The influence of interviewer characteristics on support for democracy and political engagement in Sub-Saharan Africa*

This study investigates how an interviewer’s characteristics affect how respondents answer survey questions about democracy and political engagement. I analyze data from the 2008 Afrobarometer surveys, in which 810 interviewers surveyed 27,713 respondents across 20 countries in sub-Saharan Africa. Using these data, I study how interviewer education, age, and gender affect two outcomes: (1) response distributions to attitudinal and behavioral survey questions and (2) the likelihood of respondents saying ‘don’t know’ to a survey question. The analysis also investigates how the respondent’s perception of who sponsored the survey (NGO, private sector, government) affects attitudes. The results show that these interviewer characteristics affect the quality of survey data on political attitudes and behaviors. In the discussion, I consider the implications for research based on public opinion data about democracy and political engagement.     

World population trends in 1960-70

The rapid rise in world population for the 4 periods 1950-1955, 1955 -1960, 1960-1965, and 1965-1970 is mainly due to a decline in the crude death rate from 24/1000 in 1950-1955 to 16.1/1000 in 1965-1970. 1950 was a turning-point in mortality rates because for the first time public health measures became widely available in less developed regions. These less developed regions contained 63.4% of the world population in 1930, 65.5% in 1950, and 70.0% in 1970. World population increased by 22% in 1960-1970, compared to 20% in 1950-1960, which was twice as much as the 20% registered for the 20 years 1930-1950. Developed regions contributed a 14% increase between 1950-1960 and 12% between 1960-1970; in less developed regions the increases were 23% and 27% respectively. Demographic conferences have begun to neglect mortality, but this is still a vital part of total population growth. Evidence is that the mortality decline in less developed countries is beginning to level off so that previous population projections may not be reached. What decline has been seen in crude birth rates in less developed countries is largely attributable to declines in East Asia, notably in the People's Republic of China, Republic of Korea, and other Chinese or Chinese culture-related populations, as well as some of the smaller Latin American countries and some small islands off Africa. Such demographic giants as India, Indonesia, Pakistan, and sub-Saharan Africa have shown little change. In areas with high fertility there are more mothers under age 20 and more births to women over age 35 while in low-fertility areas births are concentrated in the 20-35 year groups. An interesting example is Japan which has 50% of its births to mothers 25-29 years of age. Less developed countries have a larger proportion o f the population under age 14 while developed countries which have had lower fertility for a number of years have larger numbers in the older age groups. In less developed areas the greatest burdens are associated with child-rearing while welfare for the aged is the great concern in the more developed areas of the world. The great trend toward urbanization in all parts of the world means that the population problems commanding greatest attention are those associated with large and fast-growing cities.     

World and regional labour force trends and prospects

Changes in fertility during 1970-1985 will not have any effect on the composition of the world work force until 1985 because the people who will be of working age at that time have already been born. However, fertility for this period will directly influence the size of the age group 15-30 in the year 2000. Moreover, fertility trends for this period will have an indirect effect on participation of women in the labor force. The number of people in the labor force has proportionately followed total population. Just as total population is projected to increase in the single decade 1970-1980 by an amount equal to its size in 1750, so the labor force will increase by 360 million during the 1980's (its original size in 1750). By the end of the present century the world labor force may well number some 2,6000 million, reaching 3,000 million by the year 2010; 4,000 million by 2030; 5,000 million by 2070; and stabilizing at about 5,200 million by the end of the 21st century. There will be great regional variations. Increases will range from 20-35% in Europe and the U.S.S.R. to 100-120% in South Asia, Africa, and Latin America. For East Asia and North America the increases may amount to 60% by the year 2000 and 100% by 2050. In 1970 less developed regions had 2/3 the world's labor force; by 2000 they will have 3/4. In 1970 about 20% of the labor force in more developed regions were working in agriculture while in less developed regions 2/3 were so engaged. In other terms, in more developed regions 10 farmers supported 108 persons while in less developed regions 10 farmers supported only 38. According to Food and Agriculture Organization projections, by 2000 only 3.5% of the labor force in developed regions and 43.5% in less developed regions will be in agriculture. Differences in gross national product between regions is striking. In 1970 the less developed regions contained 70% of world population, 67% of the world labor force, 87% of the world agricultural labor, and produced 15% of its wealth. There are also sharp contrasts in participation in the labor force. In less developed countries more youths and older persons are in the labor force while in developed countries more women work. By the year 2000 female activity rates in more developed regions will increase for ages 20-64 and decrease for those under 20 and over 64. This will raise female participation in the labor force to 35%. In less developed regions female participation is expected to decline. The proportion of young workers is expected to increase in less developed and decline in more developed regions; the same will be true for older workers. The dependency burden will be concentrated among the young in less developed nations; in more devel oped regions there will be larger numbers of older dependents.     

Women's Status,Fertility Decline,and Women's Health in Developing Countries: Direct and Indirect Influences of Social Status on Health

Abstract In the present three‐wave study of 72 developing countries, we use growth curves to examine how changes in fertility and level of fertility mediate the effect of women's social status on women's health as measured by infant mortality, maternal mortality, and female life expectancy. We find that level of female education, average age at marriage, and the percentage of married women using contraceptives influence attained level of fertility, with controls for economic growth and dependency status. Change in fertility, however, is predicted only by average age at marriage and by level of education. Change in fertility, in turn, predicts improvement in all three women's health indicators, while the level of fertility predicts improvement in maternal mortality and infant mortality. In addition to the mediating effects of fertility, both age at marriage and education contribute directly to reduced level of infant mortality; level of primary education contributes directly to reduced levels of maternal mortality; and use of contraceptives contributes directly to improvement in female life expectancy. These findings provide strong evidence that women's social status makes direct contributions to women's health which cannot be attributed to economic growth, dependency status, and/or the mediating effects of level and change in fertility. The policy implication for developing countries is that greater gains can be made in women's health, particularly maternal health, by improving women's social status, especially in rural areas.     

Social security in Africa: a brief review

Africa is the poorest region of the world and has the youngest and least developed social security programs. Most Africans are not covered by social security programs. The high prevalence of HIV/AIDS in some sub-Saharan countries and internal armed conflicts in others have created difficult problems in some countries for social security programs. As a result, some countries do not have functioning social security programs. The social security programs that do exist in Africa are influenced by their colonial heritage, with the programs in English-speaking Africa differing from those in French-speaking Africa. Six different patterns of social security provision can be identified.     

Social Security in Africa

Abstract

Africa is the poorest region of the world and has the youngest and least developed social security programs. Most Africans are not covered by social security programs. The high prevalence of HIV/AIDS in some sub-Saharan countries and internal armed conflicts in others have created difficult problems in some countries for social security programs. As a result, some countries do not have functioning social security programs. The social security programs that do exist in Africa are influenced by their colonial heritage, with the programs in English-speaking Africa differing from those in French-speaking Africa. Six different patterns of social security provision can be identified.     

Young people's decision making involvement and educational attainment

Increasing participation in family decision making is an integral part of adolescent development. This paper uses longitudinal data from four low and middle income countries—Ethiopia, India, Peru and Vietnam—to assess the relationship between young people's involvement in schooling decision making and schooling outcomes. In the pooled sample, compared to young adults who indicate to have no say in educational choices at age 19, adolescents who make these decisions unilaterally or jointly with parents are on average 17%–23% more likely to drop out by age 22. The effects are, however, heterogenous across countries.     

Population and poverty in sub-Saharan Africa

The intricate interrelationships between population and development in sub-Saharan Africa are examined and the prospects are considered for converting the abundant human resources into an effective development asset. The demographic trends that characterize the sub-Saharan region at this time differ markedly from what is happening in other parts of the developing world. In Africa, death rates have come down slightly (17/1000 in 1980-85 in contrast to 20/1000 in 1970-75); there has been practically no change in the birthrate. Consequently, population growth rates are on the rise throughout Africa although there are differences within the regions. The various factors responsible for high fertility in African societies and the consequences of the continuing high fertility often are mutually reinforcing. For example, low health and educational standards are likely to lead women to have large numbers of children, but these conditions are themselves the result of the population growth, which requires an expansion of health care and educational facilities that hard-pressed national budgets cannot provide. In Africa, the growth rate of the youth population is increasing even faster than that of the population as a whole -- from 3.1% in 1980-85 to an estimated 3.4% in 1990-95. The most critical problem posed by such growth rates is an increased demand for food. Countries which cannot adequately feed their growing populations are unlikely to be significantly more successful in satisfying their other basic needs. Whether educated or healthy or not, Africa's growing numbers of children represent major economic problems for countries with a low level of economic growth. There is little hope of effectively absorbing all the new entrants who swell the labor market each year, and the indirect consequences for the economy of rapid demographic growth are no less serious. Presently, Africa is the scene of major and particularly distressing movements of population as the drought has forced people to move long distances in search of food relief. It is too soon to tell whether or how much of the lands left behind can be rehabilitated and again become productive. The question arises as to whether appropriate policies, supported by adequate funds and technical know-how, can convert Africa's millions of young people from being a brake on development into a resource for the future. Policies and strategies that may be most appropriate to this end are: to take sufficient cognizance of the interrelationship between population and development and hence to be prepared to take the necessary steps to ensure that the two remain in balance; to realize that family planning programs mean more than a reduction in fertility but also the possibility of reducing infant and maternal mortality and morbidity; to back whatever family planning programs governments introduce; to plan comprehensively; and to effectively carry out the development strategies.     

Demography of ageing

The world's elderly population, 60 years and older, reached 251.6 million by 1950, 488 million by 1990 and, according to United Nations projection estimates, it will reach 1205.3 million in 2025. These figures mean an increase of 144% between 1950 and 1990 and of 146% between 1990 and 2025. Asia accounted for the highest number of elderly persons: 49.2%, in 1990, Europe reported 19%, Africa 6.3%, and Latin America 6.5%. On the other hand, over the next 35 years, the European region figure will decrease to 12%, while other regions will show increased percentages: 58% for Asia and around 8% for Africa and Latin America. Fertility and mortality decreases in developing countries will result in the elderly population constituting 12% of the total population in the year 2025. In this same year, Latin America will have the same high proportion of elderly persons as the world will have in the year 2020. On the other hand, some of the developed regions, such as Northern America and Europe, will reach figures around 27%. Below the average value for these regions in the year 2025 will be the former Soviet Union with 20% and Oceania with 19.2%. Another way to confirm population aging is by computing the median age of a population. Thus, while in 1950 the world median age was 23.4 years, it increased up to 24.2 years in 1990, and is estimated to be 31.1 years by the year 2025. Developed regions show higher population aging than the less developed ones. In fact, in 1990, developed countries had a median age of 33.7 years and developing countries had a median age of 22 years. While the median age will be 40.7 years for developed countries in the year 2025, it will only be 29.7 years for less developed countries. Nevertheless, this relatively high median age indicates that the aging process has already started in less developed countries.     

Orphanhood and School Attendance in Nigeria: Do Gender and Household Income Matter?

Using the 2010 Nigeria Education Data Survey, this research examines the interaction of paternal and maternal/double orphanhood with gender and household income on school attendance; we ascertain whether the relationship varies by age and urban-rural residence. The research employs an economic explanation and the sociocultural construction of the gender division of labor in sub-Saharan Africa as theoretical frameworks. Findings show that the combination of being a maternal/double orphan and being female or living in a poor household leads to the lowest probability of attending school. The results also indicate that female maternal/double orphans who live in rural areas and whose age is eleven or older have the lowest probability of attending school. Both results are statistically significant. The findings support the economic explanation and the theory of sociocultural construction of the gender division of labor. Future policies should focus on subsidizing the costs of schooling for orphans.     

Juvenile court judicial expertise and children's permanency outcomes

Using a combination of survey and administrative data, the current study examines the relationship between juvenile dependency court judicial expertise and children's permanency outcomes. Specifically, based on several behaviorally-anchored questions about judicial expertise and decision-making from a survey of attorneys representing foster children, we examine the respective relationships between jurisdiction-level judicial expertise and the rates of (a) exit to different types of permanency and (b) transition between various dependency court milestones. Results suggest that judicial expertise is positively related to the rates of some dependency court transitions (e.g., entry to dispositional order approval, termination of parental rights to adoption finalization). However, because of a lack of significant associations with the rates of other transitions (e.g., dispositional order approval to reunification), judicial expertise is not found to be statistically significantly associated with the rate of exit to permanency. The findings are consistent with a growing body of evidence that suggests that the influence of juvenile-court-related factors may be limited to specific court milestones that, by themselves, do not account for a substantial proportion of the overall variability in the population-level rates of permanency exit.     

Human foibles or systemic failure—Lay perceptions of the 2008–2009 financial crisis

We examined lay perceptions of the recent financial and economic crisis through 1707 questionnaires, administered via internet, to a varied group of volunteers in a range of countries: France, the US, Russia, Germany, Israel, and sub-Saharan Africa. Respondents graded the contribution of a large number of possible factors to the crisis, and answered several complementary questions. We were able to identify two major conceptions, one seeing the economy as comprised of individuals, with failings of moral or cognitive character, and the other seeing the economy as a complex system, endowed with some resilience, functioning in cycles. Support for the former view was stronger than for the latter. Several demographic variables were found to affect these perspectives significantly, including SES, economic training, religious beliefs, and the extent to which the respondent was personally affected by the crisis.     

World system status,techno-economic heritage,and fertility

The relevance of world system/dependency theory, and ecological-evolutionary theory for the population processes of currently developing nations is explored and evaluated by testing hypotheses drawn from models of fertility and fertility decline implied by them. Despite the preliminary and necessarily limited nature of the tests and measures, some support is found for hypotheses drawn from boh perspectives. Techno-economic heritage is found to affect fertility change directly, and world system status and techno-economic heritage are each found to affect fertility level and fertility change through independent effects on intervening variables. In addition, a significant interaction effect of techno-economic heritage and world system status on fertility level is found.     

Population aging and long-term care policies in the Gulf region: a case study of Oman

Population aging is a phenomenon occurring across the globe including in countries traditionally exhibiting population dividends and “youth bulges.” The Gulf Corporation Council countries are no exception as they currently experience a process of population aging, albeit at a different stage from many developed countries. However, due to historically high fertility rates and fast-paced epidemiological transition, some of these countries will experience population aging at a higher pace than what has been observed in Europe and the United States. This article reviews recent developments in long-term care policies in the Gulf region with a focus on Oman as an example of a high-income Arab country that is experiencing population aging while still being governed by traditional family aged-care norms. Utilizing existing data and published research complemented by policy analysis and field visits, we analyze the process of population aging in Oman and neighboring countries and its policy implications.     

The Human Capital Characteristics and Household Living Standards of Returning International Migrants in Eastern and Southern Africa

Africa’s experience with return migration is not new. However, few empirical studies have examined the social and economic characteristics of returning migrants within the continent. In this study, the human capital endowments and household living standards of returning migrants in Uganda and South Africa are examined using recently available data. The study compares returnees in both countries with immigrants as well as the native‐born population with no international migration experience. It also investigates how factors such as previous country of residence, year of arrival, and other demographic factors predict levels of education and living standards among returning migrants. In Uganda, the results show that recently arrived returning migrants had better educational endowments than both immigrants and non‐migrants. Migrants who returned to Uganda following the fall of Idi Amin’s regime had the lowest educational levels and lowest living standards compared to other returnees. Furthermore, the results indicate that previous residence in countries in the West was associated with four additional years of schooling while returning migrants arriving from other African countries had the lowest levels of schooling among returning migrants. In South Africa, the study finds that returnees arriving almost immediately following the end of Apartheid had the highest levels of education compared to either immigrants or non‐migrants. Returnees on average also had the highest household living standards in South Africa. Among South African immigrants, the results indicate that those arriving towards the end of the century had lower educational endowments compared to immigrants who arrived in the country two to four years after the end of Apartheid.     

Growing up global and equal? Inequality trends among world children, 1980–2005

Children are increasingly expected to grow up global yet their worldwide inequality is understudied; while countries’ incomes may be converging, it is unclear whether children's outcomes also do. This paper investigates the recent trends in global inequality among children. Findings show a fall in resource inequality, driven by Asia's exponential economic growth and Africa's slowing fertility trends. Paradoxically, this resource convergence occurred alongside divergence in infant mortality. Such findings have three implications. First, they caution against assuming automatic convergence in children's well-being in response to income convergence between nations. Second, they illustrate how national differences in age dependency account for global inequality among children. Third and more broadly, they stress the importance of demographic and policy – in addition to economic – convergence in bridging substantive inequality among the world‘s children.     

Child maltreatment victims' attitudes about appearing in dependency and criminal courts

In the present study, we investigated the attitudes of maltreated children involved in court hearings. Specifically, this pilot research examined whether type of abuse (sexual vs. physical vs. neglect), type of court (dependency vs. criminal), and child and abuse characteristics predicted child victims' feelings about seeing defendants in court and answering questions in the courtroom. Data were collected from interviews with the children and from their court files. Results indicated that greater negativity about seeing defendants in the courtroom was significantly predicted by testifying as a sexual abuse victim in criminal court and by being female regardless of court system, whereas greater positivity about seeing defendants in the courtroom was predicted by appearing in dependency court hearings as a physical abuse victim. In addition, greater severity of maltreatment and older age of the children were significantly associated with greater negativity about answering questions in court. Implications for future research are discussed.     

Substance Abuse in the New South Africa

ABSTRACT

Over the past five years South Africa has experienced a political transformation that has riveted attention around the world. A country once known for its policy of racial separation or apartheid has emerged as a new democracy with a racially integrated government of national unity. South Africa is now one of the most sought after tourist destinations and has attracted foreign investment from every major country around the world. Ironically, it is also emerging as one of the most lucrative countries for drug trafficking, substance abuse and the crime that typically follows. This article will examine the growing problem of drug and alcohol abuse in the new South Africa. The social and economic implications and the demand reduction methods will also be explored. Finally, the status of chemical dependency treatment and available support groups will also be discussed.