Reference dependent preferences,hedonic adaptation and tax evasion: Does the tax burden matter?

We study the effects of the tax burden on tax evasion both theoretically and experimentally. We develop a theoretical framework of tax evasion decisions that is based on two behavioral assumptions: (1) taxpayers are endowed with reference dependent preferences that are subject to hedonic adaptation and (2) in making their choices, taxpayers are affected by ethical concerns. The model generates new predictions on how a change in the tax rate affects the decision to evade taxes. Contrary to the classical expected utility theory, but in line with previous applications of reference dependent preferences to taxpayers’ decisions, an increase in the tax rate increases tax evasion. Moreover, as taxpayers adapt to the new legal tax rate, the decision to evade taxes becomes independent of the tax rate. We present results from a laboratory experiment that support the main predictions of the model.     

Correlates of tax evasion

Tax evasion has increased in the United States. Estimates of evasion indicate that the amount of federal income taxes evaded equals the federal deficit. Thus, controlling tax evasion should be a major concern of future tax policy decisions. This study analyzes the effects of 18 variables that might affect tax evasion. Specifically, the variables were used as independent variables in discriminant analyses to determine their relationship to tax evasion. The results indicated that the variables affect different types of tax evasion differently, and that all variables do not significantly influence tax evasion. Policy implications are presented based on these results.     

TAX EVASION AND THE MARGINAL COST OF PUBLIC FUNDS

Tax evasion and deadweight loss have similar implications for the rules of public finance. The optimal mix of taxes can be derived from the minimization of the sum of aggregate deadweight loss and aggregate cost of tax evasion. Similarly, the marginal cost of public funds includes allowances for marginal deadweight loss and marginal cost of tax evasion per dollar of public revenue acquired.     

Reactance to taxation: Employers’ attitudes towards taxes

Taxes limit an individual’s freedom to make autonomous decisions about his or her income. A person is likely to respond to restrictions on his or her own freedom or perceived restrictions by reactance if opposition is a promising means for reestablishing the initial situation. Reactance as a consequence of perceived limitation of freedom is likely to manifest itself through change of attitudes, tax morale, and tax behavior. It is hypothesized that employers who have been running their business only a short time perceive taxes as a drastic cut in their profit and possibilities for investments and tend to feel limited their freedom and consequently display reactance more than employers who have had more extensive experience with their firms and the tax system. A sample of 117 employers with one or more dependent workers completed a questionnaire on (a) perceived limitation of one’s freedom through tax obligations, (b) attitudes towards tax evasion, (c) moral standards with regard to paying taxes, (d) actions to reduce or avoid taxes, and (e) demographic characteristics. As predicted, perceived restriction of freedom was correlated with positive attitudes toward tax evasion, lower tax morale, and reported tendencies to act against paying taxes. Employers who had run their firm only a short time felt greater loss of freedom and displayed greater reactance than employers with more extensive experience.     

Income tax evasion dynamics: Evidence from an agent-based econophysics model

We analyze income tax evasion dynamics in a standard model of statistical mechanics, the Ising model of ferromagnetism. However, in contrast to previous research, we use an inhomogeneous multi-dimensional Ising model where the local degrees of freedom (agents) are subject to a specific social temperature and coupled to external fields which govern their social behavior. This new modeling frame allows for analyzing large societies of four different and interacting agent types. As a second novelty, our model may reproduce results from agent-based models that incorporate standard Allingham and Sandmo tax evasion features as well as results from existing two-dimensional Ising based tax evasion models. In this way, such kind of models may become more relevant and useful in economics as well as social psychology. We finally use our model for analyzing income tax evasion dynamics under different enforcement scenarios and point to some policy implications that may also be of interest for psychological research on tax compliance.     

Tax morale and fairness in conflict an experiment

Most people pay their taxes most of the time, even if the expected disutility from enforcement is too low to deter tax evasion. One potential reason is tax morale and, more specifically, rule following. In a lab experiment, we show that the willingness to pay taxes just because participants are told they are supposed to pay is indeed pronounced. Yet compliance is reduced if participants learn that income is heterogeneous. The effect is driven by participants with the lowest income. The reduction obtains irrespective of the tax regime. If the tax is proportional to income, or progressive, participants become more skeptical about the willingness of participants with high income to comply.     

Regulatory fit effects on perceived fiscal exchange and tax compliance

Paying taxes can be considered a contribution to the welfare of a society. But even though tax payments are redistributed to citizens in the form of public goods and services, taxpayers often do not perceive many benefits from paying taxes. Information campaigns about the use of taxes for financing public goods and services could increase taxpayers’ understanding of the importance of taxes, strengthen their perception of fiscal exchange and consequently also increase tax compliance. Two studies examined how fit between framing of information and taxpayers’ regulatory focus affects perceived fiscal exchange and tax compliance. Taxpayers should perceive the exchange between tax payments and provision of public goods and services as higher if information framing suits their regulatory focus. Study 1 supported this hypothesis for induced regulatory focus. Study 2 replicated the findings for chronic regulatory focus and further demonstrated that regulatory fit also affects tax compliance. The results provide further evidence for findings from previous studies concerning regulatory fit effects on tax attitudes and extend these findings to a context with low tax morale.     

Psychological taxing in Flemish municipalities

We analyse whether the psychological pricing in the private sector has a public sector counterpart in tax policy. Analysing the main theoretical arguments for the existence of price points, and applying them to the public sector, suggests that psychological taxing reveals itself by the use of non-0 ending tax rates. The tax rate endings of the local income taxes, which are set by 308 Flemish municipalities in the fiscal year 1998, suggests the presence of psychological taxing. Non-0 endings occur more frequently in municipalities where demand for public policy is more elastic (and where, therefore, the benefits to the politicians from setting a tax just below a tax point is higher). The pre-tax income inequality and the level of the tax rate positively affect psychological taxing. The latter effect is reinforced in those municipalities where the existing tax rate is above the average tax rate in neighbouring municipalities and below their neighbours’ minimum, although this effect has a limited effect and is offset the further below the minimum the tax is set.     

Voting on redistribution with tax evasion

This paper analyzes voting on a linear income tax whose proceeds are redistributed lump sum to the taxpayers. Individuals can evade taxes, which leads to penalties if evasion is detected. Since preferences satisfy neither single peakedness nor single crossing, a voting equilibrium may not exist. When an equilibrium does exist, there are several possible outcomes. There may be ‘conventional’ equilibria where the rich are expropriated by the poor and middle class. There may be equilibria without full expropriation where redistribution is limited by the threat of evasion. Finally, there may be equilibria where redistribution goes from the middle class to the rich and poor.     

The burden of new taxes: acceptance of taxes as a function of affectedness and egoistic versus altruistic orientation

Taxes imply loss of individual freedom to dispose of one's own money as one wishes. From a psychological viewpoint it is reasonable to assume that people reject the introduction of new taxes if they are affected by them and have to contribute more to the tax authorities than in the past. It can also be assumed that personal value orientation such as selfishness and altruism, respectively, influence attitudes towards taxes. Moreover, personality traits, such as norm dependency, and age should affect one's acceptance of taxes.This study investigates the attitudes of 120 persons affected by a new tax and 113 persons not affected by the tax. Norm dependency, egoistic versus altruistic value orientation, tax mentality and tax morality as well as demographic characteristics were assessed by questionnaires. The results indicate that both affectedness and value orientation determined attitudes towards the new tax. Age and norm dependency are correlated with attitudes towards taxes in general. The hypothesized interaction effect between affectedness and value orientation was not confirmed. However, affected egoists, nonaffected egoists, affected altruists, and nonaffected altruists, respectively, mentioned different reasons for and against taxes, tax increases, and the introduction of new taxes.     

Does Institutional Trust Increase Willingness to Pay More Taxes to Support the Welfare State?

We evaluate the effect of institutional trust on the willingness to pay more taxes to support the welfare state. We found a positive effect of institutional trust on the willingness to pay more taxes to support the welfare state irrespective of the empirical approach used. Our instrumental variable analysis shows that causality run from institutional trust to welfare state support. A one-unit increase in institutional trust leads to a 15 percentage point increase in the willingness to pay more taxes to help the needy. Similarly, a one-unit increase in institutional trust leads to a 16 percentage point increase in the willingness to pay more taxes to support public health care and education. Consequently, institutional trust should be viewed as one of the most important mechanisms that protect the welfare state from dismantling and retrenchment. We also found a stronger effect of support for more universal programs such as public health care and education than for helping the needy.     

International Profit‐Shifting out of Developing Countries and the Role of Tax Havens

This article contributes to the debate on how tax avoidance and evasion can hamper development efforts by investigating the link between profit‐shifting out of developing countries and tax havens. Analysis of more than 1500 multinational corporations (MNCs) operating in India shows that in 2010 those MNCs with links to tax havens reported lower profits and paid less in taxes per unit of asset than MNCs with no such links. This confirms the notion that when corporations have links to tax havens they enjoy higher incentives, because of the low tax rates, and opportunities to shift income because of the secrecy provisions tax havens offer.     

True positives and false alarms in the detection of tax evasion

The probability of errors in tax returns has not been modeled explicitly before. However, corrections on individual tax returns, made by the fiscal authorities, may be related both to tax evasion and to errors made by the taxpayers. The probabilities of detecting tax evasion (true positives) and errors in tax returns (partly interpreted as false alarms) are specified and parametrized by variables known from the literature. In an empirical survey, the response to a questionnaire has been combined with information from the tax administration regarding tax returns. Taxpayers' willingness and ability to conceal income from the tax authorities are key factors with respect to tax evasion. Furthermore, the model enables the estimation of tax evasion probability, given the level of education and the opportunity to conceal income. The probabilities of tax evasion and errors could be explained to some extent.     

Social norms and tax compliance: Framing the decision to pay tax

Observed levels of tax compliance are higher than predicted levels (when predictions are based on Allingham and Sandmo's neoclassical model of tax evasion). They are higher if social norms recognise the importance of compliance. But how do social norms frame decisions to pay tax? Can prospect theory be applied to shed insight into the way that social norms exert their influence? An analysis of questionnaire responses (from Italy and from the UK) suggests that they exert their influence by changing the reference points that individuals use when they code changes as ‘gains’, or ‘losses’. The evidence suggests that social norms frame the decision to pay tax by changing individuals’ perceptions of their entitlement to income. This consideration is important when designing policy to deter evasion.     

The effects of official and unofficial information on tax compliance

The administration of tax policy has shifted its focus from enforcement to complementary instruments aimed at creating a social norm of tax compliance. In this paper we provide an analysis of the effects of information regarding the past degree of tax evasion at the social level on the current individual tax compliance behavior. We build an experiment where subjects declare their income after receiving either a communication of the average tax evasion rate (“official information”) or a private message from a group of randomly matched peers about their tax behavior (“unofficial information”). We use the experimental data to estimate a dynamic econometric model of tax evasion and find three main results. First, tax compliance is very persistent, but less so in the presence of information. Second, the higher the officially communicated past tax evasion rate, the higher the degree of persistence: former evaders are more likely to evade again (and evade more), and former compliant individuals are more likely to comply again (and, when evading, evade less). Third, when an unofficial communication of past evasion (compliance) from all their peers is received, both former evaders and compliant individuals are more likely to evade (comply) again.     

An agent-based model of network effects on tax compliance and evasion

Agent-based models are flexible analytical tools suitable for exploring and understanding complex systems such as tax compliance and evasion. The agent-based model created in this research builds upon two other agent-based models of tax evasion, the Korobow et al., 2007, Hokamp and Pickhardt, 2010 models. The model utilizes their rules for taxpayer behavior and apprehension of tax evaders in order to test the effects of network topologies in the propagation of evasive behavior. Findings include that network structures have a significant impact on the dynamics of tax compliance, demonstrating that taxpayers are more likely to declare all their income in networks with higher levels of centrality across the agents, especially when faced with large penalties proportional to their incomes. These results suggest that network structures should be chosen selectively when modeling tax compliance, as different topologies yield different results. Additionally, this research analyzed the special case of a power law distribution and found that targeting highly interconnected individuals resulted in a lower mean gross tax rate than targeting disconnected individuals, due to the penalties inflating the mean gross tax rate in the latter case.     

DO CIGARETTE EXCISE TAX RATES MAXIMIZE REVENUE?

Buchanan and Lee [1982] suggest that politicians choose tax rates on the positively sloped segment of the short-run rate-revenue curve but the negatively sloped segment of the long-run curve. This paper uses recent estimates of the slope of the cigarette demand curve by Becker, Grossman and Murphy [1994] to test the hypothesis. Becker, Grossman and Murphy's parameter estimates combined with state-by-state data on key variables yields strong evidence against the hypothesis and instead suggests that marginal revenues from cigarette excise taxes are positive in every state.     

Tax evasion, tax morale and policy maker's effectiveness

This paper aims to show that aggregate tax evasion may be largely explained by tax morale and that tax morale is dependent on the taxpayers’ intrinsic attitudes to honesty and social stigma. The theoretical hypothesis is that these attitudes are influenced by the taxpayers’ perceptions of the size of tax evasion as well as by their perceptions of the policy maker's effectiveness in exercising control over the relevant macroeconomic variables and safeguarding the interests of citizens. Applying Gordon's [Gordon, J.P.F., 1989. Individual morality and reputation costs as deterrents to tax evasion. European Economic Review 33(4), 797–805] framework, a dynamic model of aggregate tax evasion is proposed whereby multiple equilibria may emerge. Econometric analysis on Latin American countries supports the assumptions made in the model.     

Intention to pay taxes or to avoid them: The impact of social value orientation

Economic factors such as audit rates and fines have shown inconsistent effects on tax payments, suggesting that they are not sufficient to explain tax compliance. Moreover, the tax compliance rate is surprisingly higher than what the standard economic model would predict. In the last fifteen years, literature aimed at solving this so called “puzzle of compliance” has increased and pointed out several factors that could possibly explain tax compliance processes, e.g., knowledge of the tax laws, trust toward the political system, as well as personal or social norms. The studies presented here examined the impact of social value orientation on tax morale and intention to avoid/evade taxes. Social value orientation was examined both as a chronic personal orientation (Studies 1 and 2) and as a contextual factor made salient by experimental manipulations (Study 3). The results are supportive of a relationship between social value orientation and measures of tax compliance. Furthermore, results of Study 3 provided evidence for a causal effect of social value orientation on intended tax non-compliance. The effect of social value orientation on intended tax non-compliance was mediated by tax morale (Studies 2 and 3). Results are discussed with reference to their potential practical applications.     

Distribution and Poverty Impacts of Tax Structure Reform in Developing Countries: How Little We Know

The past two decades have witnessed widespread reforms of tax structures in developing countries. This article reviews available evidence on the effects of various taxes, and hence of tax structure reform, on distribution and the poor. Taxes on exports and goods consumed especially by the poor (e.g. kerosene) are the most consistently found to be regressive, whereas taxes on ‘luxury’ items such as cars, beverages and alcohol are the most likely to be progressive. Sales taxes are slightly more progressive, or less regressive, than taxes on imports. The reforms implemented are therefore unlikely to have worsened the effects of the tax structure on the poor.