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1.
基于需求信息更新和短缺量延期供给的易逝品供应链期权契约研究 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
为了降低供给与需求的不匹配,引入期权契约讨论三阶段生产和订购策略:零售商在第1阶段发出固定订单;然后在第1阶段和第2阶段之间更新需求预测,并在第2阶段调整固定订购量同时购买期权;第3阶段满足市场需求,对销售季末短缺量以执行期权和紧急订购相结合的方式实行延期供给。契约参数包含期权购买价格、执行价格和延期供给对应的批发价,三者线性相关;期权契约下,制造商不存在投机动力。根据易逝品的特征,对生产和订购模型进行仿真计算和分析,结果表明:供应链及其成员的利润都得到帕累托改进,系统利润增量的分配随期权购买价格发生变化。 相似文献
2.
需求预测更新情形下的供应链Stackelberg博弈与协调研究 总被引:4,自引:2,他引:2
在贝叶斯需求预测更新的情形下,从供需博弈角度探讨了易逝品供应链库存管理的基本问题:什么时间订、订多少以及订货价格如何决定。建立了制造商为主方、零售商为从方的供需Stackelberg博弈模型,其中制造商在低价多量与高价少量之间权衡,零售商在低成本低预测精度与高成本高预测精度之间进行权衡。分析了模型最优解的存在性,设计了两层规划的分段迭代算法,并通过数值例子说明了模型与算法的有效性。进一步,针对Stackelberg博弈中出现的双重边际效应,提出了实现供应链协调的契约形式,论证了实现供应链协调的条件。 相似文献
3.
针对二级供应链,在基于Stackelberg博弈的批发价契约中,分析了折扣价格与零售商最优提前订购量的关系及对契约双方期望收益的影响;设计了价格折扣与回购联合的协调契约,分析了供应链系统的最优提前生产量、供应链协调条件及协调契约下制造商和零售商的期望收益变化,并在协调契约不满足制造商的个体理性约束时,提出采用不对称Nash谈判模型设计两阶段生产与订购的回购契约,在保证供应链系统整体绩效最优的条件下,使制造商和零售商利润都能得到满意增长。研究表明,三级供应链实行两阶段订购的必要条件是分销商与零售商的最优提前订购量相等,与二级供应链相比,价格折扣契约下三级供应链效率更低,但价格折扣与回购联合的契约同样能协调三级供应链,该协调契约满足零售商与分销商激励相容约束。 相似文献
4.
基于集成供应的RS契约协调模型研究 总被引:5,自引:0,他引:5
在由供应商和制造商组成的两级供应链中引入集成商,研究了需求不确定且价格敏感条件下基于集成供应的3级供应链的协调问题,建立了满足渠道协调条件和集成供应条件的RS契约协调模型,给出了模型中RS契约参数的取值范围和取值过程,并用实例加以说明。利用模型不仅可以确定产品的生产量和销售价格,而且还可以通过RS契约参数实现供应链利润的分配。 相似文献
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6.
需求预测信息更新的零售商三阶段最优采购策略 总被引:2,自引:0,他引:2
考虑存在顾客需求预测信息更新下零售商最优订货策略,研究了三阶段订货模型,零售商首先在第一阶段订货,然后在第一阶段和第二阶段之间实现需求预测信息更新并在第二阶段调整第一阶段的订货水平,第三阶段顾客需求实现,零售商可以从实时市场购货以满足前两阶段订货不足的部分.给出了零售商的最优订货策略,通过数例说明了本文结论. 相似文献
7.
Marcel A. Sieke Ralf W. Seifert Ulrich W. Thonemann 《Production and Operations Management》2012,21(4):698-714
Supply contracts are used to coordinate the activities of the supply chain partners. In many industries, service level‐based supply contracts are commonly used. Under such a contract, a company agrees to achieve a certain service level and to pay a financial penalty if it misses it. The service level used in our study refers to the fraction of a manufacturer's demand filled by the supplier. We analyze two types of service level‐based supply contracts that are designed by a manufacturer and offered to a supplier. The first type of contract is a flat penalty contract, under which the supplier pays a fixed penalty to the manufacturer in each period in which the contract service level is not achieved. The second type of contract is a unit penalty contract, under which a penalty is due for each unit delivered fewer than specified by the parameters of the contract. We show how the supplier responds to the contracts and how the contract parameters can be chosen, such that the supply chain is coordinated. We also derive structural results about optimal values of the contract parameters, provide numerical results, and connect our service level measures to traditional service level measures. The results of our analyses can be used by decision makers to design optimal service level contracts and to provide them with a solid foundation for contract negotiations. 相似文献
8.
专利授权及其授权协议是知识产权转化为现实生产力的关键。本文针对由一个专利技术提供商、一个品牌制造商和一个OEM组成的供应链,考虑市场需求信息不对称以及OEM存在规模经济效应,研究了专利技术提供商最优专利授权合同设计问题,考察了不对称信息、规模经济效应等因素对专利授权合同设计、供应链利润、消费者剩余和社会福利的影响。研究结果表明:在不对称信息下,专利技术提供商通过设计一组合同菜单可以有效甄别市场需求信息;OEM会有动机去提升其规模经济效应,但却不一定有利于其他供应链成员和消费者;不对称信息的存在会影响供应链成员企业的利润水平以及消费者剩余,并总是会导致供应链系统利润的损失,但若满足一定条件,则专利技术提供商与品牌制造商可以达成信息共享谈判,实现"双赢"。 相似文献
9.
考虑批发价格更新的易逝品的零售商订货策略 总被引:13,自引:3,他引:13
易逝品的供应链管理作为供应链管理的一个重要分支,日益受到关注和重视。易逝品供应链管理的一个核心问题就是:制造商如何吸引零售商尽早订货和零售商如何针对制造商的吸引措施来进行合理订货。本文研究考虑批发价格更新的易逝品的零售商的订货策略,制造商通过为零售商提供不同批发价格的两次订货机会,来实现制造商和零售商的共赢。通过对开始时刻和批发价格更新后的系统进行建模和讨论,得到了制造商提供的两次不同的批发价格应满足的条件和零售商应该采取的优化的订货与调整策略。 相似文献
10.
不对称信息下具有需求预测更新的供应链合同协调研究 总被引:4,自引:3,他引:1
在具有需求预测更新的计划模型中,信息不对称和双重定价问题仍然在困扰着上下游企业间的关系。本文在报童模型和贝叶斯分析模型的基础上对不对称信息下具有需求预测更新的供应链系统进行了描述,并分析了信息不对称和双重定价问题。而后通过运用委托代理理论的激励原理设计最小订货比例合同,激励零售商共享其私人信息来消除双方的信息不对称,通过设计补贴合同来消除双重边际化造成的低效率,进而实现供应链上下游企业间的协调运作。最后通过运用百佳汽车公司与一汽大众供应链系统的运营数据,计算了两个合同的参数,进一步证明了最小订货比例合同和补贴合同的有效性。 相似文献
11.
Vinayak Deshpande Leroy B. Schwarz Mikhail J. Atallah Marina Blanton Keith B. Frikken 《Production and Operations Management》2011,20(2):165-180
This paper develops and tests a privacy‐preserving business process that supports the selection of a contract manufacturer by an original equipment manufacturer (OEM), and the determination of whether the OEM or the chosen contract manufacturer will procure each of the components to be used in the manufacture of the OEM's branded product. Our “secure price‐masking (SPM)” technology contributes to procurement theory and practice in four significant ways: First, it preserves the privacy of every party's individual component prices. Second, SPM assures that the contract manufacturers will bid their own private purchase cost (i.e., not add a margin to their cost). Third, SPM is not invertible; i.e., none of the participants can “solve” for the private inputs of any other participant based on its own inputs and the outputs provided to it by SPM. Fourth, the posterior distribution of any other participant's private inputs is practically indistinguishable from its prior distribution. We also describe the results of a proof‐of‐concept implementation. 相似文献
12.
供应链中基于信息更新的订货时间及价格联合决策研究 总被引:1,自引:1,他引:0
文章考虑在信息可更新的情况下,由一个制造商和一个零售商组成的供应链中订货时间及价格的联合决策问题.在模型中,制造商为零售商提供多次订货时间选择及相应的订货价格,而零售商可以在销售季节开始前自由选择订货时间并享受相应的价格.文章以不同订货时间对信息更新程度的影响为着眼点,将订货时间作为内生决策变量,突破了已有文献中仅限于两次订货时间选择的局限,分别从集中决策和分散决策两个角度建立供应链节点企业的利润模型,并在分散决策情况下引入收益共享契约,寻找帕累托改进.最后通过数值试验证明了该模型的有效性. 相似文献
13.
现实中供应不确定是比较普遍的现象,供应预测信息共享对改善供应链绩效起着重要作用。针对由一个制造商和一个零售商组成的单周期供应链,利用斯坦克尔伯格博弈方法研究信任对供应预测信息共享的影响以及回购契约对该供应链的协调作用。研究表明:零售商对制造商的信任影响供应预测信息共享效果,进而影响供应链绩效;制造商说谎的心理负效用系数越大,越倾向于说真话;回购契约可以促进制造商共享真实供应预测信息;当制造商说谎的心理负效用系数较大时,存在一个最佳的回购价格,使供应链实现完美协调。 相似文献
14.
We show simple yet optimal results to update the inventory/capacity levels, expected profit, fill rates, and service levels of substitutable resources in response to an updating of the mean demand forecasts for the resources. We find that a change in the mean demand of one resource does not affect the optimal inventory level of any other resource. The results are obtained for demands with location‐scale distribution, and for a revenue structure satisfying a triangle property such that the manager will always use the inventory of a resource to meet her own demand first before using it for substitution. The results for updating the performance measures also extend to managers who maintain non‐optimal inventory/capacity levels. Implications for procurement, sales and operational planning, and multi‐store operations are discussed. 相似文献
15.
在互联网迅猛发展的时代,生鲜农产品双渠道营销模式是供应商的最佳选择,如何发挥双渠道优势,实现渠道共赢是目前研究的热点。以供应商主导的双渠道供应链为研究对象,考虑新鲜度衰减且扰动需求和供应商保鲜努力,对比分析集中和分散决策模型,论证构建协调模型的必要性。从渠道合作和利润最大化的角度出发,设计两部定价契约、批发价协调契约和由成本分担与补偿策略构成的混合协调契约,三种契约均能在一定范围内有效实现供应链协调,提高各成员的利润。最后,对比分析所设计协调契约以认识其本质,并通过数值分析验证其有效性。 相似文献
16.
Ravi Subramanian Sudheer Gupta Brian Talbot 《Production and Operations Management》2009,18(3):259-277
Extended Producer Responsibility (EPR) legislation focuses on the life‐cycle environmental performance of products and has significant implications for management theory and practice. In this paper, we examine the influence of EPR policy parameters on product design and coordination incentives in a durable product supply chain. We model a manufacturer supplying a remanufacturable product to a customer over multiple periods. The manufacturer invests in two design attributes of the product that impact costs incurred by the supply chain—performance, which affects the environmental impact of the product during use, and remanufacturability, which affects the environmental impact post‐use. Consistent with the goals of EPR policies, the manufacturer and the customer are required to share the environmental costs incurred over the product's life cycle. The customer has a continuing need for the services of the product and optimizes between the costs of product replacement and the costs incurred during use. We demonstrate how charges during use and post‐use can be used as levers to encourage environmentally favorable product design. We analyze the impact of supply chain coordination on design choices and profit and discuss contracts that can be used to achieve coordination, both under symmetric and asymmetric information about customer attributes. 相似文献
17.
Li Jiang 《Production and Operations Management》2015,24(2):287-310
We consider a setting in which a manufacturer sequentially sources two components and uses reverse auction to select a supplier with the lowest bidding price for each component. The manufacturer chooses a quantity to order from each supplier and a price for selling the final product. We show that the interplay between the direct competition faced by suppliers in providing their respective components and the sequence whereby the manufacturer sources components influence system performance in a subtle, and sometimes dramatic, way. As the direct competition for the early sourced component intensifies, the profit of its supplier will deteriorate while the profits of the other firms will improve. As the direct competition for the late sourced component intensifies, however, the profit of its supplier may improve, and the profits of the other supplier, the manufacturer, and the system can all decrease. Compared with when the manufacturer simultaneously sources the components, sequentially sourcing the components can benefit the manufacturer and every supplier. Furthermore, all the channel parties can unanimously agree on a specific sourcing sequence. All of these signify the importance for manufacturers to take appropriate measures to manage their sourcing procedures and the competition environments faced by their suppliers. 相似文献
18.
本文研究由两个原始设备制造企业(品牌企业)、一个代工企业和一个供应商组成的多层供应链的外包模式选择问题。应用主从博弈和纳什博弈理论,当一个原始设备制造企业的外包模式给定后,通过对不同外包模型求解比较,给出了后跟进的原始设备制造企业外包模式的最优选择策略。研究发现:后跟进的原始设备制造企业最优策略应采取与前一个原始设备制造企业相同的外包策略。针对最优外包策略,还设计了使供应链达到协调的二部定价契约机制,提高了外包供应链的竞争力。 相似文献
19.
基于绩效的合同 (Performance-based Contracts-PBC) 是近年来在产品售后维修服务领域出现的全新商业模式。PBC 改变了传统上供应商通过提供维修活动和销售零件获取收益的方式,将供应商最终实现的产品可用率作为客户付款的标准。在 PBC 模式下,供应商以提高产品可用率为目标,其运营管理决策需要重新审视。备件库存对维修服务十分重要,直接影响故障修复时间。而零部件过期会影响备件库存的正常补货,降低产品可用率。本文基于 Stackelberg 博弈框架,建立了两种不同惩罚机制PBC合同的供应链动态博弈模型,得出了供应商的最优合同设计方案和用户的最优产品订购批量,分析了博弈均衡策略之间的相互作用,探讨了备件过期应对策略对供应链成员最优利润的影响。结果表明,不同的惩罚机制会对供应链成员的决策产生不同的影响。相对于基于备件缺货数量的惩罚机制,基于用户停机损失的惩罚机制对供应商提高产品可用率具有更加强烈的激励效应。然而,这种惩罚机制会导致供应商对备件库存过度投资,并减少用户的产品购买数量,进而会降低供应链成员的最优利润。同时,一个有意思的结果是在基于备件缺货数量的惩罚机制下,供应链均衡状态中惩罚金额与批发价格有联动特征,使得罚金的大小不会对产品订单数量和备件库存数量产生单独的影响。 相似文献
20.
We consider a manufacturer without any frozen periods in production schedules so that it can dynamically update the schedules as the demand forecast evolves over time until the realization of actual demand. The manufacturer has a fixed production capacity in each production period, which impacts the time to start production as well as the production schedules. We develop a dynamic optimization model to analyze the optimal production schedules under capacity constraint and demand‐forecast updating. To model the evolution of demand forecasts, we use both additive and multiplicative versions of the martingale model of forecast evolution. We first derive expressions for the optimal base stock levels for a single‐product model. We find that manufacturers located near their market bases can realize most of their potential profits (i.e., profit made when the capacity is unlimited) by building a very limited amount of capacity. For moderate demand uncertainty, we also show that it is almost impossible for manufacturers to compensate for the increase in supply–demand mismatches resulting from long delivery lead times by increasing capacity, making lead‐time reduction a better alternative than capacity expansion. We then extend the model to a multi‐product case and derive expressions for the optimal production quantities for each product given a shared capacity constraint. Using a two‐product model, we show that the manufacturer should utilize its capacity more in earlier periods when the demand for both products is more positively correlated. 相似文献