A tractable model of process fairness under risk

This paper proposes a social utility model of individual preferences for process fairness that complements the Fehr–Schmidt model for outcome fairness. The model assumes that the outcome generating process rather than the actual outcomes influences fairness perceptions, and that process fairness is evaluated through comparison of expected payoffs. The process model successfully predicts data from bargaining games involving risky payoffs that neither outcome-based nor reciprocity models can explain. In a theoretical application, Machina’s parental example for non-expected utility in a distributional problem (Machina’s Mom) is analyzed by incorporating individual level process fairness preferences under expected utility.     

Libertarian collective decision-making: A new framework

A model of collective decision-making is presented which enables us to analyze the allocation of individual rights and liberties. The model broadens the traditional social choice framework. In social choice theory it is usually assumed that individuals have preferences over a set of feasible alternatives and that society reaches a decision on the basis of those preferences only. In the model presented in this paper, decision procedures do not only take information about individual preferences as input, but also information about individual freedom. The specific decision procedures we present and analyze can be characterized as libertarian.This paper was written while I was a visitor at the University of California, Riverside. The visit was made possible by financial support of the Netherlands Organization of Scientific Research (NWO). I am extremely grateful to Prasanta Pattanaik for many stimulating discussions on the subject. For helpful comments I also thank Ad van Deemen, Grahame Lock, Huib Pellikaan and Marcel Wissenburg. Finally, I express my thanks to Wulf Gaertner and two anonymous referees.     

A self-interest analysis of justice and tax compliance: How distributive justice moderates the effect of outcome favorability

Compliance with tax authorities has been studied mainly in the fields of economics and psychology. The focus has respectively been on self-interest motives and justice concerns in tax compliance. We argue that both concerns are less divergent than is often thought. Specifically, we studied the moderating role of distributive justice on the relationship between outcome favorability and tax compliance in two cross-sectional surveys. It is generally believed that favorable outcomes increase compliance because they decrease what can be gained from non-compliance. The present research addresses the role of distributive justice in this process. Since people believe that distributive fairness guarantees their long-term outcomes, favorable present outcomes now imply favorable future outcomes and unfavorable present outcomes now imply unfavorable future outcomes. Thus, we expected fair outcomes to result in a strong relationship between outcome favorability and compliance. On the basis that unfair outcomes are believed to result from chance, outcome favorability should have a weaker relationship with compliance when outcomes are unfair. Even when controlling for other variables, this prediction was supported by both studies.     

Toward a theory of choice: Socially embedded preference construction

We present a boundedly rational model of choice that makes room for individual values and social influences in a process of preference construction. It takes from the subjective expected utility model the notion that people assess their options in terms of expected outcomes, referenced to personal values, but it presumes that individuals assess sharply truncated lists of relevant options, outcomes and values and apply a classification logic rather than a calculative one. Such a model is consistent with the nature of evolved human cognitive abilities. The model treats cognitive heuristics and various forms of social influence as determinants of selection of the truncated lists and it treats moral norms as classification rules activated when certain actions and outcomes become salient. The model has implications for understanding how political rhetoric affects individual and social preferences and how “hot cognitions” fit into human choice and for developing improved methods of collective decision making.     

The Banks Set in Infinite Spaces

I provide a definition of the Banks set, or set of sophisticated voting outcomes, over an infinite policy space and when individual preferences are weak. I also show that the Banks set is a subset of one definition of the uncovered set, but not another. The interpretation of the Banks set in this setting differs from Banks’s original interpretation in the implicit role of the agenda setter. In addition, a characterization of the Banks set is provided for a three-player game of distributive politics. In this special setting, the Banks set and all definitions of the uncovered set have full measure over the space of alternatives.     

Strategy-proof resolute social choice correspondences

We qualify a social choice correspondence as resolute when its set valued outcomes are interpreted as mutually compatible alternatives which are altogether chosen. We refer to such sets as “committees” and analyze the manipulability of resolute social choice correspondences which pick fixed size committees. When the domain of preferences over committees is unrestricted, the Gibbard–Satterthwaite theorem—naturally—applies. We show that in case we wish to “reasonably” relate preferences over committees to preferences over committee members, there is no domain restriction which allows escaping Gibbard–Satterthwaite type of impossibilities. We also consider a more general model where the range of the social choice rule is determined by imposing a lower and an upper bound on the cardinalities of the committees. The results are again of the Gibbard–Satterthwaite taste, though under more restrictive extension axioms.     

Distributive Justice in the Household

Abstract

We analyze the theoretical basis on which wives and husbands evaluate the fairness of the division of household labor. Using distributive justice theory, we argue that evaluations are based on beliefs about equality and equity rules and social comparisons. We developed a number of formal models to account for evaluations of housework fairness and compare these with data from the 1987 National Survey of Families and Households. We find that husbands' evaluations of fairness of the division of household labor are based on more traditional gender-based division of labor as their comparisons tend to be based on comparisons to other men's participation in housework. In contrast, wives' evaluations are based on both gender role norms and the justice principle of marital equality, as they tend to be based on comparisons between their spouse and themselves.     

Nash Implementation with Lottery Mechanisms

Consider the problem of exact Nash Implementation of social choice correspondences. Define a lottery mechanism as a mechanism in which the planner can randomize on alternatives out of equilibrium while pure alternatives are always chosen in equilibrium. When preferences over alternatives are strict, we show that Maskin monotonicity (Maskin in Rev Econ stud 66: 23–38, 1999) is both necessary and sufficient for a social choice correspondence to be Nash implementable. We discuss how to relax the assumption of strict preferences. Next, we examine social choice correspondences with private components. Finally, we apply our method to the issue of voluntary implementation (Jackon and Palfrey in J Econ Theory 98: 1–25, 2001).I thank Toyo Sakai for his comments on a previous draft. I also thank two anonymous referees and an editor of this journal for helpful comments that improved this paper. A previous version circulated as “A note on Maskin monotonicity”. After the results presented here were obtained, I became aware of a new unpublished paper by Benoit and Ok (2004). The result of Theorem 2 and the discussion that follows is partially similar to their Theorem 1.     

Rights and the liberal paradoxes

Traditional social choice theory does not distinguish between the choices and the preferences of an individual. However, it is often rational for an individual to make choices that do not follow his preferences, e.g. when he makes compromises with other individuals. A social choice format is introduced with separate representations for choice and preference. It is shown how different types of rights and other legal positions can be expressed in this format. Definitions are given of what it means for rights to be compatible and for a set of rights to be respected. Further, it is shown that much weaker (and fully plausible) conditions are needed to avoid Sen's paradox (the impossibility of a Paretian liberal) in this social choice format than in a traditional format that does not distinguish between choices and preferences. As an example of this, Sen's paradox can be avoided if each individual, ceteris paribus, prefers that her choices be respected in matters that belong to her own personal sphere.An earlier version of this paper has been discussed at a Swedish-English Symposium on Rights and Rationality. I would like to thank the participants, Peter Gärdenfors, William Hart, Stig Kanger, David Kelsey, Prasanta Pattanaik, and Robert Sugden for valuable comments.     

A fundamental structure of strategy-proof social choice correspondences with restricted preferences over alternatives

I prove that under each strategy-proof and unanimous social choice correspondence, there is at least one agent who is decisive. Because the result is established on a weak requirement on preferences over sets, the existence of a decisive agent is an underlying feature of most strategy-proof and unanimous social choice correspondences. Moreover, I consider a restriction on the space of preferences over alternatives. I prove that circular sets of preferences over alternatives are sufficient for the existence of a decisive agent.     

Identification of domain restrictions over which acyclic, continuous-valued, and positive responsive social choice rules operate

We consider a social choice problem in various economic environments consisting of n individuals, 4≤n<+∞, each of which is supposed to have classical preferences. A social choice rule is a function associating with each profile of individual preferences a social preference that is assumed to be complete, continuous and acyclic over the alternatives set. The class of social choice rules we deal with is supposed to satisfy the two conditions; binary independence and positive responsiveness. A new domain restriction for the social choice rules is proposed and called the classical domain that is weaker than the free triple domain and holds for almost all economic environments such as economies with private and/or public goods. In this paper we explore what type of classical domain that admits at least one social choice rule satisfying the mentioned conditions to well operate over the domain. The results we obtained are very negative: For any classical domain admitting at least one social choice rule to well operate, the domain consists only of just one profile.     

Quasi-decisiveness, quasi-ultrafilter, and social quasi-orderings

The aim of the present paper is to provide an axiomatic analysis of incomplete social judgments. In particular, we clarify the underlying power structure of Arrovian collective choice rules when social preferences are allowed to be incomplete. We propose the concept of quasi-decisiveness and investigate the properties of the collection of quasi-decisive sets associated with an Arrovian collective choice rule. In the course of this, we offer a series of applications.     

The structure of fuzzy preferences: Social choice implications

It has been shown that, with an alternative factorization of fuzzy weak preferences into symmetric and antisymmetric components, one can prove a fuzzy analogue of Arrow's Impossibility Theorem even when the transitivity requirements on individual and social preferences are very weak. It is demonstrated here that the use of this specification of strict preference, however, requires preferences to also be strongly connected. In the absence of strong connectedness, another factorization of fuzzy weak preferences is indicated, for which nondictatorial fuzzy aggregation rules satisfying the weak transitivity requirement can still be found. On the other hand, if strong connectedness is assumed, the fuzzy version of Arrow's Theorem still holds for a variety of weak preference factorizations, even if the transitivity condition is weakened to its absolute minimum. Since Arrow's Impossibility Theorem appeared nearly half a century ago, researchers have been attempting to avoid Arrow's negative result by relaxing various of his original assumptions. One approach has been to allow preferences – those of individuals and society or just those of society alone – to be “fuzzy.” In particular, Dutta [4] has shown that, to a limited extent, one can avoid the impossibility result (or, more precisely, the dictatorship result) by using fuzzy preferences, employing a particularly weak version of transitivity among the many plausible (but still distinct) definitions of transitivity that are available for fuzzy preferences. Another aspect of exact preferences for which the extension to the more general realm of fuzzy preferences is ambiguous is the factorization of a weak preference relation into a symmetric component (indifference) and an antisymmetric component (strict preference). There are several ways to do this for fuzzy weak preferences, all of them equivalent to the traditional factorization in the special case when preferences are exact, but quite different from each other when preferences are fuzzy (see, for example, [3]). A recent paper in this journal [1], by A. Banerjee, argues that the choice of definitions for indifference and strict preference, given a fuzzy weak preference, can also have “Arrovian” implications. In particular, [1] claims that Dutta's version of strict preference presents certain intuitive difficulties and recommends a different version, with its own axiomatic derivation, for which the dictatorship results reappear even with Dutta's weak version of transitivity. However, the conditions used to derive [1]'s version of strict preference imply a restriction on how fuzzy the original weak preference can be, namely, that the fuzzy weak preference relation must be strongly connected. Without this restriction, I will show that the rest of [1]'s conditions imply yet a third version of strict preference, for which Dutta's possibility result under weak transitivity still holds. On the other hand, if one accepts the strong connectedness required in order for it to be valid, I show that [1]'s dictatorship theorem can in fact be strengthened to cover any version of transitivity for fuzzy preferences, no matter how weak, and further, that this dictatorship result holds for any “regular” formulation of strict preference, including the one originally used by Dutta. Received: 13 May 1996 / Accepted: 13 January 1997     

DIRECT TESTS OF INDIVIDUAL PREFERENCES FOR EFFICIENCY AND EQUITY

Departures from “economic man” behavior in many games in which fairness is a salient characteristic are now well documented in the experimental economics literature. These data have inspired the development of models of social preferences that assume agents have preferences for equity and efficiency as well as their own material payoffs. Empirical failure of the economic man model comes from experiments that provide direct tests of its distinguishing characteristic: indifference to the payoffs of others. This paper reports an experiment that subjects popular social preferences models to the same type of empirical challenge. We report direct tests of the distinguishing characteristics of these models: preference for allocations that have higher efficiency and greater equity. (JEL A12, A13, B49, C70, C91, D63)     

Need to know vs. need to share: information technology and the intersecting work of police,fire and paramedics

Emergency preparedness concerns over inadequate emergency interoperability among police, fire and emergency medical services (EMS) have led to the adoption of shared information technologies. Using a social worlds/arenas framework, I ethnographically study police, fire and EMS, as ‘users’ of technology, to understand how they interact with their technologies, and the ways in which their respective organizational contexts, cultures and practices shape technological functioning and collaborative action. From this analysis, I uncover social world contexts (ideologies) and individual actions (social legitimation and hierarchy of credibility) that alter technological functioning and create impediments to emergency interoperability. I further highlight an important ideological disconnect between the design and in-situ application of emergency technologies. I conclude by discussing the extent to which policies and technological innovations cannot, in and of themselves, address emergency preparedness concerns.     

On strategy-proof social choice under categorization

I consider social choice problems such that (i) the set of alternatives can be partitioned into categories based on a prominent and objective feature and (ii) agents have strict preferences over the alternatives. Main results are characterizations of the structure of the strategy-proof social choice functions. I prove that each social choice function is strategy-proof if and only if it is decomposable into “small” strategy-proof social choice functions; one of them chooses one category and each of the others chooses one alternative from a category.     

The common will

This paper discusses the formation of a common will among a group of people from two separate points of view: that of social choice theory and that of discourse ethics. The paper evaluates the formation of a common will by “silent” mechanisms for aggregating individual wishes and preferences, traditionally the domain of social choice theory, from a procedural perspective. I will consider—and answer in the negative—the question of whether or not there exists a mechanism for aggregating individual preferences that is perfectly reflective—in the sense that it can be applied recursively in order to justify or legitimate its own application. I will then consider discourse ethics from a consequentialist standpoint—rather than the traditional, process-oriented perspective from which it usually advanced and defended—and show that its insistence on dialogue as a means for the formation of a common will is based on underlying assumptions about the nature of preferences—such as the discussability of tastes and the malleability of time scales—which run counter to the view of preferences normally associated with standard economic theory. I conclude that, although neither approach to the formation of a common will fares well by the standards normally used to justify the other, proponents of either approach have much to learn from a dialogue with proponents of the other.     

Social threshold aggregations

A problem of axiomatic construction of a social decision function is studied for the case when individual opinions of agents are given as m-graded preferences with arbitrary integer m ≥ 3. It is shown that the only rule satisfying the introduced axioms of Pairwise Compensation, Pareto Domination and Noncompensatory Threshold and Contraction is the threshold rule.     

Alternate Definitions of the Uncovered Set and Their Implications

Different definitions of the uncovered set are commonly, and often interchangeably, used in the literature. If we assume individual preferences are strict over all alternatives, these definitions are equivalent. However, if one or more voters are indifferent between alternatives these definitions may not yield the same uncovered set. This note examines how these definitions differ in a distributive setting, where each voter can be indifferent between any number of alternatives. I show that, defined one way, the uncovered set is equal to the set of Pareto allocations that give over half the voters a strictly positive payoff, while alternate definitions yield an uncovered set that is equal to the entire Pareto set. These results highlight a small error in Epstein (Soc Choice Welf 15, 81–93, 1998) in which the author characterizes the uncovered set for a different definition of covering than claimed.     

On relative egalitarianism

We reconsider the problem of aggregating individual preference orderings into a single social ordering when alternatives are lotteries and individual preferences are of the von Neumann–Morgenstern type. Relative egalitarianism ranks alternatives by applying the leximin ordering to the distributions of 0–1 normalized utilities they generate. We propose an axiomatic characterization of this aggregation rule.