Education,Mobility and Employers’ Monopsony Power: A Search‐theoretic Analysis

Abstract. We analyse the efficiency of schooling choices in a wage‐posting search equilibrium model with on‐the‐job search. The workers have multidimensional skills and the search market is segmented by technology. Education determines the scope — or adaptability— of individual skills. Individuals obtain schooling to leave unemployment more quickly and to climb the wage ladder rapidly through job‐to‐job mobility — that is, to speed up job shopping. Education reduces firms’ monopsony power in the wage determination by improving workers’ mobility. As a result, the wage distribution shifts rightward with aggregate schooling. However, the ratio of vacant jobs to job seekers also falls in each sector. Either one or the other externality may dominate, implying, respectively, under‐ or over‐education. A combination of minimum wage and schooling fee can decentralize the efficient allocation.     

Unemployment Insurance and Underemployment

Should unemployment insurance (UI) systems provide coverage for underemployed job seekers? Based on a statistical analysis of Norwegian unemployment spells, we conclude that the answer to this question is yes. Allowing insured job seekers to retain partial UI benefits during periods of insufficient part‐time work not only reduces UI expenditures during the part‐time work period, but it also unambiguously reduces the time until a regular self‐supporting job is found. Probable explanations are that even small temporary part‐time jobs provide access to useful vacancy information and that such jobs are used by employers as a screening device when hiring from the unemployment pool.     

Vacancy Referrals,Job Search,and the Duration of Unemployment: A Randomized Experiment

One goal of the Public Employment Service is to facilitate matching between unemployed job‐seekers and job vacancies; another goal is to monitor job search so as to bring search efforts among the unemployed in line with search requirements. The referral of job‐seekers to vacancies is one instrument used for these purposes. We report results from a randomized Swedish experiment where the outcome of referrals is examined. To what extent do unemployed individuals actually apply for the jobs they are referred to? Does information to job‐seekers about increased monitoring affect the probability of applying and the probability of leaving unemployment? The experiment indicates that a relatively large fraction (one‐third) of the referrals do not result in job applications. Information about intensified monitoring causes an increase in the probability of job application, especially among young people. However, we find no significant impact on the duration of unemployment.     

SEARCH INTENSITY,DIRECTED SEARCH,AND THE WAGE DISTRIBUTION

We propose a search equilibrium model in which homogeneous firms post wages along with a vacancy to attract job seekers while homogeneous unemployed workers invest in costly job seeking. The key innovation relies on the organization of the search market and the search behavior of the job seekers. The search market is continuously segmented by wage level, individuals can spread their search investment over the different submarkets, and search intensity has marginal decreasing returns in each submarket. We demonstrate the existence of a nondegenerate equilibrium wage distribution. The density of this wage distribution is increasing at low wages and decreasing at high wages. The distribution can be right‐tailed, and, under additional restrictions, is hump‐shaped. Our results are illustrated by an example generating a Beta wage distribution.     

DOES THE ILO DEFINITION CAPTURE ALL UNEMPLOYMENT?

The labour market status of many nonworking persons is at the boundary between unemployment and inactivity. Like the unemployed, they seek and are available for work; unlike them, their last search action was not recent enough to meet the International Labour Office definition of unemployment. In this paper we examine by nonparametric tests how the transition probabilities of these out‐of‐the‐labour‐force job seekers differ from those of the unemployed as well as the other nonparticipants. First, using data from the European Community Household Panel, we show that in most EU countries these job seekers constitute a distinct labour market state. Second, we rely on information available only in the Italian Labour Force Survey to derive a measure of search intensity that we use to break down the out‐of‐the‐labour‐force job seekers. On the basis of their transition probabilities, the most active are indistinguishable from the unemployed. (JEL: J64, J22, R23)     

Reservation Wages: Explaining Some Puzzling Regional Patterns

We use the Italian Labour Force Survey and the European Household Panel Survey to analyse the distribution of the reservation wages reported by job‐seekers. In Italy, reservation wages appear to be higher in the South — the low‐income and high‐unemployment area of the country — than in the North and Centre. A similar, rather counterintuitive, pattern can also be found in Finland, France, and Spain. First, we show that the way in which these data are commonly collected generates double‐selection bias. Second, we show that this bias has a strong effect on the estimation of the geographical pattern of reservation wages in many countries. The size of this bias is substantial in Italy. When controlling for it, reservation wages are at least 10 per cent higher in the North and Centre than in the South.     

Why Do People from Southern Italy Seek Jobs in the Public Sector?

This paper analyses the choice open to a worker seeking a job in the public and private sectors of the labour market. The private sector is identified by a steeper wage profile and by lower job security than the public sector. The reservation wage for the two sectors is calculated in the first part of the paper. The results reveal that the reservation wage for the public sector is higher than that for the private sector. The effect of career prospects, job riskiness and labour demand on optimal time allocation between the search in the two sectors is then analysed. Finally, an empirical analysis is made in order to study Italian workers’ search strategies. It highlights relevant geographical differences which can be interpreted through the theoretical results obtained in the paper.     

Job Matching and the Wage Distribution

This paper brings together the microeconomic‐labor and the macroeconomic‐equilibrium views of matching in labor markets. We nest a job matching model à la Jovanovic (1984) into a Mortensen and Pissarides (1994)‐type equilibrium search environment. The resulting framework preserves the implications of job matching theory for worker turnover and wage dynamics, and it also allows for aggregation and general equilibrium analysis. We obtain two new equilibrium implications of job matching and search frictions for wage inequality. First, learning about match quality and worker turnover map Gaussian output noise into an ergodic wage distribution of empirically accurate shape: unimodal, skewed, with a Paretian right tail. Second, high idiosyncratic productivity risk hinders learning and sorting, and reduces wage inequality. The equilibrium solutions for the wage distribution and for the aggregate worker flows—quits to unemployment and to other jobs, displacements, hires—provide the likelihood function of the model in closed form.     

An Equilibrium Theory of Learning,Search, and Wages

We examine the labor market effects of incomplete information about the workers' own job‐finding process. Search outcomes convey valuable information, and learning from search generates endogenous heterogeneity in workers' beliefs about their job‐finding probability. We characterize this process and analyze its interactions with job creation and wage determination. Our theory sheds new light on how unemployment can affect workers' labor market outcomes and wage determination, providing a rational explanation for discouragement as the consequence of negative search outcomes. In particular, longer unemployment durations are likely to be followed by lower reemployment wages because a worker's beliefs about his job‐finding process deteriorate with unemployment duration. Moreover, our analysis provides a set of useful results on dynamic programming with optimal learning.     

Unemployment Duration of Spouses: Evidence From France

This paper analyses the conditional probability of leaving unemployment of French married individuals from 1991 to 2002. We find that the effect of spousal labor income on unemployment duration is asymmetric for men and women. In particular, the probability of men to find a job is increasing in wife's labor income, while it is decreasing in husband's earnings for women. To adjust for endogenous selection into marriage, we use the quarter of birth as an instrumental variable for the spousal wage. Finally, we show that introducing a breadwinner stigma in a joint job search model generates the positive correlation observed for men in the data.     

Directed Search for Equilibrium Wage–Tenure Contracts

I construct a theoretical framework in which firms offer wage–tenure contracts to direct the search by risk‐averse workers. All workers can search, on or off the job. I characterize an equilibrium and prove its existence. The equilibrium generates a nondegenerate, continuous distribution of employed workers over the values of contracts, despite that all matches are identical and workers observe all offers. A striking property is that the equilibrium is block recursive; that is, individuals' optimal decisions and optimal contracts are independent of the distribution of workers. This property makes the equilibrium analysis tractable. Consistent with stylized facts, the equilibrium predicts that (i) wages increase with tenure, (ii) job‐to‐job transitions decrease with tenure and wages, and (iii) wage mobility is limited in the sense that the lower the worker's wage, the lower the future wage a worker will move to in the next job transition. Moreover, block recursivity implies that changes in the unemployment benefit and the minimum wage have no effect on an employed worker's job‐to‐job transitions and contracts.     

THE LOT OF THE UNEMPLOYED: A TIME USE PERSPECTIVE

This paper provides new evidence on the time use of employed and unemployed individuals in 14 countries. We devote particular attention to characterizing and modeling job search intensity, measured by the amount of time devoted to searching for a new job. Job search intensity varies considerably across countries, and is higher in countries that have higher wage dispersion. We also examine the relationship between unemployment benefits and job search.     

ON‐THE‐JOB SEARCH AND MORAL HAZARD

We analyze the interaction between intertemporal incentive contracts and search frictions associated with on‐the‐job search. In our model, agency problems call for wage contracts with deferred compensation. At the same time workers do on‐the‐job search. Deferred compensation improves workers' incentives to exert effort but distorts their on‐the‐job search decisions. We show that deferred compensation is less attractive when the value to the worker–firm pair of on‐the‐job search is high. Moreover, the interplay between search frictions and wage contracts creates feedback effects. If firms in equilibrium use contracts with deferred compensation, fewer firms with vacancies enter the on‐the‐job search market, and this in turn reduces the distortions created by deferred compensation. These feedback effects between the incentive contracts used and the activity level in the search markets can lead to multiple equilibria: a low‐turnover equilibrium where firms use deferred compensation, and a high‐turnover equilibrium where they do not. Furthermore, the model predicts that firms are more likely to use deferred compensation when search frictions are high and when the gains from on‐the‐job search are small.     

The Unemployment Volatility Puzzle: Is Wage Stickiness the Answer?

I discuss the failure of the canonical search and matching model to match the cyclical volatility in the job finding rate. I show that job creation in the model is influenced by wages in new matches. I summarize microeconometric evidence and find that wages in new matches are volatile and consistent with the model's key predictions. Therefore, explanations of the unemployment volatility puzzle have to preserve the cyclical volatility of wages. I discuss a modification of the model, based on fixed matching costs, that can increase cyclical unemployment volatility and is consistent with wage flexibility in new matches.     

SORTING AND THE OUTPUT LOSS DUE TO SEARCH FRICTIONS

We analyze a general search model with on‐the‐job search (OJS) and sorting of heterogeneous workers into heterogeneous jobs. For given values of nonmarket time, the relative efficiency of OJS, and the amount of search frictions, we derive a simple relationship between the unemployment rate, mismatch, and wage dispersion. We estimate the latter two from standard micro data. Our methodology accounts for measurement error, which is crucial to distinguish true from spurious mismatch and wage dispersion. We find that without frictions, output would be about 9.5% higher if firms can commit to pay wages as a function of match quality and 15.5% higher if they cannot. Noncommitment leads to a business‐stealing externality which causes a 5.5% drop in output.     

Modeling Earnings Dynamics

In this paper, we use indirect inference to estimate a joint model of earnings, employment, job changes, wage rates, and work hours over a career. We use the model to address a number of important questions in labor economics, including the source of the experience profile of wages, the response of job changes to outside wage offers, and the effects of seniority on job changes. We also study the dynamic response of wage rates, hours, and earnings to various shocks, and measure the relative contributions of the shocks to the variance of earnings in a given year and over a lifetime. We find that human capital accounts for most of the growth of earnings over a career, although job seniority and job mobility also play significant roles. Unemployment shocks have a large impact on earnings in the short run, as well as a substantial long‐term effect that operates through the wage rate. Shocks associated with job changes and unemployment make a large contribution to the variance of career earnings and operate mostly through the job‐specific error components of wages and hours.     

MEASURING LABOR MARKET FRICTIONS: A CROSS‐COUNTRY COMPARISON

In this paper we define and estimate measures of labor market frictions using data on job durations. We compare different estimation methods and different types of data. We propose and apply an unconditional inference method that can be applied to aggregate duration data. It does not require wage data, it is invariant to the way in which wages are determined, and it allows workers to care about other job characteristics. The empirical analysis focuses on France, but we perform separate analyses for the United States of America, the United Kingdom, Germany, and the Netherlands. We quantify the monopsony power due to search frictions and we examine the policy effects of the minimum wage, unemployment benefits, and search frictions. (JEL: J63, J64)     

Assessing the ‘Choosiness’ of Job‐seekers. An Exploratory Approach and Evidence for Italy

Abstract. We use information about job search and work preferences, typically collected in a labour force survey, in order to construct an indicator of ‘choosiness’ of the labour supply of job‐seekers. The method for obtaining the indicator, first at individual level and then at aggregate levels, is based on results from multiple correspondence analysis. We investigate the informational value of the indicator by examining its stability over time and its predictive power on labour force transitions. Empirical analyses of cross‐section and panel samples of job‐seekers from the Italian quarterly Labour Force Survey clarify the potentials (and limitations) of the approach.     

Wage Bargaining with On‐the‐Job Search: Theory and Evidence

Most applications of Nash bargaining over wages ignore between‐employer competition for labor services and attribute all of the workers' rent to their bargaining power. In this paper, we write and estimate an equilibrium model with strategic wage bargaining and on‐the‐job search and use it to take another look at the determinants of wages in France. There are three essential determinants of wages in our model: productivity, competition between employers resulting from on‐the‐job search, and the workers' bargaining power. We find that between‐firm competition matters a lot in the determination of wages, because it is quantitatively more important than wage bargaining à la Nash in raising wages above the workers' “reservation wages,” defined as out‐of‐work income. In particular, we detect no significant bargaining power for intermediate‐ and low‐skilled workers, and a modestly positive bargaining power for high‐skilled workers.     

THE EFFECT OF BENEFIT SANCTIONS ON THE DURATION OF UNEMPLOYMENT

This paper investigates the effectiveness of unemployment benefit sanctions in reducing unemployment duration. Swiss data on benefit sanctions allow us to separate the effect of a warning that a person is not complying with eligibility requirements from the effect of the actual enforcement of a benefit sanction. Moreover, public employment services are given substantial leeway in setting the monitoring intensity. Results indicate that both warning and enforcement have a positive effect on the exit rate out of unemployment, and that increasing the monitoring intensity reduces the duration of unemployment of the nonsanctioned. (JEL: J64, J65, J68)