The stochastic component in choice and regression to the mean

In this article, we illustrate experimentally an important consequence of the stochastic component in choice behaviour which has not been acknowledged so far. Namely, its potential to produce ‘regression to the mean’ (RTM) effects. We employ a novel approach to individual choice under risk, based on repeated multiple-lottery choices (i.e. choices among many lotteries), to show how the high degree of stochastic variability present in individual decisions can distort crucially certain results through RTM effects. We demonstrate the point in the context of a social comparison experiment.     

Are bygones bygones?

This article reports an experiment which tests the principle of separability, i.e. that behaviour in a dynamic choice problem is independent of history and of unreachable eventualities. Although this is a well-known principle of orthodox decision theory and central to conventional economic modelling, it has been questioned on grounds suggested by non-expected utility models of choice under risk and by the psychology of affective influences on risk-taking. Our experimental design, which provides between-subjects tests of separability using three treatments in which the history preceding a decision is manipulated, is inspired by these concerns. We expose separability to a clean and harsh test, but find no evidence that it is violated.     

Another impossibility result for normal form games

It is shown that the axioms Cubitt and Sugden (1994; Economic J. 104: 798) impose on a theory of rationally justifiable play (TRJP) do not prevent the possibility that two players necessarily disagree concerning the probability they ascribe to the choice of a third player. This appears to indicate that those axioms are not sufficient for defining a `reasonable' TRJP. In addition, for the case in which a player's beliefs are statistically independent, conditions for a TRJP are suggested under which the existence of a quasi-strict equilibrium is sufficient, but the existence of a consistent n-pair is not, for defining a TRJP meeting those requirements.     

Two envelopes

“You have been given either envelopeA orB. B contains either one-half or twice the money inA. Do you want to switch? Now you open your envelope? Are you still happy to stand pat?” Answers depend on whether you think there is an upper bound to the money inA. You should no longer be indifferent if you think there is not an upper bound, but, if you think there is a certain upper boundU, you should want to switch or not depending on whether your envelope holds less thanU. Expected monetary values are extended to acts with infinitely many equally possible monetary values. It is maintained that though strong dominance under infinite partitions does not in the absence of an upper bound for values imply greater expected value, ‘univocal strong dominance’ is even then properly decisive for choice.     

Allocating Homes for People with Intellectual Disability: Needs,Mix and Choice

Allocation of housing and support services for people with intellectual disability is based on three major sets of criteria: an assessment of the applicants' needs; considerations of social mix; and the applicants' own choices. This article examines the philosophical and institutional rationales underlying each of these notions and the tensions arising when seeking to achieve a balance between them. The first section of the article is based on a review of related studies in the UK, the USA and Australia, mainly on allocation policies in mainstream social housing. The second section presents original empirical work carried out in the state of Victoria, Australia, in 2007–08, illustrating some of the implications of a new balance that was created between needs, mix and choice in allocation of housing and support for people with intellectual disability. The article argues that the concepts of needs, mix and choice should be redefined in a way which reflects the interdependencies between them. Further, the article calls for more extensive mutual learning between studies of mainstream social housing and housing for people with intellectual disability.     

Testing the ‘standard’ model of stochastic choice under risk

Models of stochastic choice are intended to capture the substantial amount of noise observed in decisions under risk. We present an experimental test of one model, which many regard as the default—the Basic Fechner model. We consider one of the model’s key assumptions—that the noise around the subjective value of a risky option is independent of other features of the decision problem. We find that this assumption is systematically violated. However the main patterns in our data can be accommodated by a more recent variant of the Fechner model, or within the random preference framework.     

From Subsidiarity to 'Free Choice': Child- and Elder-care Policy Reforms in France, Belgium, Germany and the Netherlands

This article analyses the patterns of reform in care policies in Bismarckian welfare systems since the early 1980s. Based on a comparison of France, Germany, Belgium and the Netherlands, the article shows that these reforms share similar logics and trajectories, which can be explained by the shared conservative and corporatist traits of Bismarckian labour markets and welfare state institutions and their impact on labour market adjustment possibilities and preferences. Indeed, we argue that care policy reforms have been very closely linked to specific employment strategies, and the politics of welfare without work and subsequent attempts to shift away from such a labour-shedding strategy go a long way in explaining both the nature and the timing of child- and elder-care policy reforms in Bismarckian welfare systems. The article also shows how a focus on promoting ‘free choice’ in all four countries has justified the introduction of measures that have simultaneously reinforced social stratification in terms of access to the labour market – meaning that some women have much more ‘free choice’ than others – and weakened certain labour market rigidities. To conclude, we argue that care policy reforms have provided a backdoor for the introduction of labour-cheapening measures and for increasing employment flexibility in otherwise very rigid labour markets.     

Testing the Intransitivity Explanation of the Allais Paradox

This paper uses a two-dimensional version of a standard common consequence experiment to test the intransitivity explanation of Allais-paradox-type violations of expected utility theory. We compare the common consequence effect of two choice problems differing only with respect to whether alternatives are statistically correlated or independent. We framed the experiment so that intransitive preferences could explain violating behavior when alternatives are independent, but not when they are correlated. We found the same pattern of violation in the two cases. This is evidence against intransitivity as an explanation of the Allais Paradox. The question whether violations of expected utility are mainly due to intransitivity or to violation of independence is important since it is exactly on this issue the main new decision theories differ.     

Estimating subjective probabilities

Subjective probabilities play a central role in many economic decisions and act as an immediate confound of inferences about behavior, unless controlled for. Several procedures to recover subjective probabilities have been proposed, but in order to recover the correct latent probability one must either construct elicitation mechanisms that control for risk aversion, or construct elicitation mechanisms which undertake “calibrating adjustments” to elicited reports. We illustrate how the joint estimation of risk attitudes and subjective probabilities can provide the calibration adjustments that theory calls for. We illustrate this approach using data from a controlled experiment with real monetary consequences to the subjects. This allows the observer to make inferences about the latent subjective probability, under virtually any well-specified model of choice under subjective risk, while still employing relatively simple elicitation mechanisms.     

Opinion leaders,independence, and Condorcet's Jury Theorem

Condorcet's Jury Theorem shows that on a dichotomous choice, individuals who all have the same competence above 0.5, can make collective decisions under majority rule with a competence that approaches 1 as either the size of the group or the individual competence goes up. The theorem assumes that the probability of each voter's being correct is independent of the probability of any other voter being correct. Contrary to several authors, the presence of mutual or common influences such as opinion leaders does not easily rule independence either in or out. Indeed, and this ought to be surprising,under certain conditions deference to opinion leaders can improve individual competence without violating independence, and so can raise group competence as well.     

Satisfaction and preferences in a legality social dilemma: Does corporate social responsibility impact consumers’ behaviour?

We investigate players’ preferences in a multiplayer prisoner's dilemma by comparing results from satisfaction-based and a choice-based approach by means of a laboratory experiment. The experimental design tests the effects of the legality rating frame on consumers’ choice between products from producers labeled by the legality rating and products by unlabeled producers. Both approaches provide strong evidence of preference heterogeneity, with players who cooperate above median being less affected in their choice by monetary payoffs vis-à-vis the public good component. The empirical findings support the hypothesis of our theoretical model that (part of the) players have, in addition to the standard self-interest component, an other-regarding preference argument that is further satisfied in the legality frame plus conformity design.A policy suggestion stemming from our experiment is based on the fact that corporate social responsibility legality frames and culture have a significant effect on an important portion of consumers. These consumers reveal that the often-declared willingness to pay for socially, environmentally and legally responsible features of products is confirmed by actual purchases of more expensive responsible products. Governments should therefore promote the creation of legality rating schemes with well-defined pre-established rules such as in the Italian case.     

On the existence of stable states in game problems

Each individual or group of individuals unified by some common interests often have to either accept an offer or reject it. The choice is made on the basis of not only individual or group preferences but on the basis of the reaction to this choice by other people whose preferences are dependent to some extent on this choice. The following question is to be answered: under what conditions is an offer stable, i.e. will it be accepted by each participant in a group with non-coincident interests? To answer this question is to specify in the set of all feasible offers (options or situations) those ones which would be rejected by no participant. According to this intuitive understanding of stable offers a sequence of weak and strong equilibria referred to as active equilibria was defined. A weak equilibrium satisfies the following conditions: (1) It defines stable situations which cannot be changed by a participant because of certain retaliatory actions by the other participants, which would worsen his initial situation. (2) It always exists. (3) Under comparatively wide conditions it has a non-empty intersection with the Pareto set. (4) It includes non-cooperative equilibria well known in the game theory and does not lead to any paradoxes (as, for example, the Nash equilibrium does). These conditions, and especially the third and fourth ones, indicate that the active equilibria can be successfully used in the game theory as well. Strong equilibria define a more stable situation but they do not necessarily meet all four conditions listed above.     

An axiomatic approach to predictability of outcomes in an interactive setting

This article is an axiomatic approach to the problem of ranking game forms in terms of the predictability they offer to individuals. Two criteria are proposed and characterized, the CardMin and the CardMax. Both compare game forms on the basis of the number of distinct outcomes that can result from the choice of a CardMin (resp. CardMax) strategy. The CardMin (resp. CardMax) strategy is defined as a strategy leading to the smallest (resp. highest) number of different outcomes. In both cases, the lower these numbers the better the game form.     

Preference stability and substitution of indifferents: a rejoinder to Seidenfeld

Seidenfeld (Seidenfeld, T. [1988a], Decision theory without 'Independence' or without 'Ordering', Economics and Philosophy 4: 267-290) gave an argument for Independence based on a supposition that admissibility of a sequential option is preserved under substitution of indifferents at choice nodes (S). To avoid a natural complaint that (S) begs the question against a critic of Independence, he provided an independent proof of (S) in his (Seidenfeld, T. [1988b], Rejoinder [to Hammond and McClennen], Economics and Philosophy 4: 309-315). In reply to my (Rabinowicz, W. [1995], To have one's cake and eat it too: Sequential choice and expected-utility violations, The Journal of Philosophy 92: 586-620), in which I argue that the proof is invalid, Seidenfeld (Seidenfeld, T. [2000], Substitution of indifferent options at choice nodes and admissibility: A reply to Rabinowicz, Theory and Decision 48: 305–310 this issue) submits that I fail to give due consideration to one of the underlying assumptions of his derivation: it is meant to apply only to those cases in which the agent's preferences are stable throughout the sequential decision process. The purpose of this note is to clarify the notion of preference stability so as meet this objection.     

Choice,Competition and Care – Developments in English Social Care and the Impacts on Providers and Older Users of Home Care Services

This article critically examines recent changes in markets for home (domiciliary) care services in England. During the 1990s, the introduction of competition between private (for‐profit and charitable) organizations and local authority providers of long‐term care services aimed to create a ‘mixed economy’ of supply. More recently, care markets have undergone further reforms through the introduction of direct payments and personal budgets. Underpinned by discourses of user choice, these mechanisms aim to offer older people increased control over the public resources for their care, thereby introducing further competitive pressures within local care markets. The article presents early evidence of these changes on:

• The commissioning and contracting of home care services by local authorities and individual older people.
• The experiences and outcomes for individual older people using home care services.

Drawing on evidence from two recent empirical studies, the article describes how the new emphasis on choice and competition is being operationalized within six local care markets. There are suggestions of small increases in user agency and in opportunities for older people to receive more personalized home care, in which the quality of care‐giving relationships can also be optimized. However, the article also presents early evidence of increases in risk and costs associated with the expansion of competition and choice, both for organizations providing home care services and for individual older service users.     

Prudence and extensionality in theories of preference and value

Luce's axiom governing probabilities of choice is formulated as a principle governing metalinguistic probabilities. IfX, Y, W are sets of options, and δ(X), δ(Y), δ(W) are sentences asserting that choice is made from these sets, then the axiom is $$\begin{gathered} If \pi [\delta (X)] \ne 0 and \pi [\delta (X \cap Y)] \ne 0, then \hfill \\ \pi _{\delta (X)} [\delta (Y \cap W)] = \pi _{\delta (X \cap Y)} [\delta (W)]\pi _{\delta (X)} [\delta (Y)] \hfill \\ \end{gathered} $$ where π is a probability on sentences. The axiom is then entailed by extensionality of the probability π in company with a simple condition on probabilities of truth-functions. Conditions are also given under which the probability π is uniquely represented by a probability on the sets of options. What look to be logical constraints on the metalanguage entail a normative or prudential constraint. Debreu's well-known counterinstance to the axiom as a principle governing probability of choice is examined and a novel and consistent interpretation of the axiom is proposed.     

'Sifting the Wheat from the Chaff': A Two-dimensional Discriminant Analysis of Welfare State Regime Theory

Welfare state modelling has long been an important strand within comparative social policy. However, since the publication of Esping‐Andersen's ‘Worlds of Welfare’ typology, welfare state classification has become particularly prominent and a multitude of competing typologies and taxonomies have emerged. Each of these is based on different classification criteria, and each is trying to capture what a welfare state actually does. The result is that the literature is in a state of confusion and inertia as it is unclear which of these rival systems is currently the most accurate and should be taken forward, and which are not and should perhaps be left behind. This article extends Bonoli's two‐dimensional analysis of welfare state regimes by using multivariate analysis of variance and discriminant analysis to compare and contrast the various classifications on universal criteria. It also examines the usefulness of the two‐dimensional approach itself and suggests how it can be enhanced to benefit future attempts at holistic welfare state modelling. The article concludes that there are some welfare state classifications that are more useful than others, especially in terms of reflecting a two‐dimensional analysis: it thereby ‘sifts the wheat from the chaff’ in terms of welfare state regime theory.     

Accepting and Negotiating Service Users' Choices in Mental Health Transition Meetings

Across Western welfare regimes, policies emphasize that service users should have more choices regarding their services. This article examines how service choices are presented, responded to and decided in interactions between service users and professionals in mental health transition meetings. Choice is often associated with consumerist user involvement ideas, but in mental health choice also relates to the democratic user involvement approach and to shared decision making between professionals and service users. The results of the study show that professionals construct service users as consumers by offering service options in choice making sequences, expecting users to make appropriate choices. Service users mostly act like consumers by responding to these choice options. However, the study also demonstrates that the professionals do not always accept the user's first choice but respond to them as non‐preferred. Sometimes, they also suggest choices on behalf of the users. In these ‘non‐accepting’ sequences, choices are negotiated in interaction between the parties, rather than users acting as autonomous choice makers. The sequences are based on two kinds of professional reasoning: first, the professional‐led needs assessment and, second, the structure of the service package that the user is being offered. This negotiation has elements of shared decision making and the ‘logic of care’. But it also has elements of paternalist control which challenge both consumerist and democratic service user involvement and suggests consideration of more collectively oriented service user actions.     

Analysis of Intertemporal Choice: A New Framework and Experimental Results

This paper reports the results of a series of experiments examining intertemporal choice. The paper makes three contributions: First, it presents a new analytic device, the intertemporal choice triangle, which is analogous to the Marschak--Machina choice triangle used in the analysis of choice under risk. Second, we have developed a new experimental design based on the intertemporal choice triangle which allows subjects greater flexibility in making choices, and which allows the researcher to make more subtle inferences, than are possible with designs previously employed. Subjects are able to create their most-preferred outcome in each choice situation by choosing a constrained linear combination of two extreme options. Third, our results show that while subjects do not typically maximize present value, they are significantly influenced break by present value considerations. We refer to this finding as it present value-seeking behavior. We find only weak evidence of several previously documented intertemporal choice anomalies in our framework.