UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE IN WELFARE STATES: THE IMPACTS OF SOFT DURATION CONSTRAINTS

Abstract Based on a major reform of Norwegian unemployment insurance (UI), we examine the behavioral impacts of soft and hard UI duration constraints. A constraint is interpreted as hard if a claimant cannot rely on any form of income support after exhaustion, and as soft if UI is replaced by follow‐on benefits or participation in active labor market programs (ALMP). We find that both hard and soft constraints raise the job hazard significantly, with surprisingly similar spikes at UI exhaustion. Participation in ALMP raises the probability of eventually finding a job, but at the cost of lengthening the overall job‐search period.     

THE JOINT DESIGN OF UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE AND EMPLOYMENT PROTECTION: A FIRST PASS

Unemployment insurance and employment protection are typically discussed and studied in isolation. In this paper, we argue that they are tightly linked, and we focus on their joint optimal design in a simple model, with risk‐averse workers, risk‐neutral firms, and random shocks to productivity. We show that, in the “first best,”unemployment insurance comes with employment protection—in the form of layoff taxes; indeed, optimality requires that layoff taxes be equal to unemployment benefits. We then explore the implications of four broad categories of deviations from first best: limits on insurance, limits on layoff taxes, ex post wage bargaining, and ex ante heterogeneity of firms or workers. We show how the design must be modified in each case. Finally, we draw out the implications of our analysis for current policy debates and reform proposals, from the financing of unemployment insurance, to the respective roles of severance payments and unemployment benefits.     

UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE AND CULTURAL TRANSMISSION: THEORY AND APPLICATION TO EUROPEAN UNEMPLOYMENT

This paper emphasizes the two‐way causality between the provision of unemployment insurance and the cultural transmission of civicness. The returns to being uncivic are increasing in the generosity of unemployment insurance; but this generosity is decreasing in the number of uncivic individuals. In this context, I determine the evolution of preferences across generations and show that cultural heterogeneity is sustained over the long‐run. The dynamics of cultural transmission can generate a long lag between the introduction of unemployment insurance and an increase in people's willingness to live off government‐provided benefits. Hence, it offers an explanation to the ‘European unemployment puzzle’ due to the coexistence of generous unemployment insurance and low unemployment in the 1950s and 1960s.     

IMMIGRATION,JOBS, AND EMPLOYMENT PROTECTION: EVIDENCE FROM EUROPE BEFORE AND DURING THE GREAT RECESSION

In this paper we analyze the impact of immigrants on the type and quantity of native jobs. We use data on 15 Western European countries during the 1996–2010 period. We find that immigrants, by taking manual‐routine type of occupations pushed natives towards more “complex” (abstract and communication) jobs. This job upgrade was associated to a 0.7% increase in native wages for a doubling of the immigrants' share. These results are robust to the use of an IV strategy based on past settlement of immigrants across European countries. The job upgrade slowed but did not come to a halt during the Great Recession. We also document the labor market flows behind it: the complexity of jobs offered to new native hires was higher relative to the complexity of lost jobs. Finally, we find evidence that such reallocation was larger in countries with more flexible labor laws.     

CRIME AND UNEMPLOYMENT IN TURBULENT TIMES

We use the exceptional variation in municipality‐level unemployment in Sweden during the 1990s to identify the effect of unemployment on crime. Our findings are as follows: (i) There is a statistically and economically significant effect of general unemployment on the incidence of burglary, auto theft, and drug possession; (ii) we find no evidence for the popular view that youth unemployment matters for crime; (iii) prime‐aged unemployment is robustly correlated with main categories of youthful crimes, a finding consistent with the idea that unstable life conditions of parents have adverse spillover effects on the life‐choices of their children. (JEL: J00, K4)     

YOUTH UNEMPLOYMENT AND CRIME IN FRANCE

In this paper we examine the influence of unemployment on property crimes and on violent crimes in France for the period 1990 to 2000. This analysis is the first extensive study for this country. We construct a regional‐level data set (for the 95 départements of metropolitan France) with measures of crimes as reported to the Ministry of Interior. To assess social conditions prevailing in the département in that year, we construct measures of the share of unemployed as well as other social, economic, and demographic variables using multiple waves of the French Labor Survey. We estimate a classic Becker‐type model in which unemployment is a measure of how potential criminals fare in the legitimate job market. First, our estimates show that in the cross‐section dimension, crime and unemployment are positively associated. Second, we find that increases in youth unemployment induce increases in crime. Using the predicted industrial structure to instrument unemployment, we show that this effect is causal for burglaries, thefts, and drug offenses. To combat crime, it appears thus that all strategies designed to combat youth unemployment should be examined. (JEL: J19, K42, J64, J65)     

TURBULENCE AND UNEMPLOYMENT IN A JOB MATCHING MODEL

According to Ljungqvist and Sargent (1998), high European unemployment since the 1980s can be explained by a rise in economic turbulence, leading to greater numbers of unemployed workers with obsolete skills. These workers refuse new jobs due to high unemployment benefits. In this paper we reassess the turbulence‐unemployment relationship using a matching model with endogenous job destruction. In our model, higher turbulence reduces the incentives of employed workers to leave their jobs. If turbulence has only a tiny effect on the skills of workers experiencing endogenous separation, then the results of Ljungqvist and Sargent (1998, 2004) are reversed, and higher turbulence leads to a reduction in unemployment. Thus, changes in turbulence cannot provide an explanation for European unemployment that reconciles the incentives of both unemployed and employed workers. (JEL: E24, J64)     

EVALUATING ECONOMICS RESEARCH IN EUROPE: AN INTRODUCTION

This paper introduces a symposium of EEA‐funded studies that evaluate economics research in Europe. The paper considers some general issues in evaluations, paying special attention to the problem of selecting journal weights, and notes some special features of the individual studies. Despite their very different approaches, the same group of institutions tend to appear at the top of all lists, though individual ranks are sensitive to the choice of more or less elitist journal weights. All the studies show that the gap between economics research in Europe and the United States is narrowing, but remains very wide. (JEL: A10, J44)     

HERESY IN DECISION ANALYSIS: MODELING SUBSEQUENT ACTS WITHOUT ROLLBACK *

When making a current decision, like choosing an experiment, a subject will often take into account “subsequent acts” which he does not yet commit to. Common practice requires modeling through preposterior analysis, which treats one act as certain, conditional on the intervening information modeled. This is not logically necessary since the same expected utilities could be obtained by properly conditioning utility on any selection of events (including subsequent acts). The subject could assess utility marginal on subsequent acts or conditional on subsequent acts treated as uncertain events. The preposterior model is a special case of the latter where conditioning information is sufficiently modeled to imply subsequent act probabilities of zero or one. This paper argues that attempts at preposterior modeling are often unsuccessful and have critically flawed much current practice in decision analysis. Simpler approaches such as the “acts-as-events” model are intrinsically less dependent on restrictive assumptions and have been successfully applied to many real-world decisions.     

RANKING ECONOMICS DEPARTMENTS IN EUROPE: A STATISTICAL APPROACH

We provide a ranking of economics departments in Europe and we discuss the methods used to obtain it. The JEL CD‐ROM serves as a database for a period covering ten years. Journals are ranked using a combination of expert opinions and citation data to produce a scale from 1 to 10. The publication output and habits of fifteen European countries plus California are then compared. Individuals with a contribution greater than a predetermined minimum level are regrouped into departments which are ranked according to their total scores. A standard deviation is provided to underline the uncertainty of this ranking. (JEL: I29, D63, C12, C14)     

SEPARATING MORAL HAZARD FROM ADVERSE SELECTION AND LEARNING IN AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE: LONGITUDINAL EVIDENCE FROM FRANCE

The identification of information problems in different markets is a challenging issue in the economic literature. In this paper, we study the identification of moral hazard from adverse selection and learning about risk within the context of a multi‐period dynamic model. We extend the model of Abbring, Chiappori, and Pinquet (2003, Journal of the European Economic Association, 1, 767–820) to include learning about risk and insurance coverage choice over time. We derive testable empirical implications for panel data. We then perform tests using longitudinal data from France during the period 1995–1997. We find evidence of moral hazard among a sub‐group of policyholders with less driving experience (less than 15 years). Policyholders with fewer than five years of experience have a combination of learning about risk and moral hazard, whereas no residual information problem is found for policyholders with more than 15 years of experience.     

CONTRACT DURATION AND INVESTMENT INCENTIVES: EVIDENCE FROM LAND TENANCY AGREEMENTS

This paper analyzes the empirical determinants of contract length, a key and yet neglected dimension of contractual structure. I estimate contract length and contract type jointly using original data on tenancy agreements signed between 1870 and 1880 in the district of Siracusa, Italy. The findings indicate that the choice of contract length is driven by the need to provide incentives for nonobservable investment, taking into account transaction costs and imperfections in the credit markets that make incentive provision costly. The results also illustrate that because both length and the compensation scheme are used to provide incentives within the same contract, joint analysis is important for a correct interpretation of the evidence. (JEL: D82, O12, Q15)     

COMPETITION AND RELATIONAL CONTRACTS: THE ROLE OF UNEMPLOYMENT AS A DISCIPLINARY DEVICE

Abstract When workers are faced with the threat of unemployment, their relationship with a particular firm becomes valuable. As a result, a worker may comply with the terms of a relational contract that demands high effort even when performance is not enforceable by a third party. But can relational contracts motivate high effort when workers can easily find alternative jobs? We examine how competition for labor affects the emergence of relational contracts and their effectiveness in overcoming moral hazard in the labor market. We show that effective relational contracts do emerge in a market with excess demand for labor. Long‐term relationships turn out to be less frequent when there is excess demand for labor than they are in a market characterized by exogenous unemployment. However, stronger competition for labor does not impair labor market efficiency: higher wages induced by competition lead to higher effort out of concerns for reciprocity.     

PERFORMANCE OF THE EXPECTED UTILITY METHOD AND TWO OTHER NORMATIVE METHODS IN INSURANCE DECISION MAKING*

In an experiment, thirty-six professional insurance men employed the utility method, the worry method, and the comparison method in two insurance problems to determine the appropriate insurance coverage. It was found that the best act with the utility method almost always was no insurance, whereas the best act with the other two methods tended to be complete insurance. The utility method best act rarely agreed with the subject's actual preferred act, while the comparison method best act usually was the same or almost the same as the actual preferred act. While the worry method suggests that the subjects typically are risk averse, the utility functions obtained tend to show that the subjects typically are not risk averse.     

BUILDING REPUTATION FOR CONTRACT RENEWAL: IMPLICATIONS FOR PERFORMANCE DYNAMICS AND CONTRACT DURATION

We study how career concerns affect the dynamics of incentives in a multi‐period contract, when the agent's productivity is a stochastic function of his past productivity and investment. We show that incentives are stronger and performance is higher when the contract approaches its expiry date. Contrary to common wisdom, long‐term contracts may strengthen reputational effects whereas short‐term contracting may be optimal when investment has persistent, long‐term effects.     

CYCLICAL BEHAVIOR OF UNEMPLOYMENT AND THE HELP WANTED INDEX: A CROSS SPECTRAL ANALYSIS

The unemployment rate and the help-wanted index are two frequently used indicators of the state of the labor market. Traditional regression techniques used in the analysis of the relationship between these two indicators and their cyclical behavior with business fluctuations have yielded varying results. Spectral analysis is used in this article to examine the cyclical behavior of the labor market indicators with respect to each other and with respect to a measure of aggregate economic activity in the United States. Very strong relationships are found, lending support to the rationale of using such indicators as labor market proxies. This application of spectral analysis also provides an illustration of the potential fruitfulness of spectral analysis in examining the cyclical relationships between economic time series.     

OPTIMAL MONETARY POLICY AND FINANCIAL STABILITY IN A NON‐RICARDIAN ECONOMY

I present a model with discontinuous asset‐market participation (DAMP), where all agents are non‐Ricardian, and where heterogeneity among market participants implies financial‐wealth effects on aggregate consumption. The implied welfare criterion shows that financial stability arises as an additional and independent target, besides inflation and output stability. Evaluation of optimal policy under discretion and commitment reveals that price stability may no longer be optimal, even absent inefficient supply shocks: some fluctuations in output and inflation may be optimal as long as they reduce financial instability. Ignoring the heterogeneity among market participants may lead monetary policy to induce substantially higher welfare losses.     

THE EFFECT OF EMPLOYMENT PROTECTION ON WORKER EFFORT: ABSENTEEISM DURING AND AFTER PROBATION

Employment protection systems are widely believed to generate distortions in firms' hiring and firing decisions. However, much less is known about the impact of these regulations on workers' behavior. In this paper we provide evidence on the latter question using data from a large Italian bank. Our analysis is based on weekly observations for 545 men and 313 females hired as white‐collar workers between January 1993 and February 1995. These workers begin to be protected against firing only after the 12th week of tenure, and we observe them for one year. We show that—particularly for men—the number of days of absence per week increases significantly once employment protection is granted at the end of probation. This suggests that the provision of employment protection causes the increase in absenteeism. Alternative explanations based on career concerns or on learning about social norms would predict a smooth relationship between absenteeism and tenure instead of the observed discrete jump. This consequence of employment protection seems to have been neglected in European policy debates so far. (JEL: J2, D2, D8, M5)     

REDUCTION IN THE LONG‐TERM UNEMPLOYMENT OF THE ELDERLY: A SUCCESS STORY FROM FINLAND

In several European countries the elderly unemployed are allowed to collect unemployment benefits up to a certain age limit, after which they can retire via some early retirement scheme. In Finland the eligibility age of persons benefiting from this kind of scheme was raised from 53 to 55 in 1997. We consider layoff risks, unemployment durations, and the exit states before and after the reform. Since the reform the group aged 53–54 has had a lower risk of unemployment, shorter unemployment durations, and higher exit rates to employment, and it is almost indistinguishable from the group aged 50–52. We estimate that the amount of unemployment benefits saved due to the reform is close to $100 million for each age cohort turning 53. (JEL: J64, J26, C14, C41)