THE USE OF COLLATERAL TO ENFORCE DEBT CONTRACTS

This paper analyzes the enforcement of debt contracts by treating the adherence to a contract as a matter of choice. Many commonly observed features of debt contracts, including the widespread use of collateral, are shown to be market responses to the costs of enforcing contracts. The characteristics of the collateral asset, including its marketability and expectations regarding its future price are shown to have important effects on the payments schedule of the debt. Since default is treated as a choice variable I am able to demonstrate the effects of macroeconomic fluctuations on default rates and lending decisions. Thus the analysis provides a basis for modeling the multiplier phenomena associated with the collapse of lending markets during severe depressions.     

THE USE OF COLLATERAL TO ENFORCE DEBT: PROFIT MAXIMIZATION

Collateral lowers the probability of default. This paper modifies the work of Benjamin (1978) by characterizing the competitive lender as a price-taking profit maximizer rather than a profit eliminator. Most of Benjamin's results disappear when profit maximization is assumed; the results are corrected and extended. It is also suggested that the value of the collateral required for a standard loan is a variable that the loan market will adjust until long-run expected profits from secured loans is driven to zero.     

AGGREGATION AND THE STAGGERING OF PRICE CHANGES

Temporal distribution of individual price changes is of crucial importance for business cycle theory and for the microfoundations of price adjustment. While it is routinely assumed that price changes are staggered over time, both theory and evidence are ambiguous. We use a large Belgian data set to analyze whether price changes are staggered or synchronized. We find that the more aggregated are the data, the closer is the distribution to perfect staggering. The results hold both for aggregation across products, and across locations. They are consistent with an economy in which idiosyncratic shocks are the main cause of price changes. (JEL E30, E31, D40)     

THE IMPACT OF RETURN ON COLLATERAL IN A CHANNEL SYSTEM

We empirically investigate the relationship between the return on collateral and monetary policy implementation in the channel system. Recent developments in monetary theory suggest that the return on government assets which measures the opportunity cost of holding collateral should have negative impacts on the interest-rate spread and the interbank market rate. The central bank should set a higher spread when the return on collateral is below a cutoff but implements a lower spread when the return on collateral is higher than the cutoff. The interbank market rate tends to lie above the policy target rate when the return on collateral is low and vice versa. We use data from Eurozone area and six industrialized countries to test these theoretical implications. We propose two econometric models: one is more structural and closely related to the monetary model to test the negative relationships, and the other is based on the threshold autoregression model to detect the potential cutoffs. Our findings provide conditional support for the negative impact of return on collateral. (JEL E40, E52, E58)     

ON FRUITFUL AND FUTILE TESTS OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SEARCH AND PRICE DISPERSION

We exploit cross‐sectional and temporal differences in search intensity in order to examine the relationship between search costs and price dispersion using a hand‐collected panel data set from Jerusalem's Shuk Mahane Yehuda outdoor market. We present empirical evidence that price dispersion increases with the cost of search using several different measures of price dispersion; however, our interpretation of this finding is sensitive to the search proxy in question. We also address several acute difficulties facing empiricists seeking to test theoretical price‐dispersion models in which consumers are heterogeneous in their search behavior. (JEL L11, L13)     

Loan performance and race

Recent studies find evidence of racial discrimination in mortgage markets. Although these studies explore loan approval rates for whites versus minorities, they do not specifically consider loan performance, either in the form of default rates or loan administration costs. This study considers discrimination in the used car credit market, where the collateral is not subject to location externalities, collateral value and quality do not vary as much as in real estate, and the loan terms are shorter. We find administration costs and default rates are higher for minorities than for whites, controlling for age, income, home ownership, wealth, occupation, loan terms, and geographic location.     

INTEREST RATE CEILINGS AND THE ROLE OF SECURITY AND COLLECTION REMEDIES IN LOAN CONTRACTS

Collateral or other security for personal loans and restrictions on creditor remedies for the collection of debts have varying effects on the price and quantity of credit which depend in turn on the level of interest rate ceilings. We report here on reduced-form equations of a supply-demand model estimated for five states with different interest rate restrictions. Interest rate ceilings limit how far lenders can raise loan rates to compensate for expected default losses but restrictions on collection remedies are generally associated with a higher interest rate.     

THE IMPACTS OF THE USDA BROADBAND LOAN AND GRANT PROGRAMS: MOVING TOWARD ESTIMATING A RATE OF RETURN

In this article, we evaluate the rate of return to government efforts to promote broadband. Specifically, we estimate the impact of USDA's broadband loan and grant programs on the average payroll per worker using zip code level data from the Zip Code Business Patterns for the period from 1997 to 2007. Our results indicate that two of the smaller broadband programs (the Pilot loan program and the broadband grants program) likely had no effect on local payroll per workers. On the other hand, the largest program in terms of funding and coverage (the current broadband loan program) likely had a positive impact. Our estimate implies that a $1 per capita increase in a particular zip code's one-time receipt of the current program broadband loan results in a $0.92 increase in payroll per worker annually. Our calculated point estimates of the benefit: cost ratios for this broadband program range from 1.98 to 2.99, depending on assumptions about the time frame over which benefits accrue. However, the confidence intervals are wide enough to include the possibility that the costs outweigh the benefits.(JEL L86, J30, O18)     

ASYMMETRIC ADJUSTMENTS OF PRICE AND OUTPUT

Classical theories predict rapid price adjustments, which are observed in inflationary episodes; Keynesian theories of sticky prices predict sluggish price responses, which are observed in contractions. We attempt to reconcile these observations in a model with asymmetries in producer price and output adjustments. Analysis of SIC two-digit industry data indicates production frequently exhibits negative asymmetry-shortfalls from trend are larger than positive deviations-whereas price often displays positive avmmetry. Evidence supporting two rational motives for asymmetric pricing is presented, but causal interactions between output and price asymmetries are not resolved. (JEL E3)     

SOVEREIGN DEBT CRISIS IN A MONETARY UNION: ACCOUNTING FOR EXCESSIVE DEBT,HOUSING BUBBLES,AND THE TRANSMISSION OF CRISES

Despite vast empirical documentation of the recent sovereign debt crisis in southern Europe, there is little research accounting for the following stylized facts in a single coherent framework: continuous borrowing, high growth, housing bubbles, and current account deficits since the beginning of the European Monetary Union ending with a sudden crisis and subsequent contagion of crisis. We fill this gap by proposing a model and fitting it to the data. Using a growth model with collateral constraints of small peripheral economies in the institution of a monetary union, we analyze the multilayer moral hazards underlying excessive borrowing. Since housing bubbles can support a constant loan‐to‐value (LTV) ratio lower than LTV limits, peripheral economies can lock into a steady‐state Ponzi growth equilibrium with high growth and current account deficits, but these economies become vulnerable to crises. We identify the “self‐fulfilling crisis region” (SFCR), in which the economy grows fast with a seemingly safe LTV ratio, but with a vulnerability to crises. Moreover, a crisis in one sector propagates to other sectors by endogenously expanding their SFCRs. We derive some policy implications on LTV regulations and market psychology. Finally, our calibration exercise presents how bubbles develop and burst along with contagion across sectors, accounting for the data. (JEL E44, F34, O16)     

ONE LUMP OR TWO: UNITARY VERSUS BIFURCATED MEASURES OF INJURY AT THE USITC

The most popular methodology used by the US International Trade Commission (USITC) commissioners to determine whether dumped and/or subsidized imports injure competing domestic industries has been rejected by reviewing bodies because it does not distinguish injury caused by unfairly traded imports from other demand or supply changes. We estimate injury to the domestic industry due to changes in unfairly traded import price and to other causes for 44 USITC dumping and/or subsidy investigations. Change in unfairly traded import price was typically not the most important cause of injury to the domestic industry. (JEL F13 )     

THE LABOR MARKET IN THE ART SECTOR OF BAROQUE ROME

We analyze the labor market for painters in Baroque Rome using unique data on primary sales of portraits, still lifes, genre paintings, landscapes, and figurative paintings. In line with the traditional artistic hierarchy of genres, average price differentials between them were high. The matched painter‐patron nature of the dataset allows us to evaluate the extent to which price heterogeneity is related to unobservable characteristics of painters and patrons. We find that the market allocated artists between artistic genres to the point of equalizing the marginal return of each genre. Residual price differences at the employer level can be explained in terms of incentive mechanisms to induce effort in the production of artistic quality and compensating wage differentials. (JEL C23, D8, J3, Z11)     

HORIZONTAL MERGERS IN THE PRESENCE OF CAPACITY CONSTRAINTS

We examine a merger between two competitors in a Bertrand‐Edgeworth model. We find that the effects of merger depend on the tightness of capacity constraints. The combination of two firms has no price effect if and only if the capacity constraints of all firms are binding both before and after the merger. However, a merger may turn a binding capacity constraint into a slack one, which results in higher prices. In an industry where excess capacity drives the premerger prices of all firms to the marginal cost, a merger may cause prices to rise even though aggregate capacity remains constant. (JEL L13, L40)     

A NOTE ON THE THEORY OF BLACK MARKETS UNDER PRICE CONTROLS

In a recent article in this Journal Browning and Culbertson (hereafter B-C) extended the theoretical investigation of the predicted effects of maximum price controls to the competitive firm and deduced an excess capacity result. In this note we extend their analysis to derive long-run adjustment paths for the industry for changes in market demand or control prices. The importance of such an extension is that the relevant industry adjustment path is different depending on whether one considers changes in the control price through such mechanisms as cost pass-throughs or through changes in industry demand. To make this extension meaningful, however, we must first consider the link between the firm and market diagrams in B-C's model. Section I is devoted to the analysis. Section II offers some concluding remarks.     

THE DETERMINANTS OF THE PUBLIC DEBT IN THE UNITED STATES, 1953–1978

Barro claims that since the public rationally forecasts and discounts future taxes, government debt does not represent net wealth to the public and therefore does not affect any real economic variables. Then why are there ever deficits? Barro has presented a theory of optimal deficits based on intertemporal tax smoothing. The theory predicts that nominal debt grows in proportion to anticipated inflation, varies contracyclically with respect to real income cycles, and varies procyclically with respect to war cycles. Barro tested his theory using annual American data for 1922-76 and found weak support for his theory. This paper reexamines Barro's tests, using quarterly American data for 1953:Q1 to 1978:Q4 and finds stronger support for Barro's theory than Barro found using annual data. This paper also concludes that state and local governments do not engage in tax-smoothing behavior–––probably due to considerations of migration–––and that the debt held by the central bank should be included in the definition of public debt.     

STRUCTURAL ESTIMATION OF THE OUTPUT GAP: A BAYESIAN DSGE APPROACH

We estimate the output gap that is consistent with a standard New Keynesian dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model, where the output gap is defined as a deviation of output from its flexible‐price equilibrium, using Bayesian methods. Our output gap illustrates the U.S. business cycles well, compared with other estimates. We find that the main source of the output gap movements is the demand shocks, but that the productivity shocks contributed to the stable output gap in the late 1990s. The robustness analysis shows that the estimated output gap is sensitive to the specification for monetary policy rules. (JEL E30, E32, C11)     

WHY DO ENERGY PRICES MATTER? THE ROLE OF INTERINDUSTRY LINKAGES IN U.S. MANUFACTURING

There is considerable empirical evidence that energy prices had a large effect on the U.S. economy between World War II and the 1980s. This paper argues that linkages between manufacturing industries amplify the effect of an energy price shock and help explain the large effect. In particular, energy-intensive industries are important input suppliers to other industries. When the price of energy increases, energy-intensive industries contract, raising materials prices for other industries. Because of the reduction in materials supply, the downstream industries also contract, which I refer to as the supply effect. Using data from the Census of Manufactures, I find that the supply effect accounted for about one half of the sensitivity of value added to the price of energy. I use plant-level census data to show that the supply effect caused similar changes in value added per plant as in value added per industry. A price increase caused a small, although statistically significant, decrease in entry and had no effect on exit. Finally, the supply effect reduced plant-level labor demand . ( JEL E32, Q43)     

PRICE MATCHING AND THE DOMINO EFFECT IN A RETAIL GASOLINE MARKET

Using gasoline station price data collected eight times per day for 103 d for 27 stations in Guelph, Ontario, it is found that, consistent with an informal theory of competitive gasoline pricing, stations set prices to match a small number of other stations. However, these matched stations are not necessarily the closest. While retailers frequently respond to price changes within 2 h, many take considerably longer. Finally, while price decreases do ripple across the market like falling dominos, increases propagate across the city based more on geographic location and source of price control than on proximity to leaders of these increases. ( JEL L13, L40, L81)     

NEW ESTIMATES OF THE OPTIMAL TAX ON ALCOHOL

In this paper I use a new data set to estimate the optimal alcohol tax rate. As a benchmark, the empirical results imply that the optimal tax rate is over 100 percent of the net-of-tax price. However, alcohol taxation is a second-best solution to the problems associated with alcohol abuse. I conclude that the optimal alcohol tax rate would be much lower if punishment for drunk driving were more certain and severe. Government provision of information about the health consequences of heavy drinking would also remove part of the efficiency rationale for alcohol taxes.     

EFFICIENCY EFFECTS OF EXCLUSIVE TERRITORIES: EVIDENCE FROM THE INDIANA BEER MARKET

The welfare effects of vertically imposed exclusive territories and the appropriate antitrust policy toward them have long been debated. This paper sheds light on the exclusive-territory controversy by examing the effects of Indiana's 1979 ban on the grant of exclusive territories to beer wholesalers. Using time-series data for 1948–1990 we find the ban reduced beer consumption in Indiana by 6 percent. Coupled with previous evidence that Indiana's ban reduced price, our results suggest that exclusive territories in the beer industry increase demand and enhance welfare by stimulating the provision of dealer services.