Bertrand竞争下融资策略与产品差异化策略的博弈分析

融资策略与产品差异化策略是企业两大重要的决策.本文通过构造一个纵向产品差异化的三阶段动态博弈模型,研究了不确定环境下,企业债务融资对产品差异化策略和定价策略的影响,并与不存在债务策略下的均衡结果进行了比较.研究表明,负债情形下,企业的均衡质量和均衡价格均高于无负债下的质量和价格,产品纵向差异度低于无负债下的差异度,且负债水平越高,企业的均衡质量、均衡价格和均衡利润越高,企业间的产品纵向差异度也越高.     

中小企业财务结构与债务融资——基于浙江的实证研究

本文以浙江省中小企业为研究对象,主要讨论三方面内容:(1)全面分析中小企业财务结构与融资特征,并与大企业作比较,得出部分中小企业在偿债能力、营运能力和盈利能力等方面均不逊色于大企业;(2)从微观角度,对中小企业主要债务融资作实证分析,识别影响中小企业债务融资的显著因素。同时根据回归结果证实中小企业主要债务融资的成本比较优势依次为:银行贷款、商业信用和非正规融资;(3)利用Kruskal-Wallis非参数检验方法判定行业因素对中小企业债务融资具有显著差异,而宏观经济周期变化对其影响却不显著。本文结论的另一重要性在于,填补主流文献仅从金融机构或政府金融体制建设等方面寻求破解中小企业融资难的答案,从企业自身经营和财务管理角度解释中小企业融资难的原因。     

基于债务展期的企业融资担保合约博弈分析

债务展期是指在担保债务到期时,当债务方的资产不足于偿还到期债务的情况下,担保方代偿,同时获得对债务方的债权追偿权。本文通过对债务展期情况下的融资担保问题的合同签订期,债务到期时及展期债务到期时三个阶段进行深入辨析,分析债务展期对担保合约的影响,给出了担保合约签订期(Date-0)担保合约中担保费用和担保比例的博弈纳什均衡解,并针对债务到期时(Date-1)展期债务进行子博弈均衡分析。结果表明债务展期情况下担保费用与项目的风险和清算价值分别呈正比和反比关系;担保比例与投资成本呈现反比关系,研究结果为担保方提供科学的参考依据。     

股权收购(Buyouts)的债务估值和违约决策

杠杆收购是股权收购交易的主要形式,所以对于股权收购而言,债权和股权的价值估算至关重要。但一方面鉴于股权收购交易所需的大量资金,股权收购主要采用分层债务结构进行债务融资,另一方面囿于收购的目标公司具有显著的特质风险,传统的Leland模型无法对这类债务和股权进行定价。为此,本文基于股权收购的多层融资结构,构建数理模型研究了股权收购交易的债权和股权的定价方法,并分析了最优破产决策和违约概率。基于实证参数值,模型预测的股东内部收益率和违约概率与实证结论十分接近。当标的资产价值下降时,目标公司的杠杆比率快速提升,优先级较低的债务迅速贬值,从而解释了投资者抢购安全资产的动机。通过对比分析,本文发现采用单层融资结构会提高融资成本,使得股权受损,这为分层债务结构提供了理论依据。最后,本文比较静态分析了标的资产波动率和市场利率对估值和破产决策的影响,结论支持了实证研究中有关市场利率与股权收购相关性的结论。     

基于可协商的可转换债券和企业资本结构

本文将债务协商机制引入利用普通股和可转换债券融资的上市企业,在一个动态模型框架下分析其对债券投资者行为和企业资本结构的影响。首先分别对采取破产清算和债务协商下,利用可转换债券和普通股融资的企业建模;然后利用风险中性定价方法给出企业证券价值的显示解;最后通过数值结果分析债务协商机制的影响并给出经济解释。数值分析表明:相比企业破产清算,协商可以提高企业价值、股权价值。当股东的谈判能力在一定的范围时,协商可以提高债券价值、降低企业杠杆率,增加社会福利。股东谈判能力越强,可转债投资者的转换时机越早。本文的研究丰富了可转换债券的融资理论,为可转换债券融资企业的去杠杆提供了一定的理论指导。     

负债企业控制权转移的时机和均衡价格

应用实物期权博弈论和一般均衡理论,推导出了负债企业在信息不完美条件下控制权转移最优时机和均衡价格的解析解, 并对最优时机和均衡价格的主要影响因素进行敏感性分析。研究结果表明: 在其他条件不变的前提下, 目标企业的规模越大、兼并双方购买沉没成本越小、控股比例越高、购买者期望协同效应越大、息票率越高,税率越高, 则均会导致控制权转移越快, 转移的均衡价格越低。目标企业所处的产业增长率和波动率越高, 则控制权转移越快, 转移的均衡价格越低,并具有双重效应。控制权转移的时机和转移均衡价格不是控制因子的单调函数。     

信息披露时间不确定与风险债务评估

本文研究当公司信息披露时间不确定、而信息披露时投资者能完全真实地了解公司价值的情形下风险债务的评估问题,假设关于公司真实价值的信息流服从泊松过程,得到了公司债务安全条款的阈值和公司债务价值评估的表达式。分析表明,当信息流到达率增大时,债务安全条款的阈值降低的同时导致债务价值的损失,但若公司价值增大,债务价值的损失将逐渐减小。     

税率不确定性下的减记型二级资本债设计及银行最优债务结构

考虑了税率不确定下减记型二级资本债（减记债）设计和银行最优债务结构问题。假设银行的融资方式为股权,普通债和减记债,在税率不确定环境下,利用动态规划方法,解析地得到了银行证券的价值和银行最优债务结构。分析了税率不确定性对银行融资决策的影响。结论表明：普通债的最优券息是减记比例的凸函数,随着减税而减少,随着减税时间点的增加而增加。减记债最优券息随着减记比例先增后减,受减税和减税时间点的影响是不确定的。此外,银行总价值和最优杠杆率随着减记比例先增后减。本文也为我国"营改增"政策的可行性提供了理论依据。同时,从银行总价值最大化和税率效应角度为金融决策者如何灵活地选择适当的减记比例提供了理论参考。     

The impact of corporate social performance on the cost of debt and access to debt financing for listed European non-financial firms

This study addresses the controversial issue of how non-financial performance affects the cost of debt capital and access to it. The relationship between corporate social performance and two measures of debt cost (accounting-based and market-based) and the measure of debt access are analysed by means of a multi-theoretical framework combining economics with social theories. By observing a sample of listed European non-financial firms over an 8-year period from 2005 to 2012, we find a negative relationship between corporate social performance and interest rate. Consistent with this result, we find a positive relationship between corporate social performance and debt rating. Thus, corporate social performance has a positive role in reducing the cost of debt capital. Moreover, firms with better corporate social performance are more attractive to lenders in terms of leverage allowance. Overall, our findings provide deeper insight into the reasons why companies should improve their corporate social performance.     

认知偏差、债务政策选择偏好和资本结构税收效应

本文针对管理者认知偏差对其债务政策选择的影响问题进行研究,通过建立认知偏差影响下的最优资本结构决策模型,从行为金融学的角度研究了债务政策选择的税收效应,并以中国上市公司2006-2009年的数据为样本,使用多元回归分析等方法对相关结论进行了实证检验。研究表明:上市公司的债务政策受到了认知偏差的影响,即随着财务困境成本的不断增大,上市公司对其变化的敏感性不断降低;认知偏差严重时,上市公司会选择过度保守负债或过度积极负债,导致最优资本结构与税率无关;认知偏差不严重时,上市公司会选择适度负债,且负债水平与税率正相关。结论表明中国上市公司需要更为客观地评价财务困境成本,更为理性地利用负债的税收收益,尽可能避免认知偏差对企业价值的损害。     

资产流动性与债务期限结构——来自中国上市公司的经验证据

目前,资产流动性对债务期限结构的影响在理论上存在很大争议,主要有"正向影响"、"负向影响"和"倒U型影响"三种观点。本文以我国沪深两市A股市场1998-2009年间12110个公司年度观测值为样本,采用资产交易强度衡量资产流动性,实证检验了上述三种观点。结果表明,资产流动性越高的公司债务期限越长,即资产流动性正向影响债务期限结构,支持了较高的资产流动性能够增加公司清算价值从而延长债务期限的经典理论。     

公司债务期限结构与违约风险

在资产风险水平、负债比率等因素一定的情况下,短期债务比例与违约概率呈类U形关系,基于风险规避角度的最优债务期限结构是存在的,并且这一最优短期债务比例与资产风险水平正相关,与负债比率负相关.我国上市公司短期债务比例普遍较高,根据理论预测和实证检验得出,进一步提高短期债务比例将会使公司违约风险继续扩大,进而危及我国的信用体系和金融秩序.     

Rotten Parents and Disciplined Children: A Politico‐Economic Theory of Public Expenditure and Debt

This paper proposes a dynamic politico‐economic theory of fiscal policy in a world comprising a set of small open economies, whose driving force is the intergenerational conflict over debt, taxes, and public goods. Subsequent generations of voters choose fiscal policy through repeated elections. The presence of young voters induces fiscal discipline, that is, low taxes and low debt accumulation. The paper characterizes the Markov‐perfect equilibrium of the voting game in each economy, as well as the stationary equilibrium debt distribution and interest rate of the world economy. The equilibrium can reproduce some salient features of fiscal policy in modern economies.     

Long‐Term Debt and Optimal Policy in the Fiscal Theory of the Price Level

The fiscal theory says that the price level is determined by the ratio of nominal debt to the present value of real primary surpluses. I analyze long‐term debt and optimal policy in the fiscal theory. I find that the maturity structure of the debt matters. For example, it determines whether news of future deficits implies current inflation or future inflation. When long‐term debt is present, the government can trade current inflation for future inflation by debt operations; this tradeoff is not present if the government rolls over short‐term debt. The maturity structure of outstanding debt acts as a “budget constraint” determining which periods' price levels the government can affect by debt variation alone. In addition, debt policy—the expected pattern of future state‐contingent debt sales, repurchases and redemptions—matters crucially for the effects of a debt operation. I solve for optimal debt policies to minimize the variance of inflation. I find cases in which long‐term debt helps to stabilize inflation. I also find that the optimal policy produces time series that are similar to U.S. surplus and debt time series. To understand the data, I must assume that debt policy offsets the inflationary impact of cyclical surplus shocks, rather than causing price level disturbances by policy‐induced shocks. Shifting the objective from price level variance to inflation variance, the optimal policy produces much less volatile inflation at the cost of a unit root in the price level; this is consistent with the stabilization of U.S. inflation after the gold standard was abandoned.     

Production,Process Investment,and the Survival of Debt‐Financed Startup Firms

Whether to invest in process development that can reduce the unit cost and thereby raise future profits or to conserve cash and reduce the likelihood of bankruptcy is a key trade‐off faced by many startup firms that have taken on debt. We explore this trade‐off by examining the production quantity and cost reducing R&D investment decisions in a two period model wherein a startup firm must make a minimum level of profit at the end of the first period to survive and operate in the second period. We specify a probabilistic survival measure as a function of production and investment decisions to track and manage the risk exposure of the startup depending on three key market factors: technology, demand, and competitor's cost. We develop managerial insights by characterizing how to create operational hedges against the bankruptcy risk: if a startup makes a “conservative” investment decision, then it also selects an optimal quantity that is less than the monopoly level and hence sacrifices some of first period expected profits to increase its survival chances. If it decides to invest “aggressively,” then it produces more than the monopoly level to cover the higher bankruptcy risk. We also illustrate that debt constraint shrinks the decision space, wherein such process investments are viable.     

家族控制、两权分离与债务期限结构选择——来自中国上市公司的经验证据

本文利用我国2002-2008年家族控制上市公司数据,在控制相关变量下,从债务代理成本视角经验检查在中国债权人法律保护较弱的背景中,终极控制股东(家族)是否影响公司债务期限结构。本文提供的经验证据表明,终极控制股东显著影响公司债务期限结构。具体而言:(1)终极控制股东的控制权越大,公司具有显著低的长期债务水平;(2)终极控制股东的控制权与现金流量权分离度与公司债务期限显著负相关;(3)终极控制股东在上市公司中指派高管与公司债务期限显著负相关。     

债务容量与成长期权关系研究

本文利用期权博弈方法,探析投资成长期权如何影响公司债务融资决策问题。在不确定条件下,综合考虑利率、税率、债息和债务的期限结构这些影响融资和投资的重要因素,构建期权博弈理论模型,确定企业的最优债务容量,并运用数值方法给出了债务容量与投资成长期权的回报率之间是非线性的"U"形关系的结论。研究表明,当投资成长期权的回报率较低时,债务容量随着投资成长期权的回报率增加而债务容量减少;当投资成长期权的回报率达到较高水平时,债务容量随着投资成长期权的回报率增加而债务容量增加。从而给出了关于债务容量与投资成长期权之间的内在关系的新理论解释。     

THE POLITICAL COLOR OF FISCAL RESPONSIBILITY

We propose a dynamic general equilibrium model that yields testable implications about the fiscal policy run by governments of different political color. Successive generations of voters choose taxation, expenditure, and government debt through repeated elections. Voters are heterogeneous by age and by the intensity of their preferences for public good provision. The political equilibrium switches stochastically between left‐ (pro‐public goods) and right‐leaning (pro‐private consumption) governments. A shift to the left (right) is associated with a fall (increase) in government debt, an increase (fall) in taxation, and an increase (fall) in government expenditures. However, left‐leaning governments engage in more debt accumulation during recessions. These predictions are shown to be consistent with the time‐series evidence for the United States in the postwar period, and also with the evidence for a panel of OECD countries. (JEL: D72, E62, H41, H62, H63)     

房价上涨、家庭债务与城镇居民消费:贷款价值比的视角

家庭借贷是缓解居民支大于收、平缓消费的重要手段,而贷款价值比的约束迫使家庭的债务规模必须控制在一定的范围之内;与此同时,持续上涨的房价不断逼近贷款价值比约束,最终表现为消费的大幅度波动。基于家庭追踪调查(CFPS)微观数据,本文细致考察了房价上涨、家庭债务对城镇居民消费的影响。结果表明:(1)家庭债务对城镇居民消费的杠杆显著,即使将样本细分为有房家庭与无房家庭,杠杆效应依然显著;(2)持续上涨的房价将显著促进有房家庭的消费,且这正向作用将被贷款价值比放大;而上涨的房价将抑制无房家庭的消费。(3)无论是有房家庭还是无房家庭,贷款价值比对居民消费的作用存在明显的门槛效应,即只有当贷款价值比增大到一定水平时,其对居民消费的影响将由促进转为抑制。(4)房价上涨对城镇居民消费的作用在不同群体间差异明显,受教育程度高的城镇家庭,或者持有二套房以上的家庭,房价上涨对城镇居民消费的促进效应更强。