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This paper formulates and analyzes models of two-party bargaining behavior where each side possesses private information about its preferences that is unavailable to the other. We examine the strategic behavior that bargainers might exhibit when disclosing information either to an arbitrator or to each other. Our results show that when bargaining is over one issue, it is relatively uncomplicated analytically to calculate the optimal strategy, but, despite this, even sophisticated bargainers tend to make wrong assumptions about the behavior of others and to use strategies that are far from optimal. When the bargaining encompasses several factors, computation of optimal strategies becomes very cumbersome and the use of an optimal strategy does not gain a bargainer much over what he could have achieved with truthful revelation. Thus, in theory, truthful revelation is not the best course of action to adopt for a bargainer interested in maximizing individual gain, but in practice the alternatives may involve mistaken assumptions about the behavior of others and may therefore turn out to be inferior to truthful revelation. 相似文献
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HONGTAO ZHANG 《Production and Operations Management》2002,11(4):531-546
We consider a supply chain with one manufacturer in the upstream and two competing retailers in the downstream. The retailers sell differentiated goods and are endowed with some private demand information. The paper shows that the manufacturer's optimal strategy is independent of the type of downstream competition, Cournot or Bertrand, and that no information will be shared with the manufacturer on a voluntary basis. However, complete information sharing, which benefits all three parties, can be achieved through side payment when the retailers' information is statistically less accurate or when the leakage effect is more beneficial to the retailers. 相似文献
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Richard E. Gunther 《决策科学》1981,12(1):97-111
Dual-resource constrained queuing systems contain fewer servers than service facilities. This study uses computer simulation to evaluate several server assignment procedures in a dual-resource system. A field study serves as the basis for developing a model with two service facilities in parallel, a single server, and deterministic information access and transfer delays that can be applied to job shops, computer operating systems, and elevators. Several findings, useful in server assignment decision making, resulted from the study. If first-come, first-served sequencing is used, delaying server assignment at a facility until all jobs are completed reduces both the mean and the variance of job flow time. If shortest-process-time-first sequencing is used, an assignment rule is tested that delays a server at a facility until a sufficiently short job is estimated to have arrived elsewhere. This rule performs best overall in terms of both the mean and variance of flow time. Methods to implement this decision rule easily are discussed. 相似文献
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Joseph E. Harrington Myong‐Hun Chang 《Journal of the European Economic Association》2009,7(6):1400-1435
One of the primary challenges to measuring the impact of antitrust or competition policy on collusion is that the cartel population is unobservable; we observe only the population of discovered cartels. To address this challenge, a model of cartel creation and dissolution is developed to endogenously derive the populations of cartels and discovered cartels. With this theory, one can infer the impact of competition policy on the population of cartels by measuring its impact on the population of discovered cartels. In particular, changes in the duration of discovered cartels can be informative in assessing whether a new policy is reducing the latent rate of cartels. (JEL: L13, L41) 相似文献
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《Journal of Organizational Behavior Management》2013,33(2):125-133
No abstract available for this article. 相似文献
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