Supply chain coordination through cooperative advertising with reference price effect

Cooperative advertising, which usually occurs in a vertical supply chain, is typically a cost sharing and promotion mechanism for the manufacturer to affect retail performance. Research in the literature, however, rarely considers the important phenomenon that advertising has a positive effect on the consumer's reference price. In fact, when a consumer makes a decision to buy a product or not, a reference price is usually in his mind and plays a determinant role. Taking into account the impact of advertising on the reference price, this paper proposes a dynamic cooperative advertising model for a manufacturer–retailer supply chain and analyzes how the reference price effect would influence the decisions of all the channel members. In our model, both the consumer's goodwill and reference price for the product are assumed to be influenced by the advertising and are modeled in differential dynamic equations. In addition, the advertising level, the consumer's goodwill and the reference price are all assumed to have positive effect on sales. Utilizing differential game theory, this paper formulates the optimal decisions of the manufacturer and the retailer in two different game scenarios: Stackelberg game and cooperative game. Also, this paper proposes a new mechanism to coordinate the supply chain in which both the manufacturer and the retailer share each other's advertising costs.     

Design of Product Grading Procedures*

Consider a situation in which the items produced by a production process are sorted into two grades according to predetermined specifications and sold at two different prices. A loss is incurred by the producer when an item is classified into a grade and its quality does not meet the consumer's requirement of that grade. A loss in selling price is also incurred when an item is classified into a lower quality grade when it can meet the consumer's requirement of a higher grade. Consequently, the producer's profit is determined by sale prices and losses due to consumer dissatisfaction. The optimal grading specifications are determined to maximize the expected profit. Design of product grading procedures can be based on the performance variable of interest or a surrogate variable correlated with the performance variable. The practice of using correlated variables in product grading is common in industry. We develop product grading models for both the performance variable and a correlated variable.     

Pre‐Orders for New To‐be‐Released Products Considering Consumer Loss Aversion

Advance selling through pre‐orders is a strategy to transfer inventory risk from a retailer to consumers. A newsvendor retailer can have three strategies to choose from: no advance selling allowed (NAS), moderate advance selling with a moderate discount for pre‐orders (MAS), and deep advance selling with a deep discount for pre‐orders (DAS). This research studies how a retailer could design an advance selling strategy to maximize her own profits. We find some interesting results. For example, there exist two thresholds for the selling season profit margin and two thresholds for consumer's expected valuation. For products with higher profit margin than the high threshold on profit margin, a retailer should always use DAS. For products with medium profit margin within the two thresholds, a retailer should adopt MAS if consumer's expected valuation is lower than the high threshold and use DAS otherwise. For products with lower profit margin than the low threshold, a retailer should use NAS, DAS, or MAS, respectively, if consumer's expected valuation is lower than the low threshold, higher than the high threshold, or between the two thresholds, respectively. Through sensitivity analyses, we also show the effects of multiple consumer characteristics on a retailer's optimal advance selling strategy.     

Improving Valuation Under Consumer Search: Implications for Pricing and Profits

There is a growing trend in the retail industry to improve customer experience. In this article, we study retailer‐initiated strategies to increase consumer valuation for a product under duopoly. In such a setting, it is possible that a consumer's valuation may be increased by one retailer; however, the consumer may decide to buy the product from the competitor. We consider a two‐stage game where retailers first decide whether to invest in improvements in customer valuation and then engage in price competition. We computationally explore the Nash equilibria in terms of both investment and pricing. We find that in the majority of cases retailers price in a manner to discourage their local customers to buy from the competitor. Next, we focus on the pricing game and theoretically characterize the pricing Nash equilibrium. We find that a retailer could overcome competitive effects by improving consumer valuation beyond a certain threshold. We also find that a retailer who does not invest could benefit from competition in situations where his competitor increases consumer valuation beyond a threshold. Finally, we explore through a computational study the Nash equilibria of the two‐stage game using an alternate model to establish the robustness of our findings.     

RISK AVERSION,WEALTH, AND BACKGROUND RISK

We use household survey data to construct a direct measure of absolute risk aversion based on the maximum price a consumer is willing to pay for a risky security. We relate this measure to consumer's endowments and attributes and to measures of background risk and liquidity constraints. We find that risk aversion is a decreasing function of the endowment—thus rejecting CARA preferences. We estimate the elasticity of risk aversion to consumption at about 0.7, below the unitary value predicted by CRRA utility. We also find that households' attributes are of little help in predicting their degree of risk aversion, which is characterized by massive unexplained heterogeneity. We show that the consumer's environment affects risk aversion. Individuals who are more likely to face income uncertainty or to become liquidity constrained exhibit a higher degree of absolute risk aversion, consistent with recent theories of attitudes toward risk in the presence of uninsurable risks. (JEL: D1, D8)     

To Preannounce or Not: New Product Development in a Competitive Duopoly Market

In this study, we consider the issue of preannouncing or not preannouncing the development of a new product. Our research is motivated by contrasting views in the literature and varying actions observed in practice. We develop and analyze a game theoretic model that examines the effect of a firm's preannouncement of its product development. Our model is based on a durable goods duopoly market with profit‐maximizing firms. The first firm is an innovator who initially begins developing the product; the second firm is an imitator that begins developing a competing product as soon as it becomes aware of the innovator's product. We assume that consumers are rationally expectant and purchase at most one unit of the product when they have maximum positive utility surplus that is determined by the characteristics of the product, the consumer's marginal utility, and the consumer's discounted utility for future expected products. The innovator firm can release information about its product when it begins developing the product or can guard information about its product until it introduces the product into the market. Our analysis and numerical tests show that, under some conditions, the innovator firm can benefit by preannouncing its product and giving the imitator firm additional time to differentiate its product. We discuss these conditions and their implications for new product development efforts.     

The Interplay between Information Acquisition and Quality Disclosure

This study investigates the interactions between a manufacturer's information acquisition and quality disclosure strategies in a supply chain setting in which the manufacturer privately knows his product quality but is uncertain about consumer preferences. We argue that the manufacturer should treat his information acquisition and quality disclosure decisions as an integrated process because these decisions can significantly influence a retailer's rational inferences about product quality and can have conflicting effects on his own profitability. Although information acquisition helps a manufacturer subsequently craft better pricing and quality disclosure strategies, it also leaks certain product information to the retailer, thus helping the retailer better estimate product quality. Therefore, in equilibrium, a manufacturer may choose not to acquire any consumer information, even when such acquisition is costless. Moreover, we find that this adverse effect of acquisition is highly dependent on the cost of disclosure and consumers’ preference differentiation. Increased consumer preference differentiation may have a non‐monotonic relationship with the manufacturer's profit, and information acquisition can become detrimental to the manufacturer once the disclosure cost is sufficiently high.     

Mass Customization and Guardrails: “You Can Not Be All Things to All People”

A mass customization strategy enables a firm to match its product designs to unique consumer tastes. In a classic horizontal product‐differentiation framework, a consumer's utility is a decreasing function of the distance between their ideal taste and the taste defined by the most closely aligned product the firm offers. A consumer thus considers the taste mismatch associated with their purchased product, but otherwise the positioning of the firm's product portfolio (or, “brand image”) is immaterial. In contrast, self‐congruency theory suggests that consumers assess how well both the purchased product and its overall brand image match with their ideal taste. Therefore, we incorporate within the consumer utility function both product‐specific and brand‐level components. Mass customization has the potential to improve taste alignment with regard to a specific purchased product, but at the risk of increasing brand dilution. Absent brand dilution concerns, a firm will optimally serve all consumers’ ideal tastes at a single price. In contrast, by endogenizing dilution costs within the consumer utility model, we prove that a mass‐customizing firm optimally uses differential pricing. Moreover, we show that the firm offers reduced prices to consumers with extreme tastes (to stimulate consumer “travel”), with a higher and fixed price being offered to those consumers having more central (mainstream) tastes. Given that a continuous spectrum of prices will likely not be practical in application, we also consider the more pragmatic approach of augmenting the uniformly priced mass customization range with preset (non‐customized) outlying designs, which serve customers at the taste extremes. We prove this practical approach performs close to optimal.     

Competition and Sustainability: The Impact of Consumer Awareness

Sustainability, a broad concept that includes numerous environmental and social dimensions, has emerged as an important product evaluation criterion for consumers. We suggest the impact of sustainability on consumer behavior depends on two factors—each individual consumer's unique level of concern about sustainability, and the general level of awareness regarding the sustainability of competing products—that together determine the level of heterogeneity among consumer attitudes toward sustainability. We incorporate sustainability concern and awareness into a model of horizontal competition in a duopoly, where one firm's product is more sustainable than the other's. Our results suggest that marginal increases in awareness can benefit all firms, including the less sustainable one, when awareness is sufficiently high (the explicit goal of recent sustainability labeling initiatives). In several model extensions, we provide additional insights for the following cases: the sustainable firm controls the extent of its sustainability advantage, the sustainable firm can directly influence the general level of awareness, and the distribution of sustainability concern across consumers is nonuniform. Our results enable us to suggest several new insights for managers, both those whose products enjoy a sustainability advantage and those whose products do not.     

How Does Product Recovery Affect Quality Choice?

We study the impact of product recovery on a firm's product quality choice, where quality is defined as an observable performance measure that increases a consumer's valuation for the product. We consider three general forms of product recovery: (i) when product recovery reuses (after reprocessing) quality inducing components or material (e.g., remanufacturing), (ii) when product recovery does not reuse quality inducing components or material but it is overall profitable (e.g., cell phone recycling), and (iii) when product recovery is costly (but mandated by legislation, e.g., recycling of small appliances in the European Union). Using a stylized economic model, we show that the form of product recovery, recovery cost structure, and the presence of product take‐back legislation play an important role in quality choice. Generally speaking, product recovery increases the firm's quality choice, except for some instances of recovery form (ii). In addition, we find that product take‐back legislation can lead to higher quality choice as opposed to voluntary take‐back. We further demonstrate that both the firm and the consumers benefit from recovery form (ii), while both are worse off with recovery form (iii). However, environmental implications of the three recovery modes differ from their impact on consumer surplus and firm profit. While recovery forms (i) and (iii) reduce consumption and increase environmental benefits, the same is not true with recovery form (ii), which can increase consumption, potentially resulting in higher environmental impact.     

Consumer Trust in Food Safety—A Multidisciplinary Approach and Empirical Evidence from Taiwan

Food scandals that happened in recent years have increased consumers' risk perceptions of foods and decreased their trust in food safety. A better understanding of the consumer trust in food safety can improve the effectiveness of public policy and allow the development of the best practice in risk communication. This study proposes a research framework from a psychometric approach to investigate the relationships between the consumer's trust in food safety and the antecedents of risk perceptions of foods based on a reflexive modernization perspective and a cultural theory perspective in the hope of benefiting the future empirical study. The empirical results from a structural equation modeling analysis of Taiwan as a case in point reveal that this research framework based on a multidisciplinary perspective can be a valuable tool for a growing understanding of consumer trust in food safety. The antecedents in the psychometric research framework comprised reflexive modernization factors and cultural theory factors have all been supported in this study except the consumer's perception of pessimism toward food. Moreover, the empirical results of repeated measures analysis of variance give more detailed information to grasp empirical implications and to provide some suggestions to the actors and institutions involved in the food supply chain in Taiwan.     

A comparison of approaches to exploit budget allocation data in cross-sectional maximum likelihood estimation of multi-attribute choice models

In this paper, four calibration approaches to exploit budget allocation data in maximum likelihood estimation of multi-attribute choice models are proposed. They differ on the implicit meaning of the dependent variable: (A) share of consumers according to the preferred alternative; (B) share of sales; (C) average share of consumer's budget; and (D) share of sales according to the preferred alternative. Differences between them can be conceived as depending on two circumstances: customer loyalty and customer selectivity. These are tested in the context of spatial consumer behavior, market response to hypermarket chains being represented as a function of their location strategies. Results show that different nuances on the definition of the dependent variable lead to slightly different relationships with the explanatory variables and to different predictive capabilities.     

The Impact of Limited Supply on a Firm's Bundling Strategy

A firm's two‐product bundling decision is examined when the supply of one product is limited and consumer valuations are normally distSteckeributed. The firm can choose to sell products separately and/or through a bundle. We find that the impact of limited supply on a firm's bundling decision depends on the correlation between the consumer valuations of the two products as well as the symmetry level of the two products in terms of their attractiveness (how much they are valued by consumers). When the valuation correlation is high and the symmetry level of the two products is low, limited supply can drive bundling. When the valuation correlation is low or the symmetry level is high, limited supply can drive no bundling. When the attractiveness of both products are low or the valuation correlation is very high, limited supply has no impact on a firm's bundling decision: The firm should not bundle for all supply levels. This study offers a new driver for product bundling: the limited supply of a product. The existing bundling literature suggests that a firm should bundle symmetric products that have a low consumer valuation correlation, when bundling is driven by consumer valuation heterogeneity reduction. In contrast, when bundling is driven by limited supply, a firm should bundle asymmetric products with a high consumer valuation correlation. The benefit of supply‐driven bundling depends on the severity of supply limitation. When supply limitation is moderate, bundling creates value by expanding the market of the less attractive product. When supply limitation is severe, bundling enables a firm to extract a higher margin from the less attractive product.     

Entry Deterrence of Capacitated Competition Using Price and Non‐Price Strategies

We analyze the role of pricing and branding in an incumbent firm's decision when facing competition from an entrant firm with limited capacity. We do so by studying two price competition models (Stackelberg and Nash), where we consider the incumbent's entry‐deterrence pricing strategy based on a potential entrant's capacity size. In an extension, we also study a branding model, where the incumbent firm, in addition to pricing, can also invest in influencing market preference for its product. With these models, we study conditions under which the incumbent firm may block the entrant (i.e., prevent entry without any market actions), deter the entrant (i.e., stop entry with suitable market actions) or accommodate the entrant (i.e., allow entry and compete), and how the entrant will allocate its limited capacity across its own and the new market, if entry occurs. We also study the timing difference between the two different dynamics of the price competition models and find that the incumbent's first‐mover advantage benefits both the incumbent and the entrant. Interestingly, the entrant firm's profits are not monotonically increasing in its capacity even when it is costless to build capacity. In the branding model, we show that in some cases, the incumbent may even increase its price and successfully deter entry by investing in consumer's preference for its product. Finally, we incorporate demand uncertainty into our model and show that the incumbent benefits from demand uncertainty while the entrant may be worse off depending on the magnitude of demand uncertainty and its capacity.     

The importance of key celebrity characteristics for customer segmentation by age and gender: Does beauty matter in professional football?

This paper examines through the lens of sport whether male and female customers as well as differently aged customers focus on different celebrity characteristics and whether they are influenced by celebrities’ facial attractiveness. Drawing on psychological and sociological theories like attachment theory, social role theory of gender, or social norm theory as well as on the academic literature on celebrity endorsement in general, we develop several hypotheses regarding how a fan’s age and gender affect the importance of key characteristics of football stars—namely experience, personality, exemplary behavior, and skills. Using a proprietary dataset that combines archival data concerning professional football players and clubs with survey data of more than 2100 football fans, we find evidence that female fans attach more importance to a player’s personality and behavior while male fans seem to focus on experience and skills. We further find that when fans get older, the importance of a player’s behavior and experience increases. Moreover, our results show that the facial attractiveness of players clearly influences fan perceptions. Our results contribute to existing research on customer segmentation by providing a more differentiated picture of the effects of key celebrity characteristics on different customers.     

IS BRAND LOYALTY A CRITERION FOR MARKET SEGMENTATION: DISCRIMINANT ANALYSIS

Is it possible to use brand loyalty for market segmentation? The answer rests solely on whether the researcher can identify the group of loyal buyers among the product users. This study investigates the usefulness of external information obtained from a set of independent variables in order to discriminate between loyal and disloyal groups. The independent variables of the study measure a consumer's shopping patterns, general characteristics of the product usage, and the element of price in purchase decision.     

Die Geld-zur��ck-Garantie �C Mehr als nur ein Qualit?tsindikator?

Money-back guarantees have become an increasingly popular tool for marketing managers??mainly because they are regarded as an effective means to signal product quality. However, from an academic perspective there is sparse empirical evidence on whether such a signaling effect really exists and, most importantly, whether it influences consumer decision making. Hence, the objective of the paper is to empirically analyze the consequences of money-back guarantees on consumer buying behavior in a holistic theoretical framework accounting for both cognitive and affective consumer responses. Our results reveal that the existence of the rather cognitively driven signaling effect of a money-back guarantee is contingent on several factors: Besides the type of the product (search versus experience good), it particularly depends on consumer knowledge as well as on whether a money-back guarantee is offered for a strong or for a rather weak brand. In addition, we show that a money-back guarantee also induces affective consumer responses which additionally contribute to consumer buying behavior. These responses are mainly due to the guarantee??s insurance function reducing consumer uncertainty about product features.     

Producer's and Consumer's Risk When Proportion Defective Is a Random Variable

In acceptance sampling, producer's and consumer's risk are traditionally based on assumed fixed values of p, the proportion of the lot which is defective. A more useful definition of producer's risk would be the probability of rejecting a lot in which the proportion defective falls within some range of acceptable values. Similarly, a more useful definition of consumer's risk would be the probability of accepting a lot in which the proportion defective falls within some range of unacceptable values. In this paper, we construct measures of these more useful definitions of risk by assuming that p follows either a uniform or triangular probability distribution. The proposed measure yields consumer's risk values, β', which are smaller than the traditionally computed values by a factor of up to twenty times. The proposed measure of producer's risk, α', gives values smaller than traditional values by a factor of two to four times. Decision makers who adopt the proposed measures may be able to reduce sample sizes substantially while maintaining given risk levels.     

Using Contingent Markdown with Reservation to Profit from Strategic Consumer Behavior

We examine a contingent price markdown (CM) mechanism with guaranteed reservation under which a retailer sells multiple units to forward‐looking consumers who arrive over time according to a Poisson process. During the early part of the selling season, each arriving consumer can either purchase a unit by paying the regular price or reserve a unit at the discount price. Reserved units can only be claimed later when the number of guaranteed reservations meets a pre‐specified threshold, or at the end of the selling season, whichever comes first. Immediately after the number of guaranteed reservations meets the pre‐specified threshold, the retailer will reduce its selling price to the discount price so that all subsequent arriving consumers can take immediate possession by paying the low price. We study the consumer purchasing behavior in equilibrium when the retailer adopts such a selling mechanism, and compare the performance of our mechanism against two benchmarks: fixed price (FP) and pre‐announced discount (PD). Through an extensive numerical analysis, we identify market conditions under which CM dominates both FP and PD in terms of the retailer's revenue and consumer's surplus. Finally, through a fluid approximation to the stochastic model, we simplify the computation of the equilibrium strategy and the optimal revenues, and verify that the key insights obtained from the stochastic model still hold.     

企业IPO对同行业上市公司的影响:竞争效应还是信息溢出效应?——基于动态产品市场竞争的微分博弈模型与实证研究

从理论和实证两个方面, 研究企业IPO对同行业上市公司的均衡价值及产品市场差异化竞争的影响.在已有研究基础上加入信息溢出效应, 基于动态产品市场竞争构建了一个微分博弈模型, 模型结果表明:IPO后在位上市公司相对行业竞争力低于临界值时, 其均衡价值减少; IPO前其相对行业竞争力高于临界值时, 其均衡价值增加.采用沪深A股、中小板与创业板的市场数据, 运用非线性最小二乘法估计动态结构化模型参数, 实证研究IPO对产品市场异质化竞争倾向的影响.实证结果表明, IPO后行业消费者忠诚度提高, 产品市场竞争倾向趋于异质化竞争, 在位上市公司的市场份额利润转化率提高.这说明我国IPO竞争效应占主导地位, 企业IPO对在位上市公司构成威胁, 在位上市公司采用差异化的产品竞争策略提高竞争力和盈利能力.