Strategy-proofness versus efficiency in exchange economies: General domain properties and applications

We identify general domain properties that induce the non-existence of efficient, strategy-proof, and non-dictatorial rules in the 2-agent exchange economy. Applying these properties, we establish impossibility results in several restricted domains; for example, the intertemporal exchange problem (without saving technology) with preferences represented by the discounted sum of a temporal utility function, the risk sharing problem with risk averse expected utility preferences, the CES-preference domain, etc. None of the earlier studies applies to these examples. I am grateful to Professor William Thomson for helpful comments and suggestions. I also thank seminar participants in University of Rochester, John Duggan, and François Maniquet. I thank two anonymous referees for their detailed comments, which were very helpful in revising the earlier version. All remaining errors are mine.     

Strategy-proofness versus efficiency on restricted domains of exchange economies

 Strategy-proofness has been shown to be a strong property, particularly on large domains of preferences. We therefore examine the existence of strategy-proof and efficient solutions on restricted, 2-person domains of exchange economies. On the class of 2-person exchange economies in which agents have homothetic, strictly convex preferences we show, as Zhou (1991) did for a larger domain, that such a solution is necessarily dictatorial. As this proof requires preferences exhibiting high degrees of complementarity, our search continues to a class of linear preferences. Even on this “small” domain, the same negative result holds. These two results are extended to many superdomains, including Zhou’s. Received: 9 June 1995/Accepted: 8 January 1996     

Generic efficiency and collusion-proofness in exchange economies

The purpose of this paper is to study the kind of efficient allocations that can be achieved in exchange economies with asymmetric information, by means of a decentralized mechanism robust to coalitional, strategic deviations. To this end, we define a new strategic equilibrium concept – called strong collusion-proof contract – designed to characterize stable communication agreements in games with differential information against non-binding, self-enforcing and incentive compatible deviations by coalitions. We then construct a strategic market mechanism which, for quasi-linear economies, is such that its strong collusion-proof contracts generically induce the incentive compatible interim efficient allocations. Moreover, we show that these allocations can be achieved by strong collusion-proof contracts. We show that the internally consistent extension of the strong collusion-proof contracts generically yields the same set of efficient allocations. Received: 22 January 2001/Accepted: 15 April 2002 RID="*" ID="*"  This author was working at CORE when this paper was written. We wish to thank Claude d'Aspremont, David Martimort, Jean-Fran?ois Mertens and Heracles Polemarchakis for helpful comments on an earlier version. The usual disclaimer applies.     

Inefficiency of strategy-proof allocation mechanisms in pure exchange economies

In this paper I prove that in the standard model of 2×n (n2) pure exchange economies there is no allocation mechanism that is efficient, non-inversely-dictatorial, and strategy-proof. This strengthens two previous results on this subject by Hurwicz and by Dasgupta, Hammond, and Maskin.I thank Alvin Klevorick, William Thomson, and an anonymous referee of the journal for many helpful comments.     

The unique informational efficiency of the competitive mechanism in economies with production

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the informational requirements of resource allocation processes for convex production economies. First, we establish a lower bound of the message space of an informationally decentralized mechanism that realizes Pareto efficient allocations over the class of classical production economies. Then, it is shown that this lower bound is exactly the size of the message space of the competitive (Walrasian) mechanism, and thus the competitive mechanism is informationally efficient for general neoclassical production economies in the sense that it uses the smallest message space among the class of resource allocation processes that are informationally decentralized and realize Pareto optimal allocations. Further, it is shown that the competitive mechanism is the unique informationally efficient decentralized mechanism that realizes Pareto efficient and individually rational allocations. The results obtained in the paper may shed light on the socialist controversy between Mises-Hayek and Lange-Lerner.I wish to thank an anonymous referee and the participants at the 2001 Decentralization Conference for valuable comments. This is a reversion of an earlier paper entitled, “The Competitive Mechanism is the Unique Informationally Efficient Process for Economies with Production”. Financial support from the Texas Advanced Research Program as well as from the Bush Fellow Summer Research Program, the Private Enterprise Research Center, and the Lewis Faculty Fellowship at Texas A&M University is gratefully acknowledged.

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Production efficiency and constraints on profit taxation and profit distribution in economies with Ramsey taxation

In economies with Ramsey taxation, decreasing returns to scale, and private ownership, we show that second-best production efficiency is desirable when the grouping of private firms induced by the profit taxation power of the government is at least as fine as the grouping of firms induced by the institutional rules of profit distribution in the economy. The classic results of Dasgupta and Stiglitz (Rev Econ Stud 39:87–103, 1972) (of firm-specific profit taxation) and Diamond and Mirrlees (Am Econ Rev 61:8–27, 1971a; Am Econ Rev 61:261–278, 1971b) and Guesnerie (A contribution to the pure theory of taxation, 1995) (of uniform 100 % profit taxation) follow as special cases of our model. Moreover, second-best analysis shows that optimal profit taxation is a substitute for optimal intermediate input taxation. In smooth economies, proportional, lump-sum, and affine modes of profit taxation are equivalent. We rework Mirrlees (Rev Econ Stud 39:105–111, 1972) counterexample, which is posed in the context of a non-smooth economy, to show that second-best production efficiency continues to remain desirable under an affine structure of profit taxation.     

Strategy-proofness and the reluctance to make large lies: the case of weak orders

This article incorporates agents’ reluctance to make a large lie into an analysis. A social choice rule is D(k)-proof if the rule is nonmanipulable by false preferences within k distance from the sincere one, where k is a positive integer. If D(k)-proofness is not logically equivalent to strategy-proofness, then agents’ reluctance to make a large lie embodied in D(k)-proofness is effective to construct a nonmanipulable rule. This article considers weak orders as agents’ preferences. I prove that on the universal domain, D(k)-proofness is equivalent to strategy-proofness if and only if k ≥ m ? 1, where m is the number of alternatives. Moreover, I find a sufficient condition on a domain for the equivalence of D(1)-proofness and strategy-proofness.     

Strategy-proofness of social welfare functions: The use of the Kemeny distance between preference orderings

The Kemeny distance for preference orderings is used to determine individual rankings of social preferences. Based on this distance function, the strategy-proofness of social welfare functions is examined. Our main result is an impossibility theorem stating that no social welfare function can be strategy-proof, if some additional properties are required.The work on this paper initiated while Walter Bossert was a visitor at the CentER for Economic Research at Tilburg University. The hospitality and the support of CentER and its members are gratefully acknowledged. Ton Storcken's research was supported by a grant from the Cooperation Centre Tilburg and Eindhoven University. An earlier version of the paper was presented at the 1991 Canadian Economic Theory Meeting in Toronto. We thank the participants and especially Ingrid Peters-Fransen for comments. Substantial improvements are due to the suggestions of Bernard Monjardet and two referees.     

The three political economies of the welfare state

Le très long débat sur la nature et les causes de l'état providence n'a pas apporté de réponses définitives à l'une ou l'autre de ces questions. Cet article a trois buts: 1/ réintégrer le débat dans la tradition intellectuelle de l'économie politique pour mieux faire ressortir les principaux problèmes théoriques; 2/ spécifier les caractéristiques principales de l'état providence, les méthodes traditionnelles de mesure de l'état providence en termes de dépenses n'étant plus satisfaisantes; 3/'sociologiser' l'étude de l'état providence. La plupart des études sur le sujet ont été basées sur une conception linéaire du monde: plus ou moins de puissance, d'industrialisation ou de dépenses. Cet article considère que les états providences sont d'abord des groupes de régimes-types et que leur développement doit être expliqué de manière interactive.
The protracted debate on the welfare state has failed to produce conclusive answers as to either the nature or causes of welfare state development. This article has three aims: 1/ to reintegrate the debate into the intellectual tradition of political economy. This serves to put into sharper focus the principal theoretical questions involved; 2/ to specify what are the salient characteristics of welfare states. The conventional ways of measuring welfare states in terms of their expenditures will no longer do; 3/ to 'sociologize' the study of welfare states. Most studies have assumed a world of linearity: more or less power, industrialization or spending. This article insists that we understand welfare states as clusters of regime-types, and that their development must be explained interactively.     

Revising the research agenda on agricultural policy in developed market economies

Intervention by the state in agriculture is under increasing scrutiny world-wide as the financial cost to both consumers and taxpayers rises. This paper analyses the consequences for research of the contemporary and prospective revision of agricultural intervention, with attention directed to both direct and indirect farm support programmes. The discussion emphasizes the need for researchers to place their analyses within a more explicit conceptual framework of state-agriculture relations than in the past. A number of alternative frameworks are discussed including the previously dominant policy process model. Policy impact assessments emerge as the most researched area of state-agriculture relations, although recent research on the cost of agricultural support programmes is emphasized, together with projected effects of trade liberalization agreements. The paper concludes by drawing up a research agenda for the 1990s on agricultural intervention.     

Divergence of the world city system from national economies

This study shows that the position of cities in the world economy has diverged from national economies. Using data from 2016, we evaluate a network of 12,802 cities formed by the location decisions of 24,355 firms in terms of their point centrality, and show that the inter-city and inter-national systems have measurably decoupled, disrupting the previously-observed pattern in which the most powerful cities in the world city system were located in core countries, "mid-level" cities were in the semi-periphery,and the least powerful cities were in peripheral countries. Our findings support predictions that globalizing cities would diverge from national economies and that globalization would generate a new global geography that transects long-standing cleavages in the world system.     

Creating moral economies: Reciprocity and welfare entitlements on the Yukon mining frontier

The Alaska-Yukon mining frontier in the late nineteenth century witnessed the creation, and subsequent abandonment, of a moral economy in which all community members recognized an obligation to indiscriminately contribute to one another's material support. The case of the Yukon miners suggests that in the absence of bonds of kinship, coupled with the lack of any strongly corporate organization or effective authority, investments in indirect reciprocity can nonetheless provide the basis for the community-wide extension of interpersonal welfare entitlements. But reciprocity's capacity to sustain such an extension of entitlements also appears in this case to have been significantly constrained by demographic variables.     

Kairos economies in the post-Soviet transition period of Central Asia

There are times when entire populations of certain countries have had to readjust their lives and economic strategies as all of society is under transition. Post-Soviet Central Asia underwent this period after 1991. During times of transition, there are always people that tend to be able to make use of the new uncertainties, even at the risk of entering legal grey areas. Here new social groups emerge, ethnic origin becomes relevant and new kinship ties are made. These transformation periods are often short and provide limited opportunities for analysing the strategies of those pioneers that I call Kairos economists. They often act only in cooperation with residents of the border and with duty customs and security personnel. This article analyses this special economy with the help of case studies that have been observed during the transformation period from the Soviet to an independent Central Asia.     

Cooking up: Intestinal economies and the aesthetics of specular orality

ABSTRACT

This paper aims to make a psychoanalytical contribution to a cultural studies understanding of the logics — and fantasies — of commmodity consumption in the visual culture of late capitalism. Taking up the metaphor of the gut as a discriminating organ and of cooking as a textual production, we examine the relations between oral and ocular consumption, and between aliment and excrement, as expressed in two films from the 1980s which are centred around themes of food and money. Adrian Lynne's 9½ Weeks and Peter Greenaway's The Cook, The Thief, His Wife and her Lover employ quite different aesthetics and display contrasting inflections of what we call ‘the edible complex’. The first fantasizes wealth as enabling an unstructured excess of consumption that can only end in exhaustion; the second reaffirms the structured distinctions associated with ‘quality’ in a class-divided society where wealth alone does not secure status or legitimacy. From a feminist perspective, the male characters in each text are interesting examples of masculinities not organized around the phallus, but around anal and oral eroticisms and a more primitive oral morality.     

The politics of contraband: The honor economies of the warez scene

Lodged within the Internet’s increasingly commercialized webs there exists a thriving subculture that has developed an economy all its own. Specifically, a modern gift economy, a consistent and internally rational structure of actively anti-economic behavior that presents an interesting juxtaposition to our contemporary notions of economy. Based on an extended ethnography, this subculture is analyzed as a society ordered by agonistic play and gift-giving as economy. The contribution can best be described as adding ethnographic data from the post-industrial phase in Western economic development to the discussion of gift economies, a discourse that has usually dealt only with archaic communities.     

Neoliberal transitions: the Santiago general cemetery and the affective economies of counter-revolution

Anchored in the Santiago General Cemetery, this essay analyses the management of revolutionary memory under neoliberalism. Juxtaposing the gravesites of Salvador Allende and Víctor Jara, I theorise the gendered and racialised processes through which collective dreams for justice – and even radical politics themselves – come to be co-opted under neoliberal capitalism. If in Jara’s grave we see the state performing the part of the hyper-masculine disciplinarian father, I argue, in Allende’s grave we witness the state as the begrudgingly accepting father, ready to take in the repentant children back into the nation, in exchange for obedience. Finally, I turn to alternative memorialisation practices performed by the nation’s discontents, and namely ongoing struggles for collective self-determination and decolonisation. Ultimately, I situate critiques of neoliberalism in Chile in dialogue with intersectional queer and transnational feminist scholarship on the seductive logics of neoliberalism – and emergent forms of justice that appear just beyond its purview.     

Effect of ageing on the efficacy efficiency of TUVRP

Introduction: To evaluate the effect of ageing on the efficacy of transurethral vaporization resection of the prostate (TUVRP). Methods: The clinical outcomes of 285 patients treated by TUVRP were retrospectively analyzed. Patients were divided into three groups by age, Group A with 91 patients less than ≤70 years of age, Group B with 127 patients from 71 to 79 years of age, and Group C with 67 patients greater than ≥80 years of age. Results: Prostate volume was 53.1?±?24.1?ml in Group A, 67.8?±?39.7?ml in Group B and 60.0?±?43.9?ml in Group C (p < 0.001). More co-existent systemic diseases were identified in Group C than in the other two groups (p < 0.001). American Society of Anesthesiologists (ASA) grade increased with age (p < 0.001). Urological comorbidities associated with BPH, operating time, IPSS score, and QOL index were not different among the three groups. A significant difference was observed in before and after surgery IPSS score, QOL index, and maximum urinary flow rate (Qmax), in all three groups (p < 0.05). Post-operative Qmax decreased with age (p < 0.05). Conclusion: TUVRP was safe and effective for the patients greater than 80 years of age, similarly to younger patients. Advanced aged was not a contraindication for surgery, and did not increase the difficulty of the procedure.     

Social stratification in transitional economies: property rights and the structure of markets

In transitions from state socialism, property rights are re-allocated to organizations and groups, creating new markets and new forms of economic enterprise that reshape the stratification order. A generation of research has estimated individual-level outcomes with income equations and mobility models, relying on broad assumptions about economic change. We redirect attention to the process of economic change that structures emerging markets. The process varies across market sectors, depending on the entity that is granted rights formerly exercised by state organs, and on the combination of rights they are granted. The transformation of three sectors in China—agriculture, steel manufacturing, and real estate—shows how different allocations of property rights alter the stratification order in strikingly different ways. Historical analysis of the evolution of markets and enterprises integrates insights from economic sociology into research on social stratification, providing a structural perspective on transitions from state socialism.     

Characterization of self-selective social choice functions on the tops-only domain

Self-selectivity is a new kind of consistency pertaining to social choice rules. It deals with the problem of whether a social choice rule selects itself from among other rival such rules when a society is also to choose the choice rule that it will employ in making its choice from a given set of alternatives. Koray [3] shows that a neutral and unanimous social choice function is universally self-selective if and only if it is dictatorial. In this paper, we confine the available social choice functions to the tops-only domain and examine whether such restriction allow us to escape the dictatoriality result. A neutral, unanimous, and tops-only social choice function, however, turns out to be self-selective relative to the tops-only domain if and only if it is top-monotonic, and thus again dictatorial. Received: 8 October 2001/Accepted: 4 June 2002