人口老龄化会阻碍中等收入阶段跨越吗?北大核心CSSCI

人口老龄化水平不断提高会阻碍一个国家经济增长而陷入"中等收入陷阱"吗?文章在检验人口老龄化对经济增长影响基础上,进一步分析人口老龄化对中等收入阶段跨越概率影响。研究发现:第一,人口老龄化对经济增长具有显著负向影响;第二,人口总抚养比水平的提高会显著降低一个国家或地区中等收入向高收入阶段跨越概率,而老年抚养比的提高并不能显著降低一个国家或地区中等收入向高收入阶段跨越概率;第三,提高人力资本和全要素生产率有助于加大一个国家或地区中等收入阶段向高收入阶段跨越概率。因此,中国应提升人力资本水平,加大研发投入,弥补人口老龄化对经济增长的负面影响,实现中等收入阶段向高收入阶段的跨越。     

收入差距、中等收入陷阱与中国的城镇化道路

跨越中等收入陷阱是未来很长一段时期中国将面对的重大课题。收入差距过大、生产效率不高是中国跨越中等收入陷阱必须直面和解决的两大难题。上述两个问题的本质是效率与公平的问题。城镇化既可以提高资源配置效率,同时也是解决城乡、地区差距的主要途径。然而我国以往的城镇化政策既不利于生产效率提高,也没有达到促进公平的政策初衷。因而,加快调整的城镇化政策对顺利跨越中等收入陷阱具有极为重要的意义。     

中国经济增长减缓与稳定增长动力

文章借助艾肯格林设定经济增长减缓需要满足的条件,基于跨国经验和中长期经济增长数据寻找经济增长路径的阶段性特征。结果发现,当前无论从增长率水平还是人均收入"门槛"看,中国经济均进入增长的连续减缓期。国际比较研究发现,成功跨入高收入阶段的国家在跨越临界点前至少10年间均保持相对稳定增长,其连续增长减缓过程多集中于跨入高收入"门槛"之后。当前中国刚跨过中等高收入"门槛",2008年出现增长减缓态势,2015年可能再次出现增长减缓拐点,这将使中国向高收入阶段跨越变得相对困难。文章实证分析了经济稳定增长的动力之源,并认为在经济增长的换挡期,经济增长动力不仅表现为引致经济增长,还要看能否驱动经济稳定增长。要结合"新常态"下经济增长阶段性特征,适时转换经济增长动力机制,迎接下一个稳定增长的关键时期。     

中国沿海发达地区的城市化与工业化进程研究——基于转型升级与国际比较的视角

文章在国际比较的基础上分析了进入"上中等收入国家"人均收入阶段的中国沿海发达地区的城市化与工业化进程问题。沿海发达地区的城市化进程正面临着其工业化进程和经济发展新阶段所带来的城市化动力机制的变化,从而使沿海发达地区的城市化速度放慢;沿海发达地区的城市化进程要以工业化进程为核心,不应脱离工业化进程,盲目追求城市化率的提高;沿海发达地区的城市化进程要有利于促进第三产业,特别是生产性服务业的发展,有利于实现地区产业结构的升级和对后工业社会经济的赶超。     

中等收入群体提质扩容：环境与努力孰轻孰重？

中等收入群体提质扩容是构建新发展格局的重要支撑,也是实现共同富裕的关键环节。文章通过引入“脆弱性”的概念,将中等收入群体研究的视角从“量”拓展到“质”,借鉴“环境—努力”二元分析框架,剖析了机会不平等对中等收入群体提质扩容的制约程度和具体作用机制。研究发现,当前中等收入群体处于低质量扩张阶段,个人努力是中等收入群体提质扩容的主导力量,环境因素的影响不到三成（27.1%）;换言之,能否进入中等收入群体,“七分靠打拼”。与中等收入群体扩容相比,提质面临更高的机会不平等。环境因素不仅直接影响中等收入群体提质扩容,还会通过教育差异间接增加中等收入群体提质扩容的难度。文章从降低机会不平等的视角出发,提出中等收入群体稳存量、扩增量、提质量的政策建议。     

数字鸿沟、教育人力资本与劳动力收入北大核心

数字鸿沟阻碍了信息和机会的平等获取,是现代社会发展面临的严峻挑战。深入分析数字鸿沟对劳动力收入的影响有助于充分理解数字化时代的不平等问题,并为政策制定者提供依据。本文基于2017年中国综合社会调查数据,从数字鸿沟的相关理论与实证分析两方面考察教育人力资本协同作用下跨越数字鸿沟对劳动力收入的影响。研究发现:跨越一级、二级数字鸿沟能够显著提升劳动力收入,教育人力资本可以加强互联网的增收作用,相比于低教育人力资本个体,高教育人力资本个体互联网技能溢价更高,高、低教育人力资本个体会形成收入差距,结论在采用互联网普及率和家人上网等工具变量进行内生性检验后,从小时工资、收入异常值以及收入样本选择三方面变换收入测度方式后依旧具有稳健性。分位数回归表明跨越一级、二级数字鸿沟对中等及高收入群体的增收效应具有统计显著性。建议继续加强互联网基础设施建设,尤其是农村地区的互联网可及性和渗透性;着力打造高质量教育体系,持续提升教育人力资本积累的广度和深度;加强“互联网+人才”的示范性作用,通过促进互联网技术与人才的结合从而推动各行各业的数字化转型,提高生产效率和经济竞争力,加速产业数字化转型升级。     

海外智力回流的复合动力模型与行动类型——基于中国留学生归国动因的历史检视

影响智力行动者作出回流决策的动力来源和动力方向是多样性的,包括来自东道国的粘力和斥力、母国的拉力和推力,以及第三国的吸力;而且作用机制也是多元化的,既有经济驱动力(包括工资水平、就业机会、经济前景、购买力等),也涉及制度、网络、文化、生命周期等驱动力。作为理性行动者,智力迁移者们的回流决定主要是因为他们明确感受到来自母国的拉力(PS-PR),或者来自母国的拉力明显强于来自东道国的粘力(PS>PL)。同时文章认为,智力行动的最终回流决策事实上并不都是经济理性行动,还涉及制度强制驱动型、政策诱导型、移民网络驱动型、文化价值驱动型等社会理性行动。最后,基于中国留学生回流历史,分析不同发展阶段智力回流的主要动机和行动类型。研究发现,在长达170余年的中国海归史中,海归们的回流动机表现出多元化特征,并且在不同发展阶段呈现出不同的行动类型,具有明显的政治性、社会性和复合性,其中在限制性流动阶段,海归回流是以制度强制驱动型为主;在自由性流动阶段,海归回流动力来源表现更为多元,包括经济驱动型、政策诱导型甚至爱国情感驱动型等。     

以人口有序流动促进城镇化健康发展——"新型城镇化与人口有序流动"论坛综述

中央城市工作会议指出, 推进新型城镇化的首要任务是 "促进有能力在城镇稳定就业和生活的常住人口有序实现市民化". 流动人口的有序流动和城市融入问题, 不仅关乎新型城镇化战略推进之成败, 也是决定中国经济能否跨越中等收入陷阱进而实现可持续发展的关键所在. 由杭州国际城市学研究中心、 浙江省城市治理研究中心与浙江大学中国农村发展研究院共同举办的中国城市学年会 "新型城镇化与人口有序流动" 论坛于2016年11月6日在杭州举行. 来自北京、 上海、 武汉、 杭州等城市高校和科研机构的15位学者发表演讲, 近30位学者出席论坛并参与讨论.与会代表深入探讨了中央城市工作会议背景下中国新型城镇化面临的机遇和挑战, 并围绕 "新型城镇化与人口有序流动" 主题展开讨论, 现将主要观点综述如下.     

国内大循环背景下流动人口消费潜力的经济效应测度

文章基于有效需求理论,利用第七次全国人口普查、微观调查数据和中国省级多区域投入产出表构建扩展的列昂惕夫需求驱动模型,估计2020年中国31个省份流动人口消费拉动的增加值规模,并设计基准、城镇化和市民化3种情景对“十四五”期间流动人口消费的经济影响及最优发展路径进行量化评估。结果显示,2020年流动人口消费引致的增加值达8.3万亿元（占GDP总量的8.2%）;中等收入流动人口消费对经济增长的贡献最大,其消费拉动的增加值约占60%;流动人口消费创造的增加值60%以上体现在与食品、居住消费活动相关的部门;“十四五”时期加快流动人口市民化是扩大流动人口消费助力经济增长的有效途径。研究表明,流动人口的消费需求增加和消费结构升级对扩大生产规模、优化产业结构具有重要作用;扩大中等收入流动人口规模是增强社会有效需求和实现共同富裕的重要突破点;“十四五”时期中国社会经济政策实施的重点领域之一,仍是推动流动人口市民化并完善相关的配套措施。     

人口负增长时代人口规模结构变动对科技创新的影响北大核心

文章使用正在经历或已经历过人口负增长时代的17个国家2005-2019年的面板数据分析人口负增长时代人口规模结构变动对科技创新的影响。人口负增长时代主要以人口绝对数量的下降和人口相对结构的老化为特征,对国家科技创新能力产生影响。按照经济发展水平、人口规模大小和人口再生产的亚欧模式分类后,实证研究发现:人口结构老化与一国科技创新能力呈现明显“倒U”型关系,变化拐点为老龄化水平达到16.58%;与中等收入国家相比,高收入国家初期应对负增长时代人口结构老化风险的能力更强;按人口规模划分,人口增长率变动与科技创新能力之间的负向关系显著,人口大国承受和化解老龄化后期负面影响的能力更强;与东亚国家相比,欧洲国家由于经历的人口负增长时域长、国家多,其人口增长率、老龄化水平与科技创新之间已呈现出显著的负向关系。当前我国拥有规模庞大且相对稳定的劳动力队伍和科研队伍,高等教育普及程度和研发投入占比仍在稳步提升,对未来人口负增长时代的科技创新发展不必过于悲观。面对将很快到来的不可逆的人口负增长时代,我国应当未雨绸缪,贯彻落实创新驱动发展战略,维持稳定的国家科技创新能力,推动中国经济行稳致远。     

Economic Stress and the Great Recession in Ireland: Polarization,Individualization or ‘Middle Class Squeeze’?

Following an unprecedented boom, since 2008 Ireland has experienced a severe economic and labour market crisis. Considerable debate persists as to where the heaviest burden of the recession has fallen. Conventional measures of relative income poverty and inequality have a limited capacity to capture the impact of the recession in terms of social exclusion. This is exacerbated by a dramatic increase in the scale of debt problems including significant negative equity issues. Our analysis provides no evidence for individualization or class polarization of risk. Instead, while economic stress level is highly stratified in class terms in both boom and bust periods, the changing impact of class is highly contingent on life course stage. An income based classification showed that the affluent income class saw its advantage relative to the income poor class decline at the earliest stage of the life-course and remain stable across the rest of the life course. At the other end of the hierarchy, the income poor class experienced a relative improvement in their situation in the earlier life-course phase and no significant change at the later stages. For the remaining income classes, life-course stage was even more important. At the earliest stage the precarious class experienced some improvement in its situation while the outcomes for the middle classes remain unchanged. In the mid-life course the precarious and lower middle classes experienced disproportionate increases in their stress levels while at the later stage it is the combined middle classes that lost out. Additional effects over time relating to social class are restricted to the deteriorating situation of the petit bourgeoisie at the middle stage of the life-course. The pattern is clearly a good deal more complex than that suggested by conventional notions of ‘middle class squeeze’ and points to the distinctive challenges relating to welfare and taxation policy faced by governments in the Great Recession.     

Median Relative Partial Income Polarization Indices: Investigating Economic Polarization in Poland During the Years 2005–2015

In recent years, more and more attention has been focused on the effects of economic growth and inequality changes on income polarization, as well as on the changes in the middle income class fraction. A significant part of the literature that deals with these issues is focused on polarization indices. However, the polarization indices proposed by researchers do not allow for an assessment of impact of the income distribution changes on the disappearance of the middle income class. Moreover, the general income polarization indices do not allow for assessment of polarization within the distinguished income classes. This study proposes a class of median relative polarization partial indices, which allows for a comprehensive assessment of the median relative polarization over time, within the distinguished income classes, as well as the impact of income distribution changes (its polarization or convergence) on the change of the middle income class fraction (its disappearance or increase). Using Social Diagnosis panel data (a study carried out by the Social Monitoring Council), the proposed new tool has been used to verify the hypothesis of whether changes in the household income distribution in Poland during the years 2005–2015 have led to income polarization within the three distinguished income groups—lower, middle and upper income classes. Empirical analysis shows that despite the lack of overall polarization of incomes in the household population, there was a convergence of incomes in the upper and lower income classes and polarization of incomes within the middle income class. It implies that the income distribution has not been petrified, and as on average individuals in the lower and upper income classes tend to reduce the distance to the median income, whereas the members of the middle income class tend to be pushed out of the middle class. Moreover, the flows of households into the middle income class were higher than the outflows from this class, resulting in economic convergence, i.e. changes in income distribution leading to an increase of the middle income class fraction.

     

There is no low-level fertility and development trap

The theory of the low-level equilibrium trap asserts that an increase in income stimulates population growth sufficiently so that the additional people ‘eat up’ the ‘surplus’ over subsistence, and hence drive the level of income back to subsistence. Originally the theory referred primarily to mortality, but nowadays its application is to fertility. In the long-run equilibrium context in which the theory is ordinarily presented, the fact that the long-run elasticity of fertility with respect to income is negative in less developed countries fatally contradicts the accepted version of the trap. But to give every chance for trap theory to be meaningful, the paper presents a period-by-period analysis, embodying larger-than-observed positive elasticities during the early years and the logically necessary counterbalancing negative elasticities during the later years. These elasticities are combined with consumption and production figures for various age groups to estimate the effect in each year after the windfall, and altogether. The results show that even under assumptions not charitable to the conclusion of this paper, additional children do not even come close to ‘eating up’ the increase in income which induced their births, so that the trap theory is falsified.     

中国特色的人口转变

从人口均衡发展的角度对人口转变理论进行了研究,认为人口转变是由低级人口均衡转变为高级人口均衡的跃迁过程,人口"总量相对静止、结构高位稳定"是最理想的人口发展状态。中国人口转变经历了超前经济发展的"人口转变"和与经济互动发展的"后人口转变"两个阶段,人口转变过程中需跨越"高少儿抚养"和"高老年赡养"的两次陷阱。稳定适度低生育水平和提升人口素质是未来根本任务,从较短期看总和生育率保持在1.8左右,从中长期看总和生育率回归更替水平,是"后人口转变"时期的战略目标,也是促进人口长期均衡发展的必由之路。     

There is no low-level fertility and development trap

Summary The theory of the low-level equilibrium trap asserts that an increase in income stimulates population growth sufficiently so that the additional people 'eat up' the 'surplus' over subsistence, and hence drive the level of income back to subsistence. Originally the theory referred primarily to mortality, but nowadays its application is to fertility. In the long-run equilibrium context in which the theory is ordinarily presented, the fact that the long-run elasticity of fertility with respect to income is negative in less developed countries fatally contradicts the accepted version of the trap. But to give every chance for trap theory to be meaningful, the paper presents a period-by-period analysis, embodying larger-than-observed positive elasticities during the early years and the logically necessary counterbalancing negative elasticities during the later years. These elasticities are combined with consumption and production figures for various age groups to estimate the effect in each year after the windfall, and altogether. The results show that even under assumptions not charitable to the conclusion of this paper, additional children do not even come close to 'eating up' the increase in income which induced their births, so that the trap theory is falsified.     

中国农村居民家庭的生育决策模型与实证分析

根据"五普"和"六普"资料,人口总和生育率显著低于世代更替水平,这表明中国人口进入了低生育水平发展阶段。关于这一问题的合理解释是除了计划生育政策影响外,农村家庭生育决策的变化可能是内生的重要影响因素。基于生育决策模型及实证分析,得出这样的结论:在土地量保持不变的条件下,农村居民家庭的生育决策主要取决于收入水平和抚养子女的成本。农村居民家庭可能会依据"量质权衡"减少生育子女,这可能是导致中国人口生育水平下降的根本原因。     

生育激励与个人所得税 ——理论逻辑与经验论据

中共十九大报告提出要进一步“促进生育政策和相关经济社会政策配套衔接”。在厘清税收激励生育的理论逻辑基础上,运用工资税模型,获取OECD国家对此的经验论据。结果显示,许多国家运用税收政策向有子女家庭提供正向激励,且更注重中低收入家庭。进一步分析发现,通常为符合资格条件的儿童设计相同的或递增的定额税收优惠,甚至为大规模家庭赋予额外优惠;将儿童税收宽免转化为抵免,引进收入限制和可退抵免制;单亲家庭可享受额外优惠,而已婚家庭还通过个人申报纳税、婚姻优惠、家庭申报纳税等多种举措受益。应汲取和借鉴OECD国家的成功经验,逐步构建我国“生育友好型”的税收制度。     

The gap of economic development expanding between eastern China and middle,western China

Jiang Zemin announced at China's 5th Plenary Session of the 14th Central Committee that there was a serious problem of differences in economic development between Eastern China and Middle and Western China. There are many economic development differences between provinces. The coastal eastern zone is comprised of 12 provinces and municipalities: Beijing, Tianjin, Hebei, Liaoning, Shanghai, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Fujian, Shandong, Guangdong, Guangxi, and Hainan. The middle zone is comprised of 9 provinces and regions including Shanxi, Inner Mongolia, Jilin, Heilongjiang, Anhui, Jiangxi, Henan, Hubei, and Hunan. The third development zone in Western China includes the 9 provinces of Sichuan, Guizhou, Yunnan, Tibet, Shaanxi, Gansu, Qinghai, Ningxia, and Xinjiang. The most developed region is the eastern coastal zone. About 41% of the total population live in the eastern coastal zone, about 36% live in the middle zone, and about 23% live in the western zone. The proportion of gross domestic product (GDP) in the eastern, middle, and western zones shifted from 52.5%, 31.0%, and 16.5%, respectively, in 1973 to 58.5%, 27.4%, and 14.1%, respectively. in 1994. GDP per capita increased by 10.5 times in the eastern zone, by 8.2 times in the middle zone, and by 8.0 times in the western zone to 5352 yuan, 2878 yuan, and 2320 yuan, respectively, in 1994. Nationally, per capita income among urban households was 3179 yuan in 1994. In the eastern coastal zone only two provinces were below the national average: Liaoning with 2750.73 yuan/capita and Hebei with 2906.42 yuan/capita. Only 2 of 18 provinces in the middle and western zones had per capita urban income above the national average: Hunan with 3365.47 yuan/capita and Tibet with 3595.42/capita. Nationally, the annual net rural income was 1220.98/capita. Rural income below the national average occurred in Hebei and Guangsi in the eastern coastal zone and all provinces in the middle and western zones. The highest rural income in the middle and western zones was in Tibet with 975.95 yuan/capita.     

农村最低生活保障实施的问题与对策研究

实施农村最低生活保障制度是构建农村社会保障体系的一项基础工程．也是建设社会主义新农村的重要内容。目前,我国农村低保制度已进入全面推进的新阶段,如何尽快完善这项制度已引起普遍关注。本文分析了农村低保实施过程中存在的问题。并提出解决问题的对策。     

Low Fertility Trap:Theories,Facts and Implications

The low Fertility Trap Hypothesis proposes that there are three self-reinforcing mechanism--demographic,sociological and economic,working towards a downward spiral in future fertility.Once TFR drops below 1.5,it will be difficult to recover.The fertility recovery emerging in many countries across the world has changed the lowfertility trap theory and also the justification of the theory itself.So low-fertility trap is more likely a pattern summarized from a short-time phenomenon than a generalized social law.As with China,the current fertility level is above 1.5 births per woman,and China is not in the "Low-fertility trap".Moreover,most recent surveys suggests that current fertility intention in China is above 1.8 births per woman and more than60 percent of people would have a second child if there is an adjustment of fertility policy.In addition,birth postponement is still playing an important role in reducing TFR in China.Thus,with the high fertility intention,adjustment of family planning policy and decreasing tempo effect,TFR in China will experience upturn but not further decline in the near future.It is lack of evidence to conclude that China has already been or is going to be trapped in low fertility.