The Epistemological Significance of the Theory of Social Representations

The theory of social representations must be understood in terms of its proper epistemology so that it can accomplish its full potential in social sciences. This is often difficult to achieve because researchers comprehend it in terms of concepts that are part of static and individualistic Newtonian epistemology rather than in terms of dynamic and relational Einsteinian epistemology. This article considers three signposts that Moscovici identifies and analyses in the theory of relativity, namely the relation between epistemology and science, theory and method, and the argument against the explanation of effects by their causes. The following question is posed: are these signposts also characteristic of the theory of social representations? This question is examined focusing on interactional epistemology, theory and method and the diversity of natural thinking and communication. Moscovici's Psychoanalysis shows that natural thinking appears in a plurality of modes according to the situation in which it takes place and according to social groups towards which it is directed. Natural thinking is controversial and communication‐centred. Different professionals, groups and lay people use different kinds of speaking and different communicative genres when they try to resolve “the same” problem. The article suggests that bringing together dialogicality, dialogical linguistics and the theory of social representations may open up new possibilities for theoretical developments in social psychology.     

Happiness and Virtue in Positive Psychology

Positive psychologists aspire to study the moral virtues, as well as positive emotions, while retaining scientific objectivity. Within this framework, Martin Seligman, a founder of positive psychology, offers an empirically‐based argument for an ancient and venerable theme: happiness can be increased by exercising the virtues. Seligman's project is promising, but it needs to pay greater attention to several methodological matters: (1) greater care in defining happiness, so as to avoid smuggling in value assumptions of the sort suggested by the title of his book, Authentic Happiness; (2) more attention to the gap between happiness as overall satisfaction and specific gratifications (enjoyments); (3) the danger of sliding to subjectivism by equating self‐assessments of virtue with objectively‐justified values of the sort Aristotle had in mind; (4) awareness of how “positive” emotions and attitudes presuppose value assumptions.     

Epistemological problems and the personality and social system in social psychology

If we understand social psychology to be an area where sociology and psychology overlap, or more precisely where we try to explain interaction on the basis of psychological and sociological propositions and concepts, we have singled out a field that should be quite challenging not only in theory and method but in the fundamental questions it raises for both sociology and psychology. Actually, the discipline is not that well integrated and is constituted by such disparate approaches as reinforcement theory, field theory, role theory, small group theory, game theory and psychoanalysis. Many sociologists have abandoned the field altogether. Nor have the proponents of these sub-fields made much effort to consolidate, integrate or reconcile their methodologies. Epistemological questions have been notably absent and only now have arguments from the philosophy of science point of view reemerged to revive the critical and potentially fruitful methodological discussions of earlier theorists (F. Allport; Lewin; Mead; Simmel) and their more recent followers (Homans; Malewski). After considering epistemological problems dealing with the generality of theory and explanation, behavioristic vs. action approaches, operational and model structural implications, we want to argue for a better understanding of social system variables besides those of the personality system and of system theory in general. In our discussion we use examples from the area of sport because it composes a complex system, that is not too difficult to observe at the same time that it shows in relative clarity all of the different levels of an action system. It has, furthermore, many features of an almost experimental design in a natural field. In so far it is a model area to allow due consideration for our demand that social psychology rediscover the method of field studies. This will help to reverse the trend characterized by a general neglect of theory that has resulted from behavioral dogmatism and the expedience of research pragmatism based mostly on two-variable linear models. This is not to say that we disfavor rigorous research design and data analysis - to the contrary. We just want it to be done in the context of broader theoretical concerns and in clear recognition of the pitfalls of operationalism and the merits of action theory.     

Certain Aspects of the Study of Social History (Historical Social Psychology)

One of the scholarly disciplines, the utilization of whose method and subject matter would, in our opinion, offer very fruitful prospects for historical research, is social (societal) psychology. The subject matter of social psychology is dual. In the first place, its tasks include study of the conditioning of the individual's mentality by his membership in a society, class, or social group. Social psychology concerns itself with those aspects of the mental set and emotional behavior of man that take shape as a consequence of his life and activity in a group. In the second place, social psychology studies the behavior standards of groups and societies, the psychological reactions of groups or masses of people. We know that the emotional behavior of a group is not merely the sum of the emotions of the individuals comprising it. On the one hand, the mentality of the individual and its manifestation in the group are not analogous to the intellectual life of the individual in isolation.     

Absent, Full and Partial Responsibility of the Psychopaths

The research into the typical behavioral pattern, motivational structure, and the value system of psychopaths can shed light on at least three aspects related to the analysis of the moral agency. First, it can help elucidating the emotive and cognitive conditions necessary for moral performance. Secondly, it can provide empirical evidence supporting the externalist theories of moral motivation. Finally, it can bring into greater focus our intuitive notion of the limits of moral responsibility. In this paper I shall concentrate on the last one—the question of responsibility of the amoralists, but the discussion will have an indirect bearing on the other two themes as well. My main reason for holding psychopaths morally responsible breaks down into two claims: the assumption that most ordinary people are morally responsible for their intentional actions (i.e., the rejection of hard determinism) and the denial that the psychopaths are qualitatively different from the non‐psychopaths. This thesis is further defended against two objections. First, I am arguing that the genetically based emotive deficiency of the psychopaths cannot be seen the factor condemning them to amoral existence, and thus cannot be cited as an exempting condition. Secondly, my position is defended against the claim that psychopaths are partly responsible for their actions. It is argued that the notion of partial responsibility is either incoherent or else rests on a false empirical premise. My conclusion is in agreement with, and provides a theoretical justification for, the position of most classifications of the persons with antisocial personality disorder in the DSM IV.     

Reconstructing the social constructionist view of emotions: from language to culture,including nonhuman culture

The thesis of social constructionism is that emotions are shaped by culture and society. I build on this insight to show that existing social constructionist views of emotions, while providing valid research methods, overly restrict the scope of the social constructionist agenda. The restriction is due to the ontological assumption that social construction is indissociable from language. In the first part, I describe the details of the influential social constructionist views of Averill and Harré. Drawing on recent theorizing in psychology, I suggest that their fixation on language makes these approaches inadequate to the analysis of the social construction of human emotional experience. In the second part, I extend the argument to other species, suggesting that these social constructionist views are incapable of accommodating the fact, ascertained by primatologists, that animals have cultures, and that part of animal culture concerns the social molding of their emotions. I conclude that a reconstructed social constructionism should be regarded not as inimical to, but as part and parcel of, a nonreductive biology of emotions.     

Moral emotions in early childhood: Validation of the Chinese moral emotion questionnaire

Moral emotions such as pride, guilt and shame play an important role in the social-emotional development of preschool children. However, there are not many instruments available for measuring moral emotions in the preschool age. Moreover, relatively few research had examined cross-cultural validity of measures for moral emotions. The present study tested the Chinese version of the Moral emotion questionnaire (MEQ) upon a group of (N = 182) Chinese preschool children aged from 2 to 6 years. The Chinese MEQ is a parent-report translated from Dutch, assessing behavioural responses of pride, guilt and shame in preschool children. Confirmatory factor analysis showed satisfactory goodness-of-fit indexes for a three-factor structure (Pride, Guilt, Shame) with 15 loading items. For concurrent relations, the results suggested an adaptive role of pride and guilt and a maladaptive role of shame in the social-emotional development of preschool children. We could conclude that the 15-item Chinese MEQ is a valid and reliable instrument for measuring pride, guilt, and shame in 2–6-year-old children in the Chinese context.     

William James' Theory of Emotions: Filling in the Picture

The theory of emotion developed by William James has been subject to four criticisms. First, it is held that Jamesian emotion is without function, that it plays no role in cognition and behavior. Second, that James ignores the role of experience in emotion. Third, that James overstated the role of physical processes in emotion. Fourth, that James' theory of emotion has been experimentally demonstrated to be false. A fifth point, less an explicit criticism than an assumption, holds that James has nothing to offer a social psychology of emotions. It will be shown in this paper that not one of these criticisms of James' theory of emotion can be sustianed.     

Sex Differences in Moral Interests: The Role of Kinship and the Nature of Reciprocity

Although moral psychologists and feminist moral theorists emphasize males' interest in justice or fairness and females' interest in care or empathy, recent work in evolutionary psychology links females' interests in care and empathy for others with interests in fairness and equality. In an important work on sex differences in cognitive abilities, David Geary (1998 ) argues that the evolutionary mechanism of sexual selection drives the evolution of particular cognitive abilities and selection for particular interests. I mount two main challenges to Geary's claims. First, I argue that female social and intrasexual competitive environments evolve, which challenges the assumption that such environments are largely nonkin-based and characterized by reciprocity. Second, I grant Geary's entire characterization of female environments, but argue that the natures of reciprocal relationships themselves do not require and may not select for interests in fairness and equality. This analysis not only challenges claims regarding sex differences in moral interests, but also suggests the need for a diachronic model of male and female social and intrasexual competitive environments. In addition, I propose a return to Trivers's (1971 ) focus on the suite of emotions underlying reciprocal altruism as properties and features of individuals as fodder for selection.     

Autism, Empathy and Questions of Moral Agency

In moral psychology, it has long been argued that empathy is a necessary capacity of both properly developing moral agents and developed moral agency ( Blair, 2008 ; Hume et al., 1978 ). This view stands in tension with the belief that some individuals diagnosed with autism—which is typically characterized as a deficiency in social reciprocity (including empathy)—are moral agents. In this paper we propose to explore this tension and perhaps trouble how we commonly see those with autism. To make this task manageable, we will consider whether high functioning individuals diagnosed with an autism spectrum disorder are capable of empathetic responses. If they are, then they possess a capacity that, on the view above, is required for moral agency. If they are not so capable, and yet sometimes engage in moral behaviour, this casts some doubt on the claim that empathy is required for moral agency. This second possibility will necessitate an exploration of the capacity of some individuals with autism to engage in moral behaviour, giving us further grounds to re-see these individuals as moral agents.     

Social psychology as a stable interpretative framework irrefutably committed to the scientific study of persons and society

Despite repeated opportunities to reconsider their natural science ambitions, social psychologists have not done so, and there are no obvious signs of this changing. Why? This paper pursues an answer to this question by defining the field after the fashion of Michael Polanyi's thought. According to Polanyi, interpretative frameworks develop from our primitive bodily encounters with the world and then are shaped by language into the vast conceptual systems of our culture. Concerning frameworks erected on our most fundamental beliefs (e.g., science), he says that we “live in [them] as in the garment of our own skin.” Frameworks such as this are not objects of critical evaluation but of commitment, and social psychology, as an outgrowth of positive philosophy, is an interpretative framework in this sense. Professionals' recent responses to the field's political makeup and replication failures demonstrate this. They aim primarily at preserving a natural science understanding of social psychology and point to the influence of belief-stabilizing mechanisms Polanyi finds operative in folk religious practices. These mechanisms appear at work also in psychology as a whole. They are implied, for instance, in the field's resistance to Sigmund Koch's authoritative judgement against its scientific self-conception in the latter half of the 20^th century. Noting this reveals the broader implications of this paper's definition of social psychology, but it also urges questions about truth and relativity that cannot be ignored. These questions are addressed briefly in the end where it is suggested that what psychology needs most of all is a change of heart, and that this will happen, if at all, not primarily through argument and evidence, but through persons who authentically believe in the veracity of a different framework.     

Alienation as Atrophied Moral Cognition and Its Implications for Political Behavior

I present a theory of alienation that accounts for the cognitive processes involved with moral thinking and political behavior in modern societies. On my account, alienation can be understood as a particular kind of atrophy of moral concepts and moral thinking that affect the ways individuals cognize and legitimate the social world and their place within it. Central to my argument is the thesis that modern forms of social integration—shaped by highly institutionalized, rationalized and hierarchical forms of social life—serve to constrain the moral‐ cognitive powers of subjects leading to a condition of alienation as moral atrophy. This state results from the withering of the subject's internal powers of moral reflection and an overriding predisposition to rely on external value schemas to make sense of moral and political problems. I then present an analysis of alienated moral consciousness and its implications for modern social theory.     

Economic theory as political philosophy

I defend the integrity of the question of what the cognitive status of economic theory could amount to, and I argue that the theory is best understood as a compartment of formal political philosophy, in particular a species of contractarianism. This seems particularly apt as an account of general equilibrium theory. Given the intentional character of the explanatory variables of economic theory and the role of information in effecting choice, it is argued that economic theory is unlikely to secure the predictive power that would enable it to function as a factual instead of a normative theory.     

The social construction of character

There has been increased interest in character strengths or virtues in recent years in social research and in various policy domains. However, while the notion of virtue has gained credibility in the fields of positive psychology and moral philosophy, it has yet to be satisfactorily considered from the perspective of social theory – in spite of the ongoing calls of researchers who have identified the need for further investigation into the role of culture and social context in the development of individuals' characters. In order to consider how good character and excellence in specific virtues are formed and sustained in social context, this article gives a theoretical account of character and virtue using well‐known microsociological concepts. It is argued that whereas virtues are often understood as psychological ‘traits’ or ‘dispositions’, they are also socially practiced and represented. Analyses of their related social processes are therefore appropriate and empirically promising, particularly in institutional settings, and can complement other theoretical and methodological approaches.     

On the Possible Non-Existence of Emotions: The Passions

This paper attempts to demonstrate, at least for the passions, that while emotions are important elements of common sense psychological thought, they are not psychological, neural, or mental entities. People talk of emotions, we claim, in two sorts of cases: Firstly, when it is believed that someone has done something that she shouldn't because she has been overwhelmed by desire (a motive) and secondly, when someone is found to be compelled to devote cognitive resources to an act she knows she will never carry out. In this case motivational states command attention and cognitive and physiological resources, distract us, even though they will not issue in action. In either case pointing to an emotion is pointing to a partial, aborted, or misdirected desire. We discuss why emotions are considered important in common sense and professional psychology though they do not exist.     

On the Very Idea of "Negative Emotions"

As attention has shifted towards the emotions in general, the notion of so-called negative emotions has come in for renewed interest. The author explores this notion and argues that its invocation cannot be done without cost to our understanding since it obscures all sorts of relevant complexities. There are thus no emotions around to which we can helpfully refer collectively as "negative," although there are of course painful emotions, emotions that negatively evaluate states of affairs, emotions that are negatively morally evaluated, and so forth. Furthermore, while attempts are under way to reappraise various (commonly) negatively evaluated emotions, those attempts involve different kinds of argument which cannot and should not be collected together as "defenses of negative emotions."     

Russian Liberalism in the Face of Crisis

The development of liberalism in Russia occurred under substantially different conditions from those in the West. The history of liberalism in the West is already a century old; not only has it acquired there a sufficiently mature theoretical form, but it has even been translated into reality as civil society and the law-governed state. Liberalism cannot be reduced to any specific moral and political movement, but it can be understood as a special type of civilization, in contrast to traditional civilization. In Russia, however, liberalism evolved always under the influence of the highest achievements of Western liberal ideas; it remained an opposition movement, opposing the dominant values of society and supporting the country's transformation into a liberal civilization.     

Adaptations for Nothing in Particular

An element of the contemporary dispute amongst evolution minded psychologists and social scientists hinges on the conception of mind as being adapted as opposed to adaptive. This dispute is not trivial. The possibility that human minds are both adapted and adaptive courtesy of selection pressures that were social in nature is of particular interest to a putative evolutionary social psychology. I suggest that the notion of an evolved psychological adaptation in social psychology can be retained only if it is accepted that this adaptation is for social interaction and has no rigidly fixed function and cannot be described in terms of algorithmic decision rules or fixed inferential procedures. What is held to be the reason for encephalisation in the Homo lineage and some of best atested ideas in social psychology offers license for such an approach.     

Hypothesis, Faith, and Commitment: William James' Critique of Science

William James is remembered as the philosopher of pragmatism, but he was principally the founder of modern scientific psychology. During the period of his most intense scientific involvement James developed a trenchant critique of science. This was not a rejection of science but an attempt to identify limitations of the contemporary conceptualization of science. In particular, James emphasized the failure of science to understand its basis in human emotions. James developed a scientific theory of emotions in which the importance of emotion in cognition and decision-making is central. James' appreciation of the significance of emotions in science has continuing value. Nevertheless, his characterization of science in terms of its method introduces tensions in his account that an emphasis on the social dimensions of science, which he implicitly acknowledged, tends to resolve.