The path to lowest-low fertility in Ukraine

The phenomenon of lowest-low fertility, defined as total fertility below 1.3, is now emerging throughout Europe and is attributed by many to postponement of the initiation of childbearing. Here an investigation of the case of Ukraine, where total fertility--1.1 in 2001--is one of the world's lowest, shows that there is more than one pathway to lowest-low fertility. Although Ukraine has undergone immense political and economic transformations in the past decade, it has maintained a young age at first birth and nearly universal childbearing. Analyses of official national statistics and the Ukrainian Reproductive Health Survey show that fertility declined to very low levels without a transition to a later pattern of childbearing. Findings from focus-group interviews are used to suggest explanations of the early fertility pattern. These include the persistence of traditional norms for childbearing and the roles of men and women, concerns about medical complications and infertility at a later age, and the link between early fertility and early marriage.     

Recent course of fertility in Western Europe

An examination of recent fertility movements in 15 industrialized countries shows that in all of them fertility has tended to fall since 1965, and that there has been a tendency for it to decline to a level never previously observed in peacetime. In countries with the lowest fertility there have recently been some signs of stabilization. Changes in the distribution of ages at maternity have reinforced this trend; mean completed family size has been affected less.

We have used weighted averages to calculate monthly fertility rates in an endeavour to pinpoint turning points more precisely. Such indices may also be used to describe seasonal movements in fertility.     

Patterns of american jewish fertility

The 1971 National Jewish Population Survey provides cross-sectional data on achieved fertility, detailed birth histories, and other information on family formation for a countrywide representative sample of 5,303 ever-married women. Cohort analysis shows that—although at lower levels—Jewish fertility has followed the general trends of American population.     

Causes of fertility decline in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union

Abstract This is the first part of a wider study which attempts to throw iight on the demographic, economic and social factors that have led to dramatic declines in fertility levels in most socialist countries of Eastern Europe during the last fifteen years or so. The present part is concerned with the purely demographic influences, that is mainly with the impact of changes in the age and sex structure of the populations under study, and in nuptiality. The statistical evidence adduced indicates that the observed downward trends in the annual number of births and in crude birth rates are a reflection of genuine changes in attitudes towards family size.     

Nonmarital cohabitation and fertility in the United States and Western Europe

The increasing popularity of nonmarital cohabitation and a decline in marriage rates in the United States and Western Europe has led to a growing research interest in cohabitation without marriage and its relationship to traditional marriage. This article examines the evidence on the prevalence of cohabitation and the characteristics of cohabitants, and focuses on the childbearing behavior of cohabiting couples who are not married. The evidence to date suggests that in Denmark and Sweden cohabitation is widespread, especially among young people, and childbearing within cohabitational unions is relatively common. In the rest of Western Europe and in the United States, cohabitation is less common and fertility is less frequent. Fertility will be affected to the extent that couples delay having children until they are married. Policy and law concerning cohabitants and their children are changing rapidly. Most of these changes have resulted in a blurring of the distinctions between married and unmarried couples and between legitimate and illegitimate children.     

The lasting low fertility and ageing in Shanghai

This brief article discusses fertility decline and increased proportions of elderly in Shanghai, China. By 1996, Shanghai had 14.19 million permanent population and 13.05 million resident population. The natural population growth rate was 1.4/1000. The birth rate was 5.6/1000 and the death rate was 7/1000. 5.6084 million were engaged in urban employment by the end of 1996, which was 0.5% fewer employed people than in the preceding year. 3.8 million worked in state-owned or collectively owned enterprises. Unemployment was 2.8%. The gross domestic product per capita was 22,086 yuan (US$2661). The average annual wage was 10,572 yuan/year among urban workers. Rural and suburban households earned an average of 4846 yuan/year. The proportion of women of childbearing age continues to decline, while the proportion of elderly increases. 17.1% of total population were children aged 0-14 years in 1995 compared to 18.2% in 1990. The proportion of elderly increased from 9.4% in 1990 to 11.4% in 1995. The median age of population was 37.3 years. Life expectancy was 74.07 years for men and 78.21 years for women.     

Family limitation and the fertility transition: Evidence from the age patterns of fertility in Europe and Asia

Summary The age patterns of marital fertility levels and decline in modern Asia and historical Europe are analysed in order to answer two questions: (1) How closely do the age patterns of marital fertility in both areas prior to a systematic fertility decline conform to the age pattern of natural fertility? (2) How similar are the age patterns of the fertility transition experienced in Europe in the past, and the age pattern of fertility decline now under way in a number of Asian populations? The answers have important implications for our understanding of the fertility transition. They suggest that modern family limitation (i.e. parity-specific fertility control) was largely absent prior to a secular decline in marital fertility in both Europe and Asia. Furthermore, the evidence indicates that once the practice of family limitation starts to spread among the broader strata of the population, it seems almost inevitably to increase until it becomes a common behavioural norm. In this respect, the modern fertility transition appears to result from the spread of innovative behaviour and cannot be viewed simply as an adjustment to new socio-economic circumstances based on previously established behavioural mechanisms.     

Causes of fertility decline in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union II

Abstract The first part of this study (which appeared in the preceding issue of Population Studies) assessed the extent of the decline in fertility in the countries of the area during the last 10-15 years, and analyzed the purely demographic aspects ofthis phenomenon. Part II examines the socio-economic differentials in fertility, with regard to such variables as urban-rural residence, socio-occupational and employment status of women, educational attainment, income and housing conditions, and the consequent impact of structural changes in these characteristics of the population on observed fertility trends. The broad conclusion is that the fertility differentials usually found in western societies are also relevant to the socialist countries of eastern Europe, and that the dramatic falls in fertility in the 1950's and the 1960's have largely been the outcome ofthe deep and rapid structural changes, particularly those associated with urbanization, educational attainment and the incidence of female employment. The last part of the study is concerned with the impact on post-war fertility trends of social legislation and of general economic policies, particularly in the fields of employment and income. An appraisal of the extent of family planning is followed by a discussion of the recent pro-natalist measures introduced in most countries of the area and of their effectiveness.     

The decline of non-marital fertility in Europe, 1880-1940

Abstract Between 1880 and 1940, to take approximate dates, illegitimate fertility rates in Europe dropped precipitously, falling in most countries by 50% or more. The rates used throughout this paper relate extra-marital births to the number of unmarried (i.e. single, widowed and divorced) women; we use a standardized index, I ({ih}) to be discussed later. In Fig. 1 we present most of the European series of I ( h )'s that can be computed from existing census and vital registration data. Although there are interesting exceptions the general picture is clear: a decline in illegitimate fertility commenced in most countries in the last quarter of the nineteenth century, and was arrested in the 1920's and 1930's. Once it had begun in a country, the downward course was swift and uninterrupted, until non-marital fertility had been cut in half.     

The objectives of government policies on fertility control in Eastern Europe

Although demographers from the communist countries continue to maintain that overpopulation in the Malthusian sense Is possible only under capitalism, some East European demographers now concede that a form of overpopulation may, at times and under certain conditions, exist In a communist society. In this connection the ideological framework for an optimum population policy under communism has been developed, and demographers have been given the task of determining what the optimum population is and how it is to be attained. There has been considerable ferment on the Issue of fertility control in both the literature and action programmes of Poland, Chechoslovakia, and Hungary. The latter two countries have conducted surveys on family planning, including the use and effectiveness of contraceptives, and have established demographic journals.

All the communist countries of Eastern Europe except Albania and East Germany have relaxed laws restricting abortions and conducted campaigns for the spread of contraceptives. At the same time family allowances have been continued. These paradoxically divergent policies can be rationalized as attempts to sustain existing families while providing the basis for regulating future fertility to achieve an optimum population in relation to the resources of the respective countries.     

The impact of family policy expenditure on fertility in western Europe

This article analyzes the impact on fertility of changes in national expenditure for family allowances, maternity- and parental-leave benefits, and childcare subsidies. To do so, I estimate a model for the timing of births using individual-level data from 16 western European countries, supplemented with data on national social expenditure for different family policy programs. The latter allow approximation of the subsidies that households with children receive from such programs. The results show that increased expenditure on family policy programs that help women to combine family and employment-and thus reduce the opportunity cost of children—generates positive fertility responses.     

论稳定低生育水平

中国经济已进入以扩大内需为主的新发展阶段,从可持续发展计,保持经济持续、快速和健康发展,必须把已出现的低生育水平稳定住。我国已经是低生育率国家,但低生育水平还不稳定。从当前和今后的发展来看,稳定低生育水平,必须使人口政策和经济政策协调起来,积极寻求扩大内需与稳定低生育水平的政策结合点,增加计划生育的政府投入,完善计划生育利益导向机制,处理好稳定现行政策与人口与计划生育工作机制改革与创新的关系。     

Socio-economic status and fertility decline: Insights from historical transitions in Europe and North America

The timings of historical fertility transitions in different regions are well understood by demographers, but much less is known regarding their specific features and causes. In the study reported in this paper, we used longitudinal micro-level data for five local populations in Europe and North America to analyse the relationship between socio-economic status and fertility during the fertility transition. Using comparable analytical models and class schemes for each population, we examined the changing socio-economic differences in marital fertility and related these to common theories on fertility behaviour. Our results do not provide support for the hypothesis of universally high fertility among the upper classes in pre-transitional society, but do support the idea that the upper classes acted as forerunners by reducing their fertility before other groups. Farmers and unskilled workers were the latest to start limiting their fertility. Apart from these similarities, patterns of class differences in fertility varied significantly between populations.     

关于中国1990年代低生育水平的再讨论

本文根据全国第五次人口普查样本计算了 1 990年代各年份的分性别平均初婚年龄 ,这一结果再次表明这一时期中初婚年龄有显著提高。本文还根据以往历次调查的各年份年龄别生育率按队列计算了累计生育率 ,结果发现 2 0 0 0年时各队列的累计生育率水平高于五普数据中各队列的平均活产子女数。本文还就队列累计生育率计算结果详细分析了 1 990年代终身生育水平的趋势。这些分析从一个新的角度说明 ,1 990年代各队列的终身生育水平也在发生显著的下降 ,正在接近现行生育政策所要求的水平     

Patterns underlying fertility schedules: A decomposition by both age and marriage duration

Summary Model fertility schedules based on the proportions married and the age pattern of marital fertility are unsatisfactory to the extent that marital fertility does not depend on age alone but also on other factors. Most notably, models based just on age fail to allow for differences between populations in their composition by marriage duration. Examination of the major series of fertility rates specific by both age and duration of marriage (Sweden 1911-70, England and Wales, 1941-70) reveals striking underlying regularities. The marital fertility rates observed at any given point in time can be factored into three independent components - an overall level, a vector of age effects common to all marriage durations and a vector of duration effects common to all age groups. A simple product of these three components is shown to approximate the data very closely over the entire series, despite major changes in the aggregate levels of fertility and nuptiality during the periods concerned. Not only are the data tightly structured, conforming very closely to this simple multiplicative model, but the vectors of age and duration effects themselves are shown to exhibit clear and meaningful regularities.     

Deliberate birth spacing before the fertility transition in Europe: evidence from nineteenth-century Belgium

Many scholars have argued that deliberate birth spacing may have played a role before and during the modern fertility transition. There are good historical and theoretical reasons for this view, but it has proved to be hard to demonstrate convincingly that birth intervals were in fact partly determined by attempts at deliberate fertility control. This paper suggests a method of securing evidence on the issue for married couples. The method is applied to three cohorts living in a Belgian town in the nineteenth century. The findings indicate that, even before the fertility transition, couples in the working class were controlling their fertility by deliberate spacing.