An analysis of the fertility transition in developing countries]

Most developing countries are in the demographic stage of early mortality, high birth rates and high rates of natural population increase. A characteristic of developing countries is that after World War ii, particularly since the 1960s fertility rates are on the decline, even though they still remain high. The fertility rate of developed countries fell from a 1950 rate of 22.9/1000 to 15/1000 in 1982, a decrease of 34.5%, whereas the fertility rate of developing countries hovered around 43/1000 between 1930-1950, 40.6/1000 during the 1960s and 33/1000 in 1982. Between 1950 and 1982 there was a decrease of 24.8%. But the main reason for this decrease is the decline in the last 20 years of the fertility rates of China and India, whose rates fell 34.9% from 1960-1980. Changes in fertility rates are influenced by the age structure of a country, as seen in the changing age structure of developing countries from 1960-80. For example, an increase in fertility rates was 1 consequence of an increase in the number of fertile women aged 15-45 from 42.6% in 1960 to 44.4% in 1980. Nevertheless, there exists some sort of birth control, whether conscious or subconscious, because the number of births per fertile woman is 3-4 fewer than the 14-15 children a woman can theoretically bear. The reason for changes in fertility rates in developing countries can be traced to marriage and family customs, and even more important, to social and economic factors. For example, Asian, African and Latin American cultures tend to support early marriages. When the fertility rates of developed and developing countries are looked at for a comparable period, then the rate of decrease for developing countries is slower than developed countries. But, if the comparison is made for a transitional period (i.e., industrialization), then the rate of decrease for developing countries is faster than for developed countries. Currently there are 25 developing countries that have attained a fertility rate of 25/1000 or lower, and 52 developing countries with a rate of 35/1000.     

An analysis of major proximate determinants of our fertility]

The sample survey of fertility, in Shanghai city and Shanxi and Hebei provinces of China in 1985, provided plentiful data about fertility, marriage, contraceptive usage and breastfeeding in terms of The World Fertility Survey Model. The data, along with Bongaarts' model, was utilized to analyze the relation between several proximate determinants and fertility changes. When comparing these three geographic areas, the largest difference was breastfeeding and the smallest one was non- contraceptive usage. It was very different from the results of The World Fertility Survey in developing countries in 1977. The difference of marriage indexes among three areas was close to that of breastfeeding; but for the effects on induction of fertility, marriage index surpassed breastfeeding. There were two models showing effective efficacy on fertility decline. One was the Shanghai model, in which much more effect came from marriage delay, accounting for 71%; another was the Hebei model, induction of fertility was caused by contraceptive usage, about 53%. Both indicated that the major factor affecting fertility decline was the family planning program. Otherwise, it seemed to indicate that different factors such as social, economic development indirectly decreased fertility through family planning programs.     

An analysis of the change of marriage pattern of Beijing women]

Changes in marriage patterns occur primarily in changes in the age at marriage. During a study of fertility among Beijing, China, women in 1981, another study was undertaken of the marriage situation of 8299 women who were born in 1914, 1920, 1930, 1940, and 1946. Data show that the rate of unmarried women was close to zero, which is one reason for the high birth rate in the past. A majority of the urban and rural women born in 1914, 1920, and 1930 married before the age of 15 years, indicating that the economic, social, and marriage customs for those decades changed very little. The 1940 cohort, however, showed no urban marriages prior to the age of 15 years and less than 1% in the villages, the reason being that these women were of marriageable age in the mid-to-late 1950s when China underwent major social and economic changes that raised the status of women and permitted them to join the work force or go to school. Very few urban women in the 1946 cohort married before 20 years of age, and the number of rural women who married before they were 18 years old declined noticeably. Findings also show that for both urban and rural women, the average age at marriage was 1-3 years later than the modal age at marriage. Beginning with the 1940 cohort the age at marriage was older by 2 1/2 years, signaling major changes. Except for the 1914 cohort, the median age at marriage for all others gradually became higher. 70% of the 1946 cohort voluntarily married after turning 23 years old, reflecting the effectiveness of the late marriage, late birth policy. Although close to 59% of rural women born in 1946 married before 23 years of age, nearly double the rate for urban women, it is nevertheless a major change from the 1930 cohort where 95% of the women married before turning 23 years old.     

An inquiry into expected lifetime fertility]

Expected lifetime fertility rate, or completed fertility rate, refers specifically to the cumulative fertility rate of a cohort of women after the age of reproducibility; however, in China's case, "reproduccibility" virtually ends after a woman gives birth to a 2nd child (assuming both children live). Hypothetical situations specific to China's system of family planning are presented and analyzed; statistical formulas and lifetime fertility rates (including allowances for violations of the e child policy), are provided.     

A socio-psychological analysis of attitudes toward fertility]

This is an introduction to the study of attitudes toward fertility and the psychosocial factors that influence them. Both individual and group attitudes are included. The author also examines how such attitudes change over time.     

A tentative analysis of the effect of income on women's fertility]

The impact of income on women's fertility in China is analyzed using data from official and other published sources. The author notes that there is a clear link between lower fertility and higher income up to a certain point. This point seems to be when family income reaches a level of 300 yan in rural areas. Other factors affecting fertility are also considered, including the national family planning program, female educational level, and female labor force participation.     

Urbanization and fertility: An event-history analysis of Coastal Ghana

In this article, we undertake an event-history analysis of fertility in Ghana. We exploit detailed life history calendar data to conduct a more refined and definitive analysis of the relationship among personal traits, urban residence, and fertility. Although urbanization is generally associated with lower fertility in developing countries, inferences in most studies have been hampered by a lack of information about the timing of residence in relationship to childbearing. We find that the effect of urbanization itself is strong, evident, and complex, and persists after we control for the effects of age, cohort, union status, and education. Our discrete-time event-history analysis shows that urban women exhibit fertility rates that are, on average, 11% lower than those of rural women, but the effects vary by parity. Differences in urban population traits would augment the effects of urban adaptation itself. Extensions of the analysis point to the operation of a selection effect in rural-to-urban mobility but provide limited evidence for disruption effects. The possibility of further selection of urbanward migrants on unmeasured traits remains. The analysis also demonstrates the utility of an annual life history calendar for collecting such data in the field.     

The evolution in China's fertility and an analysis of population development]

There have been numerous projections on China's population at the end of century. Their differences are due to different estimations on the effects of fertility determinants. 2 simulation models have been developed, both from micro and macro levels, to estimate the population at the end of the century on the basis of 6 different fertility patterns. 3 possible options for fertility patterns are discussed. 1.) The 1 child per family option means that every couple has 1 child by the year 1989, the population of China will be 1.2 billion in the year 2000. Even if this is a ideal situation, it would not be a feasible policy, as the pressure from the rural population to have more than 1 child has been increasing in recent years. Nevertheless, it is still possible for urban couples to accept having only 1 child. Therefore, encouraging more people to have 1 child should be held as a basic policy. 2.) Under the option of 2 children per family with 2 or 3 years of spacing, the total population in the year 2000 would be 1.2 - 1.4 billion, which is unacceptable in terms of the development situation. 3.) Following a differential fertility policy towards urban, rural, and minority populations would mean that urban couples would have 1 child, rural couples whose first child is a girl or those who are in special circumstance would have 2 children. Minorities would have 2 or 3 children. AMong the above options, number 3 is more likely to be achieved in view of current socioeconomic, cultural, and demographic factors.     

Studying the fertility peak in Beijing]

Beijing, China, is experiencing a baby boom in response to 2 periods of large population increase in the mid-1950s and early 1960s. The average number of annual births was 220,000 in the first period and 269,000 in the second period. The causes of the large increase in the population in the first period were an improvement of health conditions which led to a reduction in mortality, immigration flow, and an erroneous population policy. The causes in the second period were recuperative fertility after three years of natural calamity and increased fertility among immigrants. Net migration had an important role in population growth these two periods; it also will have an important impact in future population changes. According to population projections, another baby boom is expected to occur before the end of the end of the century. During the up-coming baby boom period, 1.54 million births are expected, 190,000 per annum. The average increase in population size is expected to 127,000 per year. In the peak year, it may be around 200,000. Thanks to the family planning (FP) program the occurrence of the third baby boom in Beijing has been postponed and the duration will be shortened. From 1972 to 1982, 2.57 million births was averted due to FP, which drastically reduced pressure on the demand for resources and on the momentum of the next baby boom. Another baby booms is not expected during the early half of the 21st century, although an elevated birth rate within the range of normal fluctuation is predicted. The projection was based on the assumption of restricted migration and the enforcement of the FP program. The realization of the projected population will depend on deferred marriage, deferred child-bearing, prolonged birth spacing, the prevention of high parity fertility, the maintenance of the current population policy, and control over the reproductive behavior of the new migrant population.     

An evaluation of the recent fertility changes in Afghanistan: a parity-specific analysis

Very limited studies exist on the demography of Afghanistan. Using the only national survey with complete birth history data, the 2010 Afghanistan Mortality Survey, this paper describes the recent fertility changes in the country from a parity-specific perspective. From 1995 to 2009, parity progression ratios, average birth intervals, sex ratio at birth by parity and synthetic lifetime average parity are successively examined. Results show that the progression to higher-order births started to decline in the early 2000s and was accompanied by childbearing postponement. The consistency of the parity analysis is assessed by looking at the sex ratio at birth by parity and comparing the synthetic lifetime average parity to fertility estimates computed from other datasets and/or estimation methods. While the sex ratio at birth indicates strong distortion, casting doubt on the ultimate fertility level, the consistency of the parity-based fertility estimates with other fertility estimates corroborates the fact that misreporting the sex of the child is mainly causing the imbalanced sex ratio at birth and is not significantly affecting the level of fertility. The SPPRs-based analysis provides solid evidence that Afghanistan is in the early stage of its fertility transition.     

World fertility and the women's situation]

In 1981, total number of childbearing women in the world reached 9.8 hundred million. Their socioeconomic status and fertility level are very important data for the study of women's liberation and population control. Facing limited natural resources and a constant growing demand, many nations are studying how to control the population growth and achieve a "zero population growth." In nations with a high GNP, such as Switzerland, West Germany, and France, fertility is low. On the contrary, countries in central and south Asia and most parts of Africa are the poorest economically, and their fertility rate has remained very high. Another factor which is related to the fertility level is the degree of women's participation in the labor market. In Europe and North America, the percentage of women's participation in economic activities is high, and fertility is low. In Latin America and Africa, fertility is high, and the percentage of women's participation in economic labor is low. From the above, we may conclude that promotion of women's participation in the labor market and better employment conditions will reduce fertility. Another 2 factors related to fertility are marriage age and birth control rate. Late marriage and the extensive use of birth control measures are effective methods for reducing fertility. All the above mentioned factors are closely related to the woman's educational background. If women receive a better education and find better employment opportunities, delay their marriage age, and take birth control measures, fertility will be reduced and the population growth will be under control.     

Child care arrangements and fertility: An analysis of two-earner households

The determinants of child care arrangements and relations between child care and fertility are examined using data on two-earner households from the 1976 National Survey of Family Growth. We find that the probability of relying on market arrangements is higher among families in which the husband's income, the wife's wage, and the level of the wife's labor supply are high; these households are likely to benefit the most from subsidies to the market forms of care that are small relative to the total cost of care (e.g. the present system of tax credits). In addition, parental education, family size, child's age, race, religion, and place of residence have important influences on the choice of child care mode. When other factors are held constant, reliance on a relative for child care is positively associated with intentions to have further children among couples with infants and preschoolers.     

An analysis of marital status]

In the 1980 census, a special investigation was conducted in Wuxi City on the marital status of the local population above the age of fifteen. The investigation covered detailed information concerning those married, divorced, single, and widowed. Results from this investigation show that more men are single than women, and more men are also widowed. In part this is because the average age for husband is older than his wife and the death rate higher is for men than women. Data show that the popular marriage age is between 25 and 29, evidence of a general trend toward late marr iage. In the area of the divorce rate, the rate for women in the city is higher than that in the countryside. The divorce rate for men is higher in the countryside than in the city. In the rate of being single through a lifetime, the rate for men in the countryside is higher than that in the city. This situation shows that in the countryside, because of the poor geographical and economic condition, men suffer from their marriage status. Generally speaking, the divorce rate in China is still lower than that of Western countries and the marital status in China remains more stable. The marital status is influenced by many factors, such as the social and economic situation, customs and habits, religious beliefs, profession, and educational and cultural levels. The collection of information regarding the marital status is useful for analysis of the birthrate and population forecast.     

Educational mobility and the fertility of black and white women

In a test of the minority group status hypothesis, this study examines the effect of intergenerational educational mobility on the fertility of black and white women. Regression analysis of data from the National Survey of Family Growth provides only limited support for the hypothesis that upwardly mobile black women have lower fertility than their white counterparts. The main finding is that the parity of upwardly mobile black women is influenced more strongly by educational origins (parents' education) than is the parity of upwardly mobile white women. Thus, future studies should consider the effects of social origins on racial differences in fertility.This article is a revised version of a paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Sociological Association, 23 August 1992, Pittsburgh, PA, USA.     

A cohort analysis of the fertility of the July 1 People's Commune in Shanghai, County]

The survey was conducted in February-March 1981. The population of this commune at the end of 1980 was 18,608. The cultural and educational levels, economic condition, and work in family planning of this commune form a typical example among numerous similar communes in Shanghai County. The birthrate, natural growth rate, and average fertility rate began to decline in the later half of 1950s and reached the lowest level in 1974. The survey shows a delay in the marriage age. The fertility rate also dropped by 21.31% from 1963 to 1980. The average fertility rate dropped by 162.73% from 1963 to 1980. Among the women of childbearing age, 99% of them have a knowledge of birth control measures, 95% of them have used them before, and 78% are currently using them. All these figures show that the work in family planning in the commune has reached a high level by world standards. 3 factors which have a strong impact on fertility are: the economic and educational level, formation of population elements, and family planning work. A rise in the standard of living and improvement in education normally leads to late marriage and a decline in fertility. An increase in the number of women of childbearing age causes a rise in fertility. The population growth after 1974 is a reflection of this situation. The survey shows that the decline in fertility before 1973 was caused mainly by family planning work.     

The empowerment of women,fertility, and child mortality: Towards a theoretical analysis

This paper examines one avenue through which female autonomy impinges on fertility and child mortality in developing countries. A simple model is set out in which couples are motivated to have children for old age security purposes. The decisions of a couple regarding fertility and allocation of resources for the healthcare of their children are made within a bargaining framework. An increase in female autonomy translating into an increase in the relative bargaining power or the threat point utility of mothers is shown to reduce fertility and also to reduce child mortality rates. Paradoxically, the increase in female autonomy within a household may increase the disadvantage suffered by female children in that household with respect to survival. Received: 4 August 1999/Accepted: 7 September 2000     

Marriage patterns and fertility of the world population]

Marriage patterns of the world population may be divided into two major categories; i.e., the traditional marriage pattern, and the European marriage pattern. Characteristics of the traditional marriage pattern are: early marriage, a high percentage of married people, and a low percentage of people who remain single during their lifetime. Characteristics of the European marriage pattern include: late marriage and a higher percentage of females who do not marry in their lifetime. In most parts of Asia and Africa and some Latin American countries, the traditional marriage pattern is dominant, and the birth rate in these countries has remained very high. Most countries in Europe show the characteristics of the European marriage pattern, and the fertility rate in these countries is comparatively low. Some other countries, such as Sri Lanka, are in a process of transformation in their marriage pattern, and their fertility level also shows a transition from a high fertility rate to a lower fertility rate. There is a close relationship between marriage patterns and the level of fertility.     

An intervention analysis of the effects of legalized abortion upon U.S. fertility

Models of time series data on births in the United States are used to assess the impact of the 1973 decision of the U.S. Supreme Court invalidating statutes that seriously restrict access to abortion. The decision of the Court is found to have no discernible impact on births for the nation as a whole. Models of state-level data suggest that the legalization of abortion by states prior to the decision was satisfying the demand for abortion     

An attempt at evaluation of the economic and social factors [influencing] the Polish population's fertility formation

This analysis of economic determinants of fertility in Poland shows that couples' fertility decisions are negatively influenced by factors affecting family income. Social and demographic factors were found to be unrelated to fertility. 17 socioeconomic measures were grouped as those expressing the level of economic development and determining family income size, those reflecting the level of socioeconomic development and determining the level of children's education, and those characterizing the level of social development and determining the need for health care and social security. The level of actual fertility is modeled as a linear function of variables in a main components factor analysis. Average monthly pay in the national economy (37.6%), the sold industrial production per person (13.8%), and the global agricultural production per person (13.2%) account for 64.6% of the variance. Among the social factors, findings indicate that a higher feeling of security is related to lower fertility, but economic factors have a stronger influence. Voivodeships are grouped as having low levels of economic development (24), as having high educational levels (24), and as having low levels of social security (24). Voivodeships with low levels of economic development and high parity include all the grouped voivodeships with the exception of three. Low-security voivodeships showed mixed patterns of fertility. High-education voivodeships showed a weak correlation with high fertility. Only three voivodeships have low economic and security factors and high education factors, and only one voivodeship has high fertility. Of the three voivodeships with high security and economic factors and low education factors, all have low parity.     

The influence of economic conditions on the fertility of peasant women

In this paper, which is based on an enquiry carried out in twenty villages in Southern Poland, the author investigates the fertility of two consecutive generations of peasant women. He shows that the richer the couple are, the more children they have. This is due to the earlier marriage of wealthier peasant girls, who thus begin to bear children sooner, and also bear them more frequently and for a longer period.

This trend was very noticeable in the earlier generation, but shows signs of weakening in the present generation because of the spread of birth control which was first accepted among the richer peasants.

Rich peasant couples not only produce more children, but a greater proportion of their children remain in agriculture. Larger peasant farms are thus sub-divided more quickly than smaller ones, and a low standard of living results.