection is strengthened by establishing that a market allocation, which is in the core, can always be realized as a social allocation, i.e. an allocation which is optimal according to an ordering chosen by a social choice rule. Limited arbitrage characterizes those economies without Condorcet triples, and those for which Arrow’s paradox can be resolved on choices of large utility values. Received: 30 December 1994/Accepted: 12 August 1996     

Manipulating an aggregation rule under ordinally fuzzy preferences

It is well known that many aggregation rules are manipulable through strategic behaviour. Typically, the aggregation rules considered in the literature are social choice correspondences. In this paper the aggregation rules of interest are social welfare functions (SWFs). We investigate the problem of constructing a SWF that is non-manipulable. In this context, individuals attempt to manipulate a social ordering as opposed to a social choice. Using techniques from an ordinal version of fuzzy set theory, we introduce a class of ordinally fuzzy binary relations of which exact binary relations are a special case. Operating within this family enables us to prove an impossibility theorem. This theorem states that all non-manipulable SWFs are dictatorial, provided that they are not constant. This theorem uses a weaker transitivity condition than the one in Perote-Peña and Piggins (J Math Econ 43:564–580, 2007), and the ordinal framework we employ is more general than the cardinal setting used there. We conclude by considering several ways of circumventing this impossibility theorem.     

Self-selective social choice functions

It is not uncommon that a society facing a choice problem has also to choose the choice rule itself. In such situations, when information about voters’ preferences is complete, the voters’ preferences on alternatives induce voters’ preferences over the set of available voting rules. Such a setting immediately gives rise to a natural question concerning consistency between these two levels of choice. If a choice rule employed to resolve the society’s original choice problem does not choose itself, when it is also used for choosing the choice rule, then this phenomenon can be regarded as inconsistency of this choice rule as it rejects itself according to its own rationale. Koray (Econometrica 68: 981–995, 2000) proved that the only neutral, unanimous universally self-selective social choice functions are the dictatorial ones. Here we introduce to our society a constitution, which rules out inefficient social choice rules. When inefficient social choice rules become unavailable for comparison, the property of self-selectivity becomes more interesting and we show that some non-trivial self-selective social choice functions do exist. Under certain assumptions on the constitution we describe all of them.     

Nash implementation via hyperfunctions

Hyperfunctions are social choice rules which assign sets of alternatives to preference profiles over sets. Therefore, they are more general objects compared to standard (social choice) correspondences. In fact, every correspondence can be expressed in terms of an equivalent hyperfunction. We give a partial characterization of Nash-implementable hyperfunctions and explore the conditions under which correspondences have Nash-implementable equivalent hyperfunctions. While the strength of these conditions depends on the axioms used to extend preferences over alternatives to sets, they are at most as strong as the conjunction of Maskin monotonicity with the no veto power condition. Thus, our approach expands the set of Nash-implementable social choice rules. In fact, social choice rules such as the majority rule and the top cycle are Nash-implementable through their equivalent hyperfunctions, while they are not Maskin-monotonic, and thus, not Nash-implementable in the standard framework.

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Animal experiments in economic psychology

Psychologists working in the operant (Skinnerist) tradition are currently pursuing a rapprochement with economies. This trend arises from the preoccupation of operant psychology with problems like choice, and it involves the study of clinical populations in token economies and also of animal behaviour in laboratory settings. Problems with using animals include those of extrapolating across species, of the absence of a medium of exchange or rational forethought in animal social interaction, and the risk of producing too simple and formal an analysis. But there are compensating advantages, such as investigating fields where experimentation in. the real economy is impossible, securing continuity with disciplines like ecology, and investigating possible mechanisms for “rational” behaviour. Data collected so far do demonstrate continuities between animal and human economic behaviour.     

Implementation in perfect equilibria

This paper considers implementation when the feasible outcomes are lotteries over a finite set of alternatives. The following weak condition is sufficient for implementation in trembling hand perfect equilibria (with three or more players): if all but one player agree on which alternative is the best, this alternative is (among those that are) chosen by the social choice rule, and if all but one player agree on which alternative is the worst, this alternative is not chosen. Many interesting social choice rules that are not Nash implementable satisfy this condition. On the other hand, there are social choice rules that are implementable in Nash equilibria but not in perfect equilibria.I am grateful to Luis Corchón, Eric Maskin, William Thomson, seminar participants at Harvard and Rochester, and two anonymous referees for helpful comments and suggestions. This research was supported by grants from the Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences and the Bank of Sweden Tercentenary Foundation.     

Homotopy properties of Pareto aggregation rules

 We establish that the Pareto property is inconsistent with non-dictatorship for social choice rules defined on two-dimensional choice spaces. In addition, we consider applications of this result in higher dimensions. We also establish the existence of Pareto rules with infinite populations, and show that in this case there is a strong manipulator. Received: 30 December 1994/Accepted: 22 April 1996     

A general concept of scoring rules: general definitions,statistical inference,and empirical illustrations

We develop the general conceptual, mathematical and statistical foundations of behavioral social choice for scoring rules. Traditional scoring rules are difficult to assess empirically because one rarely observes the deterministic complete linear orders that they require as input. We provide a general concept of scoring rules in terms of a broad range of mathematical representations of preference or utility, namely arbitrary finite binary relations, probability distributions over such relations, real valued multi-criteria utility vectors and real valued random utility representations. We extend Regenwetter et al.’s (Behavioral social choice. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2006) statistical framework to a more general setting. We illustrate the general modeling and statistical tools by applying them to four well known sets of survey data. We illustrate two potential problems that have previously received little attention and that deserve systematic study in the future: (1) Scoring rule outcomes can suffer from model dependence in that the social welfare functions computed from ballot, survey, or hypothetical data may depend on implicit or explicit modeling assumptions. (2) Scoring rule outcomes may suffer from low statistical confidence in that the correct assessment of social orders from empirical data can be far from certain. We also illustrate the empirical congruence among conceptually competing social choice methods.     

Characterization of self-selective social choice functions on the tops-only domain

Self-selectivity is a new kind of consistency pertaining to social choice rules. It deals with the problem of whether a social choice rule selects itself from among other rival such rules when a society is also to choose the choice rule that it will employ in making its choice from a given set of alternatives. Koray [3] shows that a neutral and unanimous social choice function is universally self-selective if and only if it is dictatorial. In this paper, we confine the available social choice functions to the tops-only domain and examine whether such restriction allow us to escape the dictatoriality result. A neutral, unanimous, and tops-only social choice function, however, turns out to be self-selective relative to the tops-only domain if and only if it is top-monotonic, and thus again dictatorial. Received: 8 October 2001/Accepted: 4 June 2002     

Distribution of coalitional power in randomized multi-valued social choice

This paper considers the distribution of coalitional influence under probabilistic social choice functions which are randomized social choice rules that allow social indifference by mapping each combination of a preference profile and a feasible set to a social choice lottery over all possible choice sets from the feasible set. When there are at least four alternatives in the universal set and ex-post Pareto optimality, independence of irrelevant alternatives and regularity are imposed, we show that: (i) there is a system of additive coalitional weights such that the weight of each coalition is its power to be decisive in every two-alternative feasble set; and (ii) for each combination of a feasible proper subset of the universal set and a preference profile, the society can be partioned in such a way that for each coalition in this partition, the probability of society's choice set being contained in the union of the best sets of its members is equal to the coalition's power or weight. It is further shown that, for feasible proper subsets of the universal set, the probability of society's choice set containing a pair of alternatives that are not jointly present in anyone's best set is zero. Our results remain valid even when the universal set itself becomes feasible provided some additional conditions hold. Received: 10 May 1999/Accepted: 18 June 2000 I would like to thank Professor Prasanta Pattanaik for suggesting to me the line of investigation carried out in this paper. I am solely responsible for any remaining errors and omissions.     

Collective choice rules and collective rationality: a unified method of characterizations

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the relationship between collective rationality and permissible collective choice rules using a unified approach inspired by Bossert and Suzumura (J Econ Theory 138:311–320, 2008). We consider collective choice rules satisfying four axioms: unrestricted domain, strong Pareto, anonymity, and neutrality. A number of new classes of collective choice rules as well as the Pareto and Pareto extension rules are characterized under various concepts of collective rationality: acyclicity, transitivity, quasi-transitivity, semi-transitivity, and the interval order property. Further, new concepts of collective rationality, K-term acyclicity and K-term consistency, are proposed and the corresponding characterizations are provided.     

Universally beneficial manipulation: a characterization

There exist social choice rules for which every manipulation benefits everyone. This paper constructs a large variety of rules with this property and provides two characterizations of such rules.