Birth and death in cities in the developing world

City dwellers in Sub-Saharan Africa have increased roughly 600% in the last 35 years. Throughout the developing world, cities have expanded at a rate that has far outpaced rural population growth. Extensive data document lower fertility and mortality rates in cities than in rural regions. But slums, shantytowns, and squatters' settlements proliferate in many large cities. Martin Brockerhoff studies the reproductive and health consequences of urban growth, with an emphasis on maternal and child health. Brockerhoff reports that child mortality rates in large cities are highest among children born to mothers who recently migrated from rural areas or who live in low-quality housing. Children born in large cities have about a 30% higher risk of dying before they reach the age of 5 than those born in smaller cities. Despite this, children born to migrant mothers who have lived in a city for about a year have much better survival chances than children born in rural areas to nonmigrant mothers and children born to migrant mothers before or shortly after migration. Migration in developing countries as a whole has saved millions of children's lives. The apparent benefits experienced in the 1980s may not occur in the future, as cities continue to grow and municipal governments confront an overwhelming need for housing, jobs, and services. Another benefit is that fertility rates in African cities fell by about 1 birth per woman as a result of female migration from villages to towns in the 1980s and early 1990s. There will be an increasing need for donors and governments to concentrate family planning, reproductive health, child survival, and social services in cities, particularly in Sub-Saharan Africa, because there child mortality decline has been unexpectedly slow, overall fertility decline is not yet apparent in most countries, and levels of migration to cities are anticipated to remain high.     

Quality of life declines in big and growing cities. Poverty in cities

The quality of life in developing countries during the first couple of decades after the Second World War was higher in cities than in small towns and villages. However, the relative advantage of city dwellers in developing countries has declined since the 1970s, with high-growth rate cities experiencing a more severe decline. Infant mortality levels in Latin America and sub-Saharan Africa in the 1990s are as high in large cities as in the smallest towns and villages. In most developing regions, big city residents are increasingly disadvantaged, such that researchers and policymakers can no longer assume that the quality of life in urban areas is better than in rural areas. The urban transformation of the developing world is similar to the 19th century urbanization of now-developed countries, but today many more people are crowding into far bigger cities. Using survey information from 43 countries representing 63% of the developing world's urban population outside of China and India, Martin Brockerhoff of the Population Council and Ellen Brennan of the UN Population Division found that rapid population growth and big size have overwhelmed the capacity of cities to provide essential goods and services.     

Urban growth in Korea, 1970-1980: an application of the human ecological perspective

This study supports the ecological perspective proposed by Duncan (population, environment, organization, and technology) explaining urban population growth. Data were obtained from the 1970 and 1980 Korean Population Census and Korean Municipal Yearbook on cities with a minimum size of 20,000-50,000 people (108 cities and towns). Urban growth is most strongly influenced by indigenous labor surplus and the population potential of the city to be in contact with another city. Nine multiple regression variables explained just under 66% of the variance in urban growth. Net migration was influential among those aged 15-24 years. The extent of differentiation of industry affected net migration only among those aged 15-24 years and those aged 35-44 years. Population redistribution was more affected directly by changes in industrial organization, and migration was affected indirectly by environmental and technological effects on organization. Urban growth through migration of older age groups was affected by government expenditure on public works. Urban growth was not much affected by transportation/communication concentration, manufacturing concentration, urban labor surplus, population size, and site. Urban growth was viewed as the interaction between the unemployment rate and the urban wage, following Todaro's equilibrium models. In Korea, larger cities only grew faster during the 1960s. By the 1970s, upper middle-sized cities grew faster. Location was not a significant factor in explaining urban growth, but growth was rapid along a corridor within 100 km from Seoul and 50 km from Pusan, the second largest city in Korea. Caution was urged in interpreting Korea's ecological urban growth patterns as indicative of developing countries.     

The Role of Migration in the Urban Transition: A Demonstration From Albania

Although natural increase has been recognized as the main driver of postwar urban growth in developing countries, urban transition theory predicts a dominant role for population mobility in the early and late phases of the process. To account for this discrepancy between theory and empirical evidence, I demonstrate the complex role played by internal and international migration in the pattern of urban growth. Using a combination of indirect demographic estimations for postwar Albania, I show that the dominant contribution of natural increase from the 1960s to the 1990s was induced by a limited urban in-migration; this was due to the restrictions on leaving the countryside imposed under communist rule and, thereafter, to the redirection abroad of rural out-migrants. Although young adults in cities also engaged in international movements and significantly reduced their fertility, the indirect effects of rural-to-urban migration attenuated the fall in urban birth rates and postponed demographic aging. In-migrants swelled urban cohorts of reproductive age and delayed the urban fertility transition. Despite a high level of urban natural increase in Albania, I thus conclude that the role of population mobility dominated in the early and most recent phases of urban growth. The results also have implications for our understanding of demographic processes during the second urban transition in developing countries.     

The population and economic issues in West Asia after WW II]

Using statistical data, this report analyzes population and economic issues in West Asia after World War II. The high rate of development as witnessed in West Asian countries after their gaining of political independence following World War II was accompained by an accelerated population growth. This population growth spead unevenly among different areas. Based on surveys of 17 countries in West Asia, the socioeconomic development and rapid rate of population growth have largely affected the population age, sex, urban and rural residential, and economic sector employment structures. With the help of indicators and mathematical methods to plot population development, these countries can be divided into 3 categories based on population development features. The semiindustrial countries demonstrate a gradually slowing population growth rate, most of these countries having experienced a peak period in the growth rate during the time of population transition. The agricultural countries show a natural population growth rate which is generally considered low. The 3rd category, the oil-producing countries, are currently experiencing a peak in population growth. In general, the popuation growth rate has dramatically accelerated in West Asia since World War II. Between 1950-1960 this rate was 2.58%; between 1960-1970, 2.75%; and between 1970-1980, 2.92%. This rate shows an increase of 6.6% between 1950-1960 and 6.2% between 1960-1970. It surpasses the average world population growth rate and most of the developing country growth rates. It has been augmented by post-World War II economic and social developments.     

Declining world fertility: trends,causes, implications

This Bulletin examines the evidence that the world's fertility has declined in recent years, the factors that appear to have accounted for the decline, and the implications for fertility and population growth rates to the end of the century. On the basis of a compilation of estimates available for all nations of the world, the authors derive estimates which indicate that the world's total fertility rate dropped from 4.6 to 4.1 births per woman between 1968 and 1975, thanks largely to an earlier and more rapid and universal decline in the fertility of less developed countries (LDCs) than had been anticipated. Statistical analysis of available data suggests that the socioeconomic progress made by LDCs in this period was not great enough to account for more than a proportion of the fertility decline and that organized family planning programs were a major contributing factor. The authors' projections, which are compared to similar projections from the World Bank, the United Nations, and the U.S. Bureau of the Census, indicate that, by the year 2000, less than 1/5 of the world's population will be in the "red danger" circle of explosive population growth (2.1% or more annually); most LDCs will be in a phase of fertility decline; and many of them -- along with most now developed countries -- will be at or near replacement level of fertility. The authors warn that "our optimistic prediction is premised upon a big IF -- if (organized) family planning (in LDCs) continues. It remains imperative that all of the developed nations of the world continue their contribution to this program undiminished."     

Growth of small and intermediate cities in Korea, 1975-1980

"This paper examines the urban growth of 33 small and intermediate Korean cities during 1975-1980 from the ecological perspective. Using the multiple regression analysis, population growth of a city is measured by variables such as industrial structure, distance from a metropolitan city, and educational level of residents in a corresponding city. At the present development stage in Korea, those cities whose industrial structure is more specialized in the transformative sector rather than other sectors have grown more rapidly. The closeness to a metropolitan city and the educational level of residents for each city strongly influence urban growth of small cities."     

Renewable resources and population growth: Past experiences and future prospects

The links between population growth, resource use, and environmental quality are too complex to permit straightforward generalizations about direct causal relationships. Rapid population growth, however, has increased the number of poor people in developing countries, thus contributing to the degradation of the environment and the renewable resources of land, water, and nonhuman species on which humans depend. Demands of the rich industrial countries have also generated environmental pressures and have been foremost in the consumption of the so-called nonrenewable resources: fossil fuels, metals, and minerals. On the other hand, population and economic growth have also stimulated technological and management changes that help supply and use resources more effectively. Wide variations in the possible ultimate size of world population and technological change make future interrelationships of population, resources, and the environment uncertain as well as complex. But those interrelationships are mediated largely by government policies. Responsible governments can bring about a sustainable balance in the population/resource/environment equation by adopting population and development policies that experience has shown could reduce future population numbers in developing countries below the additional five billion indicated in current United Nations medium projections, coupled with proven management programs in both developing and developed countries that could brake and reverse the depletion and degradation of natural resources.This article is adapted from: Robert Repetto, "Population, Resources, Environment; An Uncertain Future,"Population Bulletin, Vol. 42, No. 2 (Washington, D.C.: Population Reference Bureau, 1987).     

A worldwide view of population trends

The UN Population Commission held its 20th session in New York from 29 January to 9 February, with an agenda that included reviews of UN action to implement recommendations of the 1974 World Population Conference; of progress in population work by the UN Population Division; and of the medium-term plan, 1980-1983. Of a total of 29 countries and 22 organizations participating, 5 countries were Asian--India, Indonesia, Japan, the Philippines, and Thailand. The report on monitoring of trends and policies was the most detailed examination of the global demographic situation yet available, and revealed the following facts: 1) 80% of the population of the developing countries are in countries which the governments have considered that a slower rate of population growth would be desirable; 2) among developed countries, nearly all governments preferred their rate of population growth to remain as high as or become higher than at present; 3) among the developing countries, 6 of the 8 nations having a population greater than 50 million wished to reduce their rate of growth; 4) 80% of all countries considered the rate of population growth the be of basic importance for development; and 5) with respect to mortality, about 75% of all governments of developing countries considered the prevailing level to be unsatisfactory; while among developed countries the same proportion considered the prevailing level to be acceptable. As a result of its deliberations on the report, the Population Commission endorsed the Population Information Network concept of a decentralized network for the coordination of regional, national, and nongovernmental population information activities.     

The United Nations on World Population in 2300

The Population Division of the United Nations biennially issues detailed population estimates and projections covering the period 1950–2050. The most recent revision of these estimates and projections, the 2002 assessment, was released in February 2003. At irregular intervals, the Population Division also publishes long‐range projections. The most recent of these, covering the period up to 2150, was issued in 2000, based on the 1998 assessment. On 9 December 2003, the Population Division released the preliminary report on a new set of long‐range projections, dovetailing with the 2002 assessment, that extend over a much longer time span: up to 2300 ( http://www.un.org/esa/population/publications/longrange2/longrange2.htm ). Unlike previous long‐range projections, which, apart from China and In‐dia, were prepared for large regional groupings only, the new projections are elaborated separately for 192 countries. Given the enormous uncertainties of the character of demographic trends over such an extended period, the information content of these projections is somewhat elusive. However, they are expected to be used to provide the demographic input for long‐range models of global climate change. Long‐range population projections also serve to demonstrate the unsustainability of certain seemingly plausible assumptions as to the future course of particular demographic parameters. In the present case, for example, the high‐fertility projection, reflecting a sustained total fertility rate at the relatively modest level of 2.35, by 2300 would yield a population of some 32 billion in the countries now classified as less developed. Or, in a yet more extreme exercise 0/reductio ad absurdum, maintaining constant fertility at present rates would result in a population size of some 120 trillion in the countries now classified as least developed. Apart from the “high fertility” and “constant fertility” models just cited, the projections are calculated for three additional instructive variants: “low fertility,”“medium fertility,” and “zero growth.” Underlying each of the five variants is a single assumption on mortality change: expectation of life at birth creeping up, country‐by‐country, to a 2300 level ranging between 88 and 106 years. International migration is set at zero throughout the period 2050‐2300 in each variant. Thus the projections are unabashedly stylized and surprise‐free, providing a simple demonstration of the consequences, in terms of population size and age structure, of clearly stated assumptions on the future course of demographic variables. Reproduced below is the Executive Summary of the preliminary report on the UN long‐range projections presented to a UN technical working group on long‐range projections at its December 2003 meeting in New York and slightly revised afterward. A full final report on this topic by the Population Division of the Department of Economic and Social Affairs of the United Nations Secretariat will be published later in 2004.     

Africa's expanding population: old problems,new policies

Sub-Saharan Africa faces an historic challenge: to achieve economic and social progress while experiencing extraordinary population growth. With an estimated 1989 population of 512 million, the 42 countries of sub-Saharan Africa have the highest birth and death rates of any major world region. While death rates have fallen since the 1960s, persistently high birth rates yield annual growth rates above 3% in many countries. The United Nations projects that the region's population will increase 2.7 times by 2025--to 1.4 billion. Throughout the region, population has outstripped economic growth since the mid-1970s. In addition, many African countries are experiencing an epidemic of AIDS (Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome). The extent and demographic impact of the epidemic still are unknown, but disturbing social and political effects are already being felt. The region's population growth will slow only when African couples begin to have fewer children. The average number of children per woman ranges from 6 to 8 for most countries. The Africans' preference for large families is deeply rooted in the culture and fed by the perceived economic benefits they receive from their children. Economic stagnation during the 1980s prompted many national governments to recognize that rapid population growth was hindering their socioeconomic development. The political climate has shifted away from pronatalist or laissez-faire attitudes toward official policies to slow population growth. The policy formation process--detailed here for 4 countries (Zambia, Nigeria, Zaire, and Liberia)--is ponderous and beset with political and bureaucratic pitfalls, However, policy shifts in more and more countries combined with evidence of increased contraceptive use and fertility downturns in a few countries give some hope that the region's extraordinary population growth may have peaked and will start a descent. Whatever the case, the decade of the 1990s will be crucial for the future of sub-Saharan Africa.     

An analysis of the fertility transition in developing countries]

Most developing countries are in the demographic stage of early mortality, high birth rates and high rates of natural population increase. A characteristic of developing countries is that after World War ii, particularly since the 1960s fertility rates are on the decline, even though they still remain high. The fertility rate of developed countries fell from a 1950 rate of 22.9/1000 to 15/1000 in 1982, a decrease of 34.5%, whereas the fertility rate of developing countries hovered around 43/1000 between 1930-1950, 40.6/1000 during the 1960s and 33/1000 in 1982. Between 1950 and 1982 there was a decrease of 24.8%. But the main reason for this decrease is the decline in the last 20 years of the fertility rates of China and India, whose rates fell 34.9% from 1960-1980. Changes in fertility rates are influenced by the age structure of a country, as seen in the changing age structure of developing countries from 1960-80. For example, an increase in fertility rates was 1 consequence of an increase in the number of fertile women aged 15-45 from 42.6% in 1960 to 44.4% in 1980. Nevertheless, there exists some sort of birth control, whether conscious or subconscious, because the number of births per fertile woman is 3-4 fewer than the 14-15 children a woman can theoretically bear. The reason for changes in fertility rates in developing countries can be traced to marriage and family customs, and even more important, to social and economic factors. For example, Asian, African and Latin American cultures tend to support early marriages. When the fertility rates of developed and developing countries are looked at for a comparable period, then the rate of decrease for developing countries is slower than developed countries. But, if the comparison is made for a transitional period (i.e., industrialization), then the rate of decrease for developing countries is faster than for developed countries. Currently there are 25 developing countries that have attained a fertility rate of 25/1000 or lower, and 52 developing countries with a rate of 35/1000.     

Prospects for fertility reduction and projections for future population growth in Kenya

In 1979 Kenya's annual rate of natural population growth was 3.8%. Data from the1989 Kenya Demographic and Health Survey indicate that significant decreases in fertility levels were experienced during the 1980s. Factors associated with conditions supportive of high fertility in Kenya are discussed, and progress toward attaining significant fertility reduction thresholds during the 1980s is assessed. Findings from recent fertility surveys are presented, and 1969–1989 national level family planning data are evaluated. Four population projections for 1985–2025 are presented and analyzed. One projection is based on official government growth targets; two are based on estimates provided by the United Nations and the Population Reference Bureau, and a fourth projection is based on the assumption that Kenya will attain an annual natural population growth rate of less than 1% by the year 2025. Each projection assumes that fertility declines will be experienced. Kenya's prospects for reducing the annual population growth rate to 1% within the next sixty years and a cost-sharing development policy are addressed briefly in the concluding section. Recent data suggest that Kenya will probably not complete the demographic transition before the year 2050, but Kenya should continue to move through the transition stage.     

Population problems in the economic development of developing countries]

The relationship between economic development and agricultural and urban population growth rates in developing countries is discussed. The author concludes that long-range economic planning must include population policies.     

Birth delays skew developing world's fertility figures

This article explains that birth delays skew developing world's fertility figures. When successive groups of women who have delayed childbearing start having children, the rapid fertility decline stalls. Such change in the timing of childbearing skews the total fertility rate (TFR). Analysis of the tempo component of TFR trends in Taiwan suggests that tempo effects reduced its TFR by about 10% in the late 1970s and early 1990s and by about 19% in the late 1980s. In Colombia, on the basis of increasing mean maternal age at childbirth between the 1970s and the late 1980s, tempo distortions of the TFR during the most of the 1980s seem likely. Moreover, many developing countries are now experiencing rapid fertility declines that are in part attributable to tempo changes. These changes have accelerated past fertility transitions, but they also make these countries vulnerable to future stalls in fertility when the delays in childbearing end. Since fertility reductions caused by tempo effects lead to real declines in birth rates and hence in population growth, countries that wish to reduce birth rates can take actions that encourage women to delay marriage and the onset of childbearing.     

Population pressures in Latin America

In 1950 Latin America's population of 165 million was on a par with the 166 million of North America. 2 decades of growth at nearly 3% a year pushed the total to 405 million in 1985, vs. 264 million in North America. Despite substantial fertility declines since the 1960s, continued growth is ensured by the demographic momentum built into the region's large and youthful population bases. UN medium projections put the 2025 total at 779 million, compared to 345 million in North America. This Bulletin examines the main demographic changes in Latin America since World War II and their links to economic and social changes in the region as well as their implications for international and social relations. The post World War II population surge was accompanied by massive rural-ruban and international migration, rapid urbanization, large labor shifts out of agriculture into industry and services, increased education for both men and women, and higher labor force participation for females. The rural exodus was spurred by extreme land tenure inequalities and the urban bias of postwar industrialization. The labor-saving bias of this industrialization forced exploding city populations to turn to the informal sector for jobs. Population pressures on city services and housing as well as jobs have been further exacerbated by overconcentration in a few large cities and economic downturns of the 1980s. Recent fertility declines seem to be the result of both increased access to family planning and the economic and social pressures posed by the gap between young adults' aspirations and their ability to realize them. Population and economic pressures could induce faster fertility declines than now projected but in the short run are likely to mean more employment problems, continued rapid urban growth, and even larger international immigration flows within the hemisphere, particularly to the US.     

The Soviet Union: population trends and dilemmas

Focus in this discussion of population trends and dilemmas in the Soviet Union is on demographic problems, data limitations, early population growth, geography and resources, the 15 republics of the Soviet Union and nationalities, agriculture and the economy, population growth over the 1950-1980 period (national trend, regional differences); age and sex composition of the population, fertility trends, nationality differentials in fertility, the reasons for fertility differentials (child care, divorce, abortion and contraception, illegitimacy), labor shortages and military personnel, mortality (mortality trends, life expectancy), reasons for mortality increases, urbanization and emigration, and future population prospects and projections. For mid-1982 the population of the Soviet Union was estimated at 270 million. The country's current rate of natural increase (births minus deaths) is about 0.8% a year, higher than current rates of natural increase in the U.S. (0.7%) and in developed countries as a whole (0.6%). Net immigration plays no part in Soviet population growth, but emigration was noticeable in some years during the 1970s, while remaining insignificant relative to total population size. National population growth has dropped by more than half in the last 2 decades, from 1.8% a year in the 1950s to 0.8% in 1980-1981, due mostly to declining fertility. The national fertility decline masks sharp differences among the 15 republics and even more so among the some 125 nationalities. In 1980, the Russian Republic had an estimated fertility rate of 1.9 births/woman, and the rate was just 2.0 in the other 2 Slavic republics, the Ukraine and Belorussia. In the Central Asian republics the rates ranged up to 5.8. Although the Russians will no doubt continue to be the dominant nationality, low fertility and a relatively higher death rate will reduce their share of the total population by less than half by the end of the century. Soviet leaders have launched a pronatalist policy which they hope will lead to an increase in fertility, at least among the dominant Slavic groups of the multinational country. More than 9 billion rubles (U.S. $12.2 billion) is to be spent over the next 5 years to implement measures aimed at increasing state aid to families with children, to be carried out step by step in different regions of the country. It is this writer's opinion that overall fertility is not likely to increase markedly despite the recent efforts of the central authorities, and the Russian share of the total population will probably continue to drop while that of Central Asian Muslim peoples increases.     

Countries with Rapid Population Growth and Resource Constraints: Issues of Food,Agriculture, and Development

Recent long‐term demographic projections suggest a fast deceleration of global population growth and the eventual peaking of world population later in this century at about 9.2 billion, roughly 50 percent above the present level. Some low‐income and food‐insecure countries, however, have projected populations in 2050 that are multiples of present ones. In some of these countries agriculture must play a leading role in their development efforts because they have high economic dependence on that sector. For those among them that have scarce agricultural resources, a prima facie case can be made that the high population growth rates projected may not be compatible with the development potential offered by such resources. Their demographic projections may need to be revisited, taking into account such inadequate potential. The global demographic slowdown notwithstanding, the “population explosion”‐related issues pertaining to food and agriculture will not become irrelevant but will be become increasingly localized.     

Slum Residence and Child Health in Developing Countries

Continued population growth and increasing urbanization have led to the formation of large informal urban settlements in many developing countries in recent decades. The high prevalence of poverty, overcrowding, and poor sanitation observed in these settlements—commonly referred to as “slums”—suggests that slum residence constitutes a major health risk for children. In this article, we use data from 191 Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS) across 73 developing countries to investigate this concern empirically. Our results indicate that children in slums have better health outcomes than children living in rural areas yet fare worse than children in better-off neighborhoods of the same urban settlements. A large fraction of the observed health differences appears to be explained by pronounced differences in maternal education, household wealth, and access to health services across residential areas. After we control for these characteristics, children growing up in the slums and better-off neighborhoods of towns show levels of morbidity and mortality that are not statistically different from those of children living in rural areas. Compared with rural children, children living in cities (irrespective of slum or formal residence) fare better with respect to mortality and stunting but not with respect to recent illness episodes.     

Interagency working group on demographic projections

The Interagency Working Group on Demographic Projections held its 8th session in Amman, Jordan during May 1977. Under discussion at the session was the progress of work in the field of demographic projection. A report of the current activity of preparing illustrative national population projections by sex and age based on assumptions obtained from intensive empirical observations was reviewed. Information was also provided concerning the computer program developed by ESCAP. Future ESCAP work in this area would include the preparation of projections for urban and rural populations of each country which take into account more than 1 assumption on mortality. 1 of the important recommendations made in the session was that future demographic projections should be presented by developed and developing regions and that the developing regions should include the subregion of "least developed countries."