Biases in Ethical Decision Making among University Faculty

Over the years, cognitive biases have been examined throughout the decision-making literature, but little work has investigated the cognitive biases operating in ethical decision making. The present effort explores a taxonomy of biases through interviews with university faculty members. Additionally, this study identifies the psychological processes giving rise to these biases in ethical decision making. Results suggest that the biases listed in the taxonomy are indeed operating in the ethical decision making of university faculty. Implications of these results are discussed.     

A general theorem and eight corollaries in search of correct decision

The main theorem established in this study and its corollaries summarize and generalize the existing results on optimal aggregation of experts judgments under uncertain pairwise choice situations. In particular, we explicate the link between the optimal decision procedure and the decision maker's preferences and biases and the judgmental competences of his consultants. The general theorem directly clarifies under what circumstances the optimal decision rule should be the democratic simple majority rule, the elitist expert rule, an intermediate weighted simple majority rule or a biased weighted or simple qualified majority rule.     

Some criteria for making decisions concerning the distribution of scarce medical resources

In this paper I proceed on the assumption that moral philosophers can and should contribute to the resolution of perplexing moral problems. The ones considered here relate to decisions concerning the distribution of scarce medical resources as between those in need of treatment. I draw on considerations of egalitarianism and concern for the maximization of the use of scarce resources in the task of satisfying basic human needs (such as for good health). I propose certain principles and offer some supporting suggestions as guidelines or rules for medical decisions with a view to providing a helpful decision procedure for the various persons (doctors, community panels and so on) whose task it is to make the life-or-death decisions involved in allocating certain scarce medical resources.     

Ethical challenges to the integrity of physicians: financial conflicts of interest in clinical research

Financial conflicts of interest arise when physician's judgment and decision making become compromised by financial gains or interests, and thus create risk of undo harm to research participants, to the integrity of research projects, and, ultimately to society at large. Such conflicts also violate the moral maxims of medicine, and thus damage the integrity of physicians and the medical profession. I submit that key remedies for this problem are the integrity (self-respect) of physicians and the respectful engagement of research participants (whether patients or nonpatient volunteers) as partners in research projects. Accordingly, I consider physicians the primary moral agents, research participants the secondary moral agents, and society the tertiary moral agent with responsibilities for protection against whatever undue harm in clinical research. The latter needs to address the powerful, cultural, commercial, political, and social factors that contribute to physicians' financial conflicts of interest.     

Ethical Challenges to the Integrity of Physicans: Financial Conflicts of Interest in Clinical Research

Financial conflicts of interest arise when physicians' judgment and decision making become compromised by financial gains or interests, and thus create risk of undo harm to research participants, to the integrity of research projects, and, ultimately, to society at large. Such conflicts also violate the moral maxims of medicine, and thus damage the integrity of physicians and the medical profession. I submit that key remedies for this problem are the integrity (self-respect) of physicians and the respectful engagement of research participants (whether patients or nonpatient volunteers) as partners in research projects. Accordingly, I consider physicians the primary moral agents, research participants the secondary moral agents, and society the tertiary moral agent with responsibilities for protection against whatever undue harm in clinical research. The latter needs to address the powerful cultural, commercial, political, and social factors that contribute to physicians' financial conflicts of interest.     

Minimax,information and ultrapessimism

Discussing the foundations of the minimax principle, Savage (1954) argued that it is utterly untenable for statistics because it is ultrapessimistic when applied to negative income, but claimed that such objection is not relevant when the principle is applied to regret. In this paper I rebut the latter claim. I first present an example where ultrapessimism, as Savage understood it, applies to minimax regret but not to minimax negative income. Then, for a sequential decision problems with two terminal acts and a finite number of states of nature, I give necessary and sufficient conditions for a decision rule to be ultrapessimistic, and show that for every payoff table with at least three states, be it in regret form or not, there exist an experiment such that the minimax rule is ultrapessimistic. I conclude with some more general remarks on information and the value of experimentation for a minimax agent.     

The mutual determination of wants and benefits

The degree to which I want something often affects the amount of pleasure or other benefit it will bring me if I get it. This, in turn, should affect the degree to which I want it. In theJournal of Philosophy,89 (1992) 10–29, Anna Kusser and Wolfgang Spohn argue that decision theory cannot cope with this mutual determination of wants and benefits. This paper argues, to the contrary, that decision theory can cope with it easily.     

Politics and bias in risk assessment

Whereas formal risk assessments can rationalize decision making in organizations, political and other biases remain. This article examines the origins of risk analysis in conflicts of political interest. The history of probabilistic risk analysis in the nuclear industry illustrates the problem. This involves the nexus between experts and political judgment (focusing on expert behavior in the wake of Chernobyl), and the connection between risk analysis and ideology in decision making (focusing on the issue of deliberate deception in risk assessment).     

The Gambler’s Fallacy and the Hot Hand: Empirical Data from Casinos

Research on decision making under uncertainty demonstrates that intuitive ideas of randomness depart systematically from the laws of chance. Two such departures involving random sequences of events have been documented in the laboratory, the gambler’s fallacy and the hot hand. This study presents results from the field, using videotapes of patrons gambling in a casino, to examine the existence and extent of these biases in naturalistic settings. We find small but significant biases in our population, consistent with those observed in the lab.JEL Classification: C9 Experimental, C93 Field Experiments, D81 Decision Making under Risk and Uncertainty     

Double or nothing?! Small groups making decisions under risk in “Quiz Taxi”

This paper investigates the behavior of contestants in the game show “Quiz Taxi” when faced with the decision whether to bet the winnings they have acquired on a final “double or nothing” question. The decision in this natural experiment is made by groups of two or three persons. This setup enables the decision-making process to be studied with regard to group and communication characteristics. The contestants show fairly risk averse behavior. There is also a significant heterogeneity in attitude to risk. In particular, all-female groups are much less likely to go for the risky option. Furthermore, decision-making behavior appears to vary across differently composed groups and prior performance. The study also documents the importance of discussions: The propensity to gamble increases with discussion length, and the correlation between communication content and the final choice is strong, indicating that time and subjective context are important features of decisions made under risk.     

A genetically informed examination of the relations between inaccurate emotion expression and recognition and experiencing peer victimization

This study examines children's abilities to accurately portray emotions (emotion expression; EE) and to read others' emotions (emotion recognition; ER) as possible genetically influenced behaviors that may increase vulnerability to victimization. In this study of 127 6–10‐year‐old multiples, children were assessed for EE accuracy by being photographed when told to display different emotions; photographs were subsequently rated for emotion accuracy. Children also were assessed for ER accuracy on a computer task by rating the emotions of displayed children's faces. Genetic likelihood scores for angry and fearful EE and ER errors were calculated. Children also completed a victimization questionnaire. Results showed that children who were poor at making angry faces (EE angry misses) were less likely to be victimized, and children who were more likely to rate faces as fearful (ER fearful biases) were more likely to be victimized. ER fearful biases were related to victimization through a shared genetic link. Finally, demonstrating gene–environment correlation, girls with a genetic likelihood for not looking fearful when they were intending to (EE fearful misses) were significantly less likely to be victimized by peers. These results show that emotion skills surrounding expressing and recognizing anger and fear are associated with peer victimization risk.     

Nontransitive preferences in decision theory

Intransitive preferences have been a topic of curiosity, study, and debate over the past 40 years. Many economists and decision theorists insist on transitivity as the cornerstone of rational choice, and even in behavioral decision theory intransitivities are often attributed to faulty experiments, random or sloppy choices, poor judgment, or unexamined biases. But others see intransitive preferences as potential truths of reasoned comparisons and propose representations of preferences that accommodate intransitivities. This article offers a partial survey of models for intransitive preferences in a variety of decisional contexts. These include economic consumer theory, multiattribute utility theory, game theory, preference between time streams, and decision making under risk and uncertainty. The survey is preceded by a discussion of issues that bear on the relevance and reasonableness of intransitivity.     

Adjusting for Group Size Effects in Peer Nomination Data

Adjusting nomination‐based sociometric and peer assessment scores for biases due to variations in group size has been a long‐standing concern for peer relations researchers. The techniques that have been typically used to make these adjustments (e.g., proportion and standardized scores) are known to have fundamental problems that limit their utility. This study introduces a regression‐based procedure that adjusts nomination‐based scores for variations in group size and compares it with the standardization and proportion procedures. Analyses were conducted on sociometric and peer assessment scores of 1594 fourth, fifth, and sixth graders from 63 classrooms. The advantages of the regression‐based procedure over standardization and proportion transformations are outlined. Implications for the accuracy and validity of nomination‐based measures and the research findings based on them are discussed.     

The St. Petersburg gamble and risk

Pursuing a line of thought initiated by Maurice Allais (1979), I consider whether the mean-risk method of decision making introduced by Harry Markowitz (1959) and other resolves Karl Menger's (1934) version of the St. Petersburg paradox. I provide a conditional answer to this question. I demonstrate that given certain plausible assumption about attitudes toward risk, a certain plausible development of the mean-risk method does resolve the paradox. My chief premiss is roughly that in the St. Petersburg gamble the small chances for large prizes create big risks.     

Mean-risk decision analysis

Some decision theorists criticize expected utility decision analysis and propose mean-risk decision analysis as a replacement. They claim that expected utility decision analysis neglects attitudes toward risk whereas mean-risk decision analysis accords these attitudes their proper status. However mean-risk decision analysis and expected utility decision analysis are not incompatible, and it is advantageous for decision theory to develop each in a way that complements the other. Here I present a mean-risk rule that governs preferences among options and options given states. This mean-risk rule complements an expected utility rule that takes the utility of an option-state pair as the utility of the option given the state. I argue for the mean-risk rule using principles concerning basic intrinsic desires. The rule is comparative, but the last section offers some suggestions for its quantitative development.I am grateful for comments from my colleague, Henry E. Kyburg, Jr.     

How do people value extended warranties? Evidence from two field surveys

Extended warranties are popular but expensive. This paper examines how consumers value these warranties, and asks whether economic considerations alone can account for their popularity. Results from two field surveys show that consumers greatly overestimate both the likelihood and the cost of product breakdown. However, these biases alone do not explain their willingness to buy warranties. In fact, we find evidence of probability neglect, in which warranty purchase decision depends on the magnitude of the possible consequences of not having insurance and not on the probability of having to suffer these consequences. The expected emotional benefits from having a warranty was the best predictor of purchase decision and willingness to pay. We also found that people with higher cognitive skills are less likely to overestimate the economic determinants of warranty value, yet are still highly influenced by emotional considerations when deciding whether to purchase a warranty.     

The binary search decomposition in a decentralized organization

An analytic model of the resource allocation decision process in a decentralized organization is presented. The model follows the philosophy of Kornai and Liptak in its decomposition procedure but employs the binary search technique in its resource allocation process. Briefly, the model provides two important concepts relevant to the decision making process of a decentralized organization: (1) satisficing technique of coordination and (2) simulation of a resource allocation decision process.