Urbanization and the fertility transition in Ghana

This paper examines the way in which migration and urban residence operate to alter fertility outcomes. While urban-rural fertility differentials have long been established for most developing societies, the nature of these differences among migrants and between migrants and those of succeeding generations is not well understood. The evidence presented here suggests that rural-urban migration and urbanization may contribute positively to processes of fertility transition. Using data from the 1998 Kumasi Peri-Urban Survey, which included a 5-year retrospective monthly calendar of childbearing, we suggest that migrants adapt quickly to an urban environment. Our results also reveal generational differences in recent and cumulative fertility. While migrants exhibit higher cumulative fertility than urban residents of the second and third generation, their fertility is significantly lower than rural averages in Ghana. Children of migrants exhibit childbearing patterns quite similar to those in higher-order generations. Most noteworthy is the nature of the disparities in childbearing patterns between migrants and the succeeding generations. Migrant women have higher lifetime fertility than urban natives. Migrant women also exhibit higher fertility over the last 5 years than second generation or high-order urban natives. But these first generation women exhibit lower fertility (vs. urban natives) for the year immediately prior to the survey. These patterns lend support to an interpretation that combines rather than opposes theories of selectivity, disruption, adaptation and socialization. We conclude by discussing mechanisms that might explain these interrelated processes of fertility adjustment and suggest that policies discouraging rural-urban migration need to be revisited.     

Fertility preferences and subsequent childbearing in Africa and Asia: A synthesis of evidence from longitudinal studies in 28 populations

Survey data on fertility preferences have played a central but controversial role in fertility research and advocacy for family planning. We summarize evidence from longitudinal studies in 28 Asian and African populations on the relationship between preferences and subsequent childbearing. While we found no consistent association between women's desire to delay childbearing and subsequent fertility, the baseline desire of women to stop childbearing was a powerful predictor of subsequent fertility in all populations and increased in strength as overall contraceptive use in the study populations rose. Partners’ desire also exercised some influence but was of modest importance in most populations. However, the correspondence between desire to stop and behaviour was found to be far from perfect. Weak implementation of preferences by contraception is likely to be the major cause of this preference–behaviour discrepancy. Uncertainty and instability in preferences may also contribute to the discrepancy, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa.     

Socio-political,cultural and economic preferences and behaviour of the social and cultural specialists and the technocrats. Social class or education?

Do the social and cultural specialists differ from the technocrats and other social classes with respect to their socio-political, cultural and economic preferences and behaviour? If they do, is this attributable to their level and field of education? The social and cultural specialists are assumed to form ?new’ social class and the technocrats ?old’ social class. A typical social class should differentiate itself with respect to moral attitudes, socio-political behaviour and lifestyle forms. To reveal whether these assumed classes are indeed typical classes, we have studied a variety of socio-political, cultural and economic preferences and behaviour of members of these social classes using the Family Survey of the Dutch Population (FSDP) 1992, 1998, 2000 and 2003. To unravel the net differences between the social and cultural specialists and the technocrats, we controlled for the field of study, the level of education and background factors. Taking these control factors into consideration, the social and cultural specialists differentiate themselves substantially from the technocrats in their socio-political and especially economic preferences and behaviour. With respect to their cultural preferences and behaviour, they do not differ significantly from the technocrats.     

Intensive Parenting: Fertility and Breastfeeding Duration in the United States

Using 30 years of longitudinal data from a nationally representative cohort of women, we study the association between breastfeeding duration and completed fertility, fertility expectations, and birth spacing. We find that women who breastfeed their first child for five months or longer are a distinct group. They have more children overall and higher odds of having three or more children rather than two, compared with women who breastfeed for shorter durations or not at all. Expected fertility is associated with initiating breastfeeding but not with how long mothers breastfeed. Thus, women who breastfeed longer do not differ significantly from other breastfeeding women in their early fertility expectations. Rather, across the life course, these women achieve and even exceed their earlier fertility expectations. Women who breastfeed for shorter durations (1–21 weeks) are more likely to fall short of their expected fertility than to achieve or exceed their expectations, and they are significantly less likely than women who breastfeed for longer durations (≥22 weeks) to exceed their expected fertility. In contrast, women who breastfeed longer are as likely to exceed as to achieve their earlier expectations, and the difference between their probability of falling short versus exceeding their fertility expectations is relatively small and at the boundary of statistical significance (p = .096). These differences in fertility are not explained by differences in personal and family resources, including family income or labor market attachment. Our findings suggest that breastfeeding duration may serve as a proxy for identifying a distinct approach to parenting. Women who breastfeed longer have reproductive patterns quite different than their socioeconomic position would predict. They both have more children and invest more time in those children.     

Unintended effects of poverty programmes on childbearing in less developed countries: Experimental evidence from Latin America

Because conditional cash transfer (CCT) programmes (which make payments to poor households, conditional on their behaviour) potentially affect both household resource levels and parental preferences for quality vs. quantity of children, they may have unintended consequences for fertility. We use panel data from experimental CCT programmes in three Latin American countries to assess the unintended impact of these programmes on childbearing. Our findings, based on difference-in-difference models, show that the programme in Honduras, which inadvertently created large incentives for childbearing, may have raised fertility by between 2 and 4 percentage points. The CCT programmes in the two other countries, Mexico and Nicaragua, did not have the same unintended incentives for childbearing, and in these countries we found no net impact on fertility. Subsequent analysis examined several potential mechanisms by which fertility in Honduras may have been raised but was not able to identify a primary mechanism with the available data.     

欧洲生育支持政策效果的评估及启示——基于模糊集定性比较的分析

采用组态比较方法中的模糊集定性比较分析,系统性检验了2000—2018年29个欧洲典型国家社会情境和现行生育支持政策的条件组合与生育率变化的关系,试图为我国借鉴欧洲国家生育支持政策提供新的研究思路。通过欧洲各国三类生育支持政策(育儿津贴、生育假期和儿童照料设施供给)与三类社会情境的条件(经济发展水平、性别平等及家庭重视文化)进行必要条件检验,得到五类影响生育率的组态方案。通过将不同社会情境下各国生育支持政策的实施效果与我国国情的比较和讨论,本研究提出,我国生育支持政策的出台要充分考虑地区差异:对于性别较为平等的经济发达地区,大力发展儿童照料设施和有针对性的育儿津贴可以稳定生育率;对于性别平等较差的西部欠发达地区,育儿津贴更能提高生育率;在性别差距较大、重视后代的经济发达地区,较慷慨的生育假期和提供儿童照料设施双管齐下会有助于提升生育水平。     

An investigation of the unexpectedly high fertility of secular,native-born Jews in Israel

Secular, native-born Jews in Israel enjoy the socio-economic status of many affluent populations living in other democratic countries, but have above-replacement period and cohort fertility. This study revealed a constellation of interrelated factors which together characterize the socio-economic, cultural, and political environment of this fertility behaviour and set it apart from that of other advanced societies. The factors are: a combination of state and family support for childbearing; a dual emphasis on the social importance of women's employment and fertility; policies that support working mothers within a conservative welfare regime; a family system in which parents provide significant financial and caregiving aid to their adult children; relatively egalitarian gender-role attitudes and household behaviour; the continuing importance of familist ideology and of marriage as a social institution; the role of Jewish nationalism and collective behaviour in a religious society characterized by ethno-national conflict; and a discourse which defines women as the biological reproducers of the nation.

Supplementary material for this article is available at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00324728.2016.1195913     

Fertility trajectories and later-life depression among parents in England

We examine pathways between indicators of fertility tempo/quantum and depressive symptoms among parents aged 55+ with at least two children, using three waves of the English Longitudinal Study of Ageing. Using standard regression approaches and path analysis within the structural equation framework, we also investigate whether fertility trajectories mediated the association between childhood disadvantage and later-life depression. Results provide limited support for direct influences of fertility trajectories on depression, but indicate indirect linkages for both women and men. Associations are mediated by partnership history, social support, wealth, later-life smoking, and functional limitation. Associations between childhood disadvantage and later-life depression are partially mediated by fertility stressors. Results confirm the influence of life course experiences on depression at older ages and demonstrate the interlinked role of family and other life course pathways on later-life well-being.     

Adapting the Own Children Method to allow comparison of fertility between populations with different marriage regimes

The Own Children Method (OCM) is an indirect procedure for deriving age-specific fertility rates and total fertility from children living with their mothers at a census or survey. The method was designed primarily for the calculation of overall fertility, although there are variants that allow the calculation of marital fertility. In this paper we argue that the standard variants for calculating marital fertility can produce misleading results and require strong assumptions, particularly when applied to social or spatial subgroups. We present two new variants of the method for calculating marital fertility: the first of these allows for the presence of non-marital fertility and the second also permits the more robust calculation of rates for social subgroups of the population. We illustrate and test these using full-count census data for England and Wales in 1911.     

Is There a Stabilizing Selection Around Average Fertility in Modern Human Populations?

Possibly the greatest challenge for an evolutionary explanation of demographic transition is the fact that fertility levels universally start to fall first among the well‐to‐do, well‐educated, healthy classes, which can be explained only by some voluntary or at least adaptive action. The problem of how restraints on fertility could have evolved by natural selection has been tackled with group selection models as well as with stabilizing selection models. The latter model, which is critically discussed in this article, posits that some intermediate (rather than maximal) level of fertility is optimal for long‐term reproductive success. Tests of stabilizing selection in human populations are rare, their results inconclusive. Here four sets of data are analyzed: they are samples drawn from the 'class of 1950 of the US Military Academy at West Point (cohorts 1923–29), retired US noncommissioned officers (cohorts 1913–37), and western German and eastern German physicians (cohorts 1930–35), all containing fertility data over two generations, and from European royalty (cohorts 1790–1939) containing fertility data over four generations. Deterministic as well as stochastic fitness measures are used. It is found that maximal, not average, fertility in the first generation leads to maximal long‐term reproductive success. Also against prediction, no decreasing marginal fitness gains by increasing fertility can be observed. The findings leave little space for considering stabilizing selection as a plausible mechanism explaining the course of demographic transition but indicate instead that biological evolution today is as fast and vigorous as ever in human history. Even in large populations, all people living today may be the descendants of just some few percents—a much smaller proportion than generally believed— of the people living some generations ago.     

Worldwide fertility declines do not rely on stopping at ideal parities

A key demographic hypothesis has been that fertility declines rely on stopping at target parities, but emerging evidence suggests that women frequently reduce fertility without specific numeric targets. To assess the relative importance of these two paths to fertility decline, we develop a novel mixture model to estimate: (1) the proportion of women who stop at a target parity; and (2) mean completed fertility among those who do not. Applied to Demographic and Health Survey data from women aged 45–49 in 84 low- and middle-income countries, and to United States Census cohorts, the model shows considerable variation in the proportion stopping at specific parities (1–84?per cent). The estimates also show that declines in completed fertility are largely attributable to women who do not stop at target parities, suggesting that stopping at ideal parities may be less important than parity-independent decisions for a wide range of fertility transitions.     

鼓励生育政策能否提高生育率? ——基于生育成本缺口递增的视角

中国总和生育率的下降引发调整生育政策的讨论,但鲜有对鼓励生育政策的效果评估与理论解释.通过马斯洛需求层次理论构建生育成本缺口递增假说,并基于世界人口政策数据库与OECD家庭数据库对基于转移支付的鼓励生育政策进行了效果评估,得出如下结论:第一,生育成本是一种动态结构,需求跃迁导致生育成本缺口增速快于收入增速,进而决定鼓励...     

Malthus to modernity: wealth,status, and fertility in England, 1500–1879

A key challenge to theories of long-run economic growth has been linking the onset of modern growth with the move to modern fertility limitation. A notable puzzle for these theories is that modern growth in England began around 1780, 100 years before there was seemingly any movement to limit fertility. Here we show that the aggregate data on fertility in England before 1880 conceals significant declines in the fertility of the middle and upper classes earlier. These declines coincide with the Industrial Revolution and are of the character predicted by some recent theories of long-run growth.     

Religion as a determinant of marital fertility

This paper develops hypotheses about the effects of husbands‘ and wives‘ religious affiliations on fertility. The hypotheses are based on two central ideas. First, religions differ in their fertility norms and corresponding tradeoffs between the quality and quantity of children; differences in religious beliefs between husband and wife may thus lead to conflict regarding fertility decisions and possible resolution through bargaining. Second, a low level of religious compatibility between the spouses may raise the expected probability of marital dissolution and thereby decrease the optimal amount of investments in spouse-specific human capital. Analyses of data from the 1987–1988 National Survey of Families and Households conducted in the United States suggest that both of these effects play important roles in explaining the observed linkages between the religious composition of unions and fertility behavior. JEL classification: J1, J11, J13 Received February 17, 1995 / Accepted February 15, 1996     

我国城乡居民生育意愿调查研究综述:2000-2008

通过对2000~2008年国内有关生育意愿的调查资料和研究文献分析,对我国城乡居民的生育意愿现状、差异及变化特征进行概括。城乡居民意愿生育子女数的差异逐渐缩小,但意愿生育性别的差异仍然显著;城市青年的生育意愿渐趋一致,独生子女与非独生子女的生育意愿差异不显著;外出流动对生育意愿与生育行为的影响较大,无论是生育意愿,还是生育行为,外出流动人口都更接近于目的地城市人口;生育年龄呈继续后移趋势;生育成本增高已成为生育意愿下降的主要原因。     

Support for new mothers and fertility in the United Kingdom: Not all support is equal in the decision to have a second child

Low fertility across Europe highlights the need to understand reproductive decisions in high-income countries better. Availability of support may be one factor influencing reproductive decisions, though within high-income countries availability varies between environments, including socio-economic environments. We test whether receiving higher levels of support, from different sources (informal and formal) and of different types (practical and emotional), is positively correlated with second births in the United Kingdom (UK) Millennium Cohort Study, and whether these relationships differ by socio-economic position (SEP). Our hypothesis is only partially supported: receiving emotional support correlates with higher likelihood of second birth, but the opposite is true for practical support. Availability of different types of support varies across SEP, but relationships between support and fertility are similar, with one exception: kin-provided childcare increases the likelihood of birth only among lower-SEP women. Our results highlight that not all support is equal in the decision to have a second child.     

Gender egalitarianism,perceived economic insecurity,and fertility intentions in Spain: A qualitative analysis

Economic uncertainty contributes to low fertility in many European countries. On the other hand, greater gender equality may positively influence fertility. This paper examines how these two forces interact in Spain. We use in-depth interviews to analyse fertility decision-making among young and highly educated partnered adults living in urban areas. Highly gender-egalitarian interviewees are less likely to perceive economic insecurity as an obstacle to proceeding to a next birth than less egalitarian interviewees. But there is not necessarily a difference in these two groups’ overall fertility intentions, as highly egalitarian interviewees’ greater valuation of stable employment for both partners requires institutional and policy support for dual-earner couples’ childrearing. When we look only at interviewees who express economic insecurity, somewhat higher fertility intentions are expressed by those holding less gender-egalitarian attitudes. Our results underline the complexity of the interrelationships between economic insecurity, gender egalitarianism, and fertility intentions.     

论生育文化和生育文明

生育文明中表现了生育文化的种种现象和活动,生育文化也体现了生育文明的历史轨迹、进程和内容。生育文化的发展表现了不同时期人类生育文明的进步与发展,不体现生育文化内涵的生育文明显然是不存在的。然而,严格说来,生育文化和生育文明是既有密切联系,又有一定区别的两个不完全等同的概念。正确认识和理解生育文化和生育文明的概念、内涵、功能及其相互关系,对于推动新时期人口计生工作的深入发展,进一步开展人口和计划生育的理论研究,具有十分重要的意义和作用。     

A new method for estimating the level of natural fertility in populations practicing birth control

The natural fertility schedule of a population is the schedule of age-specific marital fertility we would observe if no birth control were being practiced. In natural fertility (no birth control) populations we can observe the natural fertility schedule directly, but in populations practicing birth control the natural fertility schedule is disguised by the marital fertility rates in those age intervals in which control is exercised, the marital fertility rates being below the natural rates. This paper elaborates a method for estimating the natural fertility schedules of populations practicing birth control. Two alternative models are presented, one nonlinear and one linear. The use of these models is then illustrated with reference to the Old Order Amish population of Lancaster County, Pennsylvania. It is shown that for Amish women born between 1860 and 1900 both the nonlinear and linear models yield an estimate of .843 as the ratio between Amish and Hutterite natural fertility schedules.     

Latest-Late Fertility? Decline and Resurgence of Late Parenthood Across the Low-Fertility Countries

After decades of fertility postponement, we investigate recent changes in late parenthood across low-fertility countries in the light of observations from the past. We use long series of age-specific fertility rates from the Human Fertility Database (1950–2016) for women, and new data covering the period 1990–2016 for men. In 1950, the contribution of births at age 40 and over to female fertility rates ranged from 2.5 to 9 percent, but then fell sharply until the 1980s. From the 1990s, however, the prevalence of late first births increased rapidly, especially so in countries where it was initially lowest. This has produced a late fertility rebound in the last two decades, occurring much faster for women than for men. Comparisons between recent and past extremely late (age 48+) fertility levels confirm that people are now challenging the natural fertility barriers, particularly for a first child.