The union wage effect in Canadian manufacturing industries

Data for Canadian manufacturing industries, at the two-digit level, are used to examine the component elements of the union wage effect. The results show that absence of compulsory union membership for all employees in the bargaining unit served by a union does not significantly impair the ability of the union to negotiate wage gains. That is, our results imply that there is little reason for unions to devote much effort to negotiating the stronger forms of union security — union or closed shops. A second implication of our results is that significant bargaining advantages may accrue to unions with an international (U.S.) link, relative to Canadian national unions.     

From union hegemony to union disintegration: Collective bargaining in cement and related industries

The cement industry provides an interesting example of the impact of collective bargaining where management determines that it cannot afford a strike, yields to extreme union demands, but deludes itself that it can withstand the economic impact of unionism under such circumstances because almost all competitors are similarly situated and labor costs can be partially offset by automation. The small Cement, Lime, and Gypsum Workers Union won not only high wages and benefits, but imposed restrictive rules as severe as those in any industry. Eventually, however, foreign competition and economic realities forced the companies to revolt, and the union found that it could not sustain strikes. An ill-conceived merger broke up, an independent union was formed, and today unionism, once so strong, is weak and divided as management imposes or forces acceptance of its conditions. The story, while unique in many ways, resembles what has occurred in other industries with high fixed costs, militant unions, and the reluctance of management to sacrifice current gains for longer run needs. Professor Emeritus of Management and former Director, Industrial Research Unit. Ms. Sue Torelli, Librarian, Industrial Research Unit, and Kevin Barry, Librarian, Industrial Relations Section, Princeton University, provided helpful information and numerous documents.     

Gender differences in union membership,preferences, and beliefs

This study uses moderated regression analysis and two major sources of individual data to examine gender differences in union membership, pro-union voting intent, union instrumentality, and relative confidence in union leaders. Some specific male-female differences are noted, particularly involving union-related variables. Overall, however, the authors report a minimal role for gender as a determinant of the alternative union-related measures examined. The authors acknowledge the research assistance of Marlene Wechselblatt. Jack Fiorito also acknowledges support for this research from the University of Iowa’s Old Gold Summer Fellowship program. Helpful comments on an earlier draft were provided by William N. Cooke, John A. Fossum, Daniel G. Gallagher, Cynthia L. Gramm, and Ronald L. Seeber.     

Patterns and determinants of union growth in the hospital industry

Recent changes in the National Labor Relations Act have increased the possibility that union coverage will expand among private non-profit hospitals. This study examines the success of union organizing efforts in the industry during the 1974–1978 period. The analysis focuses on the influence of environmental and organizational variables as well as the nature of the election process itself. The results suggest that hospital union success is largely dependent uponprior union success in the hospital (+), voter turnout (−) and unit size (−). The annual rate of election victories is predicted to fall to nearly 25 % by 1983 from an average of 50% in the 1974–1978 period.     

The determinants of union membership growth in Taiwan

This paper examines the determinants of intertemporal variation in the growth rate of trade union membership in Taiwan during 1960–1987. The empirical results indicate that the widely used empirical model of growth in trade union membership based largely on cyclical variables applies to the case of a newly industrialized Asian country—Taiwan.     

The influence of technological opportunity on union membership in U.S. manufacturing industries

I examine influences of technological opportunity on a set of factors determining inter-industry variation in union membership density. A data set of 239 U.S. manufacturing industries is divided into subsets of “technologically progressive “ and “technologically unprogressive “ industries, and my unionization model is estimated for each subset. The study confirms recent findings indicating that innovation activity and industry concentration have significant negative effects on union membership density. However, these results are obtained only for the subset of “technologically progressive industries and not for the “technologically unprogressive “ industries. These findings suggest that estimation bias is imparted to interindustry studies of the extent of union membership through the influence of technological opportunity on the interrelationships between innovation output, industry concentration, and union membership density. I am grateful for the support of the Center for Technology Management Research at Stevens.     

Labor market adjustments in the unionized contract construction industry

The unionized construction labor market reaches equilibrium by means of three adjustment mechanisms: wage changes, changes in the quality of workers hired, and the migration of workers in and out of the market. The relative importance of the three mechanisms in local labor markets depends on laws and institutional rules. This paper examines some of the important institutional rules and presents a model of market clearning where wage adjustments are infrequent.     

Union organizing expenditures: Determinants and their implications for union growth

This paper explores some implications of the economics of union organizing. Following the literature, it is argued that the economic costs and benefits of organizing are systematically related to the proportion of the union’s jurisdiction already organized. Evidence is presented that unions do allocate a smaller proportion of their budgets to organizing when a greater proportion of their jurisdiction is already organized. Total union organizing expenditures, however, are found to increase over a broad range as the percentage organized increases. The supply of union-organizing services to unorganized workers apparently only declines at relatively high levels of union penetration. These critical levels of unionization have been attained only by a few U.S. labor organizations.     

Outsiders in the union: organizing,consent, and union recognition campaigns

Although outsiders have played an important role in social protest in the U.S., outsiders’ role in the U.S. labor movement has been the focus of spirited debate. Debate about outsider organizers, in particular, reached a fevered pitch in the late 1990s, and continues today. This paper scrutinizes two of the core assumptions of this debate: that insider and outsider organizers operate differently on union recognition campaigns, and that workers respond to them differently in these settings. We analyzed 153 in-depth interviews with workers and organizers conducted at the height of the debate, in order to answer two questions: What is the role of outsider organizers during private sector union recognition campaigns, and how do outsider organizers secure workers’ consent in these settings? All of the organizers in our data-set were graduates of the AFL-CIO’s Organizing Institute, and 64 of them were outsiders. The outsider organizers in our data-set confronted barriers that insider organizers did not, including workers’ concerns about their youth, inexperience and lack of professionalism, and their own inability to relate to workers. While many critics of outsider organizers claim that these barriers are insurmountable, we found the opposite to be true. The vast majority of outsider organizers in our data-set successfully secured workers’ consent by demonstrating commitment, building relationships, and being honest and forthright. After proposing changes in organizer training and leadership development in response to these findings, we conclude with a brief discussion of the enduring debate about outsiders’ role in social protest in the U.S.     

Policy assignment in the European union

EMU will see a re‐allocation of responsibility between different tiers of government for different elements of economic policy, yet policy assignment in the EU often reflects political compromises rather than dispassionate analysis or principles. This article explores the arguments for assigning responsibility for economic policy to different tiers of government in the EU. In the light of these arguments, the case for re‐assigning policy for prudential supervision of credit institutions, regulation of utilities and industrial policy is examined. This leads to the conclusion that closer economic integration will require potentially substantial changes in the assignment of policy.     

Urban tree growth models for two nearby cities show notable differences

Urban Ecosystems - Reliable models of urban tree growth over time are useful for selecting appropriate species for available planting sites, anticipating future tree maintenance and removal costs,...     

Recent trends in the union wage premium

Estimates of union-nonunion wage differentials are updated by examining a wide variety of subgroups in the general population. Variations in union wage premiums are tracked over a 15-year period, allowing inter-temporal comparisons that are not usually available. One important finding is that union wage premiums have been generally rising since 1972–1973. It also appears that females and nonwhites no longer gain the huge payoffs from unionism that evidence has suggested. The impact of race and education on union wage premiums is weighed, and there is an examination of how levels of education, association with blue-collar or white-collar occupations, and employment in specific industries affect union premiums. The author thanks Professor Jack Skeels for invaluable comments and Northern Illinois University for financial support.     

Formalization,collectivization, and the demand for union services

Formalized collective bargaining rather than individual employer-employee negotiation is the fundamental characteristic of a unionized labor market. Formalization involves the substitution of rules for employer discretion. Collectivization substitutes simultaneous decision making on behalf of all workers in a unit for a set of individual employee decisions. Formalization and collectivization are present in nonunion as well as union labor markets and their extent varies within as well as between these two sectors. In particular, individuals may negotiate where they belong in a union environment, and the presence of rules invites negotiation over their interpretation. Nevertheless, because formalization and collectivization are obvious concomitants of trade union organization, their costs to both employers and employees should explain the probability of union organization, as well as the incidence of such antecedents of the modern trade union as the Italian padrone who acted as foreman, pay-master, and employment agency for newly-arrived immigrants to the United States; and the Indianjamdar, a construction industry recruiter-foreman. Our occasional observations of union-induced costreductions may appear to counter the implicit assumption in much of the trade union literature that unions always induce suboptimal combinations of factor inputs and factor payments (nonunion firms could choose union-induced parameters on their own and do not). Because these cost reductions may be accompanied by increased costs imposed by unions, however, the cost reductions discussed below imply nothing about overall effects of unions on employers or employees. I wish to thank John Pencavel for helpful comments on earlier versions of this paper. For further analysis of these points, see Flanders (1968). See Epstein and Monat (1973) for a discussion of the services provided by labor contractors.     

Countercyclical union wage premium? Evidence for the 1980s

Empirical results based on pooled male data from the Panel Survey of Income Dynamics indicate an overall union wage premium of about 11.92 percent for the 1980s. In response to fluctuations in local labor market conditions, proxied by the local unemployment rate, a much more flexible wage-setting process is found in the nonunion sector relative to the union sector. The long-term effect of unemployment on nonunion real wages suggests an approximate 0.6 percent decline for every one percentage point increase in unemployment, a statistically significant reduction, but the long-term effect of unemployment on real wages of union members is negligible. The union wage premium ranges between 11.6 to 12.3 percent for the sample years. Even though union wages are insensitive to short-run fluctuations in local labor market conditions, and are somewhat countercyclical in nature, widespread union wage concessions which occurred during the 1980s may now be exerting a downward pressure on union wages. We acknowledge financial support of National Science Foundation [OSR-9350540], the Ada Howe Kent Research Fund, and The Fogelman Academic Research Excellence Fund. We thank Barbara Ganley for valuable editorial comments and Noga Peled for her able research assistance. The usual caveat applies.