Population projections: states, 1995 - 2025

All states will have more people in the future, especially in the south and west, while population aging occurs as the baby boomers age. This report identifies population changes projected to affect the US's 50 states and District of Columbia during 1995-2015. Basic assumptions for state population projections are presented with regard to population, births, deaths, net international migration, and net internal migration. The methodology used to produce the report is also described. Total population and net change is presented in tabular format for each state over the period. These data are used as the basic input to many federal, state, and local projection models which produce detailed statistics on education, economic factors, labor force, health care, voting, and other subjects. State differentials in fertility and mortality are also projected to widen, reflecting the concentration of race and ethnic groups with high fertility in some states and differential migration patterns.     

Geopolitical Aspects of Population in the Twenty‐First Century

Over the second half of the twentieth century rapid population growth in the less developed countries has redrawn the global demographic map. Many once‐poor countries have also experienced strong economic growth, which in combination with the demographic change has yielded marked shifts in the world's economic balance, with far‐reaching geopolitical implications. At the same time, low fertility in much of the developed world presages a future of population shrinkage, accompanied by pronounced population aging. In per capita terms, the economic advantages of the developed countries will likely persist for many years, but their actual and potential falls in population may accentuate their loss of relative economic power and eventually lead to marginalization of their international standing and influence. Preventing population shrinkage will be an urgent task for them, requiring either large‐scale immigration (likely to be ruled out) or raising the birth rate. Existing pro‐family policies have had at best modest effects on fertility levels. Two novel approaches are described that would plausibly have greater impact. One would counteract the disproportionate influence of older voters in the electorate by granting voting rights to all citizens, allowing custodial parents to vote on behalf of their children. The second would reform the public pension system to reestablish the link between the financial security of retired persons and the number of children they have raised to productive adulthood.     

Sociological aspects of inter-island migration in Indonesia

“Transmigration” to the Outer Islands of Indonesia is generally considered a solution for the overpopulation problem of Java. An analysis of the actual situation exposes some of the fallacies behind this assumption.

Organised resettlement in irrigated areas tends to reproduce the overpopulation pattern prevalent in Java. “Spontaneous” migration, without governmental planning and supervision, is still less satisfactory as it exposes the cleared soils to erosion, after a few harvests.

The analysis shows that the concept of overpopulation should be made more precise. In relation to the modes of cultivation practised among most of the peoples outside Java, many regions in the Outer Islands may be regarded as overpopulated, in spite of their low population densities.

The absorptive capacity of the Outer Islands should not be measured in spatial terms only, but sociological and psychological factors must be taken into account. Assimilation of the Javanese migrants with Sumatrans would seem unlikely, given the present system of rural resettlement.

A solution of the overpopulation problem of Java and of the resettlement problem would call for efficient planning to bring about basic changes in the economic structure of the whole archipelago, including a programme for industrial development.

The weaknesses of the newly founded Asian states are in part due to the fact that national loyalties have not yet taken root among the mass of the population.     

Persistent efforts must continue to be made

Evidence has continuously suggested that population growth in a particular country is closely related to its social stability and economic development. Statistics show that the population growth in the developing countries accounts for 90% of the world's total increase, and the growth rate in those countries is the highest. Therefore, the population problem is of a more serious nature to the developing countries. Unless this problem is solved or at least alleviated, it would be extremely difficult for many developing countries to shed poverty, develop their national economies, and raise standards of living. On the other hand, the trend of growth of the world population and the high rate of population growth in the developing countries will inevitably have grave consequences affecting, directly or indirectly, the economic stability and development of developed countries. These consequences would also affect world peace. The population problem is therefore both a national and an international issue. While each country should take the problem seriously and work hard to tackle it according to its own conditions, all countries in the world should come together to address the problem and make joint efforts for its settlement or alleviation. It is inspiring that the "Day of 5 Billion" has caught global attention and is being observed throughout the world with massive support.     

Kofi Annan on an Immigration Strategy for Europe

In his September 2002 report to the United Nations General Assembly, Secretary‐General Kofi Annan identified migration as a priority issue for the international community. Subsequent initiatives prompted by the UN resulted, in December 2003, in the formation of a Global Commission on International Migration. This independent body has three mandates: to bring international migration issues to the top of the global agenda, to analyze shortcomings in approaches to international migration and examine inter‐linkages with other issue‐areas, and to make practical recommendations for how to manage international migration more effectively. Remarks made by Kofi Annan at the launching of the Commission in Geneva were amplified in an address he gave to the European Parliament in Brussels on 29 January 2004 upon receiving the Andrei Sakharov Prize for Freedom of Thought. Simultaneously a brief article covering the themes in that address, signed by Kofi Annan, was released by the Secretary‐General's office for publication in leading newspapers throughout Europe. The full text of this article ( http://www.un.org/News/ossg/sg/stories/sg‐29jan2004.htm ) is reproduced below. The article presents a number of propositions about international migration, with special reference to Europe, that tend to be taken for granted in discussions of the subject in international forums. Perhaps because of the article's brevity, the propositions are stated in strikingly unqualified form. Europe needs migrants. Immigration will enrich and strengthen European countries; the alternative is accepting declining living standards and social division‐‐a meaner, weaker, older Europe. In the absence of migration, jobs would go unfilled and services undelivered. Immigration cannot be controlled: closing the door would not only harm Europe's long‐term economic and social prospects, it would drive more and more people to come in through the back door. Such propositions, far from being axiomatic, are of course highly controversial. A fuller examination of them is presumably part of the Global Commission's remit. One of the biggest tests for the enlarged European Union, in the years and decades to come, will be how it manages the challenge of immigration. If European societies rise to this challenge, immigration will enrich and strengthen them. If they fail to do so, the result may be declining living standards and social division. There can be no doubt that European societies need immigrants. Europeans are living longer and having fewer children. Without immigration, the population of the soon‐to‐be twenty‐five Member States of the EU will drop, from about 450 million now to under 400 million in 2050. The EU is not alone in this. Japan, the Russian Federation and South Korea, among others, face similar possible futures‐where jobs would go unfilled and services undelivered, as economies shrink and societies stagnate. Immigration alone will not solve these problems, but it is an essential part of any solution. We can be sure that people from other continents will go on wanting to come and live in Europe. In today's unequal world, vast numbers of Asians and Africans lack the opportunities for self improvement that most Europeans take for granted. It is not surprising that many of them see Europe as a land of opportunity, in which they long to begin a new life‐just as the potential of the new world once attracted tens of millions of impoverished but enterprising Europeans. All countries have the right to decide whether to admit voluntary migrants (as op‐posed to bona fide refugees, who have a right to protection under international law). But Europeans would be unwise to close their doors. That would not only harm their long‐term economic and social prospects. It would also drive more and more people to try and come in through the back door‐by asking for political asylum (thus overloading a system designed to protect refugees who have fled in fear of persecution), or by seeking the help of smugglers, often risking death or in‐jury in clandestine acts of desperation on boats, trucks, trains and planes. Illegal immigration is a real problem, and States need to cooperate in their efforts to stop it‐especially in cracking down on smugglers and traffickers whose organized crime networks exploit the vulnerable and subvert the rule of law. But combating illegal immigration should be part of a much broader strategy. Countries should provide real channels for legal immigration, and seek to harness its benefits, while safeguarding the basic human rights of migrants. Poor countries can also benefit from migration. Migrants sent at least $88 billion to developing countries in remittances during 2002‐54% more than the $57 billion those countries received in development aid. Migration is therefore an issue in which all countries have a stake‐and which demands greater international cooperation. The recently established Global Commission on International Migration, co‐chaired by distinguished public figures from Sweden and South Africa, can help to establish international norms and better policies to manage migration in the interest of all. I am confident that it will come up with good ideas, and I hope they will win support, from countries that "send" migrants as well as those that receive them. Managing migration is not only a matter of opening doors and joining hands internationally. It also requires each country to do more to integrate new arrivals. Immigrants must adjust to their new societies and societies need to adjust too. Only with an imaginative strategy for integrating immigrants can countries ensure that they enrich the host society more than they unsettle it. While each country will approach this is‐sue according to its own character and culture, no one should lose sight of the tremendous contribution that millions of immigrants have already made to modern European societies. Many have become leaders in government, science, academia, sports and the arts. Others are less famous but play an equally vital role. Without them, many health systems would be short‐staffed, many parents would not have the home help they need to pursue careers, and many jobs that provide services and generate revenue would go unfilled. Immigrants are part of the solution, not part of the problem. All who are committed to Europe's future, and to human dignity, should therefore take a stand against the tendency to make immigrants the scapegoats for social problems. The vast majority of immigrants are industrious, courageous, and determined. They don't want a free ride. They want a fair opportunity for themselves and their families. They are not criminals or terrorists. They are law‐abiding. They don't want to live apart. They want to integrate, while retaining their identity. In this twenty‐first century, migrants need Europe. But Europe also needs migrants. A closed Europe would be a meaner, poorer, weaker, older Europe. An open Europe will be a fairer, richer, stronger, younger Europe‐provided Europe manages immigration well.     

Population and the energy problem

When energy is scarce or expensive, people can suffer material deprivation and economic hardship. When it is obtained in ways that fail to minimize environmental and political costs, these too can threaten human wellbeing in fundamental and pervasive ways. The energy problem today combines these syndromes: much of the world's population has too little energy to meet basic human needs; the monetary costs of energy are rising nearly everywhere; the environmental impacts of energy supply are growing and already dominant contributors to local, regional, and global environmental problems (including air pollution, water pollution, ocean pollution, and climate change); and the sociopolitical risks of energy supply (above all the danger of conflict over oil and the links between nuclear energy and nuclear weapons) are growing too. This predicament has many causes, but predominant among them are the nearly 20-fold increase in world energy use since 1850 and the cumulative depletion of the most convenient oil and gas deposits that this growth has entailed, resulting in increasing resort to costlier and/or environmentally more disruptive energy sources. The growth of world population in this period was responsible for 52% of the energy growth, while growth in per capita energy use was responsible for 48% (excluding causal connections between population and energy use per capita). In the United States in the same period, population growth accounted for 66% of the 36-fold increase in energy use. In the late 1980s, population growth was still accounting for a third of energy growth both in the United States and worldwide. Coping with global energy problems will require greatly increased investment in improving the efficiency of energy enduse and in reducing the environmental impacts of contemporary energy technologies, and it will require financing a transition over the next several decades to a set of more sustainable (but probably also more expensive) energy sources. The difficulty of implementing these measures will be greatest by far in the developing countries, not least because of their high rates of population growth and the attendant extra pressures on economic and managerial resources. If efficiency improvements permit delivering the high standard of living to which the world aspires based on a per capita rate of energy use as low as 3 kilowatts—about a quarter of the current U.S. figure—then a world population stabilized at 10 billion people would be using energy at a rate of 30 terawatts, and a population of 14 billion would imply 42 terawatts (compare 13.2 terawatts in 1990). Delivering even the lower figure at tolerable monetary and environmental costs will be difficult; each additional billion people added to the world population will compound these difficulties and increase energy's costs, making everyone poorer.Presented at the Symposium on Population and Scarcity: The Forgotten Dimensions.     

International migration: a global challenge

Trends in international migration are presented in this multiregional analysis. Seven of the world's wealthiest countries have about 33% of the world's migrant population, but under 16% of the total world population. Population growth in these countries is substantially affected by the migrant population. The migration challenge is external and internal. The external challenge is to balance the need for foreign labor and the commitment to human rights for those migrants seeking economic opportunity and political freedom. The internal challenge is to assure the social adjustment of immigrants and their children and to integrate them into society as citizens and future leaders. Why people cross national borders and how migration flows are likely to evolve over the next decades are explained. This report also presents some ways that countries can manage migration or reduce the pressures which force people to migrate. It is recommended that receiving nations control immigration by accelerating global economic growth and reducing wars and human rights violations. This report examines the impact of immigration on international trade, aid, and direct intervention policies. Although migration is one of the most important international economic issues, it is not coordinated by an international group. The European experience indicates that it is not easy to secure international cooperation on issues that affect national sovereignty. It is suggested that countries desiring control of their borders should remember that most people never cross national borders to live or work in another country, that 50% of the world's migrants move among developing countries, and that countries can shift from being emigration to immigration countries. The author suggests that sustained reductions in migration pressure are a better alternative than the "quick fixes" that may invite the very much feared mass and unpredictable movements.     

A further consideration of the human aspects of economic readjustment in Hungary

The economic transition to a market economy has not only caused severe economic disruption in the nations of Central and Eastern Europe but also uncertainty among the population. This study presents indicators of the Hungarian population's perceptions and expectations with respect to levels of inflation, unemployment and poverty. A survey of published social and quality of life indicators revealed that the necessary information to carry out this study was not available. Instead, data from a monthly Hungarian Gallup Institute sample poll was obtained and this information was disaggregated by income classification and place of residence to show the differential effect of these factors. The study shows that lower income groups and residents of smaller places are generally more concerned about the future prospects of unemployment and inflation than higher income groups and residents of larger places. Given the level of unemployment, however, which even to June 1992 was relatively low by international standards, a very large proportion of the overall population are concerned about the possibility of becoming unemployed. The volatility of public perceptions toward the variables considered in the study is clearly shown for all classifications by income and residence, many of which would seem to have no logical explanation. In all groupings, pessimism about the future has increased over the period considered.     

A summary analysis of the 3rd inquiry

20 ESCAP member countries responded to the "Third Population Inquiry among Governments: Population policies in the context of development in 1976." The questionnaire sent to the member countries covered economic and social development and population growth, mortality, fertility and family formation, population distribution and internal migration, international migration, population data collection and research, training, and institutional arrangements for the formulation of population policies within development. Most of the governments in the ESCAP region that responded indicate that the present rate of population growth constrains their social and economic development. Among the governments that consider the present rate of population growth to constrain economic and social development, 13 countries regarded the most appropriate response to the constraint would include an adjustment of both socioeconomic and demographic factors. 11 of the governments regarded their present levels of average life expectancy at birth "acceptable" and 7 identified their levels as "unacceptable." Most of the governments who responded consider that, in general, their present level of fertility is too high and constrains family well-being. Internal migration and population distribution are coming to be seen as concerns for government population policy. The most popular approaches to distributing economic and social activities are rural development, urban and regional development and industrial dispersion. There was much less concern among the governments returning the questionnaire about the effect of international migration than internal migration on social and economic development.     

Intercountry adoption in the new millennium; the ``quiet migration' revisited

Intercountry adoption is not usually seen as a matter for demographers, although articles in the International Migration Review have looked at international adoption as a migratory process. This article outlines the author's estimate of the number of intercountry adoptions world-wide, using data recorded by 18 receiving states in the 1990s. Data from selected receiving countries are used to estimate the number of adoptions from states of origin. Comparisons are made with data for 14 countries over the period 1980–89 collated by Kane (1993).The global estimate of at least 32,000 adoptions in 1998 is much higher than thenumbers usually cited and suggest a rise of fifty percent over the previous decade.Total numbers are dominated by adoptions to the United States and from China andRussia. However standardisation against population size or number of live birthssuggests that the highest rates among receiving states are to be found in Scandinavia,while the highest rates for states of origin are in countries of Eastern Europe, followedby Korea – countries typified by very low birth rates. The article ends with a discussion of the implications of these findings for the future of international controls and the implementation of the 1993 Hague Convention.     

The UN Population Division on Replacement Migration

The most salient demographic trend pictured by the influential set of population projections prepared by the Population Division of the United Nations (a unit in the UN's Department of Economic and Social Affairs) is the continuing substantial increase—albeit at a declining rate—of the global population during the coming decades. According to the “medium” variant of the most recent (1998) revision of these projections, between 2000 and 2050 the expected net addition to the size of the world population will be some 2.85 billion, a figure larger than that of the total world population as recently as the mid‐1950s. All of this increase will occur in the countries currently classified as less developed; in fact, as a result of their anticipated persistent below‐replacement levels of fertility, the more developed regions as a whole would experience declining population size beginning about 2020, and would register a net population loss of some 33 million between 2000 and 2050. A report prepared by the UN Population Division and released on 21 March 2000 addresses some of the implications of the changes in population size and age structure that low‐fertility countries will be likely to experience. The 143‐page report, issued under the eyecatching title Replacement Migration: Is It a Solution to Declining and Ageing Populations?, highlights the expected magnitude of these changes by the imaginative device of answering three hypothetical questions. The answer to each of these questions is predicated on the assumption that some specified demographic feature of various country or regional populations would be maintained at the highest level that feature would exhibit, in the absence of international migration, in the United Nations' medium population projections (as revised in 1998) during the period 1995–2050. The selected demographic features are total population size, the size of the working‐age population (15–64 years), and the so‐called potential support ratio: the ratio of the working‐age population to the old‐age population (65 years and older). The illustrative device chosen for accomplishing the specified feats of preserving the selected demographic parameters (i.e., keeping them unchanged up to 2050 once their highest value is attained) is international migration. Hence the term “replacement migration.” Given the low levels of fertility and mortality now prevailing in the more developed world (and specifically in the eight countries and the two overlapping regions for which the numerical answers to the above questions are presented in the report), and given the expected future evolution of fertility and mortality incorporated in the UN population projections, the results are predictably startling. The magnitudes of the requisite compensatory migration streams tend to be huge relative both to current net inmigration flows and to the size of the receiving populations; least so in the case of the migration needed to maintain total population size and most so in the case of migration needed to counterbalance population aging by maintaining the support ratio. Reflecting its relatively high fertility and its past and current record of receiving a large influx of international migrants, the United States is a partial exception to this rule. But even for the US to maintain the support ratio at its highest—year 1995—level of 5.21 would require increasing net inmigration more than tenfold. The country, the report states, would have to receive 593 million immigrants between 1995 and 2050, or a yearly average of 10.8 million. The extreme case is the Republic of Korea, where the exercise calls for maintaining a support ratio of 12.6. To satisfy this requirement, Korea, with a current population of some 47 million, would need 5.1 billion immigrants between 1995 and 2050, or an average of 94 million immigrants per year. (In the calculations, the age and sex distribution of migrants is assumed to be the same as that observed in the past in the main immigration countries. The fertility and mortality of immigrants are assumed to be identical with those of the receiving population.) The “Executive Summary” of the report is reproduced below, with the permission of the United Nations. Chapters of the full report set out the issues that prompted the exercise; provide a selective review of the literature; explain the methodology and the assumptions underlying the calculations; and present the detailed results for the eight countries and two regions selected for illustrative purposes. A brief discussion of the implications of the findings concludes the report. As is evident even from the figures just cited, immigration is shown to be at best a modest potential palliative to whatever problems declining population size and population aging are likely to pose to low‐fertility countries. The calculations, however, vividly illustrate that demographic changes will profoundly affect society and the economy, and will require adjustments that remain inadequately appreciated and assessed. The criteria specified in the UN calculations—maintenance of particular demographic parameters at a peak value—of course do not necessarily have special normative significance. Past demographic changes, with respect notably to the age distribution as well as population size, have been substantial, yet they have been successfully accommodated under circumstances of growing prosperity in many countries. But the past may be an imperfect guide in confronting the evolving dynamics of low‐fertility populations. As the report convincingly states, the new demographic challenges will require comprehensive reassessments of many established economic and social policies and programs.     

Globalization and Inequality: A Norwegian Report

Is global inequality increasing? Some authoritative voices—for example, from the United Nations Development Programme—assert unequivocally that it is, and have carried popular belief with them. Others see a more nuanced and on balance a positive picture. Any attempt to answer the question must grapple with many conceptual and measurement difficulties. These are not wholly eliminated even if the inequality in question is narrowed to that among the per capita incomes of countries, ignoring intracountry differences in income. Disagreement about the empirical record has not impeded argument over causes. Globalization—the expansion of trade, investment, and technology flows among states that is making for a more integrated world economy—is invoked on both sides: seen by some as further marginalizing the world's poor, by others as offering a route out of poverty. The starkly different positions surface in the heated debates that have surrounded the World Trade Organization and the proposal for a Multilateral Agreement on Investment. The nature of trends in international inequality and the role in them of globalization are explored in a recent report issued by the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Globalisation and Inequality: World Income Distribution and Living Standards, 1960–1998 (October 2000), the summary from which is reproduced below. The report finds that global inequality between countries has decreased over the last four decades. Globalization may or may not have contributed to that outcome, but at least does not appear to work against it. In sum, “not everything has turned out badly; in fact there has—in spite of the setbacks in some regions and in spite of population growth—been considerable global progress during the last decades.” Given the chosen focus on inequality, there is little discussion in the report of that other dimension of global progress: changes in absolute income levels. But in assessing the implications of development for human welfare, the issue of economic growth and its relationship to globalization is clearly pertinent. Footnote 4 offers a passing glimpse of that dimension, referring to changes in absolute poverty. The World Bank's World Development Report 2000/2001 estimates that the number of people in absolute poverty (living on less than $1 a day) changed little between 1987 and 1998: it went from 1.18 billion to 1.20 billion. As the population grew, this meant a modest reduction in the proportion in absolute poverty in the world population (excluding the rich countries): from 28.3 percent to 24.0 percent. But in the East Asia and Pacific region—a region characterized by both rapid overall economic growth and increasing integration into the global economy—the number of poor dropped from 418 million to 278 million during the same period, with the proportion dropping from 26.6 percent to 15.3 percent. The report was commissioned from the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI), and prepared by Ame Melchior, Kjetil Telle. and Henrik Wiig. It is available online both in its English version and in its original (and longer) Norwegian version—the former at http://odin.dep.no/ud/engelsk/publ/rapporter/index‐b‐n‐a.html , the latter through the Ministry's parallel Norwegian‐language site.     

Non-poor Components of Population Growth and Immigration in the U.S., 1990–2010

Traditional measures of poverty are informative in indicating the degree of economic deprivation in a population at a cross-sectional point in time, but they do not consider growth in the size of the non-poverty population. We develop a measure of non-poverty population growth in order to explore whether it constitutes a useful indicator of an important demographic dynamic. We illustrate our approach with an analysis of the U.S. states using Census and American Community Survey data from 1990, 2000, and 2010. The results indicate that the extent to which the non-poor population increased across states is uncorrelated with the initial poverty rate as conventionally measured. Broken down by nativity, the findings further show that some states with official poverty rates above the national average (e.g., Arizona, Georgia, and Texas) nonetheless had some of the highest rates of non-poor population growth among less skilled immigrants. By contrast, other states with official poverty rates below the national average (e.g., Connecticut, New Hampshire, and Vermont) often had low rates of non-poor population growth among less skilled immigrants. These findings suggest that low initial poverty rates do not necessarily contribute substantially to the alleviation of global poverty through the immigration of less skilled persons from less developed nations. However, the rate of non-poor population growth among less skilled immigrants also appears to be uncorrelated with state variation in minimum wages even after taking into account population density and median home value.     

Report of the Global Commission on International Migration

In December 2003, “acting on the encouragement of UN Secretary‐General Kofi Annan,” the Global Commission on International Migration was established as an independent body, consisting of 19 Commissioners co‐chaired by Jan O. Carlsson, former Minister for Migration and Development, Sweden, and Mamphela Ramphele, formerly the World Bank's Managing Director, from South Africa. The mandate of the Commission was to “provide the framework for the formulation of a coherent, comprehensive and global response to the issue of international migration.” The work of the Commission was assisted by a Geneva‐based Secretariat and a “Core Group of States,” eventually including 32 governments from all world regions, that acted as an informal consultative body to the Commission. (The United States, the most important host country to immigrants, was not among the 32.) In October 2005, in New York, the Commission presented its Report to Kofi Annan, the UN member states, and other interested bodies. The Report is also intended as an input to intergovernmental discussion of international migration issues at the UN General Assembly in the Fall of 2006. The Report, an 88‐page document, is accessible at « http://www.gcim.org ». That web site also provides access to extensive background materials on selected topics concerning international migration, regional studies of international migration prepared for the Commission, and reports of the regional hearings, consultations with “stakeholders,” and expert meetings held by the Commission. Reproduced below are three sections of the Report: its Introduction (titled “Dimensions and dynamics of international migration”) and two of its four Annexes: “Principles for Action and Recommendations,” and a compendium of data: “Migration at a glance.” Under the impact of globalization, international migration, long an important element of demographic change as experienced by individual states, has acquired increasing salience in international relations and in domestic politics. National sovereignty in deciding about immigration policy (probably the key determinant of contemporary international migration flows) remains an established principle in international law, subject only to treaty obligations to admit bonafide refugees. Increasingly in recent years, however, demands have surfaced to treat such policies as matters to be decided bilaterally between sending and receiving countries, or even to be regulated by an international or supranational body. (For earlier voices discussing this topic see the Archives section of this issue and the Archives section of the December 1983 issue of PDR:“On the international control of migration.”) Unexpectedly to some observers, the Report of the Global Commission fell short of recommending establishment of a new, WTO‐like, international organization within the UN system with responsibility for international migration. It recommends, instead, steps to be taken toward an Inter‐agency Global Migration Facility. Whether or not such arrangements will materialize and be influential, the Commission clearly sees international migration flows, primarily from less developed to more developed countries, as increasing in the future. While not quantified, this vision contrasts with the assumptions incorporated in the often‐cited projections of the UN Population Division, which envisage future net migratory flows as either constant in size or even decreasing. The Report's argument rests primarily on the perceived economic benefits of migration to both receiving and sending countries, fueled by persisting income differentials and by contrasting demographic configurations between migrants' places of origin and destination. It gives short shrift to arguments that question the economic gains of mass migration to receiving countries, or that see such gains at best as minor and likely to be counterbalanced by noneconomic considerations. Nor does the Report gauge the likelihood that heeding its strictures for a more welcoming treatment of migrants would increase the incentives to migrate.     

How a trend towards a stationary population affects consumer demand

Abstract During the great depression of the 1930seconomists in both the United States and Europe tried to analyse the economic consequences of declining rates of population growth. Not only were birth rates in many industrial countries at the lowest levels ever, but they coincided with high rates of unemployment. Of the many economists who held that demographic trends were partly responsible for the adverse economic conditions, a prominent example was John Maynard Keynes. According to his so-called stagnation thesis, population growth stimulates investment demand in two ways: more people need more goods and services and, hence, more investment in factories and machinery; and with population growing, businessmen are more likely to regard their investment misallocations as less serious than when the growth is slow or nil.(1)A minority of writers were more optimistic about the economic consequences of slower rates of population growth. For example, Thompson argued that with a lower ratio of consumers to producers the population would enjoy a higher standard of living and the education of children should improve.(2).     

Population,Development and Global Warming: Averting the Tragedy of the Climate Commons

Carbon emissions from fossil fuel use and other human activity are predicted to cause a significant warming of the global climate, according to a growing consensus of scientists. Global warming would have substantial negative effects on the world environment and economy. Human population and economic growth continue to drive both energy use and carbon emissions. While the developed countries are the largest source of present and past emissions, developing countries are rapidly catching up. China will probably surpass the United States as the largest carbon emitter early in the next century. The global warming treaty signed in Rio in 1992 relies entirely on voluntary emission caps for developed countries and has had little or no apparent effect on emissions. Much stronger steps must be taken to avoid or lessen potential climate change. A globally determined but nationally imposed carbon tax should be adopted to internalize the future costs of carbon emissions into the present cost of fossil fuel and other carbon sources. This would allow the maximum use of free market forces and individual choice to determine how carbon emission reductions are achieved. In addition, national emission caps for all countries should be established. International trade mechanisms can be used to support universal implementation of these measures. Where possible, global warming policy should include strong but equitable incentives for sustainable development and population stabilization, important goals in themselves regardless of the extent of future climate change.     

Marshall on the population question. I

English economic thought was dominated for close to a half century by the system of economic analysis developed by Alfred Marshall (1842–1924) whose views relating to population are examined. The demographic and economic changes taking place within Marshall's lifetime are briefly summarised in the Introduction. There follows in Part I a review of the opinions of Marshall's predecessors and contemporaries respecting both the behaviour of the laws of returns, technical progress, etc., and the circumstances on which population growth had depended or was likely to depend. The optimum is included among the concepts here treated. Reactions to the late nineteenth-century decline in natality are noted. In Part II Marshall's treatment of the laws of returns and of capital formation, together with their significance for the population question, is examined. His treatment of technological and organisational change and of international trade as counterbalances to population growth is considered. His failure to make use of the optimum concept is remarked as is the theory of economic growth that appears to underly his analysis of demographic development.     

The future of world population

Analysis of future population trends reveals a regional pattern of continued growth, dependent upon basic assumptions about demographic factors and the priority given to human rights, socioeconomic development, and global interdependence. Developing countries will account for 85-87% of world population growth, and the most rapid increase will occur in Africa. The optimum size of population remains debatable. Ecologist argue for a reduction to 1-2 billion people in order to be in balance with nature and maintain a high quality of life. A rapid, but plausible, fertility decline would result in a population of 10 billion by 2070. The lowest feasible UN projection is 8 billion. A 1-2 billion world population would not be feasible without drastic mortality increases and fertility declines. Population control is a highly charged and complex issue; feminists are not about to place responsibility for environmental degradation on women's excess fertility. The spirit of the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights is that women have the right to determine family size with personal integrity and freedom rather than suffer coercion for the rights of society. Family planning is a necessary ingredient for achieving the goal of desired family size. The quality of life may be undermined by upholding human rights, without recognition of the context of socioeconomic development and global interdependencies. Global economic conditions, political crises, and environmental degradation can undermine even the best national development efforts. The most difficult task ahead is addressing priorities and forming a consensus. Human rights, socioeconomic conditions, and global interdependencies must be satisfied in a mutually beneficial way. When national and global goals conflict, a compromise must be reached. There are many unknowns. The challenge is to "identify a set of policies that will stabilize world climatic conditions, promote economic development, enhance the quality of life, and respect human rights." Investment in human capital, such as education and health, will help women to avoid unwanted pregnancies. Improving the status of women is key to socioeconomic development, human rights, and global interdependencies.     

Theories and practical problems of population facing four modernizations being conscientiously studied]

The Second National Symposium on Population Theory focused on the problems of population and their solution associated with the 4 modernizations. The following issues discussed by 7 Sumposium panels are summarized: population development theory in the socialist society; population problems in China and their solution; population policies and legislation relating to population control; population distribution and migration; population estimation and population planning; and population research and the establishment of population theory. Discussants agreed that the comprehensive investigation of population principle in a socialist society is of great importance to decisionmaking in the area of China's population development policy. Several different issues arose concerning the content and critical areas in the development of a socialist population principle. More than 1 principle is operating in socialist population theory, but the most important is the principle of population reproduction. The point was made that in addition to the population principle specific to individual society, there exists principles that are common to every society. The consensus was that population growth is associated with all the economical, political, and idelogical developments and that among these the association between population growth and economic development is the most significant. The current major population problem in China was identified as maladjustment between population growth and economic development. This maladjustment has led to problems in the areas of education, employment, transportation, and housing. The fundamental solution was identified as improving economical development to increase the material reproduction and controlling the population reproduction. In addition to birth control policies, it was suggested that population policies should include the geographical distribution and migration of the population. There was wide support for the proposal to legislate population control. It was agreed that such legislation would promote the progress of population control and assure its success. Discussion of the problems of population distribution and migration concentrated on the population problems of the urban area and minority ethnic groups. It was suggested that a nationwide census be conducted in population planning, population legislation, and population theory investigation. In order to establish the socialist population theory, it is essential to clarify the subjects, scopes, and methods of population research.     

Urbanization as a Global Historical Process: Theory and Evidence from sub‐Saharan Africa

Urbanization has traditionally been understood as a byproduct of economic development, but this explanatory framework fails to account for the phenomenon of “urbanization without growth” observed in sub‐Saharan Africa throughout the 1980s and 1990s. In light of this apparent anomaly, I argue that urbanization is better understood as a global historical process driven by population dynamics associated with technological and institutional innovations that have substantially improved disease control and food security in urban settlements across the globe. These innovations first emerged in Europe in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries and were subsequently diffused through colonialism, trade, and international development assistance. A range of qualitative and quantitative evidence is presented to demonstrate that this historically grounded theory of urbanization offers a more convincing explanation for the stylized facts of Africa's urban transition—and hence the process of world urbanization more broadly—than the traditional economic account.