Recent minimum wage increases and the minimum wage labor force

Coclusion  Recently Whaples (1996) reported that most labor economists believe that minimum wage laws decrease employment. Despite this, policy makers have continued to periodically raise the minimum, with the most recent increases occurring in October 1996 and September 1997. The various analyses done by Card, Katz, and Krueger, that showed little to no employment effect of past minimum wage increases, have provided additional ammunition for those who would seek further increases. However, using the estimates of Williams and Mills (1998), we demonstrate that the latest minimum wage increases substantially decreased employment for both sexes. We believe that future increases will do likewise.     

The minimum wage and productivity differentials

A firm’s ability to adjust its production process to economize on low-skilled labor when faced with a minimum wage increase will differ greatly depending on industry or occupation. For example, more capital-intensive means of cleaning hotel rooms or serving customers at restaurants may not be readily available without degrading service quality. In such situations, the productivity of labor is essentially capped, and firms have few options when the minimum wage increases. This simple observation has implications for studies that rely on microdata to examine the effects of minimum wage increases. If firms only increase prices in response to a minimum wage increase, employment effects are likely small. If the goal of the minimum wage is to redistribute income from firms and consumers to workers, minimum-wage increases targeted at industries and occupations where such rigidities result in an inelastic demand for labor may achieve the desired goal at a lower cost than across-the-board increases. However, such a scheme causes an inefficient allocation of labor and would be subjected to substantial political pressures that may lead to anomalous results. Additionally, it is unreasonable to conclude that policy makers have the necessary information to skillfully set the minimum wage. I thank Brian E. Chezum and Jeff Waddoups for helpful comments. All mistakes, of course, are my own.     

Nepotism and the minimum wage

That an increase in the minimum wage or minimum wage coverage results in an increase in the incidence of nepotism is empirically tested using 1972 data on job-seeking methods used by American workers. The elasticity of the incidence of nepotism with respect to the level of the minimum wage and minimum wage coverage in 1977 is estimated at between .38 and .68. I would like to thank Peter Montiel and Geoffrey Woglom for their helpful comments and suggestions and Bruce Chesebrough for providing the stimulus to write this paper; remaining errors are my own.     

The minimum wage and poverty among full-time workers

V. Conclusions The empirical evidence is strong that minimum wages have had little or no effect on poverty in the U.S. Indeed, the evidence is stronger that minimum wages occasionally increase poverty. It also suggests that the minimum wage does not even lower poverty for the one group that, almost by definition, one would expect to be helped: full-time, year-round workers. While the empirical results suggest minimum wages do not achieve what is ostensibly their primary goal — relieving poverty among the working poor — minimum wages do seem to impose a real cost on society in terms of lost income and output. The empirical evidence on work hours suggests that a $1 increase in the minimum wage, far from being almost costless, could conceivably impose income losses to American workers in the $12-15 billion range per year — an amount equal to the “income deficit” of millions of persons counted as poor by the U.S. Bureau of the Census.     

The minimum wage can harm workers by reducing unemployment

Economists may disagree over how much raising the minimum wage increases unemployment, though few argue that the unemployment effect is zero. According to the standard model, the less the unemployment caused by a minimum wage increase, the less the harm (or greater the good) that results. But by recognizing that minimum wage workers receive fringe benefits, I show that increasing the minimum wage may not cause any unemployment and harms workers because it doesn 't. Furthermore, when there is lumpiness in providing fringe benefits, a minimum wage increase may harm workers by     

Political support for minimum wage legislation

Conclusion Even if minimum wage laws reduce employment opportunities for some workers, other individuals may benefit from their enactment. In particular, union members and residents of states with high wage levels would be expected to encourage their senators to vote in favor of minimum wage legislation. Examination of senators’ votes on the 1966 and 1974 minimum wage bills indicates that senators favoring passage of these bills are likely to come from states with high union membership and, to a lesser extent, high wage levels. The equations explaining senators’ votes on these bills were disaggregated by political party affiliation and length of membership in the Senate. Democrats were more likely than Republicans to support minimum wage bills. Virtually no difference was observed between senators who voted on both the 1966 and 1974 measures and those who voted on only one. Perhaps the most encouraging result reported is the similarity of coefficients generally observed for corresponding 1966 and 1974 equations. This similarity suggests that the equations reported herein could be used to predict votes on future minimum wage bills. The results suggest also that the general mode of analysis can be fruitfully applied to other economic legislation.     

State minimum wage laws: Youth coverage and impact

Federal minimum wage statutes cover only 70 percent of the work force and 30 percent of all employers. State laws are designed to close some of these coverage gaps and in some cases to set higher wage floors. Hence, differences in state wage floors and coverage should affect employment rates and wage distributions, particularly among low-skilled workers. Evidence from the National Longitudinal Ssurveys of Youth is mixed, however: State wage floors appear to have no impact on youth employment or entry wages, but coverage exemptions appear to increase both employment and wages. These observations underscore the need to include state provisions in models of minimum wage impacts, particularly for later periods (e.g., 1988–1991) when state wage floors were relatively higher.     

Economic growth and inequality in Singapore: The case for a minimum wage

In the context of Singapore's ageing population, the employment of large numbers of low‐skilled foreign workers is proving to be a major challenge to inclusive growth because of the stagnation of low‐wage workers' incomes. In order to address this problem, the author makes the case for introducing a minimum wage to complement existing in‐work benefit schemes. After addressing the commonly voiced objections to a minimum wage system, he suggests ways in which a minimum wage could be implemented in Singapore. New measures to enhance the social safety net and foster more sustainable economic growth are also proposed.     

Political support for minimum wage legislation: 1989

A model explaining senators’ votes on minimum wage increases in 1966 and 1974 was applied to the 1977 and 1989 votes with similar results. The extent of unionization in each state was positively associated with votes in favor of minimum wage increases. State wage levels were not significantly associated with senators’ votes. These results held for Republican senators as well as for all senators. However, neither wage levels nor unionization rates was a significant factor explaning Democrats’ votes on minimum wage increases.     

The labor market effects of minimum wage laws: A new perspective

Economists almost uniformly argue that minimum wage laws benefit some workers at the expense of other workers. This argument is implicitly founded on the assumption that money wages are the only form of labor compensation. Based on the more realistic assumption that labor is paid in many different ways, the analysis of this paper demonstrates that all laborers within a perfectly competitive labor market are adversely affected by minimum wages. Although employment opportunities are reduced by such laws, affected labor markets clear. Conventional analysis of the effect of minimum wages on monopsony markets is also upset by the model developed. The author is indebted to Rex Cottle, Benjamin Hawkins, Hugh Macaulay, Michael Maloney, Thomas Schaap, Gordon Tullock, Gene Uselton, and Karen Vaughn for helpful comments on earlier drafts of this paper.     

Nontransferable rents and an unrecognized social cost of minimum wage laws

This paper identifies an additional social cost of minimum wage laws. The nontransferable sunk investments made in competing to obtain minimum wage jobs produce a social cost since individuals will remain in those positions as long as they obtain a positive return on this investment. This will be true even when more efficient providers of the service exist. The higher the minimum wage is, the greater the level of sunk nontransferable investments and, therefore, the greater the potential inefficient allocation of labor.     

The illegal alien work force,demand for unskilled labor,and the minimum wage

Estimates of the illegal alien work force, employment, and the number employed below the legal minimum wage are not available, but are often required for the study of a variety of public policy issues, e.g., immigration and refugee policy, and policy towards the monitoring of minimum wage laws. This paper attempts to fill this void by developing estimates of these quantities. Of equal importance, however, is determining what light this and other related evidence throws upon the oft-expressed view that the demand for unskilled labor at below-legal-minimum wage rates is virtually inelastic. Evidence is presented which contradicts this belief. I am grateful to Janet Hunt and Richard H. Timberlake, Jr. for valuable comments but I absolve them of responsibility for any errors.     

The migratory impact of minimum wage legislation: Puerto Rico, 1970-1987

"This study examines the impact of minimum wage setting on labor migration. A multiple time series framework is applied to monthly data for Puerto Rico from 1970-1987. The results show that net emigration from Puerto Rico to the United States fell in response to significant changes in the manner in which minimum wage policy was conducted, particularly after 1974. The extent of commuter type labor migration between Puerto Rico and the United States is influenced by minimum wage policy, with potentially important consequences for human capital investment and long-term standards of living."     

Fixing minimum wage levels in developing countries: Common failures and remedies

Some developing countries have set their minimum wages too high or too low to constitute a meaningful constraint on employers. The article compares minimum wages worldwide, proposes several ways of measuring them in developing countries and discusses whether they are effective thresholds in those countries. The second part of the article considers the institutional factors leading countries to set minimum wages at extreme levels. The author concludes that the minimum wage is used as a policy instrument to several ends – wage negotiation, deflation and social dialogue – which results in the absence of a wage floor, weak collective bargaining, or non‐compliance.     

The impact of the minimum wage in West Virginia: A test of the low-wage-area theory

VI. Conclusions West Virginia counties do provide evidence of significant dis-employment due to the minimum wage, a finding that supports the theory that low-wage areas are more susceptible to employment losses when the legislated minimum wage is increased. My results show that a 10 percent increase in the minimum wage will reduce total employment in the average West Virginia county by 1.1 percent. The most rural counties may also respond more severely, up to 1.4 percent for the same minimum wage change. I thank Clifford Hawley, Sudeshna Bandypadhyay, George Hammond, Stratford Douglass, Brian Cushing, Tom Garrett, Victor Claar, Gary Wagner, and an anonymous referee for helpful comments.     

Does the minimum wage drive teenagers out of the labor force?

Labor force participation is directly related to the value of being in the labor force. The effect of the minimum wage on labor force participation thus measures how the minimum wage affects the welfare of labor force participants. In contrast, a decline in employment tells us little about welfare, because of the offsetting wage increase. Only changes in labor force participation can directly measure the welfare effects of the minimum wage. Despite this, most literature about the minimum wage has been focused on employment. My empirical results show that the minimum wage has a significant negative effect on teenage labor force participation. Thus, a minimum wage reduces the value of entering the labor market.